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Preface
The contributions to this book are based on presentations at a two-day
conference held at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Poli-
cy in Munich on 12 and 13 December 2019. The revised papers consist of
five “general” contributions and nine “case studies” covering Belgium,
Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Spain,
France and Estonia.
We would like to thank the authors for taking part in our project and
their great commitment. Our meeting in Munich was not only a very fruit-
ful but also a very enjoyable event. We look back to it now with even more
fond memories, in times in which Europe is caught in the midst of a
raging pandemic and measures like lockdowns and travel restrictions are
making personal encounters impossible.
We would particularly like to thank Fritz Thyssen Stiftung for their gen-
erous financial support of our conference. We are also grateful for the help
from many colleagues at our Institute with various matters regarding orga-
nisation and publication. Last but not least, we would like to thank
Christina McAllister for her proofreading and corrections.
Munich, November 2020 Ulrich Becker
 Olga Chesalina
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Chapter 1
Social Law 4.0: Challenges and Opportunities in Social
Protection
Ulrich Becker and Olga Chesalina
Starting Points
Digitalisation, Industrial Relations and Social Protection
Digitalisation has a strong impact on our societies. It intensifies the soci-
etal process of individualisation in general, and it influences a specific type
of social relationships, namely industrial relations, in particular. Those re-
lations are already changing. The term “non-standard work” which is be-
ing used both by the ILO1 and the OECD2 indicates such changes – al-
though the main part of the workforce is still working under full-time
labour contracts,3 and although it is questionable whether temporary con-
tracts and part-time work can be regarded as non-standard at all as they
have not only formed part of the labour markets for a long time, but also
do not pose any difficulties with a view to identifying a legal relationship
between employees and employers which follows the rules of labour law
and leads to the inclusion in traditional social security systems. Neverthe-
less, there is no doubt that new forms of work are arising, both within in-
dustrial relations as well as outside, especially in the form of self-employ-
ment. The keywords here are short-term labour contracts and labour con-
tracts with a marginal number of working hours (like mini-jobs, zero-
hours contracts, on-call work and other forms of casual work), hybrid and
I.
1.
1 International Labour Organization, Non-Standard Forms of Employment, 2020,
https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/non-standard-employment/lang--en/index.htm.
Accessed 14 September 2020.
2 Non-Standard Work, Job Polarisation and Inequality, in: OECD, It Together: Why
Less Inequality Benefits All, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2015, pp. 135-208, https://w
ww.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all_97
89264235120-en. Accessed 14 September 2020.
3 See also Schoukens, Paul/Barrio, Alberto, The Changing Concept of Work: When
does Typical Work Become Atypical?, in: European Labour Law Journal, 8 (2017)
4, pp. 1-28, doi:10.1177/2031952517743871.
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multiple employment, proliferation of self-employment and bogus self-em-
ployment, triangular relationships with more than one person on the em-
ployees’ or employers’ side (like employee-sharing or temporary agency
work). The outcome is an increasingly fragmented labour market, a rise in
precarious and informal work, a shifting of risks from the employer to the
employee, and a growing grey zone between dependent employment and
self-employment.
Digitalisation is a catalyst for respective changes. It allows for new ways
of communication, for more flexibility and more mobility; it enhances in-
formality, and it enforces globalisation as territorial boundaries of human
interactions lose their relevance. New employment patterns are emerging,
and the most prominent one is platform work including crowdwork4 and
work on demand via apps5.
Those changes in the labour market pose, in turn, challenges to social
protection, in particular if social protection is organised via traditional
forms of social security. Social security aims at protecting against the vicis-
situdes of life, at securing against social risks. It is, through its specific
function, closely linked to societal structures. These structures are current-
ly experiencing changes for two other reasons: the ageing of our societies
leads to a change in the age structure of populations; individualisation,
pluralisation and shifts of role models lead to a change of household struc-
tures. Together with changing labour markets, these different processes
make it necessary to adapt the existing social security systems. While this
necessity is, generally speaking, nothing new and rather forms a typical fea-
ture of institutions that are established in order to react to societal needs,
the multitude of ongoing changes and their magnitude make the reform-
4 Crowdwork is a new form of employment that “uses an online platform to enable
organisations or individuals to access an indefinite and unknown group of other
organisations or individuals to solve specific problems or to provide specific ser-
vices or products in exchange for payment”, see: Eurofound, New Forms of Em-
ployment, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 2015,
doi:10.2806/937385, https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_public
ation/field_ef_document/ef1461en.pdf. Accessed 14 September 2020.
5 In the case of work on demand via apps the execution of specific services, such as
transport, cleaning and running errands etc. is offered to an indefinite number of
individuals by means of electronic platforms (app companies), see: De Stefano, Va-
lerio, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork
and Labour Protection in the “Gig-Economy”, in: Conditions of Work and Em-
ployment Series, International Labour Office, Geneva, 71 (2016), https://www.ilo.o
rg/travail/whatwedo/publications/WCMS_443267/lang--en/index.htm. Accessed 14
September 2020.
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ing of social security a particularly difficult task. Necessary reforms con-
cern all relevant features of social security, namely coverage, the definition
of an appropriate level of benefits, and the financing.6
Core Questions
This project concentrates on the two most important questions in the con-
text of social protection in a digitalised world, and on the two most urgent
problems raised by the consequences of digitalisation for the labour mar-
ket: (a) access to social protection and (b) its future financing.
Access to Social Protection
Social security in its traditional form is based on two binary distinctions at
two different levels. The first concerns the distinction between economic
and non-economic activities. Social insurance as a cornerstone of both so-
cial security and social protection is, in a certain way, a consequence of the
former activities: it covers those who are economically active, which also
allows for its financing through contributions – independent of whether
social insurance is being organised in the shape of the so-called Bismarck-
ian insurance scheme or following the Beveridgean model. It is a long-
standing debate whether social protection should overcome this basic bi-
nary distinction or not, and this debate always pops up when changes on
the labour markets occur – which is why it is no surprise that it is on the
agenda again in these times of digitalisation. There are good reasons in
favour of decoupling social protection from economic activities, although
better reasons are still against it. In the end, it is a question of how to or-
ganise the coexistence of people in a stable, freedom-based political com-
munity. First, if we want to base our communities on individual freedoms
and solidarity, and if we want to keep these fundaments, we will have to
organise our communities accordingly; in this context, it is advisable to
put emphasis on self-responsibility and to establish institutions which re-
2.
a)
6 See Becker, Ulrich, New Forms of Social Security? A Comment on Needs and Op-
tions for Reform in a National and Supranational Perspective, in: Pichrt, Jan/
Koldinská, Kristina (eds.), Labour Law and Social Protection in a Globalized
World: Changing Realities in Selected Areas of Law and Policy, Alphen aan den
Rijn: Wolters Kluwer 2018, pp. 205-211.
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mind us that this is one basis of our life together. Second, companies
should not be excluded from assuming social responsibility. They profit
from market economies, and they thus must also take on their share of re-
sponsibility – which means that they should have the obligation to finan-
cially support institutions which are necessary in order to reconcile indi-
vidual freedom and markets with human dignity and participation in an
open society.
It is not necessary to go further into this debate here as our project takes
into account the interdependencies between both binary distinctions, but
concentrates at least in its starting points on the second binary distinction
at a second level, i.e. a rather operational one. Traditional social protection
in the form of social security as it still forms a fundament of all European
welfare states, is not only based on economic activities, but also draws a
distinction between dependent and independent work. The reason for this
categorical distinction at the level of constructing concrete schemes is root-
ed in the 19th century and the times of industrialisation. Dependent work
became a new form of economic activity, and those who had to rely on it
became those in need of social protection as the traditional societal safety
nets lost their protective role.
Nowadays, new forms of work are those brought about by the digitalisa-
tion of the labour market. Most welfare states are, for good reasons, con-
vinced that “digital workers” are also in need of social protection. As with
all forms of “new” economic activities, there are two different strategies of
how to deal with them and how to include them into existing social securi-
ty systems.7 The first is a “doctrinal” solution: every distinction between
dependent and independent work has to be based on a respective legal
term (like “employed earner”, or “Beschäftigung”), and the interpretation
of this term as exercised by administrative authorities and courts might be
flexible enough in order to cover “new forms” of work. The second solu-
tion is a political one that may be pursued in two different ways: a legisla-
tor can try to define new categories of persons and to make them part of
an existing social protection system, be it one for dependent workers, be it
one for the self-employed; or it can set up a new social protection system
for a newly defined group – which will in most cases be an (re-)assemblage
7 For more details Becker, Ulrich, Die soziale Sicherung Selbständiger in Europa, in:
Zeitschrift für europäisches Sozial‑ und Arbeitsrecht (ZESAR), (2018) 8, pp. 307,
315 et seq.
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of already well-known social security tools.8 All this is anything but new:
in many countries, so-called “homeworkers” are a legally defined group of
economically active persons explicitly covered by social protection – not so
much as a reaction to changes in the labour market but as a reaction to a
too narrow definition of employed earners in the initial phase of social in-
surances. It is not by chance that a modernised understanding of home-
workers may also cover a vast range of new digital work. Yet, the extent to
which solutions actually open up possibilities in order to rearrange access
to social protection, and what solutions are appropriate, depends very
much on the institutional pathways that exist in a given country. If, for ex-
ample, social protection for the self-employed does not exist or is of a
rather rudimentary nature, this naturally restricts options for including
digital workers into social protection. In many countries, the weaknesses
and gaps in social protection for the self-employed have become visible
through the COVID-19 crisis, which functions like a magnifying glass in
this respect.9 That efforts have to be taken to improve access to social pro-
tection is obvious. Within the EU, a respective (political) obligation fol-
lows from the Council Recommendation on access to social protection for
workers and the self-employed of 8 November 201910 (see also below, Sec-
tion II.4.) according to which member states are recommended to “provide
access to adequate social protection to all workers and self-employed per-
sons” (1.1.) – in the sense of not only formal, but also effective coverage
(pt. 9. of the Recommendation).
Financing of Social Protection
Financing social protection has already become a major challenge due to
demographic processes such as the aging of our societies. Digitalisation
will pose additional problems. This does not hold true in the first place be-
b)
8 Chesalina, Olga, Extending Social Security Schemes for “Non-Employees”: A
Comparative Perspective, in: Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Ar-
beits- und Sozialrecht, (2020) 1, pp. 3-12.
9 See Becker, Ulrich/He, Linxin/Hohnerlein, Eva Maria/Seemann, Anika/Wilman, Niko-
la, Protecting Livelihoods in the COVID-19 Crisis: Legal Comparison of Mea-
sures to Maintain Employment, the Economy and Social Protection, MPISoc
Working Paper 7/2020, https://www.mpisoc.mpg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/data/
Sozialrecht/Publikationen/Schriftenreihen/Working_Papers_Law/MPISoc_WP_7
_2020_Corona_Livelihood_Nov.pdf. Accessed 6 November 2020.
10 OJ C 387/1, 15 November 2019.
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cause digital work is often seen as being rather “informal” – although it is
often being carried out without written contracts and formal registration.
Yet, this does not necessarily mean that the collection of contributions
would have to experience additional difficulties. Rather to the contrary: if
contributions were based on the revenue from the rendering of services, or
on the expenses for these revenues respectively, the underlying transactions
will already be existent in digital form and thus easily traceable. In this re-
gard, digitalisation also opens up opportunities for social protection – giv-
en that the relevant data will be made available: it enables, and it will also
urge, the administration involved to make use of digital technologies.
Nevertheless, digitalisation may lead to a reduction of social security
contributions as more economic activities will be performed in form of
self-employment and as employer’s contribution will be missing. This
hints to a well-known problem of social security regarding the self-em-
ployed: it is comparatively costly for the insured. As a consequence, state
subsidies may seem to be an unavoidable remedy, or else the level of social
protection will remain rather low.11 A general solution to these problems
is to open up new sources for financing. The most prominent example is
certainly the French general contribution (contribution sociale généralisée –
CSG).12 It is questionable, and has even been qualified differently by the
highest French and European courts, whether the CSG is a tax or a social
security contribution.13 In any case, it shifts financing into the direction of
taxes – which might be suitable for those branches of social security that
aim at providing a certain infrastructure such as health insurance, but also
leads back to the question of how to organise social security in general and
to the role of financial sources in particular.
If one wants to maintain a contributory financial basis of social security,
at least for a major part, other and more targeted solutions should be
found. There is an interesting example in Germany that comes from the
social insurance for artists (Künstlersozialversicherung) introduced by the
Artists’ Social Insurance Act14 in 1983. Artists and publicists have to pay
11 See for example Becker, ZESAR 2018 (fn. 7), pp. 307, 314.
12 See for the CSG and the contribution au remboursement de la dette sociale (CRDS)
information of the French Treasury, https://www.economie.gouv.fr/particuliers/c
ontribution-sociale-generalisee-csg. Accessed 7 November 2020.
13 See for a qualification as contribution: ECJ of 15 February 2000, C-169/98 (Com-
mission/France), ECR 2000, I-1049, recit. 34 et seq.; Cour de Cassation of 31 May
2012, 11-10,762; Conseil d´Etat of 27 July 2015, n° 334551. Arguing for a specific
tax Conseil Constitutionnel of 19 December 2000, Déc. n° 2000-437.
14 Act of 27 July 1981 (BGBl. I, 705).
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their own contributions which amount – like in other traditional insu-
rance schemes – to 50 percent of the overall financial sources of the insu-
rance system. For the other half, a third is paid from the state budget (as a
state subsidy). The remaining two-thirds have to be paid through a specific
fee or levy. This levy is imposed on the remunerations paid by a “mar-
keter” to the independent artists and publicists in a calendar year, irrespec-
tive of whether the recipient is insured under the Artists’ Social Insurance
Act or not. Of course, this legal construction led to the question whether
such an obligation of every marketer was in line with the constitution, in
particular with the right to equal treatment: why would marketers have to
pay for insurance, but others not, although the artists work independently?
In this respect, the German Federal Constitutional Court made the re-
markable statement15 that it would be inappropriate “to deny that artists
and publicists are in need of social protection and that marketers have a
social responsibility simply because there is no formal employer-employee
relationship”; it put emphasis on the fact that this relationship might be
the most important case of a “social responsibility” as a justification for the
obligation to contribute to a social insurance scheme which protects third
persons, but that it is not exclusive; more generally, it follows that laws
have to take social facts into account, that they should react to these facts
and establish institutions fitting the particularities of a given economic ac-
tivity “instead of making it a condition in advance that this form of exis-
tence be dissolved and transferred to a formal employment relationship”.16
Today, laws have to answer how to organise social protection for digital
workers. The reality of working conditions of many platform workers is
comparable to the case made by the German Federal Constitutional Court.
15 Decision of 8 April 1987, 2 BvR 909, 934, 935, 936, 938, 941, 942, 947/82, 64/83
and 142/84, BVerfGE 75, 108.
16 BVerfGE 75, 108, 159 et seq.: „Es würde die Eigenart künstlerischen und publizis-
tischen Schaffens verkennen und wäre daher sachwidrig, eine soziale
Schutzbedürftigkeit der Künstler und Publizisten und eine soziale Verantwor-
tung der Vermarkter ungeachtet dessen nur darum zu verneinen, weil rechtsförm-
lich kein Arbeitgeber-Arbeitnehmer-Verhältnis vorliegt. Denn dieses ist, wie
dargelegt, zwar der hauptsächliche und weithin typische, aber nicht der auss-
chließliche Fall einer sozialen Verantwortlichkeit, die die Heranziehung zu
fremdnützigen Sozialversicherungsbeiträgen rechtfertigt. Das Recht findet die
Eigenart der Existenzform als Künstler oder Publizist vor, die mit dem Sachgehalt
dieser Tätigkeit in Zusammenhang steht. Es ist dann sachgerecht, bestehender
sozialer Schutzbedürftigkeit in einer Weise Form und Gestalt zu geben, die dieser
Eigenart Rechnung trägt, anstatt vorab zur Bedingung zu machen, daß diese Exis-
tenzform sich auflöst und in ein förmliches Arbeitnehmerverhältnis übergeht.“
Chapter 1: Social Law 4.0
21
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002, am 02.12.2021, 16:03:17
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Platform providers can, and may be urged to, take over financial responsi-
bility as a consequence of their social responsibility. Under what condi-
tions that could and should be realised, and how to implement such an
obligation to pay social security contributions has to be discussed further.
In this context, the technical problems are of secondary importance. The
questions of how to impose which obligation and how to enforce it, must
first of all be answered from a legal perspective. And this answer becomes
especially challenging as many platform activities cross at least one nation-
al border. This is why coordination, and, to some degree, also harmonisa-
tion will be needed, both at the EU and the international level. That is one
reason why a potential remedy for the challenges to social protection in
the age of digitalisation must always take the transnational perspective into
account.
Aim of the Project and State of Research
Insights from Innovations in Social Protection
Our book undertakes an analysis of the impact of labour market changes
in the digital age on social security law and addresses the challenges to so-
cial security which arise through these changes by putting emphasis on
platform work. It seeks to examine innovations: solutions and mechanisms
for ensuring social security on the one hand, and those for financing social
security on the other. In this regard, different national approaches – ones
that have already been implemented (through legislation, collective agree-
ments or private actors) or are presently under discussion (in the literature
or draft laws) – are analysed in a comparative perspective. Although it is
first and foremost the task of states to adjust their social protection sys-
tems, transborder issues will – as stated above – become even more impor-
tant in the digital age. Therefore, we include the present and future role of
the European Union: on the one hand, new coordination problems may
arise; on the other, new forms of financing will also have an impact on the
basic freedoms and basic rights, and we will have to ask whether it is possi-
ble or necessary to opt for new regulatory approaches at European level.
The overall aim of the book is to provide new insights on what a “Social
Law 4.0” should look like. With respect to methods and the question of
how to find these insights, we base our analysis on a systematic legal com-
parison which takes account of the existing empirical (social science) evi-
dence, but also focus on case studies in order to give concrete and detailed
3.
a)
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examples of the different ways of adapting social security systems to the
present challenges.
Innovations in Research
Although research on the impact of digitalisation on industrial relations is
anything but new, contents and methods of our book are based on two in-
novative points.
First, we concentrate on a social law perspective. While labour law classifi-
cation, working conditions and labour law protection for platform work-
ers have already been the subject of numerous sociological, economic and
political studies17 and other legal publications,18 so far only few studies
b)
17 E.g. Digital Labour Platforms and the Future of Work: Towards Decent Work in
the Online World, International Labour Office – Geneva, ILO, 2018, https://www
.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_645337/lang--en/index.htm;
Employment and Working Conditions of Selected Types of Platform Work, Lux-
embourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018, https://www.eurofou
nd.europa.eu/publications/report/2018/employment-and-working-conditions-of-se
lected-types-of-platform-work; Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts,
Karolien/Smits, Ine/Hauben, Harald/Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/
Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivier, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the
Working Conditions of Platform Workers, VT/2018/032, Final Report, 13 March
2020, European Commission, 2020; Pesole, Annarosa/Urzí Brancati, Maria Cesira/
Fernández-Macías, Enrique/Biagi, Federico/González Vázquez, Ignacio, Platform
Workers in Europe, EUR 29275 EN, Publications Office of the European Union,
Luxembourg, 2018, ISBN 978-92-79-87996-8, doi:10.2760/742789, JRC112157,
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC112157/jrc112157_p
ubsy_platform_workers_in_europe_science_for_policy.pdf; Forde, Chris/Stuart,
Mark/Simon, Joyce/Oliver, Liz/Valizade, Danat/Alberti, Gabriella/Hardy, Kate/Trapp-
mann, Vera/Umney, Charles/Carson, Calum, The Social Protection of Workers in
the Platform Economy, Study for the EMPL Committee, European Union, Brus-
sels, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/614184/IP
OL_STU(2017)614184_EN.pdf. All accessed 14 September 2020.
18 Blanpain, Roger/Hendrickx, Frank/Waas, Bernd (eds.), New Forms of Employ-
ment in Europe, Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer 2016; Prassl, Jeremias, Hu-
mans as a Service, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018; Meil, Pamela/Kirov, Vas-
sil (eds.), Policy Implications of Virtual Work, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan 2017.
The chapter by Wynn, Michael/Paz-Fuchs, Amir, Flexicurity Outside the Employ-
ment Relationship? Re-engineering Social Security for the New Economy, in:
Westerveld, Mies/Olivier, Marius (eds.), Social Security Outside the Realm of the
Employment Contract” (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2018), focuses
“rather on changes in the labour market than on welfare institutions” (p. 32),
whereas we analyse the interrelationship between employment and social policy,
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and publications have been conducted on the social protection of platform
workers from a legal perspective.
Second, this book does not want to merely add another study to the al-
ready existing publications that reflect specific single aspects of social pro-
tection in the changing world of work19; rather, it takes a holistic approach
that systematises new insights concerning the future of social protection in
the digital age. As this approach is based on a legal comparison and in-
cludes transnational perspectives, our study is at the same time a contribu-
tion to the more general topic of how welfare states develop, and it sheds
light on a common European core of the concept of welfare state.
between labour law and social law from the social law perspective. The volume
Casale, Guiseppe/Treu, Tiziano (eds.), Transformation of Work. Challenges for
the Institutions and Social Actors (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer 2019),
addresses the changes affecting the world of work in national systems of labour
law and social security. The main research themes of this volume and our under-
taking overlap only insignificantly (e.g. concerning new forms of social security,
required interrelationship (closer link) between social security and employment
policies). The other six research themes of this volume – informal workers; mi-
grant workers; global trade and labour; organisation, productivity, well-being at
work; transnational collective agreements; the role of state and industrial rela-
tions – are mostly related to labour law and are not subject of our research
project. The book by Tiraboschi, Michele, Labour Law and Welfare Systems in an
Era of Demographic, Technological, and Environmental Changes, (Adapt Univer-
sity Press 2019) also focuses on labour law, in particular on the impact of the
“Fourth Industrial Revolution” in Italian labour law and policy, and addresses the
demographical challenges for welfare systems.
19 E.g. the contributions in: Pichrt, Jan/Koldinská, Kristina (eds.), Labour Law and
Social Protection in a Globalized World: Changing Realities in Selected Areas of
Law and Policy, Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer 2018, by: Hajdú, József,
Social Security and the Modern and Post-Modern Forms of Work, (pp. 191-203);
Laborde, Jean-Pierre, Social Security: A New Idea for the Twenty-First Century (pp.
183-190); Martin Štefko, Guaranteed Minimum Income for All? Task for the ILO”
(pp. 213-220) and Jorens, Yves, Migrant Workers and European Social Law: Of a
Respectable Age or Time for a Rebirth? (pp. 233-246). See also Schoukens, Paul/
Barrio, Alberto/Montebovi, Saskia, Social Protection of Non-Standard Workers: The
Case of Platform Work (pp. 227-258) and Stevens, Yves, Social Security and the
Platform Economy in Belgium: Dilemma and Paradox (pp. 259-286), both in: De-
volder, Bram (ed.), The Platform Economy. Unravelling the Legal Status of On-
line Intermediaries (Cambridge – Antwerp – Chicago: Intersentia, 2019).
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Structure and Contents
Background
The following chapters of this book start with a background paper on
“Platform Work: Critical Assessment of Empirical Findings and its Implications
for Social Security” (Olga Chesalina).
The main goal of this chapter is to find out implications for social secu-
rity from empirical findings and practical evidence. The author stresses
that careful attention must be paid when interpreting the figures and
trends from such empirical research on platform work due to its numerous
shortcomings. The chapter discusses the novelty of platform work in com-
parison to other forms of non-standard employment and the specifics of
the business model of online labour platforms, the motivation of platform
workers and their access to social protection, as well as dependence pat-
terns. In the author’s opinion, the category of financial dependence on
platform work as explored in empirical studies is not suitable for justifying
the classification of platform workers as employees and for justifying a so-
cial responsibility of platforms for workers; it is only a socio-economic
characteristic of platform workers that reflects labour fragmentation,
which is characteristic also of other types of non-standard work. It con-
cludes that even if many challenges related to platform work are similar to
the challenges of non-standard employment, the heterogeneity of platform
workers and the fact that platform work is chiefly carried out as a side job
– which is not typical for self-employment – should be taken into account.
Numerous issues for future investigations are offered in the chapter (e.g.
concerning changes of the platform operator’s policy in relation to extend-
ing or reducing its social insurance responsibility; insurance schemes dedi-
cated to platform workers; research questions for interviews with platform
workers that can help to estimate and prevent fraud through the receipt of
social assistance benefits etc.).
Ensuring Social Security: Employment Status Classification and Innovative
Solutions
Access to social protection is related to a set of different conditions and to
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– the architecture of the existing social protection schemes and whether
they are employment-based like the traditional social insurance,
whether they include the self-employed, and if so, to what extent;
– the status of the worker, and in particular the assessment of the work
performed following the traditional distinction between the employed
and the self-employed, with special emphasis on the role of the courts;
– approaches concerning the employment status classification in labour,
social security and tax law used in the respective country;
– the introduction of either new forms of social protection or new ap-
proaches within the existing schemes.
Even if many countries have already undertaken social law reforms widen-
ing the access to social security for self-employed persons and non-standard
workers, there are still huge accessibility gaps20 and difficulties concerning
the calculation of social benefits, as social security systems had originally
been designed for standard labour relationships and are still linked to a
certain employment status. As dependent employment is associated with
social contributions, many employers deliberately misclassify workers.
With the emergence of platform work it has become more difficult to
clarify whether platform workers are employees or self-employed persons,
and whether the platform provider or the requester (client) fulfils any em-
ployer functions. Platforms describe themselves as an intermediary or a
market-place. The first decisions of national courts concerning the classifi-
cation of platform workers for labour and social law purposes have been
controversial. Whereas in many cases, for example in the case of Deliveroo
riders in Spain,21 the employee status was recognised, in other cases plat-
form workers were classified as self-employed persons22. Therefore, Chap-
ters 3 to 8 of this book also concern the employment status classification of
platform workers for labour and social law purposes. They analyse court
20 European Commission, Access to Social Protection for All Forms of Employment
– Assessing the Options for a Possible EU, Initiative Publications Office of the
European Union, Luxembourg, 2018, pp. 295 ff., http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.j
sp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=8067&furtherPubs=yes. Accessed 18 October
2020.
21 See for an overview on case law of different courts Beltrán de Heredia Ruiz, Ignasi,




22 Decision of the Labour Court of Second Instance of Munich of 4 December 2019
– 8 Sa146/19.
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decisions related to this subject, look at the outcomes of these decisions
and their relevance for social law issues, and examine whether the tradi-
tional criteria have undergone changes, or whether they have to be
changed in order to tackle the challenges of platform work.
Chapter 3 deals with “The Sharing Economy in Belgium: Status due to Tax-
ation or Non-Status?” (Yves Jorens). It describes a model introduced in 2016
which is based on separate fiscal and social regulations and a separate cate-
gory for certain providers within the sharing economy aimed to encourage
self-employment and to combat the grey economy. In 2018 the Belgian leg-
islator went one step further, providing instead of a reduced tax burden
rate a total tax and social security contribution exemption for income from
certain forms of gainful activities. The author addresses issues concerning
the nature of these activities and the transfer of certain forms of labour in-
to the sphere of spare-time work. Furthermore, problems arising from the
special treatment of these activities within the framework of Belgian social
security legislation are dealt with. The author reflects on the decision of
the Constitutional Court whether such a treatment can be objectively and
reasonably justified and articulates the need for a new vision of social secu-
rity that should “also be opened up for activities that do not or not always
follow the normal scope of employment”.23
In Chapter 4, the question “Is the Classification of Work Relationships Still
a Relevant Issue for Social Security?” is asked from “An Italian Point of View
in the Era of Platform Work” (Edoardo Ales). The chapter aims at “analysing
the connection between the classifications of work activities in labour law
and the protective statute they enjoy in social security”.24 It describes the
new approach of the Italian legislator based on a political assessment of the
weaknesses of specific groups of workers (which is not necessarily associat-
ed with assessing the social needs of a certain category of workers), taking
into account the new forms of integration into the organisation. The au-
thor investigates the new category of “hetero-organised” collaborations and
riders as bright examples of a continuous tendency to move away from a
“tailor-made protective statute” towards “a new frontier of subordination”.
He describes different modalities of platform work in Italian legislation:
subordinate work (smart working); hetero-organised collaboration and fi-
nally (false) autonomous work. The author identifies contradictions and
gaps concerning the social protection of “hetero-organised” collaborators
and autonomous riders; this means riders who are classified as au-
23 Chapter 3, Section IV, p. 96.
24 Chapter 4, Section I, p. 97.
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tonomous workers and entitled to a wage, set by collective agreements, but
who are simultaneously excluded from the scope of the general social insu-
rance scheme for employees as they fall within the scope of application of
the social insurance scheme for the self-employed.
Chapter 5 is entitled “Relationship between Employment Status and Scope
of Social Security Protection: The United Kingdom Example” (Philip Larkin).
The United Kingdom labour market has experienced the proliferation of
non-standard forms of employment, in particular “zero-hours” contracts
and “gig” work. The chapter examines the entitlement to social security
benefits in the modern UK labour market and analyses difficulties result-
ing from employment status (self-employment or non-standard employ-
ment in combination with an irregularity of earnings and their precarious
financial position) in the access to various social security benefits. Hereby,
the author pays particular attention to Universal Credit, but also includes
other benefits (e.g. Employment and Support Allowance). Furthermore,
the question is analysed of whether, and how, the Welfare Reform Act can
be made effective through legislative and technological reform. The author
suggests that “the optimum solution to maintaining regular and stable pay-
ments of Universal Credit to gig workers in particular also lies in technolo-
gy, with some form of integration of revenue authorities and digital plat-
form software, so that gig workers have taxes automatically deducted from
their earnings, relieving them of the burden of calculating this for them-
selves, and these calculations could be reported to the Department for
Work and Pensions”.25
Chapter 6 on “Extending Social Insurance Schemes to ‘Non-Employees’: The
Dutch Example” (Gijsbert Vonk) presents a broad overview of the Nether-
lands’ state of protection of non-standard employees and self-employed
persons under social security law. The contribution is devoted to new ap-
proaches which have been taken into consideration in order to fill protec-
tive gaps for these persons. The author provides an analysis of policy objec-
tives, legislative change and proposals for change made by successive gov-
ernments in the Netherlands and by official advisory agencies since 2010
and an overview of lessons that may (not) be learned from the Dutch expe-
rience.
Chapter 7 reports on “Collective Agreements and Social Security Protection
for Non-Standard Workers and Particularly for Platform Workers: The Danish
Experience” (Natalie Videbæk Munkholm). It shows the implications of the
uncertain employment status of non-standard workers on access to social
25 Chapter 5, Section VII, pp. 145 et seq.
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protection with special attention on platform workers. Denmark is famous
for the important role of collective agreements in the provision of addi-
tional social benefits and extending the scope of social protection. Den-
mark was the first country where, in 2018, a collective agreement for plat-
form workers was concluded as a pilot project.26 The contribution analyses
the role of the social partners in developing the regulatory measures in tri-
partite negotiations and in negotiating supplementary social security mea-
sures in collective agreements for non-standard workers. Therefore, the au-
thor discusses the role of the social partners and demonstrates the
strengths and weaknesses of the Danish experiences of providing platform
workers with access to the social security systems. Special emphasis is put
on the reform of the unemployment insurance system in 2017, changing
this system to a more universal approach by taking into account income
from all types of work. The author concludes that even if platform com-
panies represent a new form of company and the employment status of
these workers is often uncertain, these persons are still in need of social se-
curity.
Chapter 8 “Looking for the (Fictitious) Employer – Umbrella Companies:
The Swedish Example” (Annamaria Westregård) provides an analysis of social
security implications of the Swedish umbrella companies’ business model
which has been adopted in Sweden in the 1990s but became widespread
with the growing of the collaborative economy. The author shows particu-
lar gaps and problems in the social security system and unemployment in-
surances for umbrella company workers, and she emphasises the impor-
tance of supplemental social security benefits in industry-wide collective
agreements. The author seeks to answer whether or not umbrella com-
panies are a possible way of extending social security protection to include
this group of vulnerable employees and the self-employed. The contribu-
tion concludes that the different approaches concerning the concept of
employment in Swedish labour, social security and tax law have resulted in
a situation in which an umbrella company, from a social security point of
view, pays taxes and social security contributions for its fixed-term workers
who are employees according to labour legislation, while at the same time
the umbrella company workers, when it comes to unemployment insu-
26 Munkholm, Natalie Videbæk/Schjøler, Christian Højer, Platform Work and the Dan-
ish Model: Legal Perspectives, in: Nordic Journal of Commercial Law, (2018) 1,
pp. 116-145, https://journals.aau.dk/index.php/NJCL/article/view/2487. Accessed
18 October 2020.
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rance, will be regarded as self-employed persons without current assign-
ments and, therefore, will not be entitled to unemployment benefits.
Financing Social Security: Experiences and New Approaches
The rise of the platform economy, the proliferation of self-employment
and non-standard forms of employment are starting to erode the contribu-
tion base of social protection systems, threatening the sustainability of the
social security systems.27 Traditional social security systems allow for risk-
sharing among employers and employees. New forms of employment,
combined with a lack of obligatory contributions paid, undermine the
foundations of collective solidarity and the current institutional forms of
social security. Companies profit from the proliferation of self-employ-
ment and the gig economy (cheap labour, without social insurance obliga-
tions and contributions), a fragmentation of labour and a shifting of risks
to the weaker contractual party (employees or self-employed workers).
The question arises whether platforms providers / clients should assume
their share of (financial) responsibility towards individuals and / or to-
wards the state (and public institutions). And if this is so, further questions
concern the conditions under which contributions should be paid: in
which cases are persons who provide services via digital platforms and ser-
vice contracts (to a certain degree) dependent on third persons (e.g. plat-
form providers or clients) who control their activity, and does this make
the latter responsible and justify the participation of the platform
providers in the financing of social protection for the service providers?
Does a shift in the structure of financing and the inclusion of new sources
of financing comply with the principles of social insurance systems (in par-
ticular, the principle of solidarity)? And if this is the case, which institu-
tional changes are necessary? Those were the background considerations
for the contributions of Part III of the book and its Chapters 9 to 11.
Chapter 9 deals with “The Influence of the Platform Economy on the Fi-
nancing of Social Security: The Spanish Case” (Borja Suárez Corujo). In Euro-
pe, Spain is the country with the second largest number of platform work-
ers and probably with the highest number of court decisions concerning
3.
27 Chesalina, Olga, Access to Social Security for Digital Platform Workers in Ger-
many and in Russia: A Comparative Study, in: Spanish Labour Law and Employ-
ment Relations Journal, (2018) 1, pp. 17-28.
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the classification of platform workers.28 The aim of this chapter is to reflect
on how this major technological shift could modify the financing struc-
ture of Bismarckian social security systems. The author emphasises that the
financial balance of a social security model based on financing through so-
cial contributions could seriously be harmed once the platform economy
gains greater weight. In the author’s opinion, a progressive redesign of so-
cial security financial resources or a reconfiguration of benefits is required.
The author investigates different options concerning future financing of
social security in Spain in order to address the challenges posed by the rise
of the platform economy.
Chapter 10 expands on the question “Social Security in the Platform Econ-
omy: The French Example – New Actors, New Regulations, Old Problems?”
(Francis Kessler). While other countries are still discussing the possible op-
tions with regard to involving platforms in the financing of social security,
imposing on them obligations in the field of social security and taxation
and granting platform workers social security rights, France was the first
country that has already introduced such regulations. In 2016, regulations
concerning a social responsibility of platforms were introduced in the
French Labour Code; they are applicable to self-employed persons who
have access to one or more platforms offering electronic networking for
their professional activities.29 Among other things, this chapter of the
Labour Code provides for social responsibility on the part of platforms for
occupational accidents of platform workers. Furthermore, issues concern-
ing the classification of platform workers in France are addressed; there are
first cases where litigation has been resorted to. Classification of a worker
as an employee means an obligation of platforms to pay social contribu-
tions for platform workers (e.g. Uber drivers). Furthermore, the author in-
vestigates various legislation novelties adapted until 2019: concerning the
new sources of financing of social security in the gig economy, with the
example of rental of furnished accommodation for short periods; anti-
fraud measures concerning tax and social security obligations of online
platform operators. He also provides an analysis of different legislative ini-
tiatives. The chapter concludes that – concerning the financing of social
28 Royo Rodríguez-Piñero, Miguel, Spain, in: Daugareilh, Isabelle/Degryse,
Christophe/Pochet, Philippe (eds.), The Platform Economy and Social Law: Key
Issues in Comparative Perspective, ETUI Working Paper 2019.10, Brussels, 2019,
p. 92 f., https://www.etui.org/Publications2/Working-Papers/The-platform-econo
my-and-social-law-Key-issues-in-comparative-perspective. Accessed 14 September
2020.
29 Articles L. 7341-1 to Art. L. 7342-6 Code du Travail.
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protection – the French legislator preferred to only marginally modify the
existing rules rather than to implement comprehensive reforms.
Chapter 11 reports on “New Forms of Employment and Innovative Ways
for the Collection of Social Security Contributions: The Example of Estonia”
(Gaabriel Tavits). The author starts by describing the Estonian social securi-
ty system and the role of social taxes and contributions for its financing.
He continues with the general tendencies of development of social protec-
tion and its financing. The most significant shortcoming of the social secu-
rity system is the Estonian health insurance system that excludes approxi-
mately 14 percent of the whole working age population due to the discon-
tinuity of their income and employment. The author concludes that only
fundamental changes in the financing of health care and in the state tax
system would allow to address this challenge. Nevertheless, Estonia is of-
ten seen as the most excellent example of e-government and digitalisation
in Eastern Europe (ranking 2nd out of the 28 EU Member States concern-
ing digital public services in the Digital Economy and Society Index
202030). It has already implemented some innovative mechanisms of ad-
ministering social security and taxes, and of simplifying the taxation of ser-
vices. The entrepreneur account, on the one hand, represents a new way of
simplifying tax liability (including social taxes) and, on the other hand, en-
ables access to social security, in particular health insurance. However, in
order to get benefits from health insurance, a social tax of at least the mini-
mum rate (540 euros per month) should be paid, which means that work-
ing for the minimum wage does not guarantee the minimum level of so-
cial protection.
Transborder Perspective: The Future Role of the European Union
The final Part IV of the book is dedicated to the transborder perspective.
As the challenges of the changing world of work in many cases go beyond
the national borders, the future role of the European Union, of interna-
tional organisations, and of agreements of public international law needs
to be addressed. In this context, we concentrate on the role of the Euro-
pean Union which is currently working on a renewal of its social policy
programmes and trying to set up a common agenda. The so-called Euro-
4.
30 Digital Economy and Society Index Report 2020 – Digital Public Services, https://
ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-public-services-scoreboard. Accessed
14 September 2020.
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pean Pillar of Social Rights shall serve as a general basis.31 Contrary to the
wording of its title, it does not contain individual entitlements but general
principles that should guide both national and European policies of social
protection.32 One of these principles (No. 12) reads as follows: “Regardless
of the type and duration of their employment relationship, workers, and,
under comparable conditions, the self-employed, have the right to ad-
equate social protection.”
As part of the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights
and based on Article 292 in conjunction with Articles 153 and 352 TFEU,
the Council of the EU adopted its Recommendation “On access to social
protection for workers and the self-employed” on 8 November 2019.33 The
Recommendation addresses the problem that up to half of the people in
non-standard work and self-employment across the EU are at risk of not
having sufficient access to social protection and/or employment services,
which is a growing impediment to the sustainability of social protection
systems and to the welfare of an increasing proportion of the workforce.34
The main objective of the Recommendation is to provide access to ad-
equate social protection to all workers and the self-employed and to estab-
lish minimum standards in the field of social protection of workers and
the self-employed.
In this context, Chapter 12 on “Building Up and Implementing European
Standards for Platform Workers” (Paul Schoukens) focuses on how the EU in-
stitutions address the challenge of organising social security for platform
workers. The contribution examines the question to what extent the Rec-
ommendation responds to the challenges for the organisation of social se-
curity that arise from the emergence and proliferation of platform work.
For this reason, the typical features of platform work that present chal-
lenges to traditional social security are assessed based on the provisions
31 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monet
ary-union/european-pillar-social-rights/european-pillar-social-rights-20-principles_
en. Accessed 14 September 2020.
32 See for its character and its possible indirect legal impact Becker, Ulrich, Die Eu-
ropäische Säule sozialer Rechte, in: Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, (2018) 73,
pp. 525-558.
33 Fn. 10.
34 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Analytical Docu-
ment accompanying the Consultation Document “Second Phase Consultation of
Social Partners under Article 154 TFEU on a Possible Action Addressing the
Challenges of Access to Social Protection for People in All Forms of Employment
in the Framework of the European Pillar of Social Rights”, Brussels, 20 Novem-
ber 2017, p. 25.
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outlined in the Recommendation. Finally, the author analyses the short-
comings of the Recommendation (and its underlying EU vision on access
to social protection), and what kind of EU legal action in the field of social
security could still be relevant. Analysing the question whether the legal
standards developed by the Recommendation are sufficient, the author
comes to the result that common standards at EU level are needed. The
chapter concludes that since income is generated no longer only mainly
from standard employment but also from other non-standard activities
and returns from goods, the traditional elements of social security systems
(sources of financing, social security risks as well as eligibility conditions
and calculation of benefits) should be reconsidered. At the EU level, a
broad approach seems to be required: apart from the protection through
social benefits, fair competition rules on the internal market should be
elaborated.
Chapter 13 on “Social Law 4.0 and the Future of Social Security Coordina-
tion” (Grega Strban) changes the perspective and deals with the questions
of cross-border movement. Due to digital technologies in a changing
world of work many kinds of dependent and independent work can be
carried out from any place in the world linked to the internet; there are
diverse patterns of mobility. At the same time, EU provisions on the coor-
dination of social security systems (Regulations 883/2004, 987/2009) and
rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union (e.g. case C-137/11
“Partena”) still suppose primarily stable working arrangements and a fixed
physical location.35 The author seeks to answer how the coordination of
national social security systems should be modified in order to follow the
development of non-standard forms of employment and self-employment.
He outlines that solutions to contemporary challenges of social security co-
ordination lie in a more inclusive approach: not only freedom of move-
ment of standard, but also of non-standard workers should be promoted.
In order to achieve this goal, a targeted modification of the coordination
regulations is required. Also, technical achievements should be used in or-
der to provide for the exchange of information in relation to the move-
ment of non-standard workers.
Although we can identify completely different rules on social contribu-
tions and taxes in all jurisdictions, a common problem of both types of
35 European Commission, Analytical Report 2018: Social Security Coordination and
Non-Standard Forms of Employment and Self-Employment: Interrelation, Chal-
lenges and Prospects. Written by Strban, Grega/Bermejo, Dolores Carrascosa/
Schoukens, Paul/Vukorepa, Ivana, Brussels, 2020.
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public charges is that they are based on the physical presence of taxpayers
and assets. The current rules are not fit for taxing in a digital economy
characterised by online or virtual companies whose location is hard to de-
termine. This may result in legal uncertainty, tax and social contribution
evasion, or enforcement problems regarding the collection of tax and so-
cial contributions. Furthermore, the division between contributions and
taxes is not always clear. Many different initiatives were launched at the na-
tional and supranational levels in order to tackle the challenges concerning
the taxation of the platform economy. This is taken up in the final Chapter
14 on “Taxation of the Platform Economy: Challenges and Lessons for Social Se-
curity” (Katerina Pantazatou). It provides an analysis of the main problems
concerning the taxation of the platform economy. The prime aim of the
chapter is to try to answer “whether there is anything for social law to
learn from tax law and whether taxation, one of the main sources of fi-
nancing social protection, is adequately prepared to deal with the platform
economy challenges”36. One of the outcomes of the chapter is that a coor-
dinated approach in social and tax law in relation to employment classifi-
cation would prevent resorting to circular arguments, such as using the
platform worker’s tax treatment for labour law classification purposes,
which may lead to contradictory results. Another point concerns anti-fraud
measures: the author highlights that incentives to encourage platform
workers to declare their income together with a simplified reporting sys-
tem would promote the appropriate payment of social contributions and
the fight against false self-employment.
Conclusions and Perspectives
1. As can be seen from the brief summary of the chapters provided above,
they contain an overview on a variety of approaches in order to meet the
challenges posed to social protection in the digital age. The contributions
cover a broad range of different topics such as the legal qualification of
economic activities including both legal and practical issues concerning
the inclusion of digital workers, the role of different systems of social pro-
tection including the relation between contributory-based and tax-fi-
nanced schemes as well as the relation between basic and supplementary
security, or the difficulties to secure a stable financial basis for social securi-
ty.
III.
36 Chapter 14, Section I, p. 364.
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The contributions in this book do not only give evidence of the fact that
despite recent amendments in the legislation, there are still a lot of obsta-
cles to effective access to social protection for non-standard workers and
self-employed persons. They also analyse new approaches for ensuring and
financing social security, they put these approaches into the context of the
overall social protection structure, discuss their pros and cons, and provide
the reader with a critical assessment of whether, and to what extent, novel
approaches can help to effectively meet current and actual challenges.
 
2. What can be learned from those different approaches presented in this
book? Two points merit particular attention.
a) First, it is clear that many national solutions – or rather: the initial
steps to meet challenges in the digital age at a national level – remain em-
bedded in the national architectures of social protection institutions. There
are sometimes structures of single national schemes which either open up
specific gaps in social protection on the one hand, or allow for coverage
without any classification of persons on the other. And also the actors in-
volved, those playing a decisive role in shaping social protection systems,
differ: where trade unions and employers’ associations have a specific re-
sponsibility in this respect, they have to be actively involved in reforming
social protection. Having said this, it is nevertheless rather more remark-
able that not only few of the approaches described in this book might easi-
ly being transferred from one jurisdiction to another, or that such transfer-
ral would be possible with minor adjustments only. That holds especially
true for rather technical approaches like making the enrolment of digital
workers easier and providing economic incentives in this regard. Yet, the
same transfer would be feasible when it comes to more fundamental as-
pects like putting certain social responsibilities on platforms and thus inte-
grating these enterprises more closely into the systems of social protection.
b) Second, and if one wants to sum up the different approaches in react-
ing to digitalisation, we can observe a patchwork of single measures. Gov-
ernments, and societies as a whole, not only have to deal with many details
in order to maintain effectively functioning social protection. There also
seems to be a certain lack of overall strategies and a certain tendency to-
wards special solutions which often remain controversial and fragmented,
or more generally speaking, a tendency towards modifications or exten-
sions of existing social protection schemes in the light of specific develop-
ments.
This does not only call for more exchange and dialogue at EU level in or-
der to establish a common social policy basis. It also leads to the question
whether such “construction works” aimed at repairing the existing “build-
Ulrich Becker and Olga Chesalina
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ings” of social protection suffice in order to meet future challenges or
whether these should be scheduled for demolition and be rebuilt follow-
ing new plans. Or, in other words: are new, and specific forms of social se-
curity necessary for digital workers? To what extent does digitalisation urge
us to change (and not only further develop) the traditional structures of ex-
isting social security systems? These questions are even more urgent if one
considers digitalisation as being one of a plurality of challenges, and in a
way also as a phenomenon of more general societal changes. This leads to a
reconsideration of the structural fundaments of social security and the co-
ordination of different social protection schemes within every state37, in-
cluding the question of how to share which tasks between these schemes.
It also requires the reconsideration of fundamental aspects of transnational
social security coordination at EU level, especially the respective roles of
places of employment and of residence38.
 
3. Although these questions will have to be answered, we propose to take
intermediate steps and to react in two steps to the challenges posed by digi-
talisation. The first concerns better knowledge of the factual develop-
ments: there is still the need for empirical analysis of the impact of digitali-
sation on the existing social protection systems, which is an endeavour that
calls for interdisciplinary research as social science methods have to be ap-
plied while, at the same time, knowing which circumstances are taken into
account for the application of social protection law.
In a second step, the existing law will have to undergo changes. These
changes will certainly differ from one jurisdiction and one state to the
next, depending on the national social protection architecture, the actors
involved, and also the legal instruments available with regard to the ad-
ministrative and constitutional law background. They may lead to a more
universal, and at the same time more restricted, role of social security, leav-
ing room for more variety as regards supplemental protection.
Yet, three aspects will be of universal importance in order to realise a
Social (Protection) Law 4.0 – and going beyond the fact that protection
systems themselves have to become (much more) “digitalised”:
– where still existent, restrictive conditions for the access to social securi-
ty have to be abolished even, and in particular, within employment-
based systems, namely as regards requirements of a certain amount of
economic activities or their regular form;
37 See Chapter 12, Section VI, pp. 328-333.
38 See Chapter 13, Section VIII, pp. 360-361.
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– social protection for the self-employed needs to be improved, both with
a view to the social risks covered and the level of protection;
– the financial basis of social security needs to be broadened, not only
through subsidies from the general state budget but also through novel
forms of public charges and the redefinition of social responsibilities;
– coordination has to be improved both between different types of social
protection schemes and with other financial transaction systems, in
particular the tax system – as social spending and levying taxes and oth-
er contributions are the core activities of welfare states in order to de-
fine access to and participation in our societies, sharing responsibilities
between their members and laying a fundament for societal life.
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Chapter 2
Platform Work: Critical Assessment of Empirical Findings
and its Implications for Social Security
Olga Chesalina
Introduction
The platform economy is characterised by platform work as a new form of
employment. So far, no uniform definition of platform work has been es-
tablished in the literature, in empirical studies or across European and in-
ternational organisations. Nevertheless, there is a consensus concerning
the division of platform work into two main types. Valerio de Stefano has
proposed to distinguish between crowdwork and work on demand.1 Euro-
found also follows this divison.2 Crowdwork is a form of employment that
“uses an online platform to enable organizations or individuals to access
an indefinite and unknown group of other organizations or individuals to
solve specific problems or to provide specific services or products in ex-
change for payment”.3 In the case of work on demand via apps the execu-
tion of specific services, such as transport, cleaning and running errands
etc. is offered to an indefinite number of individuals by means of electron-
ic platforms (app companies).4 Other terms for crowdwork are “location-
I.
1 De Stefano, Valerio, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work,
Crowdwork and Labour Protection in the “Gig-Economy”, in: Conditions of Work
and Employment Series, International Labour Office, Geneva, 71 (2016), https://w
ww.ilo.org/travail/whatwedo/publications/WCMS_443267/lang--en/index.htm
Accessed 12 September 2020.
2 Eurofound, Work on Demand: Recurrence, Effects and Challenges, Luxembourg:
Publications Office of the European Union, 2018, doi:10.2806/463459, https://ww
w.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2018/work-on-demand-recurrence-effe
cts-and-challenges. Accessed 12 September 2020.
3 Eurofound, New Forms of Employment, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the
European Union, 2015, doi:10.2806/937385, https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/site
s/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef1461en.pdf. Accessed 12
September 2020.
4 De Stefano, Valerio, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work,
Crowdwork and Labour Protection in the “Gig-Economy” (fn. 1).
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independent”, web-based,5 online work, remote platform work6; other
terms for work on demand are offline work, on-location platform work
(location-based).7
Labour law classification, working conditions and labour law protec-
tion for platform workers have already been the subject of numerous stud-
ies and publications,8 whereas social law research in this field is still in its
infancy. Platform work has already been addressed in a wide range of soci-
ological, economic and political studies. Nevertheless, questions regarding
the social security of platform workers represent a very young field of re-
search dealt with only in recent studies.
In studies, two approaches are used concerning the issue of access of
platform workers to social protection: Firstly, there are various studies that
exclusively target platform workers.9 An excellent example worth mention-
ing is the study for the EMPL Committee entitled “The Social Protection of
5 Pesole, Annarosa/Urzí Brancati, Maria Cesira/Fernández-Macías, Enrique/Biagi, Federi-
co/González Vázquez, Ignacio, Platform Workers in Europe, EUR 29275 EN, Publi-
cations Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2018, ISBN
978-92-79-87996-8, doi:10.2760/742789, JRC112157, p. 14, https://publications.jrc.e
c.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC112157/jrc112157_pubsy_platform_workers_
in_europe_science_for_policy.pdf. Accessed 12 September 2020.
6 Piasna, Agnieszka, Counting Gigs. How Can we Measure the Scale of Online Plat-
form Work? Working Paper 2020.06, ETUI, Brussels: ETUI aisbl, 2020, p. 11, https:
//www.etui.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/Counting%20gigs_2020_web.pdf.
Accessed 12 September 2020.
7 Ibid.
8 Blanpain, Roger/Hendrickx, Frank/Waas, Bernd (eds.), New Forms of Employ-
ment in Europe, Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer 2016; Prassl, Jeremias, Hu-
mans as a Service, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018; Meil, Pamela/Kirov, Vas-
sil (eds.), Policy Implications of Virtual Work, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan 2017. In
the handbook of Davidson, Nestor M./Finck, Michèle/Infranca, John J. (eds.),
Cambridge Handbook of the Law of the Sharing Economy, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press 2018, the sharing economy is addressed from different legal
perspectives, i. a. from the labour law perspective, but not from the social law per-
spective. Platform work as a kind of precarious work from the labour law perspec-
tive is devoted some contributions in Kenner, Jeff/Florczak, Izabela/Otto, Marta
(eds.), Precarious Work. The Challenge for Labour Law in Europe, Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar Publishing 2019.
9 Berg, Janine, Income Security in the On-Demand Economy: Findings and Policy
Lessons from a Survey of Crowdworkers, in: Conditions of Work and Employment
Series, International Labour Office, Geneva, 74 (2016); Digital Labour Platforms
and the Future of Work: Towards Decent Work in the Online World, Internation-
al Labour Office – Geneva, ILO, 2018, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-
--dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_645337.pdf. Accessed
12 September 2020; Eurofound, Employment and Working Conditions of
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Workers in the Platform Economy”10, which provides comprehensive re-
search findings on the social protection of platform workers. Secondly to
be mentioned are studies that analyse the situation of platform workers
among a larger category of persons in non-standard forms of employ-
ment,11 new forms of work12 or among self-employed persons.13 The stud-
ies of the second group provide, in large part, insights from a social policy
point of view rather than from empirical evidence. Many studies mention
social security issues only briefly.14 A mix between the first and the second
approach is the study of the European Social Insurance Platform entitled
Selected Types of Platform Work, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the Euro-
pean Union, 2018, https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publica
tion/field_ef_document/ef18001en.pdf. Accessed 12 September 2020; Pesole,
Annarosa/Urzí Brancati, Maria Cesira/Fernández-Macías, Enrique/Biagi, Federico/
González Vázquez, Ignacio, Platform Workers in Europe (fn. 5); Zachary,
Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien/Smits, Ine/Hauben, Harald/
Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivier, So-
phie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform Workers,
VT/2018/032, Final Report, 13 March 2020, European Commission, 2020.
10 Forde, Chris/Stuart, Mark/Simon, Joyce/Oliver, Liz/Valizade, Danat/Alberti, Gabriella/
Hardy, Kate/Trappmann, Vera/Umney, Charles/Carson, Calum, The Social Protec-
tion of Workers in the Platform Economy, Study for the EMPL Committee, Euro-
pean Union, Brussels, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STU
D/2017/614184/IPOL_STU(2017)614184_EN.pdf. Accessed 12 September 2020.
11 Spasova, Slavina/Bouget, Denis/Ghailani, Dalila/Vanhercke, Bart, Access to Social
Protection for People Working on Non-Standard Contracts and as Self-Employed
in Europe. A Study of National Policies. European Social Policy Network (ESPN),
Brussels: European Commission, 2017; OECD, The Future of Social Protection:
What Works for Non-Standard Workers?, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2018, https://d
oi.org/10.1787/9789264306943-en. Accessed 12 September 2020.
12 OECD, New Forms of Work in the Digital Economy, OECD Digital Economy
Papers, No. 260, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1787/5jlwnklt8
20x-en. Accessed 12 September 2020; OECD, Policy Responses to New Forms of
Work, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1787/0763f1b7-en. Ac-
cessed 12 September 2020.
13 ILO/OECD, Ensuring Better Social Protection for Self-Employed Workers, paper
prepared for the 2nd Meeting of the G20 Employment Working Group under
Saudi Arabia’s presidency, 8 April 2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/publ
ic/---dgreports/---ddg_p/documents/publication/wcms_742290.pdf. Accessed 12
September 2020.
14 Pesole, Annarosa/Urzí Brancati, Maria Cesira/Fernández-Macías, Enrique/Biagi, Fed-
erico/González Vázquez, Ignacio, Platform Workers in Europe (fn. 5); Zachary, Kil-
hoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien /Smits, Ine/Hauben, Harald/
Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivier, So-
phie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform Workers
(fn. 9); Digital Labour Platforms and the Future of Work: Towards Decent Work
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“Are Social Security Systems Adapted to New Forms of Work Created by Digital
Platforms?”15. It is mainly based on a questionnaire sent out to social securi-
ty institutions that made it possible “to provide a state-of-the-art view on
the situation of platform workers and social security in certain coun-
tries”16. This study covers two main types of platform work (online deliv-
ered platform work and locally delivered work).
This chapter provides a critical assessment of empirical studies and prac-
tical findings. In this context, we would like to focus rather on cross-na-
tional studies (European or international perspective) than on national
studies (however, in some cases we shall also refer to those). With this un-
derstanding, the author seeks to elaborate the implications for social secu-
rity and some proposals for future investigations. The chapter is organised
as follows: The following, second Section discusses the novelty of platform
work in comparison to other forms of non-standard employment and the
specifics of the business model of online labour platforms. The third Sec-
tion considers the size of platform work and issues concerning cross-bor-
der labour flows in platform work, reflecting the shortcomings of empiri-
cal studies. Implications for social security resulting from empirical find-
ings are examined in the fourth Section. Hereby, the motivation of plat-
form workers and their access to social protection as well as dependence
patterns are analysed. Special attention is paid to comparing the situation
of platform workers concerning access to social protection to that of non-
standard workers and self-employed persons. The implications for social
security from practical evidence are discussed in the fifth Section. Finally,
and important from a social security point of view, shortcomings of empir-
ical and practical evidence are summarised and proposals for future investi-
gations are offered.
in the Online World (fn. 9); Eurofound, Employment and Working Conditions
of Selected Types of Platform Work (fn. 9); Florisson, Rebecca/Mandl, Irene, Plat-
form Work: Types and Implications for Work and Employment – Literature Re-
view, Working Paper WPEF18004, Eurofound, Dublin, 2018, https://www.eurofo
und.europa.eu/sites/default/files/wpef18004.pdf. Accessed 12 September 2020.
15 ESIP, Are Social Security Systems Adapted to New Forms of Work Created by
Digital Platforms?, 30 January 2019, https://esip.eu/images/pdf_docs/ESIP_Study_
Platform_Work.pdf. Accessed 12 September 2020.
16 Ibid., p. 4.
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Platform Work: What is Really New?
There is an ongoing discussion on whether platform work is something
entirely new or rather a result of the evolutionary development of work or-
ganisation.17 The supporters of the first approach consider platform work
as the “most relevant manifestation of new forms of employment generat-
ed by technological change”18, “a new way to share and exchange goods,
services and knowledge”19. This group (which includes platform providers
themselves) considers technology to be a driving force.20 However, numer-
ous researchers are sceptical about the leading role of technology behind
the growth of the platform economy. Research has shown that it is not
technology, but taxes, social contributions and other cost-savings that are
key drivers of the expansion of platform work. Some research sees an inter-
relationship between the decline of standard employment relationships
and the emergence and proliferation of platform work.21
Platform work reflects a number of different trends on the labour mar-
ket over several decades22: fragmentation, segmentation and precariousness
of work,23 commodification of labour, control mechanisms of economic
partners via telecommunication tools, disruption of the concept of firm,
bogus self-employment, shift of risks from the employer to the employee
II.
17 Stanford, Jim, The Resurgence of Gig Work: Historical and Theoretical Perspec-
tives, in: Economic and Labour Relations Review, 28 (2017) 3, pp. 382-401, https:/
/doi.org/10.1177/1035304617724303. Accessed 12 September 2020.
18 Royo, Miguel Rodríguez-Piñero, Spain, in: Daugareilh, Isabelle/Degryse,
Christophe/Pochet, Philippe (eds.), The Platform Economy and Social Law: Key
Issues in Comparative Perspective, ETUI Working Paper 2019.10, Brussels, 2019,
p. 92 f., https://www.etui.org/Publications2/Working-Papers/The-platform-econo
my-and-social-law-Key-issues-in-comparative-perspective. Accessed 12 September
2020.
19 Semenza, Renata/Mori, Anna, New Self-Employment as a Theoretical Matter, in:
Semenza, Renata/Pichault, François (eds.), The Challenges of Self-Employment in
Europe. Status, Social Protection and Collective Representation, Cheltenham: Ed-
ward Elgar 2019, p. 27.
20 Joyce, Simon/Stuart, Mark/Forde, Chris/Valizade, Danat, Work and Social Protection
in the Platform Economy in Europe, p. 14, http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/148824/.
Accessed 12 September 2020.
21 Ibid., p. 3.
22 Huws, Ursula, Where did Online Platforms Come From? The Virtualization of
Work Organization and the New Policy Challenges it Raises, in: Meil, Pamela/
Kirov, Vassil (eds.), Policy Implications of Virtual Work, Cham: Palgrave Macmil-
lan 2017, pp. 30-31.
23 Joyce, Simon/Stuart, Mark/Forde, Chris/Valizade, Danat, Work and Social Protection
in the Platform Economy in Europe (fn. 20), p. 14.
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and spread of self-employment and informal work. For this reason, some
research does not consider the challenges presented by platform employ-
ment as something new in comparison to challenges posed by non-stan-
dard employment and self-employment.24 This has been confirmed by a re-
cent study of the European Commission.25
Digital technologies are one of the factors that contributed to the emer-
gence of platform work. At the same time, digital technologies have sig-
nificant consequences for the development of platform work: they enable
virtual26 connections between all participants of this business construction
(“digital intermediation”27), they allow platforms to control platform
workers permanently and to avoid employment law classification. These
digital mechanisms were not known and used before. The proliferation of
crowdwork in a certain country depends on the respective level of internet
availability. Summarising all the above, we consider that all mentioned
factors together called platform work as a new form of employment into
existence.
Platform work is the outcome of a business model of labour platform
companies. Natalie Munkholm argues in this book that platform com-
panies represent a new form of company model rather than new forms of
work.28 In our opinion, we cannot separate a new form of business model
from a new form of employment: they are both new as they are intercon-
nected. Even if there is a variety of labour platforms, the assessment of aca-
demic literature and empirical findings allows us to highlight the follow-
ing distinctive features of this business model:
24 Garben, Sacha, Tackling Social Disruption in the Online Platform Economy.
Shifting the Narrative to the Benefits of (EU) Regulation, FEPS Policy Paper, July
2019, p. 7, https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/publications/feps%20paper%
20-%20garben%20-%20clean%20final.pdf. Accessed 12 September 2020.
25 Zachary, Kilhoffer/Pieter De Groen, Willem/Lenaerts, Karolien/Smits, Ine/Hauben,
Harald/ Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivi-
er, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform
Workers (fn. 9), p. 226.
26 Ursula Huws speaks about the “virtualization of work and virtualization of work
organization”, cf. Huws, Ursula, Where did Online Platforms Come From? The
Virtualization of Work Organization and the New Policy Challenges it Raises (fn.
22), pp. 30-31.
27 Stanford, Jim, The Resurgence of Gig Work: Historical and Theoretical Perspec-
tives (fn. 17), p. 384.
28 Munkholm,Natalie Videbæk, Collective Agreements and Social Security Protection
for Non-Standard Workers and Particularly for Platform Workers: The Danish Ex-
perience, Chapter 7, Section IV, p. 200 in this book.
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– There is a remarkable change in the structure of firms. Whereas the
managerial firm is organised as an entity, platforms establish “hybrid
governance structures”.29 As market organisations they outsource work
and shift risks to platform workers.30 While platforms try to possess few
assets,31 the “new” class of the self-employed32 that has emerged
through this business model often possesses some capital (e.g. car, flat)
and are, at the same time, deprived of entrepreneurial freedom.33
– Platform companies pretend to be a mere marketplace and an interme-
diary, with the result that platform workers are considered to be self-
employed.
– Platform companies (and also clients) try to avoid or limit labour and
social responsibility34 as well as a classification of platform workers as
employees or as employee-like persons.35
– Digital and informational technologies are an integral part of this busi-
ness model.
– Platforms advertise this form of employment with workers’ autonomy
and flexible working arrangements. In fact, they are “controlling auton-
omy”36 in the way that platform workers are controlled through algo-
rithms and also human management.
29 Acquier, Aurélien, Uberization Meets Organizational Theory. Platform Capitalism
and the Rebirth of the Putting-Out System, in: Davidson, Nestor M./Finck,
Michèle/Infranca, John J. (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of the Law of the Sharing
Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2018, p. 15.
30 Ibid., pp. 15, 19.
31 Nick Srnicek has proposed to call “Uber’s business model” a “lean platform”, cf.
Sniercek, Nick, Two Myths About the Future of the Economy, in: Skidelsky,
Robert/Craig, Nan (eds.), Work in the Future. The Automation Revolution,
Cham: Springer VS 2020, p. 134.
32 Lobel, Orly, Coase and the Platform Economy, in: Davidson, Nestor M./Finck,
Michèle, Infranca, John J. (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of the Law of the Sharing
Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2018, p. 72.
33 Acquier, Aurélien, Uberization Meets Organizational Theory. Platform Capitalism
and the Rebirth of the Putting-Out System (fn. 29), pp. 15, 19.
34 Desbarats, Isabelle, Workers in Legally Constituted Online Platforms in France:
Should the Courts Determine Their Professional Categorization?, in: Revue de
Droit Comparé du Travail et de la Sécurité Sociale – English Electronic Edition
(2019) 4, p. 165.
35 Hotvedt, Marianne, The Contract-of-Employment Test Renewed. A Scandinavian
Approach to Platform Work, in: Spanish Labour Law and Employment Relations
Journal, 7 (2018) 1-2, p. 59, doi: https://doi.org/10.20318/sllerj.2018.4436.
36 Ivanova, Mirela/Bronowicka, Joanna/Kocher, Eva/Degner, Anne, The App as a Boss?
Control and Autonomy in Application-Based Management. Arbeit/Grenze/Fluss
– Work in Progress interdisziplinärer Arbeitsforschung No. 2, Frankfurt (Oder):
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– Control through algorithmic methods (including rating systems) and
financial incentives prevail over control through “classical labour law
tools”. Nevertheless, there is a covert subordination.
– The relationship between the platform and the platform worker is char-
acterised by information asymmetries.37 Platforms gather a huge
amount of data concerning platform workers and, simultaneously, this
information is withheld from platform workers.38 This gives labour
platforms greater power over workers.
– Platforms introduce recommendation systems based on data collected
from workers in order to encourage them to adopt a certain targeted
behaviour.
– Platforms purposely use the “overstaffing” strategy: regarding work via
platforms, the number of active drivers, couriers or other platform
workers registered with the platform is many times higher than would
be necessary for the fulfilment of all orders during a certain period of
time or during a shift.39
Platform workers are highly substitutable and impersonalised. An ex-
treme commodification of labour is happening.
While some courts have already recognised the new forms of control and
monitoring mechanisms (and in particularly, geolocation) as features of
employment relationship,40 others have refused to do so. For example, in
the first German labour law judgement concerning the employment classi-
fication of a platform worker, the courts of first and of second instance
have refused to recognise his employee status.41 It remains to be seen
whether the Federal Labour Court42 will recognise that the platform work-
er was practically, economically and personally dependent on the plat-
form, including through the use of its monitoring mechanisms.
Viadrina, 2018, doi: 10.11584/Arbeit-Grenze-Fluss.2.; Schönefeld, Daniel, Kontrol-
lierte Autonomie. Einblick in die Praxis des Crowdworking, in: Hensel, Isabell/
Schönefeld, Daniel/Kocher, Eva/Schwarz, Anna/Koch, Jochen (eds.), Selbständige
Unselbständigkeit, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2019, p. 76.
37 Ivanova, Mirela/Bronowicka, Joanna/Kocher, Eva/Degner, Anne, The App as a Boss?
Control and Autonomy in Application-Based Management (fn. 36), p. 16.
38 Ibid., p. 16.
39 Ibid., p. 7.
40 E. g. in France the decision of the Labour Chamber of the Supreme Court of 28
November No. 17-20.079.
41 Decision of the Labour Court of Second Instance of Munich of 4 December 2019
– 8 Sa146/19.
42 The proceeding is scheduled for 1 December 2020.
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The business model of labour platforms is highly changeable. The nu-
merous court decisions in favour of the employee or worker status of plat-
form workers prompt platforms to change their initial strategy and find
new ways to avoid the application of compulsory labour and social law
regulations.43
In fact, platform work is a highly heterogeneous category. Some plat-
form workers are genuinely self-employed persons, i.e. professional self-
employed workers. This group is the main beneficiary and sees platform
work as an opportunity.44 Simultaneously, the situation of other platform
workers is even more precarious than that of workers in other non-stan-
dard forms of employment.45
Empirical Evidence
Situation at a Glance
Since the emergence of platform-mediated work, there have been a lot of
attempts to estimate and evaluate this phenomenon. Today, there are al-
ready a number of studies and surveys that give insights into platform
work. The estimations on the size of the platform economy vary signifi-
cantly across the studies because of different research methodologies and
different definitions of platform work used.46 Different studies indicate
III.
1.
43 The most recent example being Uber, which has changed its app after the law
“AB5” came into effect in order to avoid drivers operating as contractors to be
classified as employees. In particular, it allowed drivers to set their own rates. Cf.
Paul, Kari, Uber and Lyft must classify drivers as employees, judge rules, in blow
to gig economy, The Guardian, 10 August 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/te
chnology/2020/aug/10/uber-lyft-ruling-california-judge. Accessed 12 September
2020; other examples are mentioned by Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/
Lenaerts, Karolien/Smits, Ine/Hauben, Harald/ Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/
Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivier, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the
Working Conditions of Platform Workers (fn. 9), p. 122.
44 Semenza, Renata/Mori, Anna, New Self-Employment as a Theoretical Matter (fn.
19), p. 28.
45 Some scholars consider platform work as a last stage of precariousness. See Cav-
allini, Gionata/Avogaro, Matteo, “Digital Work” in the “Platform Economy”: The
Last (but not Least) Stage of Precariousness in Labour Relationships, in: Kenner,
Jeff/Florczak, Izabela/Otto, Marta (eds.), Precarious Work. The Challenge for
Labour Law in Europe, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2019, p. 176.
46 Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien/Smits, Ine/Hauben,
Harald/Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivi-
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that between one and five percent of the working age population are some-
how engaged in platform work.47 While one group of studies shows that
the rise of work on demand (offline platform work) is significantly higher
than that of crowdwork,48 other studies come to the opposite result.49
Many studies demonstrate that platform work is “an emerging phe-
nomenon of increasing importance but still modest in size”50. There are
different scenarios and estimations concerning the growth of platform
work, as to whether it has already peaked or continues to extend. Accord-
ing to one approach, confirmed in some more recent studies, the number
of platform workers has dropped.51 According to a different approach,
er, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform
Workers (fn. 9), pp. 44-45.
47 ESIP, Are Social Security Systems Adapted to New Forms of Work Created by
Digital Platforms? (fn. 15), p. 4; Forde, Chris/Stuart, Mark/Simon, Joyce/Oliver, Liz/
Valizade, Danat/Alberti, Gabriella/Hardy, Kate/Trappmann, Vera/Umney, Charles/
Carson, Calum, The Social Protection of Workers in the Platform Economy (fn.
10); OECD, Measuring Platform Mediated Workers, OECD Digital Economy Pa-
pers, No. 282, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2019, pp. 8-12, https://doi.org/10.1787/17
0a14d9-en. Accessed 12 September 2020; Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem
Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien /Smits, Ine/Hauben, Harald/ Waeyaert, Willem/
Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivier, Sophie, Study to Gather
Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform Workers (fn. 9), p. 44; Freuden-
berg, Christoph, Rising Platform Work. Scope, Insurance Coverage and Good
Practices among ISSA Countries, German Federal Pension Insurance/Technical
Commission on Old-Age, Invalidity and Survivors Insurance, World Social Secu-
rity Forum, Brussels, 14-18 October 2019, p. 1.
48 Drahokoupil, Jan/Fabo, Brian, The Platform Economy and the Disruption of the
Employment Relationship. ETUI Policy Brief, Brussels, 2016, http://www.etui.org
/Publications2/Policy-Briefs/European-Economic-Employment-and-Social-Policy/
Collective-labour-law-under-attack-how-anti-crisis-measures-dismantle-workers-col
lective-rights. Accessed 12 September 2020.
49 Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien/Smits, Ine/Hauben,
Harald/ Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivi-
er, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform
Workers (fn. 9), p. 228; ILO/OECD, Ensuring Better Social Protection for Self-
Employed Workers (fn. 13), p. 4.
50 Pesole, Annarosa/Urzí Brancati, Maria Cesira/Fernández-Macías, Enrique/Biagi, Fed-
erico/González Vázquez, Ignacio, Platform Workers in Europe (fn. 5), p. 5.
51 ILO/OECD, Ensuring Better Social Protection for Self-Employed Workers (fn.
13); Urzí Brancati, Maria Cesira/Pesole, Annarosa/Fernandez Macias, Enrique, New
Evidence on Platform Workers in Europe, EUR 29958 EN, Publications Office of
the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020, ISBN 978-92-76-12949-3 (online),
doi:10.2760/459278 (online), JRC118570, p. 4.
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platform work will continue to extend.52 It is important to recall that plat-
form work and labour platforms like TaskRabbit and Uber emerged and
have grown after the global financial crisis of 2007.53 The global coron-
avirus crisis of 2020, which is accompanied by job losses and a deep econo-
mic recession, will most likely contribute to the further growth of certain
types of platform work and the emergence of new, as yet unknown forms
of non-standard work. There is first evidence of such a development, e.g.
the number of new registrations on the freelancer platform PeoplePer-
Hour increased in March 2020: in the UK, registrations rose by 300 per-
cent, in Spain by 329 percent and in Japan by as much as 513 percent.54
Shortcomings of Empirical Studies
The studies available up to now provide a lot of information about the so-
cio-demographic characteristics of platform workers, their working condi-
tions, access to labour and social protection. However, there are consider-
able limitations to the studies and the data:
(1) There is a lack of reliable data on platform work.55 Official data is al-
most non-existent. Until 2016/2017, there was no official statistical da-
ta on the total number of platform workers at all, and until now only
some countries have such data. One of the first large-scale official sta-
tistical data concerning electronically mediated employment (in-per-
son, offline tasks and online task) was presented in the survey of the
American Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of May 2017.56 It was found
that one percent of the total employed population in the US were en-
2.
52 Huws, Ursula, Where did Online Platforms Come From? The Virtualization of
Work Organization and the New Policy Challenges it Raises (fn. 22).
53 Ibid., p. 29.
54 The Coronavirus Crisis is Shining a Light on the Difficult Situation Many Gig
Workers Face, 8 April 2020, https://www.rolandberger.com/en/Point-of-View/The
-future-of-the-gig-economy.html. Accessed 12 September 2020; Achleitner, Ranjana
Andrea, Plattformbasierte Arbeit als Herausforderung der EU – Handlungsper-
spektiven und aktuelle Initiativen der Union, in: ZESAR, (2020) 9, p. 363.
55 Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien/Smits, Ine/Hauben,
Harald/ Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivi-
er, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform
Workers (fn. 9), p. 229.
56 U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Popula-
tion Survey, Electronically Mediated Employment, https://www.bls.gov/cps/electr
onically-mediated-employment.htm. Accessed 12 September 2020.
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gaged in this form of employment. More recently, some official statis-
tical agencies of OECD member states have formulated questions on
platform work in labour force surveys57 and Internet usage surveys.58
(2) There are more studies on crowdwork than on work on demand, as
crowdworkers can be reached more easily by online surveys.59 Also
problematic is the fact that the earliest research is based mostly on an
analysis of the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) platform, which
means that a significant part of the current scientific knowledge refers
to US-American employees.60
(3) Often the samples sizes of empirical studies are too small to make clear
conclusions about platform workers’ characteristics.61
(4) Some studies do not differentiate between types of platform work (on-
line and offline platform work), or between work for one platform or
work for many platforms.
(5) Studies show that there are considerable differences in the numbers of
platform workers both across countries and across studies for the same
country.62 Different factors may explain this situation:
– the high volatility of platform workers should be taken into ac-
count;
– some studies include – apart from activities on labour platforms –
also activities on capital platforms like Airbnb;
– some studies count all registered users63 while other studies count
only active users,64 giving a more accurate picture of this phe-
nomenon;
57 E.g. Finland extended the Labour Force Survey with questions on platform work
in 2017, cf. Piasna, Agnieszka, Counting Gigs. How Can we Measure the Scale of
Online Platform Work? (fn. 6), p. 12.
58 OECD, Measuring the Digital Transformation: A Roadmap for the Future, OECD
Publishing, Paris, 2019, p. 176, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264311992-en. Ac-
cessed 12 September 2020.
59 Joyce, Simon/Stuart, Mark/Forde, Chris/Valizade, Danat, Work and Social Protection
in the Platform Economy in Europe (fn. 20), pp. 5, 14.
60 BMAS, Plattformbasierte Erwerbsarbeit: Stand der empirischen Forschung,
Forschungsbericht No. 498, 2017, p. 44.
61 OECD, Measuring Platform Mediated Workers (fn. 47), p. 4.
62 OECD, Measuring Platform Mediated Workers (fn. 47), pp. 8-11; OECD, Measur-
ing the Digital Transformation: A Roadmap for the Future (fn. 58), p. 176.
63 ESIP, Are Social Security Systems Adapted to New Forms of Work Created by
Digital Platforms? (fn. 15), p. 21.
64 Piasna, Agnieszka, Counting Gigs. How Can we Measure the Scale of Online Plat-
form Work? (fn. 6), p. 6.
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– there is no consistency in the definitions of platform work used in
studies: while some studies use a broad definition of platform
work, others use a rather narrow definition;
– many studies are not comparable as they cover different countries,
use different definitions of platform work or online platforms,
and examine different reference periods.65
(6) There are concerns in relation to the reliability of the studies. Relying
on the outcome of studies concerning the classification of platform
workers may lead to an inaccurate picture when the studies are based
on the subjective opinion of the respondents. Many respondents mis-
understand the questions and misinterpret the definitions of platform
work66 and “online platforms”67 used in a survey. For example, in the
COLLEEM I survey, the majority of platform workers (68.1 percent)
define themselves as employees, but de facto they are self-employed.68
There were different reasons for misinterpretations in this study, be it
that the main activity of one respondent was in dependent employ-
ment, or that one respondent considered himself as an employee, or
simply due to poor answer content.69
(7) While some studies cover platform work as a main job only when a
substantial part of income is generated from it, others use a broader
definition of platform work including cases where platform work is
performed as a secondary job.70 Also some of the existing official
labour statistics of the OECD member states (e.g. France)71 focus on a
worker’s primary job and can be unreliable in their coverage of sec-
ondary jobs and self-employment.72 Researchers stress that official
labour market statistics are generally not suited for capturing sporadic
or secondary employment.73 Using a longer reference period increases
65 Urzí Brancati, Maria Cesira/Pesole, Annarosa/Fernandez Macias, Enrique, New Evi-
dence on Platform Workers in Europe (fn. 51), p. 11.
66 OECD, Measuring the Digital Transformation: A Roadmap for the Future (fn.
58), p. 176.
67 Piasna, Agnieszka, Counting Gigs. How Can we Measure the Scale of Online Plat-
form Work? (fn. 6), p. 10.
68 Pesole, Annarosa/ Urzí Brancati, Maria Cesira/Fernández-Macías, Enrique/Biagi, Fed-
erico/González Vázquez, Ignacio, Platform Workers in Europe (fn. 5), p. 31.
69 Ibid.
70 OECD, Measuring Platform Mediated Workers (fn. 47), p. 8.
71 Ibid., p. 19.
72 Ibid., p. 14.
73 Piasna, Agnieszka, Counting Gigs. How Can we Measure the Scale of Online Plat-
form Work? (fn. 6), p. 5.
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the share of occasional platform workers in the estimated number of
platform workers.74
(8) Platform work is often informal or not precisely regulated, which
might lead to an underestimation of the real dimension of the plat-
form economy.75 However, there is a lack of statistical and empirical
data on the prevalence of undeclared platform work.76
Cross-Border Labour Flows in Platform Work
The use of online labour platforms to access the global market is historical-
ly older than national labour platforms. For example, AMT was founded
already in 2005.77 Online crowdsourcing platforms can be seen as a further
step in the development of “global sourcing” of value chains.78
There are different forms of cross-border online platform work. A plat-
form worker can perform work in one (home or other) country or more
countries – while the client, platform or both can be located in another
(EU or third) country or countries. The more platforms and/or clients, the
more complicated constellations are possible.79 In the case of crowdwork,
platforms and clients can always select a country which does not provide
for any limitations or obstacles to platform work or which has not estab-
lished any labour and social guarantees for platform workers. Mark Gra-
ham and Mohammad Amir Anwar write about a so-called “planetary
labour market” in digital work80, where “clients can choose who they work
3.
74 OECD, Measuring Platform Mediated Workers (fn. 47), p. 19.
75 Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien/Smits, Ine/Hauben,
Harald/Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivi-
er, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform
Workers (fn. 9), p. 93.
76 Ibid.
77 Huws, Ursula, Where did Online Platforms Come From? The Virtualization of
Work Organization and the New Policy Challenges it Raises (fn. 22), p. 30.
78 Ibid., p. 34.
79 Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien/Smits, Ine/Hauben,
Harald/Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivi-
er, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform
Workers (fn. 9), p. 94.
80 Graham, Mark/Anwar, Mohammad Amir, The Global Gig Economy: Towards a
Planetary Labour Market?, in: First Monday, 24 (2019) 4, DOI: https://doi.org/10.
5210/fm.v24i4.9913. Accessed 12 September 2020.
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with, among a larger pool of people from around the globe”.81 According
to Mark Graham and Mohammad Amir Anwar, a planetary market does
not eliminate geography, but rather takes advantage of it.82 Furthermore,
platforms profit from the huge over-supply of labour that pushes down
labour costs and restricts the ability of workers to bargain for better condi-
tions,83 including social security benefits. Klaus Schwab stresses that in
these cases, the relocation of work to foreign countries happens invisibly.84
Researchers speak of “virtual migration”, which occurs without the spatial
movement of the body across borders but facilitates new forms of the glob-
al division of labour.85
In order to properly assess the need for transnational regulation and co-
ordination of social security and the required level and type of regulation
(e.g. at the international, European or regional level; in bilateral or interna-
tional agreements; or with a view to recommendations or directives at the
European level), it is necessary to have a clear picture about online plat-
form labour flows, where clients (customers), platforms and platform
workers are located in different countries respectively. At the moment, we
only have a fragmented picture about cross-border labour flows related to
on-demand platforms (“real migration”) as well as to crowdwork (referred
to as “virtual migration”). Furthermore, there is only limited data available
on the prevalence of cross-border platform work.86
Despite the huge gaps in information about cross-border labour flows,
we can note several trends. First, the younger a platform, the more local is
its character (local clients, local platform workers). The longer-established
platforms have a broader spread of nationalities. Among the platform
workers registered with the German platform “Clickworker”, for instance,
about one third are from Germany, one third are from other European
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Graham, Mark/Anwar, Mohammad Amir, Labour, in: Ash, James/Kitchin, Rob/
Leszczynski, Agnieszka (eds.), Digital Geographies, Los Angeles: Sage 2018.
84 Schwab, Klaus, Die Vierte Industrielle Revolution, München: Pantheon Verlag
2016, p. 75.
85 Website of the project Digitalisation of Labour and Migration. Berliner Institut
für empirische Integrations- und Migrationsforschung, http://www.platform-mob
ilities.net/en/konzepte-notizen. Accessed 12 September 2020.
86 Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter /Lenaerts, Karolien /Smits, Ine/Hauben,
Harald/Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivi-
er, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform
Workers (fn. 9), p. 94.
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countries, and the remaining third are from the Americas.87 According to
its own figures, the platform “Upwork” counts eight million crowdwork-
ers from 180 countries.88 Second, language constraints dictate regional
boundaries; for example, clients and platform workers speaking German
are distributed, in addition to Germany, also across Switzerland and Aus-
tria. At the same time, access to certain global work platforms for non-na-
tive language speakers is likely to be associated with higher levels of educa-
tional attainment, even if the work carried out does not itself require high
levels of education.89
Implications for Social Security in Empirical Studies
Platform Work as a Main Job and as a Side Job, and Motivation of Platform
Workers
There is interesting evidence that studies consider as a “main job” not
work for one single platform, but platform work as a kind of work/job it-
self. Such an approach is typical of studies exploring self-employment,
which demonstrate the distribution of the self-employed across economic
sectors.
All existing studies devoted to platform work come to the result that
platform work is mainly (to an extent of approximately 70 percent) carried
out as a side job in addition to a second or multiple jobs. This confirms
studies covering only crowdwork which have shown that for about one
third of crowdworkers, platform work was the main source of income. For
example, the ILO study of 2018 shows that for 32 percent of crowdworkers
platform work was the main source of income.90 The majority of platform
IV.
1.
87 Eurofound, New Forms of Employment, Publications Office of the European
Union (fn. 3), pp. 112-113.
88 Däubler, Wolfgang, Herausforderungen für das Arbeitsrecht – Deregulierung,
Globalisierung, Digitalisierung, in: Arbeit und Recht, (2016) 8-9, p. 333.
89 Forde, Chris/Stuart, Mark/Simon, Joyce/Oliver, Liz/Valizade, Danat/Alberti, Gabriella/
Hardy, Kate/Trappmann, Vera/Umney, Charles/Carson, Calum, The Social Protec-
tion of Workers in the Platform Economy (fn. 10), p. 31.
90 Digital Labour Platforms and the Future of Work: Towards Decent Work in the
Online World (fn. 9), p. 41.
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workers provide more than one type of service and are active on two or
more platforms.91
In order to analyse the need for social protection, it is important to con-
sider the reasons for working in the platform economy, and whether such
activity is chosen voluntarily or due to insufficient alternatives on the
labour market. Numerous studies have shown the following:
(1) The most common reason for being a platform worker is the flexibility
in working arrangements, working time and location.92
(2) Another important reason is the opportunity to earn an additional in-
come.93
(3) For some categories of workers, it is the only option on the labour
market, e.g. for foreign workers. The studies confirm that foreign-born
workers are significantly more likely to provide services via digital
labour platforms than native workers.94 For example, a study of 2017
on Finland states that 70-80 percent of all food couriers were immi-
grants.95 The first large-scale statistical data on the share of migrant
workers was presented in the survey of the BLS of May 2017 concern-
ing electronically mediated employment.96
(4) Other categories who are interested in platform work are persons with
disabilities and women with family obligations as they can only work
91 Pesole, Annarosa/Urzí Brancati, Maria Cesira/Fernández-Macías, Enrique/Biagi, Fed-
erico/González Vázquez, Ignacio, Platform Workers in Europe (fn. 5), p. 4.
92 Forde, Chris/Stuart, Mark/Simon, Joyce/Oliver, Liz/Valizade, Danat/Alberti, Gabriella/
Hardy, Kate/Trappmann, Vera/Umney, Charles/Carson, Calum, The Social Protec-
tion of Workers in the Platform Economy (fn. 10), p. 44; OECD, The Future of
Social Protection: What Works for Non-Standard Workers? (fn. 11), p. 33.
93 Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien/Smits, Ine/Hauben,
Harald/Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivi-
er, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform
Workers (fn. 9), p. 72.
94 Urzí Brancati, Maria Cesira/Pesole, Annarosa/Fernandez Macias, Enrique, New Evi-
dence on Platform Workers in Europe (fn. 51), pp. 4, 26-27.
95 Does the Worker have a Say in the Platform Economy? The Time of Opportuni-
ties project, SAK, Autumn 2017, p. 8, https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/sak_finla
nd_report_does-the-worker-have-a-say-in-the-platform-economy.pdf. Accessed 12
September 2020.
96 U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Popula-
tion Survey, Electronically Mediated Employment (fn. 56).
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from home.97 A “strong difference by gender for those who could only
‘work from home’” in favour of women has been shown.98
(5) Platform work could be a stepping stone into a labour relationship,
e.g. for the long-time unemployed.99 Nearly half of those for whom
platform work is a main source of income were unemployed for more
than one year in the past five years.100
Researchers point out that, at the moment, there is a lack of knowledge as
to whether there are any differences in motivation between those for
whom platform work is a side job and those that generate their main in-
come from platform work.101 Data contradicts the myth of student plat-
form workers. The study by Huws et al.102 demonstrates that the propor-
tion of students among crowdworkers is not higher than their general dis-
tribution in the labour force. In Berg’s survey103 students make up 14.5
percent, and according to Serfling104 nine percent.
There are different reasons and factors that determine the choice of plat-
form work as a main activity: type of platforms and platform work (e.g.
high-skilled workers105), the relative difference between average incomes
in the country of the client and the country of the worker. Berg discloses
97 Weißbuch “Arbeiten 4.0” – Antworten der BA auf die Herausforderungen der
Digitalisierung, p. 13, https://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Thema-
Arbeitsmarkt/Arbeiten-4-0/stellungnahme-ba.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.
Accessed 12 September 2020; Joyce, Simon/Stuart, Mark/Forde, Chris/Valizade,
Danat, Work and Social Protection in the Platform Economy in Europe (fn. 20),
p. 21.
98 Digital Labour Platforms and the Future of Work: Towards Decent Work in the
Online World (fn. 9), p. 38.
99 Forde, Chris/Stuart, Mark/Simon, Joyce/Oliver, Liz/Valizade, Danat/Alberti, Gabriel-
la/Hardy, Kate/Trappmann, Vera/Umney, Charles/Carson, Calum, The Social Pro-
tection of Workers in the Platform Economy (fn. 10), p. 56 f.
100 Joyce, Simon/Stuart, Mark/Forde, Chris/Valizade, Danat, Work and Social Protec-
tion in the Platform Economy in Europe (fn. 20), p. 21.
101 Ibid., p. 20.
102 Huws, Ursula/Spencer, Neil H./Syrdal, Dag S./Holts, Kaire, Work in the European
Gig Economy, FEPS/Uni Europa/Hertfordshire University, 2017, p. 37, https://u
hra.herts.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/2299/19922/Huws_U._Spencer_N.H._Syrdal_D
.S._Holt_K._2017_.pdf?sequence=2. Accessed 12 September 2020.
103 Berg, Janine, Income Security in the On-Demand Economy: Findings and Policy
Lessons from a Survey of Crowdworkers (fn. 9), p. 5.
104 Serfling, Oliver, Crowdworking Monitor No. 1, in: Discussion Papers in Behav-
ioral Sciences and Economics (2018) 4.
105 Freudenberg, Christoph, Rising Platform Work. Scope, Insurance Coverage and
Good Practices among ISSA Countries (fn. 47), pp. 10-11.
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that motivations for platform work depend on the country of origin, e.g.
Indian workers are more likely to rely on it as a source of main income
while US workers consider it as secondary income.106
Characteristics of Dependence
Dependence as a Legal Category
From the social law perspective, the issue of “dependence” of platform
workers is relevant for the employment classification for social law purpos-
es, for the determination of the need for social protection as well as for the
justification of the social responsibility of third persons who are not parties
to the employment relationship.
Many researchers have referred to elements of dependence107 of plat-
form workers. According to the prevalent opinion in the literature, plat-
form workers are at least economically dependent. This dependence is of-
ten evidenced through new control and monitoring mechanisms on the
part of platform providers. However, it has not been conclusively clarified
whether a new manifestation of personal dependence or of economic de-
pendence has emerged, or whether these are cases of a completely new di-
mension of dependence. Wiebke Brose, for example, speaks of a new form
of dependence on the platform provider – which she describes as a subtype
of economic dependence which is taking on a new quality due to digital
control mechanisms.108
Because of the heterogeneity of platform workers and the various kinds
of platform work and platforms, as well as because of different strategies
concerning the allocation of tasks (allocated by the platform, by the client
2.
a)
106 Berg, Janine, Income Security in the On-Demand Economy: Findings and Policy
Lessons from a Survey of Crowdworkers (fn. 9), p. 11.
107 Selzer, Dirk, Crowdworking – Arbeitsrecht zwischen Theorie und Praxis, in:
Husemann, Tim/Wietfeld, Anne (eds.), Zwischen Theorie und Praxis – Heraus-
forderungen des Arbeitsrechts. Dokumentation der 5. Assistententagung im Ar-
beitsrecht vom 16. - 17.07.2015, Bochum 2015, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2015, pp.
27-48; Waas, Bernd, Crowdwork in Germany, in: Waas, Bernd/Liebman, Wilma
B./Lyubarsky Andrew/Katsutoshi, Kezuka (eds.), Crowdwork. A Comparative
Law Perspective, Frankfurt am Main: Bund Verlag 2017, pp. 142-186.
108 Brose, Wiebke, Von Bismarck zu Crowdwork: Über die Reichweite der Sozialver-
sicherungspflicht in der digitalen Arbeitswelt, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Sozial-
recht, (2017) 1, p. 14.
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or by the worker),109 it is not possible to define one single pattern of de-
pendence for either the platform provider or client(s). While platform
workers are often similar to employees or economically dependent self-em-
ployed persons in some aspects, there are also aspects in which they are dif-
ferent. In my opinion, the new business model of platform work brings
about a new type of dependence for the workers involved. When we try to
identify the most salient features that characterise this new type of depen-
dence in relation to platform workers, the following aspects are to be high-
lighted:
(1) Traditionally, economically dependent self-employed persons are de-
pendent on a client. Platform workers can be dependent on a client as
well as on the platform or on both. In the case of work on demand,
economic and personal dependence exists predominantly in relation to
the platform and not to certain clients. However, through rating and
evaluation mechanisms clients are also involved in the exercise of con-
trol. It seems that in the case of crowdwork, sometimes the depen-
dence on a client is higher than on a platform and not limited to
ratings. There are findings that “clients often give detailed instructions
on how to complete the work or directly supervise work execution and
control the work processes”110.
(2) According to an assumption common until now in social law legisla-
tion, economically dependent self-employed persons typically work for
one client or chiefly for one client. The idea behind the “one client cri-
terion” was that if somebody works predominantly for one person, he
or she cannot freely operate on the market given the extensive time
commitment. The studies indicate that the majority of crowdworkers
work for several clients. The abovementioned ILO study shows that
eleven percent of freelancers have only one main client; 56 percent of
them work with two to five different clients per month.111 Workers on
demand have numerous clients.
109 Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien/Smits, Ine/Hauben,
Harald/Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivi-
er, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform
Workers (fn. 9), p. 55.
110 Aleksynska, Mariya/Bastrakova, Anastasia/Kharchenko, Natalia, Work on Digital
Labour Platforms in Ukraine: Issues and Policy Perspectives, International
Labour Office – Geneva, ILO, 2018, p. 33.
111 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
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(3) A long-lasting relationship with a client serves as an indicator of econo-
mic dependence.112 Studies demonstrate the high volatility of platform
workers. The relation with a client is rather short (especially in the case
of micro tasks and work on demand) and the fluctuation rate of clients
is high. However, the relation with a platform can be of long duration.
During the course of such relationships platforms can influence partic-
ipation in other platforms by high or low multihoming costs, or
through dependence on ratings or reputation systems.
(4) Many platform workers participate in more than one platform.113
Dependence Explored in Empirical Studies
As has already been mentioned, many empirical studies consider “platform
work” as a main job. Furthermore, they refer to “financial dependence on
platform work”. Some researchers differentiate between those platform
workers who exclusively work on platforms and call them work-dependent
platform workers, and those who have one or more jobs in addition to plat-
form work and term the latter non-dependent platform workers.114 Other re-
searchers use the term financial dependence to describe how much income
is generated from platform work,115 and this term is also used in the study
for the EMPL Committee.116 According to this study, 16 percent of the re-
spondents – who were online platform workers (crowdworkers) – were
heavily (more than 70 percent of their income comes from platform work)
financially dependent on the platform economy, nine percent were highly
(50-69 percent of income) and 13 percent were moderately (26-49 percent of
income) financially dependent on platform work. Hereby, 68 percent of
the respondents had one or multiple other jobs outside of the platform
b)
112 Willemsen, Heinz Josef/Müntefering, Michael, Begriff und Rechtsstellung arbeit-
nehmerähnlicher Personen: Versuch einer Präzisierung, in: Neue Zeitschrift für
Arbeitsrecht (NZA), 4 (2018), pp. 193-201, 195.
113 Leimeister, Jan Marco/Durward, David/Zogaj, Shkodran, Crowd Worker in
Deutschland. Eine empirische Studie zum Arbeitsumfeld auf externen Crowd-
sourcing-Plattformen, Study 323, Hans Böckler Stiftung, p. 31, https://www.boec
kler.de/pdf/p_study_hbs_323.pdf. Accessed 12 September 2020.
114 Joyce, Simon/Stuart, Mark/Forde, Chris/Valizade, Danat, Work and Social Protec-
tion in the Platform Economy in Europe (fn. 20), p. 20.
115 Forde, Chris/Stuart, Mark/Simon, Joyce/Oliver, Liz/Valizade, Danat/Alberti, Gabriel-
la/Hardy, Kate/Trappmann, Vera/Umney, Charles/Carson, Calum, The Social Pro-
tection of Workers in the Platform Economy (fn. 10), p. 48.
116 Ibid.
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economy.117 The COLLEEM I study came to the result that 2.3 percent of
the European working-age population in 14 Member States earned 50 or
more percent of their income via platforms (both crowdwork and work on
demand).118 However, the recent COLLEEM II study showed a decline of
the number of such persons to 1.4 percent (a drop of 0.9 percent).119 Si-
multaneously, this study indicates a small increase of platform work as a
side job.120
Workers with a stable job outside the platform economy have higher in-
come security than those who rely on their platform earnings.121 High-
skilled workers may use platform work to supplement their income. Low-
skilled workers without a permanent job are likely to become more depen-
dent on platform work as their primary source of income.122 For these
groups of platform workers also organisational and algorithmic dependen-
cy on platforms has been demonstrated and their need for social protec-
tion is comparable with that of employees. Studies show an interrelation
between dependencies on platform work or on platforms and the need for
social protection coverage of platform workers. The study for the Euro-
pean Commission outlines that “those who depend the most on platform
work are covered the least”123.
117 Ibid.
118 Pesole, Annarosa/Urzí Brancati, Maria Cesira/Fernández-Macías, Enrique/Biagi, Fed-
erico/González Vázquez, Ignacio, Platform Workers in Europe (fn. 5), p. 3.
119 Urzí Brancati, Maria Cesira/Pesole, Annarosa/Fernandez Macias, Enrique, New Evi-
dence on Platform Workers in Europe (fn. 51), p. 3.
120 Ibid.
121 Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien/Smits, Ine/Hauben,
Harald/ Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-
Olivier, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Plat-
form Workers (fn. 9), p. 75.
122 Forde, Chris/Stuart, Mark/Simon, Joyce/Oliver, Liz/Valizade, Danat/Alberti, Gabriel-
la/Hardy, Kate/Trappmann, Vera/Umney, Charles/Carson, Calum, The Social Pro-
tection of Workers in the Platform Economy (fn. 10), p. 48; Zachary, Kilhoffer/De
Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien /Smits, Ine/Hauben, Harald/ Waeyaert,
Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivier, Sophie, Study
to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform Workers (fn. 9), p.
72; Conen, Wieteke/Schippers, Joop, Self-Employment: Between Freedom and Inse-
curity, in: Conen, Wieteke/Schippers, Joop, Self-Employment as Precarious Work.
A European Perspective, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2019, p. 7.
123 Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien/Smits, Ine/Hauben,
Harald/Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivi-
er, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform
Workers (fn. 9), p. 72.
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We can assume that financial dependency on platform work might indicate
a new pattern of dependence in comparison to the well-known legal con-
struction of economic dependency of dependent self-employed workers on
the principal/(main) client. However, this is rather a sign of the vulnerabil-
ity of workers and a reflection of the labour fragmentation which is charac-
teristic also for other types of non-standard work (e.g. on-call work, zero-
hours contracts). Workers just struggle to accumulate orders from differ-
ent platforms in order to make ends meet, especially if such a kind of em-
ployment is their main activity. The category of financial dependence on
platform work explored in empirical studies is not suitable to justify the
classification of platform workers as employees and to justify social respon-
sibility of platforms over workers; it is only a socio-economic characteristic
of platform workers.
Interestingly, this study simultaneously outlines that “self-employed
platform workers who are economically dependent on a single platform
[…] appear to be the most vulnerable and least protected by […] social
protection legislation at both national and EU level”124. It confirms the ra-
tionale and legitimacy of the already existing strategy of imposing social
insurance responsibility on the (main) client for dependent self-employed
contractors as this is provided for in the social legislation of some Euro-
pean countries.125
Access of Platform Workers to Social Protection
The general outcome of the different studies is evidence of a low level of
access to social protection of platform workers, especially those for whom
it is a main job. Insurance coverage differs significantly if platform work is
carried out as a side job. Those for whom platform work is a side activity
rely on social protection from salaried employment.126
3.
124 Ibid.
125 Chesalina, Olga, Extending Social Security Schemes for “Non-Employees”: A
Comparative Perspective, in: Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales
Arbeits- und Sozialrecht, (2020) 1, pp. 3-12.
126 Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien /Smits, Ine/Hauben,
Harald/ Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-
Olivier, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Plat-
form Workers (fn. 9), p. 26 and p. 72; Garben, Sacha, Protecting Workers in the
Online Platform Economy: An Overview of Regulatory and Policy Develop-
ments in the EU, European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, Luxembourg:
Publications Office of the European Union, 2017, https://osha.europa.eu/fr/publi
Chapter 2: Platform Work: Critical Assessment of Empirical Findings
61
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002, am 02.12.2021, 16:03:17
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
The study by Joyce et al. demonstrates that between 68 percent and 82
percent of micro task platform workers (for whom it is a main job) had no
access to the different branches of social protection with the exception of
healthcare.127 Berg’s study of 2016 indicates that 90.6 percent of crowd-
workers (AMT workers in the US) did not contribute to social security128
(in the US reality this is equivalent to not having access to social protec-
tion). This situation calls forth concerns among platform workers about
their social security and accident insurance in particular.129
Those who carry out platform work as a main job are much less likely to
be saving towards a pension – being the case for less than one in five –
than those that carry out platform work as a side activity.130 The study for
the EMPL Committee (without specification as to which kind of platform
work is considered – main or side job) reveals that only just over a third of
micro task platform workers (35.5 percent) were paying into a personal
pension.131 Concerning access to different social benefits, this study report-
ed that 22.6 percent of all platform workers have no access to healthcare,
47 percent – to sickness benefits, 60.6 – disability, 58.1 percent – old age,
69.5 – pregnancy, 63.1 percent – unemployment benefits.132 This is a very
interesting outcome which shows that “workers who were relatively heavi-
ly dependent on platform work were only marginally disadvantaged in
cations/protecting-workers-online-platform-economy-overview-regulatory-and-p
olicy-developments; Berg, Janine, Income Security in the On-Demand Economy:
Findings and Policy Lessons from a Survey of Crowdworkers (fn. 9), p. 16; Euro-
found, Employment and Working Conditions of Selected Types of Platform
Work (fn. 9), p. 19; Pesole, Annarosa/Urzí Brancati, Maria Cesira/Fernández-Macías,
Enrique/Biagi, Federico/González Vázquez, Ignacio, Platform Workers in Europe
(fn. 5).
127 Joyce, Simon/Stuart, Mark/Forde, Chris/Valizade, Danat, Work and Social Protec-
tion in the Platform Economy in Europe (fn. 20), p. 25.
128 Berg, Janine, Income Security in the On-Demand Economy: Findings and Policy
Lessons from a Survey of Crowdworkers (fn. 9).
129 Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien/Smits, Ine/Hauben,
Harald/Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivi-
er, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform
Workers (fn. 9), p. 72.
130 Joyce, Simon/Stuart, Mark/Forde, Chris/Valizade, Danat, Work and Social Protec-
tion in the Platform Economy in Europe (fn. 20), pp. 22, 25.
131 Forde, Chris/Stuart, Mark/Simon, Joyce/Oliver, Liz/Valizade, Danat/Alberti, Gabriel-
la/Hardy, Kate/Trappmann, Vera/Umney, Charles/Carson, Calum, The Social Pro-
tection of Workers in the Platform Economy (fn. 10), p. 57.
132 Ibid.; Florisson, Rebecca/Mandl, Irene, Platform Work: Types and Implications for
Work and Employment – Literature Review (fn. 14), p. 99.
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terms of access to social protection, compared with occasional platform
workers”.133 This means that for a significant number of workers who have
another source of income, their other source(s) may come from other
forms of insecure, non-standard employment or self-employed work,134
which would also explain their limited access to social protection, especial-
ly to unemployment benefits and sickness benefits.135 The ILO study of
2018 confirms that of crowdworkers engaged in other paid jobs, 33 per-
cent were in non-standard employment, including part-time and casual
work, and 25 percent were freelancers.136 However, we have to keep in
mind that many studies first of all represent the situation of micro task
platform workers,137 who are mostly unskilled or low-skilled, and we can-
not transfer these results to the entirety of platform workers. Taking the
German example, the study by Leimeister has shown that more than 50
percent of workers who carry out mostly unskilled and low-skilled “micro
tasks” (which proved to be particularly precarious) are not insured in a
pension scheme at all.138
However, platform workers differ significantly from each other in terms
of income; dependence on platform work and their access to social protec-
tion. For instance, the study by Bertscheck et al.139 has shown that in Ger-
many, in 2016, about 44 percent of crowdworkers were included in a pri-
vate pension scheme; 85 percent were insured in statutory health insu-
rance, eight percent got social benefits in terms of unemployment benefits,
social assistance and social welfare benefits.
A very important outcome of the research by Freudenberg is that in two
thirds of the 30 ISSA members, additional income from platform work as a
133 Forde, Chris/Stuart, Mark/Simon, Joyce/Oliver, Liz/Valizade, Danat/Alberti, Gabriel-
la/Hardy, Kate/Trappmann, Vera/Umney, Charles/Carson, Calum, The Social Pro-
tection of Workers in the Platform Economy (fn. 10), p. 64.
134 Ibid., p. 55.
135 Ibid., p. 65.
136 Digital Labour Platforms and the Future of Work: Towards Decent Work in the
Online World (fn. 9), p. 42.
137 E.g. the study by Forde et al. (fn. 10), p. 11 is based on an original survey of
1,200 micro task platform workers across four established platforms: AMT,
Clickworker, CrowdFlower and Microworkers.
138 Leimeister, Jan Marco/Durward, David/Zogaj, Shkodran, Crowd Worker in
Deutschland. Eine empirische Studie zum Arbeitsumfeld auf externen Crowd-
sourcing-Plattformen (fn. 113).
139 BMAS, Befragung zum sozioökonomischen Hintergrund und zu den Motiven
von Crowdworkern, Forschungsbericht 462, 2016, http://www.bmas.de/SharedD
ocs/Downloads/DE/PDF-Publikationen/Forschungsberichte/fb-462-endbericht-cr
owdworker.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4. Accessed 12 September 2020.
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side job is not taken into consideration for social security purposes.140 This
can be explained by different reasons: legislation does not provide for the
coverage of extra income at all or merely below a certain threshold; plat-
form work is carried out informally.141
Comparison of the Situation concerning Access to Social Protection of
Platform Workers and Non-Standard Workers, and that of Self-Employed
Persons
As already indicated in the Introduction, studies that analyse the situation
of platform workers are divided into two main groups: One group of re-
search is dedicated exclusively to platform workers. The other group of
studies investigates the situation of platform workers within the broader
categories of “non-standard employed” or “self-employed”. Many studies
point out that one of the most important factors that explains the limited
access of platform workers to social protection is their classification as self-
employed workers.142 The challenges for the social protection of platform
workers are regarded to be the same as the challenges for persons in other
non-standard forms of employment and self-employed persons. Therefore,
it has been proposed to improve the social protection of self-employed and
non-standard workers in general, not only that of platform workers.143
Despite the fact that there are many similar challenges concerning ac-
cess to social protection among these groups, caution is advised concern-
ing the automatic transfer of the outcomes. Research points out that in or-
der to answer whether we need a special tailor-made solution for platform
workers or rather solutions for all atypical employees or self-employed
workers in total, it is necessary to compare the coverage of social security
4.
140 Freudenberg, Christoph, Rising Platform Work. Scope, Insurance Coverage and
Good Practices among ISSA Countries (fn. 47), p. 18.
141 Ibid.
142 Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/Lenaerts, Karolien/Smits, Ine/Hauben,
Harald/Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos, Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivi-
er, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on the Working Conditions of Platform
Workers (fn. 9), p. 71.
143 Ibid., p. 71. Piasna, Agnieszka, Counting Gigs. How Can we Measure the Scale of
Online Platform Work? (fn. 6), p. 17; Aleksynska, Mariya/Bastrakova, Anastasia/
Kharchenko, Natalia, Work on Digital Labour Platforms in Ukraine: Issues and
Policy Perspectives (fn. 110); Berg, Janine, Income Security in the On-Demand
Economy: Findings and Policy Lessons from a Survey of Crowdworkers (fn. 9).
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in the entire working population at the same time.144 This is the only way
to assess whether they have particular deficiencies in access to social securi-
ty and in the financing of social security.145
While platform work is mostly considered de jure as self-employment, it
is interesting to compare the development of platform work with the de-
velopment of self-employment in the appropriate country. On the one
hand, official statistics and studies do not show an increase of self-employ-
ment taking place in general.146 The studies show a steady decrease in the
share of self-employed persons in Bulgaria, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Switzerland, Hungry and Portugal. On the contrary, in
the UK, Netherlands and Slovakia, a substantial increase of self-employ-
ment can be observed.147 Nevertheless, there are some new tendencies con-
cerning self-employment: firstly, the number of self-employed persons
with employees has fallen;148 secondly, there are changes in motivation
among the self-employed – for every fifth, this form of employment is in-
voluntary;149 thirdly, there is a rise in part-time self-employment while his-
torically this form of self-employment has been the exception.150
On the other hand, it remains unclear whether platform workers are to
be counted among the self-employed.151 While the classification of “self-
employed” should be the result of a legal review, in some studies, for ex-
ample in the labour force studies, the employment classification is based
on the subjective view of the interviewed person152 with the result that –
144 Cf. BMAS, Plattformbasierte Erwerbsarbeit: Stand der empirischen Forschung
(fn. 62), p. 22.
145 Ibid.
146 There are different reasons that can explain an increase or decrease in self-em-
ployment. For example, the fall in numbers of self-employed workers in the UK
in the late 1990s was the result of a reclassification of some workers in the con-
struction industry. See Choonara, Joseph, Insecurity, Precarious Work and Labour
Markets, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan 2019, p. 113.
147 Schippers, Joop, Labour Market Flexibility, Self-Employment and Precariousness,
in: Conen, Wieteke/Schippers, Joop, Self-Employment as Precarious Work. A Euro-
pean Perspective, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2019, p. 30.
148 Joyce, Simon/Stuart, Mark/Forde, Chris/Valizade, Danat, Work and Social Protec-
tion in the Platform Economy in Europe (fn. 20), p. 18.
149 Ibid.
150 Choonara, Joseph, Insecurity, Precarious Work and Labour Markets (fn. 146), p.
113.
151 Joyce, Simon/Stuart, Mark/Forde, Chris/Valizade, Danat, Work and Social Protec-
tion in the Platform Economy in Europe (fn. 20), p. 18.
152 Choonara, Joseph, Insecurity, Precarious Work and Labour Markets (fn. 146), p.
113.
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for example in the study of Pesole et al. – 68.1 percent of platform workers
claimed to be employees.153
Taking into account the result that platform work is carried out as a side
job, it would be very important to compare the access to social protection
of side platform workers with workers in other forms of non-standard
work and self-employment also carried out as a secondary job. However,
until now little is known about non-standard employment and self-em-
ployment as a side job as studies and labour force surveys predominantly
focus on a main occupation. This information is easier to find in the na-
tional reports than in cross-national studies. According to one opinion,
having a side job can indicate a reduction in standard employment.154
However, the rate of persons with a second job in the EU is rather low
(about four percent) and stable.155 Eurofound demonstrates that according
to data from the sixth European Working Conditions Survey nine percent
of the self-employed without employees have another job.156 However,
these studies probably do not reflect the situation in certain European
countries. For example, in France at the end of 2016, 23 percent of self-em-
ployed persons were also employees or used to be employees during the
year. These averages reveal very different situations: half of the persons in-
volved in pluriactivity have a main activity, whether as employees or self-
employed persons, from which they earn a large income as compared to
other self-employed persons with a less lucrative additional activity. The
other persons involved in pluriactivity have both quite low self-employed
incomes and wages: they often have intermittent activities or have just
launched their business.157 For example, the German study concerning
self-employed gainful activity demonstrates that almost one third of all
self-employed in Germany are working part-time; hereby, the share of self-
employed persons with a side job is only 6 percent.158 On the contrary, the
153 Pesole, Annarosa/Urzí Brancati, Maria Cesira/Fernández-Macías, Enrique/Biagi, Fed-
erico/González Vázquez, Ignacio, Platform Workers in Europe (fn. 5), p. 4.
154 Joyce, Simon/Stuart, Mark/Forde, Chris/Valizade, Danat, Work and Social Protec-
tion in the Platform Economy in Europe (fn. 20), p. 17.
155 Ibid.
156 Eurofound, Exploring Self-Employment in the European Union, Publications
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2017, p. 9.
157 One in four self-employed people also works as an employee. Cf. Guilhem,
Théron, The French National Institute for Statistics (Insee), https://www.insee.fr/
en/statistiques/4280464. Accessed 12 September 2020.
158 Conen, Wieteke/Schippers, Joop/Schulze Buschoff, Karin, Self-Employed without
Personnel between Freedom and Insecurity, Hans-Boeckler-Foundation, Study
No. 5, August 2016, pp. 30-31.
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study of Bertelsmann Stiftung shows that 99 percent of platform workers
in Germany carry out such an activity as a side job, and at the same time
have better social protection.159
First insights demonstrate that platform workers differ significantly
from each other in terms of income and that the spread of the household
income among digital self-employed workers is even greater than among
the “classic” self-employed.160 Furthermore, some research and studies
show that online platform work also poses new (and worse) health and
safety risks and that offline platform work goes along with higher injury
rates than other non-standard arrangements.161
Implications for Social Security from Practical Evidence
Concerning the social responsibility of platform operators, practice
demonstrates a deep contradiction between their alleged position as an in-
termediary and their factual reaction to the social risks of platform work-
ers, which demonstrates that platforms acknowledge their responsibility
for some social risks.162
The study of the European Social Insurance Platform demonstrates that
“Uber gives drivers and couriers across Europe a one-off childbirth al-
lowance of 1,000 euros. The benefit is granted under the following condi-
tions: Uber drivers must have completed 150 trips and Uber Eats couriers
30 deliveries in the two months prior to the birth of the child. In addition,
Uber gives drivers and couriers across Europe a sickness or injury compen-
sation for a maximum of 30 days on-trip and 15 days off-trip of varying
amounts according to the country [...] The same conditions apply to this
benefit as to the maternity or paternity benefit. In case of accidents while
V.
159 Baethge, Catherine Bettina/Boberach, Michael/Hoffmann, Anke/Wintermann, Ole,
Plattformarbeit in Deutschland, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019, https://www.bertels
mann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/Plattfo
rm_07lay.pdf, p. 6, Accessed 12 September 2020.
160 Leimeister, Jan Marco/Durward, David/Zogaj, Shkodran, Crowd Worker in
Deutschland. Eine empirische Studie zum Arbeitsumfeld auf externen Crowd-
sourcing-Plattformen (fn. 113), p. 43.
161 Garben, Sacha, Tackling Social Disruption in the Online Platform Economy.
Shifting the Narrative to the Benefits of (EU) Regulation (fn. 24), p. 5.
162 Fairwork, The Gig Economy and Covid-19: Looking Ahead, Oxford, United
Kingdom, 2020, p. 3.
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working causing permanent disability Uber gives drivers and couriers
across Europe a compensation. All of the above is provided by AXA”163.
Also, other platform operators have insured their workers on demand
(couriers, drivers) against accidents at work. For example, Yandex.Taxi in
Russia has insured all rides from 1 January 2017. According to the infor-
mation on the Yandex.Taxi website, in case of a car accident during trans-
portation the client and the driver can claim damages for harm caused to
life and health. The maximum amount of compensation is two million
roubles.164 Deliveroo offers its couriers “a scheme through private insurers
that gives its riders accident insurance against medical expenses and loss of
earnings”.165
The COVID-19 pandemic has imposed on workers on demand (couri-
ers, drivers etc.) immense risks to health and life. At the beginning of the
pandemic, platforms refused to provide any social benefits to platform
workers due to their status of “self-employed”/“independent contrac-
tors”.166 The strong pressure from regulators, driver’s advocates and the
media has forced platforms to respond to the health risk caused by
COVID-19. Many platforms, especially those that provide ride-hailing ser-
vices, have introduced regulations concerning sickness payments for plat-
form workers e.g. Uber, on 7 March 2020, launched a global financial assis-
tance policy for drivers diagnosed with COVID-19; on 15 March 2020 and
on 17 April 2020, the scope of the regulation was extended to drivers re-
quired to self-isolate.167 In fact, the conditions for individual payment are
similar to the conditions for payment on the part of an employer to an em-
ployee of continued remuneration in case of temporary incapacity to work
– cf. the eligibility conditions (waiting period) – at least one trip in the 30
days before the application for assistance; calculation of payment – average
163 ESIP, Are Social Security Systems Adapted to New Forms of Work Created by
Digital Platforms? (fn. 15), p. 27.
164 Yandex homepage, https://yandex.ru/support/taxi/insurance.html. Accessed 12
September 2020.
165 ESIP, Are Social Security Systems Adapted to New Forms of Work Created by
Digital Platforms? (fn. 15), p. 28, also Zachary, Kilhoffer/De Groen, Willem Pieter/
Lenaerts, Karolien /Smits, Ine/Hauben, Harald/ Waeyaert, Willem/Giacumacatos,
Elisa/Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Robin-Olivier, Sophie, Study to Gather Evidence on
the Working Conditions of Platform Workers (fn. 9), p. 122.
166 Fairwork, The Gig Economy and Covid-19: Looking Ahead (fn. 162), p. 13.
167 Katta, Srujana/Badger, Adam/Graham, Mark/Howson, Kelle/Ustek-Spilda, Funda/
Bertolini, Alessio, (Dis)embeddedness and (De)commodification: COVID-19,
Uber, and the Unravelling Logics of the Gig Economy, in: Dialogues in Human
Geography, 10 (2020) 2, p. 205.
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weekly earnings over the three months before the application; the maxi-
mum amount of payment – for up to 14 days.168
If platform companies, in fact, act only as a marketplace, there is no rea-
son to provide for insurance against accidents at work, sickness payments
or maternity benefits. They did indeed, de facto, admit responsibility for
different social risks. It does not matter whether they decided in favour of
such regulations voluntarily or rather involuntary as, for example, a reac-
tion to the COVID-19 crisis.
Conclusion
Numerous studies have already been dedicated to the measuring of plat-
form work and its characteristics. The issues of social security of platform
workers is still quite a young research field both in empirical studies and
social law research. The main goal of this chapter is to find out implica-
tions for social security from empirical findings and practical evidence.
Great insights have already been gained from empirical studies concerning
the social protection of platform workers. The most important finding
confirmed in all existing studies is that platform work is mainly carried out
as a side job in addition to one or several other jobs. However, those who
carry out low-qualified platform work as a main job, and especially for one
single platform, are protected the least against social risks. To conclude,
the following outcomes shall be stressed and proposals for future investiga-
tions be made.
1. The empirical studies provide a lot of information about the socio-de-
mographical characteristics of platform workers, their working condi-
tions, access to labour and social protection. However, careful attention
must be paid when interpreting the figures and trends from such em-
pirical research on platform work due to its numerous shortcomings.
2. The problem is that a large part of cross-national studies169 represent
the situation of crowdworkers and especially low-skilled micro taskers,
VI.
168 https://www.uber.com/en-BH/blog/update-covid-19-financial/. Accessed 12
September 2020.
169 Berg, Janine, Income Security in the On-Demand Economy: Findings and Policy
Lessons from a Survey of Crowdworkers (fn. 9); Digital Labour Platforms and
the Future of Work: Towards Decent Work in the Online World (fn. 9); Forde,
Chris/Stuart, Mark/Simon, Joyce/Oliver, Liz/Valizade, Danat/Alberti, Gabriella/
Hardy, Kate/Trappmann, Vera/Umney, Charles/Carson, Calum, The Social Protec-
tion of Workers in the Platform Economy (fn. 10).
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who can be more easily captured by online research than workers on
demand. Hereby, a significant part of the studies is based on research
(surveys and interviews) of the American platform AMT. Caution is ad-
vised as regards the extrapolation of outcomes in relation to depen-
dence patterns and access to social security from crowdworkers to other
groups of platform workers (e.g. workers on demand, high-skilled
workers) and to other countries with differing systems of social securi-
ty.
3. We share the opinion170 that for answering the question of how to ad-
dress the challenges of social protection for platform workers – whether
through a special tailor-made solution for platform workers (or even
special groups of platform workers) or rather through solutions that ad-
dress all non-standard workers – it is necessary to compare the formal
and effective coverage of social security in the entire working popula-
tion at the same time, and to find out whether there are special prob-
lems and gaps in access to social protection for platform workers.
4. Even if many challenges related to platform work are similar to the
challenges of non-standard employment and self-employment, the het-
erogeneity of platform workers and the fact that platform work is
chiefly carried out as a side job – which is not typical for the self-em-
ployed – should be taken into account. Further investigation concern-
ing the “main” job situation of side platform workers is welcomed. In
particular, it would be interesting whether the main job is carried out
in self-employment or salaried employment and, if the latter is the case,
what kind of salaried employment it is.
5. It is interesting that studies consider as a “main job” of platform work-
ers not work for one single platform, but platform work as a kind of
work what is typical for empirical studies exploring self-employment.
6. The category of financial dependence on platform work as explored in
empirical studies is not suitable for justifying the classification of plat-
form workers as employees and for justifying social responsibility of
platforms for workers; it is only a socio-economic characteristic of plat-
form workers that reflects labour fragmentation, which is characteristic
also of other types of non-standard work.
7. The patterns of personal and economic dependence of persons who
provide services via online labour platforms of platform providers or
clients should be further investigated. This research can assist the inves-
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tigations as to who controls the activity of platform workers and
whether platform providers are responsible for the service providers
and, hence, whether their participation in the financing of social pro-
tection for the service providers would be justified.
8. In the past years, it has become a matter of scientific debate whether
platform providers – or clients respectively – have to bear their share of
social (financial) responsibility towards contractors (whose labour force
might even be used to dump prices) and towards the state. To date, and
especially since the coronavirus crisis, many examples are known from
practice demonstrating that platforms are taking on responsibility for
social risks (work accident, sickness, childbirth) of workers on demand
concluding agreements with private insurance companies for the bene-
fit of such workers. This demonstrates a deep contradiction between
the alleged position of platforms as intermediaries and their factual re-
action to the social risks of workers on demand. On the one hand, the
assumption of responsibility by platforms – both voluntarily and un-
dertaken under public pressure – should be explored in further re-
search. Hereby, the changes of the platform operator’s policy (extend-
ing or reducing its social insurance responsibility) in the course of time
should be investigated. A very interesting case is presented in the form
of insurance schemes dedicated to platform workers by AXA insurance
company.
9. In some countries, social responsibility on the part of platforms in rela-
tion to platform workers has already been established in the legislation
(e.g. in France). Many platforms in France have launched partnerships
with private insurance companies for accident and liability protection
of platform workers.171 In other countries, some platforms have under-
taken such steps voluntarily. It would be very interesting to get more
empirical evidence in relation to enforcement aspects, the level of pro-
tection guaranteed and the allocation of costs between platforms and
platform workers.
10. Up to date, there is a lack of statistical and empirical data concerning
the share of informal (undeclared) platform work. This information is
very important not only for the correct estimation of the real size of the
platform economy. From the point of view of social security, this infor-
mation can help to prevent fraud related to the receipt of social assis-
171 See Kessler, Francis, Social Security in the Platform Economy: The French Exam-
ple – New Actors, New Regulations, Old Problems, Chapter 11, Section III, p.
270 in this book.
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tance benefits from the state (e.g. in cases where a worker pretends to
be unemployed, as platform work is not exactly regulated and often is
not seen as “work”). The reviewed persons should be asked whether
they are unemployed and whether they are receiving unemployment
benefits and social assistance benefits.
Olga Chesalina
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Chapter 3




During the last couple of decades, the motto was a flexible labour market.
The technological development, also known as the Industrial Revolution
4.0, contributed largely to this credo. It gave clients an extreme form of
flexibility. The platform economy constitutes a great example of this evolu-
tion. With this new technology, it is possible to pay a person a small fee
and “get rid” of him/her when they are no longer needed.1 Clients can use
platform workers’ services only when needed and pay when the workers
carry out a certain activity for them. By setting up a platform, the employ-
er – or rather, the consumer (?) – aims to keep a high level of flexibility and
to eliminate downtime to the greatest extent possible, while at the same
time trying to control as much as possible the entire process in order to
minimise transaction costs.2 Thanks to his labour (?), the platform worker
himself earns an additional reward, which may be low but not always in-
significant for the person concerned. Nevertheless, this evolution within
the flexible labour market presents the legislator with enormous chal-
lenges, both for the economy and for social law. Is it possible to consider
the sharing economy as a complement or a substitution to the current
economy? Does it give rise to unfair competition? How shall we, inciden-
tally, describe these activities? Is it work? Furthermore, it is noteworthy
that the activities carried out via electronic platforms are not described as
work but rather as a service rendered, a task, a gig or a ride in the case of
transport. Often, terms like work and employee are not used at all. It is as
I.
1 Marvit, Moshe Z., How Crowdworkers Became the Ghosts in the Digital Machine,
The Nation, 5 February 2014, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-cro
wdworkers-became-ghosts-digital-machine/. Accessed 30 July 2020.
2 Prassl, Jeremias/Risak, Martin, Uber, TaskRabbit, & Co: Platforms as Employers? Re-
thinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, in: Comparative Labour Law and Poli-
cy Journal, 37 (2016), p. 625.
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if one tried to indicate that it concerns a very special form of activities,
which do not fit within the traditional way of thinking about work and
the associated labour and social security protection. The persons carrying
out these activities are often not known to their client, who calls on them
through a click on a computer or an app.3 Likewise, the persons concerned
often have no idea at all who they are working for and if their clients are,
for instance, a private person or a company.4 However, it is exactly these
questions that come with certain risks, because labour law and social secu-
rity law do assume that work is carried out.
In social security law, contributions are often calculated on the basis of
the income from work. And can it be said at all times that the income
these persons earn is income from work? Can we therefore consider these
activities as work-related activities within the meaning of the social securi-
ty systems and, if not, is there not a risk that the financial basis of our sys-
tems will be compromised? It is, of course, exceptional not to qualify cer-
tain activities as work just because they would take place through a plat-
form. If activities are considered to be work in the case of contracted work,
they must, of course, also be seen as such if mediated through an app.5
This chapter describes the reaction of the Belgian legislator to the sharing
economy, the reaction of the Constitutional Court and reflects on a new
vision for social security.
The Sharing Economy under Belgian Social Law
Any work carried out in Belgium takes on one of three forms: work per-
formed in a subordinate capacity for remuneration on the basis of an em-
ployment contract (as an employee), work performed in execution of a sta-
tus determined unilaterally by the public authorities (as a civil servant),
and work performed in the context of a self-employed professional activity
(as a self-employed person). A person who carries out an activity in Bel-
gium comes under one of these three social statuses. In social security law,
II.
3 See also De Stefano, Valerio, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand
Work, Crowdwork and Labour Protection in the “Gig-Economy”, in: Conditions
of Work and Employment Series, International Labour Office, Geneva, 71 (2016),
p. 5, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/do
cuments/publication/wcms_443267.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2020.
4 Warter, Johannes, Crowdwork, Wien: OGB Verlag 2016, p. 297.
5 Clearly, this does not imply that some activities could not be excluded from social
law as a voluntary activity under national law.
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self-employed persons are all persons carrying out an activity which ex-
cludes them from social security for employees or from the status of civil
servant.6 The self-employed person follows the concept of (non-)employee,
so that employment contracts are seen under the exact same terms for both
groups in labour law and with regard to the status of self-employed per-
sons. In the end, the Belgian Employment Relationship Act, which cites
criteria on the basis of which a judgement is made as to whether there is
an employment contract,7 will establish if someone is an employee or a
self-employed person. Whether one is an employee or a self-employed per-
son will ultimately have to be judged by the court. Just as in many other
countries, the answer to this question is not always unequivocal.8 How-
ever, the impact of the answer to this question is not insignificant. The
protection of the platform worker is much more limited under the self-em-
ployed status than under the employee status. However, this question is
not always considered with the same attention by the platform worker in
question. Platform workers are often unaware of their status or of its con-
sequences in the short and long term. They often see platform work as an
ancillary activity, a side job which can sometimes lead to the start of their
own independent activity.
Therefore, every activity automatically falls under one single social sta-
tus. That is no different for a platform worker. Activities within the shar-
ing economy consequently fall under the traditional social and fiscal
regime. The platform worker will therefore, like any other active person,
be covered either by the social security system for employees or by that of
the self-employed. In most cases, however, the person concerned will be
considered to be self-employed.9 This is partly due to the self-employed sta-
tus being a residual category and also to the special tax presumption con-
tained in the social status of self-employed persons. Under this scheme,
there is a presumption – albeit a rebuttable one – on the basis of which a
person who declares profits, income, remuneration from professional ac-
tivities for tax purposes is presumed to be engaged in an independent activ-
6 Article 3 (1) of Royal Decree No. 38 of 27 July 1967 establishing the social status of
self-employed persons.
7 Article 328-342 of the Programme Law of 27 December 2006.
8 See CAR (Belgian Labour Relations Commission) and tribunal discussions on De-
liveroo.
9 See also Stevens, Yves, Social Security and Platform Work in Belgium: Dilemma
and Paradox, in: Devolder, Bram (ed.), The Platform Economy, Unravelling the
Legal Status of Online Intermediaries, Cambridge-Antwerp-Chicago: Intersentia
2019, pp. 262-263.
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ity. Only miscellaneous income that is occasional and falls outside a profes-
sional context is not included. If a platform worker declares professional
income, he will have to join a social security scheme as a self-employed
person. If he declares the income from the sharing economy as miscella-
neous income on his tax declaration form, this will be reclassified as pro-
fessional income as soon as this is done on a regular basis and thus, the sus-
picion of a self-employed (secondary) activity arises.
Indirect Legal Status
Faced with an increasing number of private individuals offering services to
other private individuals as mini-entrepreneurs, the Government wanted
to strengthen this form of sharing economy and at the same time remove it
from the grey zone in order to combat fraud. Therefore, it was decided to
establish a special regulation. Through the Programme Law of 1 July 2016,
a separate fiscal and social regulation was introduced for certain providers
within the sharing economy.10 Based on the realisation that the sharing
economy could constitute an important growth engine for the economy,
which therefore needed to be promoted, the legislator considered it impor-
tant for workers to be able to carry out a limited activity with minimal ad-
ministrative formalities in the context of the sharing economy.11 The sys-
tem consisted of introducing a separate category within miscellaneous in-
come for income generated in the context of the sharing economy. How-
ever, the income from occasional services as miscellaneous income was in
principle taxable at 33 percent but was often not declared. The Govern-
ment’s aim with the new regulation was not only to take out of its grey
zone income that had previously often escaped taxation, but also to en-
courage entrepreneurship by giving people the opportunity to carry out a
limited activity with a minimum of formalities.12 If a number of condi-
1.
10 Programme Law of 1 July 2016, Articles 35-39, https://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/c
gi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=nl&la=N&table_name=wet&cn=2016070101.
Accessed 20 August 2020.
11 Explanatory memorandum of the Programme Law of 2 June 2016, Parliamentary
Acts of the Belgian House of Representatives 2015-2016, No. 54-1875/001, p. 23.
12 Ibid. It must be mentioned that, in principle, someone who performs with a min-
imum of regularity or continuity a self-employed activity in addition to the job as
employee (self-employed persons in secondary employment) must pay social secu-
rity contributions to the social insurance fund he/she is affiliated with. The contri-
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tions were met, this income would henceforth be taxed at a net tax rate of
10 percent. The condition was that this income may not exceed a certain
threshold amount (EUR 5,210).13 In addition, the activities carried out un-
der this regulation could not be closely linked to an activity carried out as
a self-employed person or to the activity of the company of which he/she is
the manager.14 Nevertheless, closeness to the activities carried out as an
employee did not pose a problem. The reason for this distinction stemmed
from its objective. The aim of the regulation was, on the one hand, to en-
courage employees to try out self-employment and, on the other hand, to
give the self-employed the opportunity to try out another professional ac-
tivity.15 It would, of course, be a different case if a self-employed person
were to bring part of his activities under the cheaper status. In a nutshell,
the Government simply aimed to encourage self-employment. Of course, it
remains a delicate matter to determine which activities are closely related.
Does a sectoral approach suffice?
Another condition is that the sharing platform had to be recognised.
Through the recognition, the Federal Public Service Finances is not only
able to assess whether the services are eligible for the regulation, but also
ensures that the platforms provide the necessary cooperation in the deduc-
tion of the tax withheld on professional income and in the reporting of in-
come. This way, income from grey labour can be made visible. The service
provider must mention the gross amount of the income in its personal in-
come tax declaration. This is the amount actually paid or granted by or
through the platform, plus all amounts withheld by the platform or
through its intervention. At the end of the year, the sharing economy plat-
forms report this gross amount to the Federal Public Service Finances,
which checks that the exempted limit has not been exceeded.
This tax section was also linked to a social section. Both sections had to
be read together.16 In accordance with the social status regulations for self-
employed persons, income from platform work is not subject to Royal De-
cree No. 3817 for the activity related to this income, as long as platform
work-related income does not exceed the maximum amount provided for
in the Income Tax Code. No one can deny that the importance of the shar-
13 Income threshold to be indexed of EUR 3,255, which is set at EUR 5,210 for the
tax year 2019.
14 Explanatory memorandum of the Programme Law of 2 June 2016 (fn. 11), p. 24.
15 Ibid., p. 24.
16 Ibid., p. 12.
17 Royal Decree No. 38 of 27 July 1967 establishing the social status of self-employed
persons.
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ing economy is increasing. In fact, the Belgian Government set up this
regulation to not “miss the boat”. Moreover, the system of exemption from
fiscal and parafiscal contributions indirectly subsidises the entire sharing
economy. If one earns less than the threshold, the income is seen as miscel-
laneous income that does not give rise to the fiscal presumption of self-em-
ployment.18 Thus, the legislator intervened through an ingenious system
of fiscal and parafiscal exemption of income from platform work and regu-
lated aspects of platform work.
With the adoption of the Act on Economic Recovery and the Strength-
ening of Social Cohesion on 18 July 2018, the legislator went even one step
further.19 Indeed, instead of a reduced rate of 10 percent net tax burden,
there is now a total tax and social security contribution exemption for in-
come from certain forms of employment. Natural persons can now carry
out activities untaxed and exempt from contributions for a certain amount
of income limited to EUR 6,000 per year. This limit is higher than the one
set in the law of 2016.20 Also, the activities are not limited to the sharing
economy. There are three possibilities: association work, services from citi-
zen to citizen, and the sharing economy. For the first two categories, a sys-
tem has been set up that is in line with the existing tax system of the shar-
ing economy through a recognised platform and has also been linked to it
(in terms of maximum income limit). The law aimed to support associa-
tion work which is by its very nature based on voluntary cooperation be-
tween citizens without a traditional subordinate relationship and possibly
carried out at a legally limited fee.21 For a specific list of activities,22 natural
persons may provide support to persons organising an activity. In addition,
18 This is on condition that (a) the services are provided exclusively to natural per-
sons who are not acting in the course of their professional activity; (b) the services
are provided solely under contracts established by means of an approved electron-
ic platform; (c) the fees for the services are paid or granted to the service provider
solely by the platform referred to or through that platform (Article 36 of the Pro-
gramme Law).
19 Act on Economic Recovery and the Strengthening of Social Cohesion of 18 July
2018, https://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=nl&la=N&
cn=2018071803&table_name=wet. Accessed 20 August 2020.
20 However, it should be noted that the income from the sharing economy is now
added to the income from associations and occasional services between citizens.
21 Explanatory memorandum of the Government Bill on Economic Recovery and
the Strengthening of Social Cohesion of 11 December 2017, Parliamentary Acts
of the Belgian House of Representatives 2017-2018, No. 54-2839/001, p. 152.
22 As an animator, youth leader or coordinator providing sports initiation and/or
sports activities; sports trainer, sports instructor, sports coach, youth sports coor-
dinator; caretaker of youth, sports, cultural and artistic infrastructure; carer in
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and by extension, the legislator also wanted to take into account the limi-
ted services performed by citizens among themselves. After all, these ser-
vices are similar to association work, since they are also primarily carried
out during leisure time, but on the other hand, the difference lies in the
fact that the services are not performed through an organisation, but di-
rectly between citizens. Activities of this sort are occasional and are there-
fore not carried out on a regular basis. They are also described as a “favour
for a friend”. Finally, the system of the sharing economy is also mentioned,
whereby the system of an untaxed sideline will also be made applicable to
additional earnings from the sharing economy through recognised plat-
forms. The difference with the occasional services between citizens is that
in the sharing economy, the work is done through a recognised platform.23
Since an association or citizen does not work through a recognised plat-
form and in order to allow effective control, the performance of the associ-
ation’s work and the occasional performance between citizens must be de-
clared in advance.24 The application of this law is framed by a number of
conditions which are, however, much less stringent as far as the sharing
economy is concerned. Nevertheless, the law did not include a separate so-
cial section for the sharing economy.
As soon as a person earns more than the maximum threshold, that per-
son cannot be considered as an occasional service provider and the services
are by law irrefutably presumed to have been provided under the social sta-
tus of self-employment.25 In this sense, activities performed for remunera-
tion but outside the framework of the sharing economy or outside the
framework of occasional services will not be covered by this exemption.
Therefore, one performs work that falls under the status of either employ-
ee or of a self-employed person. This applies both if one exceeds the thresh-
old and if one does not comply with the application conditions. The inten-
childcare before, during and/or after school hours organised at school or during
school holidays, as well as during transport to and from the school; providing
help and support on an occasional or small-scale basis in the field of administra-
tion, management, the organisation of archives or the assumption of logistical re-
sponsibility for activities in the socio-cultural, sports, cultural, art education and
education sectors. (Article 3 of the Act on Economic Recovery and the Strength-
ening of Social Cohesion of 18 July 2018).
23 Explanatory memorandum of the Government Bill on Economic Recovery and
the Strengthening of Social Cohesion of 11 December 2017 (fn. 21), p. 158.
24 Articles 19 and 25 of the Act on Economic Recovery and the Strengthening of So-
cial Cohesion of 18 July 2018.
25 Article 41 of the Act on Economic Recovery and the Strengthening of Social Co-
hesion of 18 July 2018.
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tions of the legislator varied in this regard: to create an accessible, compre-
hensible and easily applicable legal framework with a focus on legal cer-
tainty for the provider (in terms of liability and in social, fiscal and admin-
istrative terms) and with fair compensation; to avoid the unbridled appli-
cation of social legislation (fines, criminal liability of directors, etc.); to en-
courage ancillary activities in leisure time and to discourage and reduce
undeclared or illicit work.26
The law is known as the “sideline” law or the “untaxed moonlighting”
law. As the word itself already indicates, it involves activities carried out
“on the side”. Furthermore, in Dutch, the word for this phenomenon
refers to chores which do not exactly correspond to labour or a secondary
profession, precisely in order to highlight the very essence of these activi-
ties, namely that they are activities that rather take place in leisure time
and as a hobby. Certain restrictions and conditions had to ensure that
there was no competition with commercial activities and that an outflow
from the professional labour market was avoided. For instance, activities
that may be carried out in the context of association work and occasional
services between citizens are limited to a defined list of activities. Accord-
ing to the legislator, these activities are of a special nature, which is the
very reason for them to be given separate social and fiscal treatment and
status. These are activities that mainly have an added social and societal
value and therefore have a different purpose. Unlike an employee who
wants to earn a living through work, or a self-employed person who wants
to make a profit, these activities are purely ancillary and non-remunerative
in nature and are therefore limited in their amount and fulfil a social inter-
est.27 However, this list is long. For example, activities from citizen to citi-
zen can include: childcare, babysitting, family support services, tutoring,
music/drawing/craft/technique lessons in the private home of the teacher
or in the home of the client, small maintenance works to or around the
home, help with administration and punctual help with small IT prob-
lems, with the exclusion of professional accounting, supporting persons
with occasional or small household tasks in the home of the user, with the
exception of regular cleaning.28
26 Explanatory memorandum of the Government Bill on Economic Recovery and
the Strengthening of Social Cohesion of 11 December 2017 (fn. 21), p. 156.
27 Ibid., pp. 151-152.
28 Article 20 of the Act on Economic Recovery and the Strengthening of Social Co-
hesion of 18 July 2018.
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The problem, however, is that all these activities can also be provided
for in the regular labour market29 and are not simply regarded as non-com-
mittal by those involved. To what extent can one still say that this is only
about favours for a friend? These are activities that can also be perfectly car-
ried out by the self-employed or companies. As a result, there is a competi-
tive position vis-à-vis the regular labour market. Precisely in order to avoid
this risk of competition, the legislator imposed a number of conditions for
the application of this favourable financial and social system. In addition
to the nature of the activity (limited list), it should also concern occasional
services. These are additional services among other activities performed.
The system is only accessible to persons who are already engaged in a main
professional activity (i.e. working four-fifths) and who derive a social secu-
rity status from it.30 It surely seems that certain forms of labour are being
transferred to the sphere of spare-time work. An employee who works four
fifths as an IT specialist for an employer could, for instance, easily offer
similar work the other day of the week, untaxed and exempt from contri-
butions. A full-time worker could certainly consider this option with a
view to part-time employment. In certain cases, the Belgian legislation pro-
vides for an allowance for a person who reduces his/her employment by
1/5 to 4/5, with a view to thematic leave (e.g. bringing up young children)
or a career break, end-of-career jobs, time credit, etc.31 The person involved
then receives an allowance for unemployment and can still supplement
this with an untaxed amount of income via the sideline law.
For a self-employed person, however, the condition applies that the ac-
tivity must be different from the normally exercised professional activity.32
But the requirement that it should be an additional activity is not entirely
correct. Whereas this requirement does apply to the regulation of asso-
ciations and occasional services between citizens, it does not apply to the
sharing economy. In the latter case, it is not required to perform another
main activity. Furthermore, the nature of activities does not play any role
in the case of the sharing economy. All possible services may be per-
formed. It should not necessarily be activities with added value for society.
Only services that are an extension of the professional activity are excluded.
29 These activities can also be carried out by a (non-remunerated) volunteer.
30 Articles 4 and 21 of the Act on Economic Recovery and the Strengthening of So-
cial Cohesion of 18 July 2018.
31 CLA No. 103 of 27 June 2012 introducing a scheme for time credit, career reduc-
tions and end-of-career jobs and the Royal Decree of 12 December 2001.
32 Article 20 of the Act on Economic Recovery and the Strengthening of Social Co-
hesion of 18 July 2018.
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For the legislator, the individual purpose of these activities was the rea-
son to proceed with a separate treatment of these activities with a complete
exemption of fiscal and parafiscal contributions. Activities of this sort are
not seen to constitute productive labour, which is the very basis of the so-
cial security system. It is not professional work, but more like a compensat-
ed favour for a friend. Therefore, these activities do not constitute labour
and are excluded from the scope of the Belgian social security system. The
solution the legislator had in mind was ambivalent, because although this
labour became visible, the legislator did not consider it to be labour. The
difficulty of making the traditional distinction between employees and
self-employed persons, necessary within a professional social security sys-
tem, enticed the legislator to look for a third “non-status” somewhere be-
tween professional work and voluntary work. The Government intro-
duced, as it were, a new category of “reimbursed spare-time work” that
moves between pure volunteering and work within the regular labour
market as an employee, a civil servant or a self-employed person. Thus, al-
though the person concerned may carry out these activities in a profession-
al capacity, he/she is given the possibility to carry out the same activity un-
der the status of an “untaxed side job”. Therefore, as long as one stays be-
low the foreseen threshold, the status does not play a role. As these persons
are engaged in activities which do not constitute employment within the
meaning of social law, they therefore do not enjoy protection under social
legislation (e.g. no maximum working hours, no social security protec-
tion).
Non-Status
However, one may question whether this far-reaching fiscal and parafiscal
exemption of income associated with the mentioned activities can be ob-
jectively and reasonably justified. Both legislations on the sharing econo-
my demonstrate that for the legislator, different objectives were central to
provide for a separate status: to make a major part of “grey” or “black
labour” visible again; to find a solution to the difficulty of making the tra-
ditional distinction between employees and the self-employed, necessary
within a professional social security system; to promote free enterprise and
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ties, not least because these activities are often of a marginal and ancillary
nature and seek to offer added social value.33
The big fear was of course that this regulation would lead to unfair com-
petition with the regular labour market. For example, the Belgian National
Labour Council (CNT), which brings together the social partners in its
opinion on this law, pointed out that it should not be the aim to discour-
age activities through recognised platforms, but that this activity should ei-
ther generate additional income or be seen as a stepping stone to regular
self-employment. However, such an activity should not aim to circumvent
social legislation and thus create unfair competition between sectors or
workers.34
The CNT points out that the introduction of the tax and social security
contributions exemption for sharing platforms would have the conse-
quence that, depending on the way in which these services are offered, the
respective exemptions would apply purely and exclusively in function of
the way in which the services are made known to the public and the way
in which supply and demand are brought into contact with each other.35
Therefore, the CNT was extremely critical of this law. For many, this law
could therefore lead to new systems, in which regular entrepreneurs would
have to compete with very cheap temporary labour. Consequently, the law
quickly gave rise to joint action by many interest groups and trade unions
before the Constitutional Court for annulment of this law.36
Is the Sharing Economy not Labour?
Before examining the various arguments put forward before the Constitu-
tional Court, we should first examine which labour is covered by the Bel-
gian social security system and which labour is excluded from it. After all,
this is what the whole discussion is about. There is no doubt about activi-
ties carried out within the sharing economy being labour. Of course, this is
3.
33 Explanatory memorandum of the Programme Law of 2 June 2016 (fn. 11), pp.
12-13; Explanatory Memorandum of the Government Bill on Economic Recovery
and the Strengthening of Social Cohesion of 11 December 2017 (fn. 21), pp.
180-181.
34 National Labour Council (CNT), Opinion No. 2065, 29 November 2017, p. 22,
http://www.cnt-nar.be/ADVIES/advies-2065.pdf. Accessed 20 August 2020.
35 Ibid., p. 23.
36 See Constitutional Court, Judgement No. 53/2020 of 23 April 2020, https://www.
const-court.be/public/n/2020/2020-053n.pdf. Accessed 20 August 2020.
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labour, it is simply not professional labour in the sense of social security
legislation. The social security legislation in Belgium, as a professional sys-
tem, is based on the requirement to exercise a professional activity. This is
literally a consequence of the social status of self-employed persons: a self-
employed person is any natural person who carries out a professional activ-
ity in Belgium by virtue of which he is not bound by an employment con-
tract or by a status.37
In the self-employed professions, there is a special scheme for those who
“in addition to the activity giving rise to submission to this Royal Decree,
habitually and principally – that is to say, a person whose working hours
are at least equal to those of a full-time employed worker” – so simultane-
ously – are employed as employees or civil servants. This is better known
as self-employment in secondary activity.38 In order to be self-employed,
one must be engaged in a professional activity, which means an activity
that is usually carried out and with the aim of making a profit. Thus, on
the one hand, a minimum of regularity or continuity is required and, on
the other hand, occasional work does not constitute a professional activi-
ty.39 The requirement for a certain regularity often gives rise to interpreta-
tion problems and discussions, whereas in the past it was claimed that this
required at least 18 days of activity per year. As early as 1976, this 18-day
rule was abolished as the minimum threshold for work requiring insu-
rance40 and was replaced by the requirement of a certain regularity and
continuity. Indeed, it was unfair that persons with significant professional
income from a single occupation of less than 18 days would be treated
more favourably than persons who, although working over a longer period
of time, acquired a lower income.41 On the other hand, a self-employed
worker has to strive for profit even if he might not actually make any prof-
it.42 The profit motive excludes voluntary help from family members or
37 Article 3 (1) of Royal Decree No. 38 of 27 July 1967 establishing the social status
of self-employed persons.
38 Article 12 of Royal Decree No. 38 of 27 July 1967 establishing the social status of
self-employed persons.
39 Labour Court Brussels, 22 June 1984, TSR, 1985, 228; Labour Court Brussels, 13
January 2012, JTT, 2012, 462.
40 By law of 6 February 1976.
41 Reyniers, Kelly/Van Regenmortel, Anne, Bijklussen in de sociale zekerheid: de ju-
ridische omkadering kritisch belicht?, in: Janvier, Ria/Van Regenmortel, Anne/
Vervliet, Valérie (eds.), Actuele problemen van het socialezekerheidsrecht, Bruges:
die Keure 2011, p. 340.
42 Court of Cassation of 2 June 1980, JTT, 1982, 76; Court of Cassation of 26 Jan-
uary 1987, JTT, 1987, 254.
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friends.43 It is quite remarkable, however, that every self-employed person
whose business is his/her primary occupation is expected to pay a contribu-
tion anyway, even when no profits are made. Indeed, the calculation of the
contributions is based on the fiction that a certain minimum amount of
professional income is reached, even if this is not the case. Therefore, this
income is not exempted from contributions. It is only in the system of self-
employment as a secondary occupation that contributions are only due if
the professional income has reached a certain minimum amount, which is
approximately 1/4 of the threshold amount in the sideline law. It is impor-
tant in this context that self-employed persons in secondary employment
also pay contributions under their self-employed status – with an exemp-
tion if the reference income is below a certain amount – even if no profits
have been made and without this granting them additional benefits. This
is, therefore, a form of solidarity: contributions paid must support the bal-
ance of the scheme for self-employed workers, while enabling them to en-
joy the social advantages of the scheme to which they are subject due to
their main activity.
In the employee system, it is somewhat less clear whether a professional
activity is also required, but this is an indirect consequence of the fact that
the National Social Security Office (NSSO) Law applies to employees and
employers who are bound by an employment contract.44 Labour law fur-
ther defines what an employment contract is. In addition, this requirement
also stems from the notion of solidarity that only those who pay contribu-
tions and wish to belong to the system and to a particular professional cat-
egory45 can have access to benefits. The concept of employment contract
refers to an agreement under which work is carried out under the authori-
ty of an employer in return for remuneration. This is the basis for the obli-
gation to contribute. Does this also require a professional activity? Or does
every work we do, including e.g. babysitting and garden work, give rise to
insurance if this were done through an agreement and under the authority
of someone? The answer is not always clear. Legal doctrine points out that
43 Labour Court Brussels, 6 April 1981, TSR, 1981, 577.
44 Article 1 of the Law of 27 June 1969 revising the Legislative Decree of 28 Decem-
ber 1944 on social security for workers; Articles 1 and 2 of the Law of 29 June
1981 defining the general principles of social security for employees.
45 Reyniers, Kelly/Van Regenmortel, Anne, Bijklussen in de sociale zekerheid: de ju-
ridische omkadering kritisch belicht? (fn. 41), p. 351.
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labour can be approached in two ways46: the first way examines whether
the labour is for the benefit of the employer and whether the labour is the
object of the performance or whether it can only be regarded as incidental
to the main purpose of the contract. A typical example of this is a trainee-
ship contract. If the sole purpose of the labour is to acquire the necessary
professional skills and it forms part of a training programme, it will not be
considered as work. On the other hand, labour can be considered as the
objective to obtain an income to provide for living. This vision is also cited
by the legislator as an objective in the sideline law. Labour means activities
taking place on the paid labour market.
But this means that any activity, even if it is occasional, can be a profes-
sional activity as long as it provides a living.47 Similarly, the limited fee ob-
tained or the time or amount spent on such an activity does not constitute
a criterion. The specificity of labour is not the nature of the activity, but
rather the objective with which it is carried out, i.e. the acquisition of in-
come.48 What is a leisure activity for one person (e.g. football, working in
the garden) is professional work for somebody else (professional footballer,
gardener). Therefore, remunerated leisure activities can also constitute
work performances. It is precisely due to the fact that remuneration is paid
which exceeds the real costs and that it is not generosity that it can be con-
sidered to be a wage and therefore, in principle, the one receiving it is also
subject to social security. Thus, everything one does to earn money is pro-
fessional labour, even if it is a rather everyday activity. However, the legis-
lation provides that certain work may be excluded from the scope of social
security legislation (NSSO legislation).
It is of interest to us to know in which cases and for what reasons cer-
tain work is excluded from the scope of social security. Labour is only ex-
cluded if it is too marginal to be liable for insurance. The legislator hereby
provides that the King (Government) may, under the conditions he deter-
mines, exclude from the application of this law those categories of workers
who are employed in a job which is ancillary to their employment or
which is essentially of short duration.49 This confirms that, in principle,
46 De Vos, Marc, Loon naar Belgisch Arbeidsovereenkomstenrecht, Antwerp: Maklu
2001, p. 62; Reyniers, Kelly/Van Regenmortel, Anne, Bijklussen in de sociale zeker-
heid: de juridische omkadering kritisch belicht? (fn. 41), p. 353.
47 Van Langendonck, Jef/Jorens, Yves/Louckx, Freek/Stevens, Yves, Handboek Socialezek-
erheidsrecht, Antwerp: Intersentia 2020, pp. 139-140.
48 Ibid., pp. 138-139.
49 Point 4 of Article 2 (1) of the Law of 27 June 1969 revising the Legislative Decree
of 28 December 1944 on social security for workers.
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any work can be subject to insurance. The King has made use of this by
excluding a number of categories. Nevertheless, the reason for the exclu-
sion is not always explained.50 Short-term work as a ground for exclusion is
rare today, especially since the past rules excluding workers who did not
normally work more than two hours a day have been abolished and re-
placed by the concept of occasional work.51 Nonetheless, the latter notion
is interpreted in a very restrictive way as an activity or several activities car-
ried out for the household of the employer or his/her family, with the ex-
ception of manual household activities – think of intellectual labour such
as performed by a governess, private teacher, babysitter – and manual non-
household activities (driver, gardener), insofar as the employee does not
perform these occasional activities in the household professionally and reg-
ularly and insofar as the activities do not exceed eight hours a week for one
or several employers.52 In this, the nature of the activities occupies centre
stage. Whether 8 hours is still essentially of short duration is doubtful.
In addition, there are some activities that are excluded because they are
ancillary to the job. But what is ancillary?53 This includes in the first place,
for example, a number of people who provide services for public services
or activities of public utility, such as sports camps. It could be argued that
“ancillary” implies that it is complementary to a job considered to be prin-
cipal. This was also the original wording, but it was subsequently changed
to an activity carried out for a maximum of 25 days. As a result, the exclu-
sion refers more to short-term than secondary jobs. In addition, the follow-
ing are also excluded: students for a particular number of hours (475
hours), some temporary workers in agriculture and horticulture as long as
they do not work more than 25 days, temporary workers engaged by or-
ganisers of sports events for the day of those events. In essence, all these
exceptions concern people who are exempted on the basis of the number
of days’ work and for a specific type of activity. One might, however, won-
der if these are all services of a short duration. Moreover, “ancillary” does
not indicate that the person concerned works in addition to a main activi-
ty. There are, furthermore, a few special arrangements for categories of
50 Articles 16 and 17 of the Royal Decree of 28 November 1969 implementing the
Law of 27 June 1969.
51 Article 16 of the Royal Decree of 28 November 1969 implementing the Law of 27
June 1969 as modified by Royal Decree of 24 August 1987.
52 Ibid.
53 See Article 17c of the Royal Decree of 28 November 1969 implementing the Law
of 27 June1969 and see also Van Langendonck, Jef/Jorens, Yves/Louckx, Freek/Stevens,
Yves, Handboek Socialezekerheidsrecht (fn. 47), pp. 171-175.
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staff who actually already pay full contributions in another system.54 It is
only exceptional that it is not an hour or day limit that is considered, but
the “income” earned. This is the case for volunteer firefighters and the con-
text of the “untaxed moonlighting” law that we are discussing here.
But even if we do not subject persons involved to social security, they
are certainly not completely excluded from social protection. For example,
most of them are covered by industrial accidents and occupational illness
schemes55; or a solidarity contribution is paid by the employer, as is done
for students (and by themselves) and in the case of flexi-jobs, so these
workers also build up rights for e.g. unemployment and pensions.
Back to the Drawing Board
Consequently, the total exclusion of side jobs from the social legislation
gave rise to a situation in which persons who carry out the same activities
as self-employed persons or as service providers through a recognised elec-
tronic platform are treated differently. Is this therefore a breach of the
principle of equal treatment or are there grounds for justification, and is
this distinction based on an objective criterion which is reasonably justi-
fied? Discrimination occurs when equal categories are treated differently or
different categories of persons are treated equally. Is there a difference in
treatment?
To what extent are service providers through recognised electronic plat-
forms comparable to employees and self-employed persons? According to
the Belgian legislator, these groups are not comparable. After all, this law
does not aim to replace the employment type of employee or self-em-
ployed person by a new employment type, but rather to avoid undeclared
work. The same persons may fall within both categories. It is therefore not
a comparison between groups of persons, but a comparison between dif-
ferent types of activities. The Constitutional Court does not follow this
4.
54 It concerns doctors employed in hospitals who have a practice outside the hospi-
tal and pay full contributions on a self-employed basis. But in fact, it is not so
much a question of short-term work or a secondary job, but of finding a solution
to the difficulty of distinguishing between doctors who work in an institution as
self-employed persons or as employees, or with regard to flexi-jobs in the catering
industry: persons who, in addition to a main occupation for which they pay con-
tributions, work to a limited extent in the catering industry.
55 With the exception of doctors, temporary support staff at sports events and civil
servants providing performances during sports camps.
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position at all. The Court points out that the introduction of the new sta-
tus aimed, among other things, to remedy the lack of clarity about the clas-
sification as employee or as self-employed person. This lack of clarity was
caused precisely by the fact that it is possible to carry out these activities
both as an employee and as a self-employed person, depending on the con-
crete circumstances. Therefore, the compared categories are indeed compa-
rable.56 Are there any justifications for the different treatment?
One of the main objectives for the Government to establish this regime
was to combat undeclared work. This objective is certainly pertinent, but
is this the right way to go? Will this objective be attained by completely
exempting someone from all contributions? Is it not aberrant to note that a
measure aimed at avoiding undeclared work now, on the contrary, makes
it possible to switch from a status subject to social security and tax obliga-
tions to a status exempting the person concerned from all those obliga-
tions?57 It is almost as if the legislator wanted to encourage people to try
another professional activity. Avoiding undeclared work through an ex-
emption and by giving someone no status seems like values turned upside
down. The name of the law in which this legislation was included speaks
volumes: Act on Economic Recovery and the Strengthening of Social Co-
hesion. Social cohesion is thus “strengthened” by not granting a social se-
curity status!
For the legislator, the activities referred to are activities that take place
in leisure time and are therefore carried out on an occasional basis. They
are thus considered as ancillary activities. After all, their purpose is not so
much to make a living. Of course, “ancillary” is a relative and very subjec-
tive notion. Moreover, in the sharing economy, there is no limited month-
ly amount, only a maximum annual threshold amount. Supposing that
someone earns, for example, EUR 1,000 a month, it can hardly be said that
this is incidental. This looks more and more like an alternative to part-time
employment. It is not even required that the person concerned has a main
activity in addition. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court points out that
there is a contradiction between this assumption and the legislator’s objec-
tive of stimulating entrepreneurship and providing a stepping stone to self-
56 See Constitutional Court, Judgement No. 53/2020 of 23 April 2020, recital A.12
and B.7.3, https://www.const-court.be/public/n/2020/2020-053n.pdf. Accessed 20
August 2020.
57 See Constitutional Court, Judgement No. 53/2020 of 23 April 2020, recital B. 6.10
and 7.5, https://www.const-court.be/public/n/2020/2020-053n.pdf. Accessed 20
August 2020.
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employment through the creation of this status.58 And rightly so! For
many people it is more than a marginal activity, but it is an important, if
not a necessary, addition to their income that supports them in their daily
needs and intentions. For some, this work is necessary, not only in order to
earn a living, but even to survive.
The idea is that this work is often carried out for reasons other than
profit-seeking and at the service of others or of society.59 But can profes-
sional work not also be carried out at the service of others or society? More-
over, if the same activities are carried out by an employee or a self-em-
ployed person, do they no longer have any special added social value?
Quite rightly, the Constitutional Court also points out that the fact that it
would concern a limited number of activities offering particular added val-
ue for society, whereas there is no such restriction in terms of permitted
activities under the status of employee or self-employed person, does not
justify the significant difference in treatment where identical activities are
involved. Moreover, it does not appear that the activities listed in the law
would all have a greater social added value than other possible activities.60
Furthermore, the nature of the activities does not play any role in the shar-
ing economy and therefore, the argument of the special added social value
does not hold true.61 Consequently, it has not been demonstrated that the
difference in treatment has the objective of supporting activities with an
added social value.62
The various arguments put forward by the Government are, to say the
least, highly debatable and it should therefore come as no surprise that the
Constitutional Court – more than rightly so – has overturned this regu-
lation. At the same time, however, this also shows that the approach adopt-
ed to regulate platform work is debatable. Nevertheless, the potential im-
58 See Constitutional Court, Judgement No. 53/2020 of 23 April 2020, recital B. 7.6,
https://www.const-court.be/public/n/2020/2020-053n.pdf. Accessed 20 August
2020.
59 The exclusion of volunteer firefighters from social security contributions can be
partly explained by the idea that this is labour with a special social role.
60 See Constitutional Court, Judgement No. 53/2020 of 23 April 2020, recital B. 6.9,
https://www.const-court.be/public/n/2020/2020-053n.pdf. Accessed 20 August
2020.
61 See Constitutional Court, Judgement No. 53/2020 of 23 April 2020, recital B. 7.6,
https://www.const-court.be/public/n/2020/2020-053n.pdf. Accessed 20 August
2020.
62 See Constitutional Court, Judgement No. 53/2020 of 23 April 2020, recital B. 5.7,
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pact of this law could be so big for all parties concerned that the Constitu-
tional Court did not proceed with the retroactive effect of the annulment
of this law, which would have been as if the law had never existed. Precise-
ly in order to avoid that persons carrying out side jobs could get into trou-
ble and face all kinds of after-claims and fines, the annulment only applies
as from the next tax year. This should also allow the sharing platforms to
revise their entire business plan which was based on the sideline law.
Towards New Protection for Platform Workers?
In which direction should we now go regarding the protection of platform
workers? No one can deny that the importance of the sharing economy is
increasing. In fact, the Belgian Government set up the Recovery Act63 to
keep pace with developments. Moreover, the system of exemption from fis-
cal and parafiscal contributions indirectly subsidises the entire sharing
economy.
The Government has already clarified the direct consequences of the an-
nulment of this Act. It is only with the adoption of the Recovery Act of
2018 that an appeal was lodged with the Constitutional Court for the an-
nulment of this Act. However, after the promulgation of any law, one has
only 6 months to lodge an appeal for annulment before the Constitutional
Court. No appeal had been lodged against the old separate status intro-
duced in 2016. The Minister has already stated that from 2021, the old law
granting a reduced tax rate will enter into force again. The question then
arises as to whether this forthcoming Act could not be appealed against?
The fact that the old law would be reinstated does not, in principle, oppose
this. After all, the Council of Ministers had defended this argument in the
case before the Constitutional Court. Thus, the Council of Ministers con-
tested the admissibility of the pleas relating to the status of service provider
through a recognised electronic platform, since that status was already in-
troduced by the Programme Law of 1 July 2016, against which the appli-
cants did not bring an action for annulment. An action brought against a
difference in treatment which does not derive from the contested law but
is already contained in a previous law is inadmissible. However, the Con-
stitutional Court points out that when the legislator adopts an old provi-
III.
63 Act on Economic Recovery and the Strengthening of Social Cohesion of 18 July
2018, https://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=nl&la=N&
cn=2018071803&table_name=wet. Accessed 20 August 2020.
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sion in a new legislation and thus appropriates its content, an appeal may
be lodged against the provision within six months of its publication. Does
this argument now backfire? The Constitutional Court already gives a cer-
tain indication: “Although the uncertainty about the correct classification
may justify the need for a separate status, such a status was already created
by the Programme Law of 1 July 2016. Moreover, the lack of clarity as to
the classification does not justify the fact that the contested provisions at-
tach to that status a total exemption from labour law, the social security
system and tax obligations”64.
In tax law, there is no longer a full exemption and the 10 percent net tax
burden can be considered justified, but as far as the social aspect is con-
cerned, it seems that this is not really justified. Furthermore, it is time to
go down a different path, not only for the benefit of the platform worker
but for the sake of our entire social security system.
Platform workers do not need a third separate status. In Belgium, social
law is based on the traditional dichotomy between employees and self-em-
ployed persons, and creating a third group will certainly not help to avoid
the traditional difficulties in distinguishing between the two categories.
On the contrary, one may even expect that in this case, a heated discussion
will emerge about who can be defined as a platform worker.65 It is, in any
case, very questionable to use a separate status for a special category of per-
sons as a solution to the ever-increasing flexibility on the labour market.
Are these persons really special? After all, do they not carry out the same
activities as other people on the regular labour market?
Conclusion
Platform workers do not need a third status, but they certainly do not need
a non-status either. Is it also justified, on the basis of the marginal charac-
ter and added value for society, to withdraw someone completely from so-
cial legislation, as is the case for platform workers? This is particular in
times when social security also pays attention to work that can at least be
considered socially useful. Thus, we see that the (Belgian) legislator pro-
IV.
64 See Constitutional Court, Judgement No. 53/2020 of 23 April 2020, recital B. 7.7,
https://www.const-court.be/public/n/2020/2020-053n.pdf. Accessed 20 August
2020.
65 See also Nerinckx, Stefan, De “Uberisering” van de Arbeidsmarkt: Enkele Be-
denkingen bij het Sociaal Statuut van de Actoren in de Platformeconomie, in:
TSR 2018, p. 49.
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vides for an increasing number of measures granting protection to those
who do not perform “paid” work but still perform activities that are con-
sidered useful: people who take a career break to take care of a sick parent
or sick child, or even just to pursue a dream, are – often even while receiv-
ing benefits – protected under the social security system. Even volunteer-
ing, the area par excellence where unpaid but useful work is provided, is
economically encouraged by providing social protection. Work on the pe-
riphery or outside the traditional labour market is to a great extent recog-
nised within social security.66 So why exclude platform workers from so-
cial security? This creates a dilemma: the greater the number of people do-
ing such work and the more important it is for these people, the more in-
comprehensible it is that these people would be deprived of any social pro-
tection and at the same time, however, the more difficult it is to carry out
work that does not support the financial capacity of the social security sys-
tem. The fundamental starting point of the Belgian social security system
is that regular or productive labour constitutes the basis for the develop-
ment of our welfare system. The looser the link with professional employ-
ment becomes, the more questions arise about the financing of social secu-
rity, certainly in a professional system.
However, today’s flexible workforce consists of people who not only
switch between employers, but who also alternate between periods of pro-
fessional activity and voluntary work. Individuals may no longer only carry
out one secondary activity alongside a main activity, but rather different
(secondary) activities, whereby the distinction between main and sec-
ondary activities fades. In addition, many platform workers also perform
work that may not be considered professional work today, but which is of
great use. It is not because this work is not carried out on the labour mar-
ket that these activities should be considered as inferior, as chores, as a sec-
ond-class activity.67 It is not up to our social security system to exclude peo-
ple who perform useful work and work in the platform sector. On the con-
trary, we should embrace them. This is not done by giving them a non-sta-
tus, but by including them in the current system of social protection. It is
not a question of robbing the platform worker of any social protection. In
fact, he needs adequate protection precisely because of his precarious work
situation.
66 Van Steenberge, Josse, Arbeid en Sociale Bescherming: Een LAT-relatie?, in: Minis-
terie van Sociale Voorzorg, 50 Jaar Sociale Zekerheid…en Daarna?, Brussels: Bruy-
lant 1995, p. 97.
67 Van Steenberge, Josse/Delanote, Liliane, Maak er Werk van, Bruges: die Keure 1998,
p. 37.
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However, as long as our social security system only focuses on regular
employment, the sharing economy will pose a threat to our welfare state.68
Perhaps it is time to put forward a new concept of labour. Labour is more
than earning an income; it is also the right to usefulness: to be given, ac-
quire and earn a useful place in society.69 Social security should therefore
also be opened up for activities that do not or not always follow the nor-
mal scope of employment. The big advantage would be that precisely those
activities floating between the commercial and non-commercial labour
market, often in a grey zone, are made visible again. Labour then becomes
not so much the basis of social security, but rather its purpose.70 May plat-
form work act as a trigger for this development!
68 See also De Vos, Marc, De Toekomst van Arbeidsrecht, in: De Corte, Rogier/De
Vos, Marc/Humblet, Patrick/Kefer, Fabienne/Van Hoorde, Eva (eds.), De Taal is
gans het Recht: Liber Amicorum Willy van Eeckhoutte, Mechelen: Wolters Kluw-
er 2018, p. 31.
69 Van Steenberge, Josse/Delanote, Liliane, Maak er Werk van (fn. 67), p. 37.
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Chapter 4
Is the Classification of Work Relationships Still a Relevant




This chapter aims at analysing the connection between the classifications
of work activities in labour law and the protective statute they enjoy in so-
cial security. After a period during which a “tailor-made” approach has pre-
vailed, linking a specific protective statute to a certain typology (subordina-
tion and autonomy), as classified by the labour law legislator, the decon-
struction of those typologies as well as of the undertaking organisation has,
more recently, pushed the legislator to effect change. The new approach of
the Italian legislator consists of an arbitrary application of a social protec-
tion statute (as a “package”) according to a political assessment of the
weaknesses of specific groups of workers (“social types”), taking into ac-
count the new forms of integration into the organisation of increasingly
“deconstructed” undertakings. Paramount examples would be the issue of
“hetero-organised” collaborations and that of riders.
The Classification of Work Relationships: The Beginning
From a historical perspective, Italian legislation was confronted with the
challenge of classifying work for the first time when mandatory social in-
surance against work accidents (Infortuni sul lavoro) was introduced by Act
No. 80 of 17 March 1898. This Act defined who should be covered as a
“worker” (operaio) for social law purposes: This is anyone who “is em-
ployed” outside his or her premises, permanently or temporarily, with
fixed or piecework remuneration or anyone in the same situation who su-
pervises the work of others, even without participating in it, if his or her
salary does not exceed a certain amount and the pay periods remain within
the month. The definition is completed by a list of activities regarded as
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sites, or other construction activities where more than five workers are em-
ployed. In general, the understanding of the term “operaio” referred to
manual workers. However, the legislator did not provide any definition of
employment, probably counting on the fact that the very notion of worker
(operaio) was undisputed. It is worth noting that such a notion, at least for
the purpose of Act No. 80, included supervisors and apprentices, paid or un-
paid, who from a labour law perspective may not necessarily be regarded
as workers (operai). By consequence, one has to stress that social security
legislation uses a different, autonomous classification of workers covered
by mandatory insurance for accidents at work, deviating from the one used
for labour relations.
A second important turning point in the evolution of notions and clas-
sifications is represented by the introduction of the Mandatory Old Age
and Invalidity Insurance1 established immediately after WWI. It applied to
male and female persons aged between 15 and 65 who work “in the em-
ploy” of a third party, as workers (operai), busboys (garzoni), apprentices,
janitors (inservienti), assistants, shop assistants, supervisors and clerks (imp-
iegati), in the private as well as in the public sector, home workers includ-
ed. Interestingly, social insurance definitions did not replicate those pro-
vided for in the legislation on employment contracts in the private sector
enacted two months earlier.2 The latter had defined the contract of employ-
ment in the private sector as a contract under which a legal or physical per-
son who runs a business, hires “at the service” of that business, usually on
an open-ended basis, the professional activity of the other party for the
purpose of “cooperation” as a staff member, with the exclusion of any
manual work. The legislator refrained from providing any explanation of
what was meant either by “in the employ” (“alle dipendenze”) or by “at the
service” (“al servizio”). Both expressions exclude, however, persons under
contract working independently, although allowing for some shades of depen-
dency. Furthermore, manual workers (operai) were covered by the manda-
tory old age and invalidity social insurance whereas they did not fall under
the notion of contract of employment in the private sector. As a conse-
quence, access to and protection by early social security legislation in Italy
was provided in an autonomous way, not linked to labour law and its clas-
sifications.3
1 Royal Lieutenant Decree-Law No. 603 of 21 April 1919.
2 Royal Lieutenant Decree-Law No. 112 of 9 February 1919.
3 Indeed, the labour law legislation of that time did ignore, on purpose, the condi-
tions of the worker (operaio) in order to exclude any recognition of rights during a
period in which the worker movement was still struggling to overturn the existing
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The divide between social security law and labour law regarding the
definition of the protected categories of workers in each field persisted
over the Fascist period. In fact, Royal Decree-Law No. 1827 of 4 October
1935 (Article 37) recalled that mandatory old age and invalidity pension re-
ferred to people as “in the employ” (“alle dipendenze”), thus including op-
erai as well as impiegati, excluding impiegati with income above a certain
earnings level. At the same time, employment contract law still excluded
manual workers.4
Subordination and Autonomy: A Political and Legal Issue
A third, decisive turning point in the evolution of notions and classifica-
tions is represented by the adoption, in the Civil Code of 1942, at the very
sunset of the Fascist regime, of the notion of subordination that applies to
all “collaborators” of the entrepreneur (Article 2094) at times seen as the
head (capo) of the undertaking (Article 2086). Subordination eliminated
any differences not only between workers (operai) and clerks (impiegati)
but also in relation to managers (dirigenti), all gathered in Article 2095 as
belonging to subordinated “collaborators”, although of different categories
(categorie di prestatori di lavoro) due to the hierarchical supremacy of the en-
trepreneur as employer. Even if subordination in the fascist Civil Code is
more of a political than a legal notion,5 the employer’s managerial prerog-
atives are recognised explicitly by Article 2094 and 2104 (2) Civil Code. On
the other hand, the subordination of managers who, at times, exercise
those prerogatives on behalf of the entrepreneur as employer over the rest
of “collaborators”, seems to be justified in view of granting them some
form of social security in terms of old age and inability pension in connec-
tion to having been “in the employ” of the undertaking. One can conclude
that the notion of subordination has become the decisive classification
III.
political order. On the contrary, in a clear Bismarckian approach, the social securi-
ty legislator tried (in vain) to appease workers’ protests by introducing old age and
invalidity pensions on a mandatory basis. Cf. Gaeta, Lorenzo, Storia (illustrata) del
Diritto del Lavoro Italiano, Turin: Giappichelli 2020, pp. 388 ff.; Ales, Edoardo, Die
geistigen Grundlagen der Sozialgesetzgebung des Kanzlers Otto von Bismarck und
das Entstehen des Sozialstaates in Italien, in: Eichenhofer, Eberhard (ed.), Bismar-
ck, die Sozialversicherung und deren Zukunft, Berlin: Berlin Ver. A. Spitz 2000,
pp. 55-74.
4 Royal Decree-Law No. 1825 of 13 November 1924.
5 Gaeta, Lorenzo, Storia (illustrata) del Diritto del Lavoro Italiano (fn. 3), p. 80 ff.
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tool, both for labour law and social law purposes. Nevertheless, social law
may pursue more comprehensive coverage strategies in an autonomous
way, as has been the case for some liberal professions which already had
their own categorical old-age protection schemes.6
At the beginning of the constitutional period (1948), the very notion of
hierarchical subordination was questioned because of its negative political
significance and progressively substituted with that of technical subordina-
tion – to be understood in terms of “hetero-direction” of the employer on
his “collaborators”. In the social security perspective, subordination as
“hetero-direction”, encompassing the entire workforce, easily matches the
notion of “in the employ” of the entrepreneur, including any kind of work
performed within the undertaking, to be understood as a physical struc-
ture organised and directed by the entrepreneur/employer. Integration
through the subordination of “collaborators” in the undertaking as a het-
ero-organised structure excludes any form of autonomy inside it. From
such a perspective, autonomy can be conceived only as a feature of any
kind of work performed without subordination to the entrepreneur i.e. with-
out integration in the organisation of the undertaking even if provided in
favour of it. The provision of a service or of a workmanship (opera) is so
defined by Article 2222 Civil Code and protected in a way that highlights
the non-involvement of work in the organisation of the undertaking. The
issue of protection of autonomous work (self-employment) is the product
of a comprehensive approach to work as a professional activity (en-
trepreneurial included) typical of the corporatist view, as expressed in Arti-
cle 2060 Civil Code, according to which “work is protected in all its organi-
sational and executive forms, be it intellectual, technical or manual”.
Although extrapolating the freedom to conduct a business (as recog-
nised by Article 41), the same holistic approach to the protection of work
has been adopted, at least theoretically,7 by the 1948 Constitution in Arti-
cle 35. Nevertheless, one could say that the labour law protection of “pure-
ly” autonomous work, i.e. work performed without any form of integra-
tion whatsoever in the undertaking, further to that already provided by the
Civil Code (Articles 2223-2238), became an issue for the legislator only in
2017, when Act No. 81 was adopted (see below). One important point to
be stressed is that, on the one hand, autonomous work may come in the
6 See below.
7 Ales, Edoardo, (The Right to) Work as Foundational Value: Italy and the Very No-
tion of a Constitutional Promise, in: Bellace, Janice/ter Haar, Beryl (eds.), Research
Handbook on Labour, Business and Human Rights Law, Cheltenham: Edward El-
gar 2019, pp. 34-49.
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form of a registered intellectual profession (Articles 2229 ff. Civil Code),
and is as such protected, as for social security, within the system of Profes-
sional Funds, while separated from the General Social Insurance System
(Assicurazione Generale Obbligatoria). For instance, this was and still is the
case for barristers and solicitors who, according to Act No. 406 of 13 April
1933, are mandatorily insured by Cassa Forense, originally a public law
body that was, however, privatised in 1994 (Legislative Decree No. 509 of
30 June 1994), and has been run since then by a foundation under the con-
trol of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. On the other hand, social
protection had been extended to artisans and merchants, first under the li-
mited scope of health insurance (respectively, Act No. 1533 of 29 Decem-
ber 1956, and Act No. 1397 of 27 November 1960), then under inability,
old age and survivors insurance (respectively, Act No. 463 of 4 July 1959,
and Act No. 613 of 22 July 1966).
The differences between the two groups are manifest, since persons in
the second (artisans and merchants) are by definition (small) en-
trepreneurs, whereas in the first (barristers and solicitors), this is not neces-
sarily the case. Nevertheless, both are required to contribute to their activi-
ty through personal work, which, in case of the latter, shall be prevalent
(Article 2222 Civil Code). Mainly for this reason, more recently, the social
security legislator has addressed artisans and merchants, too, as “au-
tonomous workers” (Act No. 233 of 2 August 1990) with a view to distin-
guishing them from entrepreneurs falling outside the scope of social pro-
tection on the grounds that they “just” run a company. On the other hand,
artisans and merchants are autonomous also in the sense that they organise
their own activity and work, without being integrated into any alien orga-
nisation, at least as far as their personal work is concerned. Nowadays, the
social security of artisans and merchant is managed by INPS through sepa-
rate funds.
Coordination: A New Star is Born
From the perspective of notions and classifications, specific consideration
must be given to sales agents or representatives who operate under an agency
contract as regulated by Article 1742 ff. Civil Code.8 Although at least in
view of the Civil Code, they do not belong to the “collaborators” of an en-
trepreneur (agency contracts do not fall within the scope of Book V of the
IV.
8 Ghezzi, Giorgio, Del contratto di agenzia, Bologna: Zanichelli 1970.
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Civil Code dedicated to “Labour”), their activity has to be coordinated with
that of the undertaking. For instance, the areas in which the sales agent is
active are predefined within the contract and the proponent entrepreneur
shall not assign another agent to them. Furthermore, the sales agents shall
discharge their duties according to the instructions received and have to
provide the proponent with all the information related to the market con-
ditions of the assigned area as well as with any other information that may
help in assessing the convenience of each business deal. The fact that sales
agents and representatives find themselves somewhere in the middle between
organisational integration and independence is confirmed by the circum-
stance that, since 1938, their activity has also been regulated by framework
collective agreements (accordi collettivi), which, among other things, have
introduced a first form of social security in relation to the guarantee of sev-
erance payments. In fact, the 1938 Agreement established a social security
body (ENASARCO, which still exists as an integrative pension fund)
which was transformed into a public body by Royal Decree No. 1305 of 6
June 1939, and which regained its private law status in 1997. As for their
classification, Act No. 741 of 14 July 1959, which provided the just men-
tioned collective agreements with a temporary erga omnes effect, explicitly
traced back the position of sales agents and representatives to a coordinated
and continuous collaboration with the proponent undertaking.
Relationships of such kind caught on rapidly in the labour market also
outside the realm of the agency contract. This is confirmed by the fact that,
some years later, the legislator included in the scope of application of the
new employment proceedings coordinated and continuous collaboration other
than that of the sales agents and representatives (Act No. 533 of 11 August
1973 modifying Article 409 No. 3 Civil Procedure Code). Nevertheless, the
legislator did not provide these groups immediately with any other form
of protection, social security included. On top of that, it was specified that
they did not fall under any subordination relationship (Article 409 No. 3
Civil Procedure Code) so that they could not be put on an equal footing
with collaborators “in the employ” of the entrepreneur, being therefore ex-
cluded from the General Social Insurance System. On the other hand, as
autonomous workers they could have been entitled to social security only
if they fell within the scope of application of one of the specific schemes
mentioned above, which was almost never the case. It is still highly disput-
ed whether coordinated and continuous collaboration shall be regarded as an
intermediate category between subordination and autonomy. For the time
being, the conclusion is that workers in this category are self-employed
persons of sorts (collaborazioni autonome coordinate e continuative).
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The above situation did not help in tackling the already relevant prob-
lem of (mis)qualification of the work relationship, both from the employ-
er’s and the employee’s side. For the former, it had and still has to do with
an escape from subordination because of its heavy social security burden; for
the latter, on the contrary, with a run after subordination, since outside it
there was no (social) protection. The possibility to qualify a work relation-
ship as “coordinated and continuous collaboration”, de facto outside any
social security scheme (and burden), accentuated the fraudulent contractu-
al behaviour of a part of the employers, stimulating the doctrine and the
case law to look for an intermediate classification of such collaborations as
“para-subordinated”9 – with the consequence that at least part of the
labour law provisions could have applied to them.
From the social security perspective, with reference to pensions, the leg-
islator in Act No. 335 of 8 August 199510 has adopted a decisive provision.
In fact, Article 2(26) has extended the General Social Insurance System to
any person who performs professionally, although not exclusively, an au-
tonomous activity for which no registration by a professional board is re-
quired (as specified by Article 18(12), Decree-Law No. 98 of 6 July 2011).
Truth be told, Article 2(26) also recalls the “coordinated and continuous
collaborations”. However, it does so with reference to a tax law provision
that has been withdrawn in the meantime. Decisive is the idea that, as it
happens with sales agents and representatives, autonomous work can be
compatible with a certain degree of coordination if the modalities of the lat-
ter are co-determined by the parties in a kind of co-organisation of the activ-
ity. By specifying that, for the purpose of Article 409 No. 3 Civil Procedure
Code, a collaboration is coordinated “when, in the respect of the modali-
ties of coordination defined by consensus between the parties, the collabo-
rator organises autonomously his or her activity”, the legislator has con-
firmed, by Act No. 81 of 2017, the autonomous nature of those collabora-
tions. By consequence, these collaborations fall within the scope of appli-
cation of the so-called Gestione Separata of the General Social Insurance
System, under specific conditions of entitlement to benefits that are fi-
nanced from contributions, the rate of which now amounts to 34 percent
of the annual income as defined for tax law purposes.
9 Santoro Passarelli, Giuseppe, Il lavoro “parasubordinato”, Roma: Franco Angeli
1979.
10 Cinelli Maurizio/Persiani Mattia (eds.), Commentario della riforma previden-
ziale: dalle leggi “Amato” alla finanziaria 1995, Milano: Giuffré 1995.
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The Beginning of Ambiguity
The Extension of Subordinated Social Protection to Autonomous Work
From the late nineties, the legislator extended to female self-employed
workers insured only by the Gestione Separata the provisions on maternity,
family allowances and hospitalisation grant, increasing proportionally the
contribution rate. In particular, according to Article 64 of Legislative De-
cree No. 151 of 26 March 2001, maternity provisions have to be applied ac-
cording to the same principles as for subordinate work, although without
requiring the abstention of the worker from her activity during the mater-
nity leave as a condition to receive the maternity allowance (adoption and
foster cases included).11 This is a sign that, on the one hand, the integra-
tion into the organisation of the undertaking is not quite the same as in
case of subordinate work, but also, on the other hand, that the legislator
considers the need for protection of the coordinated collaborator to be the
same as that of the subordinated one.
Once again, from the perspective of notions and classifications, it is im-
portant to stress that in 2015 the legislator referred straightforward to “co-
ordinated and continuous collaborators” insured by the Gestione Separata,
but not entitled to a pension and without a VAT number, as beneficiaries
of a specific unemployment grant (DIS-COLL). DIS-COLL was introduced
by Article 15 of Legislative Decree No. 22 of 4 March 2015, and it is paid
in case of involuntary unemployment for a maximum of six months. Its
amount is calculated based on the beneficiary’s yearly income and corre-
sponds to 75 percent of the monthly income if this falls below a minimum
threshold fixed by the law. On the contrary, subordinated workers are enti-
tled to NASPI, an unemployment benefit that is calculated based on the
last wage. Both are of a typical social insurance nature.12
A further and highly controversial turning point as far as notions and
classifications are concerned is represented by Article 2 (1) Legislative De-
cree No. 81 of 15 June 2015, as recently modified by Article 1 Act No. 128
of 2 November 2019. In its original version, Article 2 (1) provided for the
application of the protective statute of subordinate work (one could argue
both from a labour law and social security perspective) to “collaborations
V.
1.
11 Ales, Edoardo, Maternità e congedi parentali, in: Enciclopedia del Diritto, Annali,
Vol. IX, Milano: Giuffré 2015, pp. 531-556.
12 Renga, Simonetta, Post fata resurgo: la rivincita del principio assicurativo nella
tutela della disoccupazione, in: Lavoro e Diritto, 29 (2015) 1, p. 77.
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that consist of exclusively personal and continuous work the execution
modalities which are organised by the client, with particular reference to
the time and place of work”. The difference regarding subordination has to
be found in the use of “organisation” instead of “direction” in order to de-
scribe the way in which the client relates to the collaborator: as a result,
one could not define the former as an employer. Contrary to coordinated
and continuous collaborations, the execution modalities of the perfor-
mance are unilaterally organised by the client, excluding any negotiation
with the “collaborators”, which is a decisive element of the notion con-
tained in Article 409 of No. 3 Civil Procedure Code. Scholars have named
this “hetero-organisation”, with a view to distinguishing it from “hetero-di-
rection”. They have also debated whether such a notion can be classified
under subordination or autonomy.13 In our view, however, one has to re-
fer to the way in which the performance “collocates” with the structure of
the client undertaking, and to the notion of “organised by the client”. This
has also to do with the understanding of the very notion of subordination.
What is clear is the clash between “hetero-direction” as a typical feature of
“traditional” subordination, and “hetero-organisation” as main character
of what we can call an “autonomised subordination”,14 in which neither
hetero-direction power nor full autonomy is at stake. As for the very notion of
“hetero-organisation”, an important point was represented by the preroga-
tive of the client to determine unilaterally the time and the place of the
performance.15 However, such specification has been withdrawn by Article
1 Act 2 No. 128 of November 2019, whereby “exclusively” was also
changed into “mostly” as far as the personal character of the performance
is concerned.
13 See, among others, Nogler, Luca, La subordinazione nel d.lgs. n. 81 del 2015: alla
ricerca dell’“autorità del punto di vista giuridico”, in: WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo
D’Antona”.IT, 267 (2015); Perulli, Adalberto, Il lavoro autonomo, le collaborazioni
coordinate e le prestazioni organizzate dal committente, in: WP C.S.D.L.E. “Mas-
simo D’Antona”.IT, 272 (2015); Santoro Passarelli, Giuseppe, I rapporti di collabo-
razione organizzati dal committente e le collaborazioni continuative e coordinate
ex art. 409 n. 3 c.p.c., in: WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.IT, 278 (2015);
Magnani, Mariella, Autonomia, subordinazione, coordinazione nel d.lgs. n.
81/2015, in: WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.IT, 294 (2016).
14 Ales, Edoardo, Subordination at Risk (of “Autonomisation”): Evidences and Solu-
tions from Three European Countries, in: Italian Labour Law e-Journal, 12 (2019)
1, p. 65.
15 Magnani, Mariella, I tempi e i luoghi del lavoro. L’uniformità non si addice al
post-fordismo, in: WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.IT, 404 (2019).
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“Hetero-Organisation”: A New Challenge for Subordination
It is rather clear that, as far as notions and classifications are concerned, the
very meaning of hetero-organisation has to be investigated.16 This in order to
understand whether there is a typological justification for the application
of the protective statute of subordination to relationships that do not fall
under the scope of “hetero-direction”, being not integrated in the same
way into the structure of the undertaking. In such a perspective, it has to
be stressed that the Constitutional court has declared unlawful a legislative
provision denying (for the purpose of both labour law and social security)
the classification of subordinated to work relationships that actually
showed the typical features thereof on the ground of its irrationality and
self-contradictoriness.17 In the same vein, one could argue that, even if
made to the benefit of workers, the choice to apply the protective statue of
subordination to “hetero-organised” relationships may be deemed uncon-
stitutional as well. In fact, it imposes a disproportionate burden on the client
who is not entitled to the managerial prerogatives he or she may enjoy as
employer in terms of “hetero-direction”.
A big chance to clarify the situation has been offered by the case of food
delivery riders, contracted as coordinated and continuous collaborators,
who have lodged claims before several Italian courts in order to be recog-
nised as subordinated workers and to have access to the relevant protective
statute. In parallel to the court proceedings, in a quite unfortunate timing,
the legislator has classified riders as autonomous workers, by adopting a
specific regulation (see below) that could have not been taken into account
by the judges due to its nonretroactive effect. Deciding on the first claim
brought to its knowledge, the Cassazione,18 although aware of the stance
taken by the legislator, upheld the judgement of the Court of Appeal of
Turin, according to which the activity of riders must be classified as “het-
ero-organised” collaboration, thus falling within the scope of application
of subordination according to Article 2 (1) Legislative Decree 81 of 2015.
However, without a motivation worthy of the name, the Cassazione, con-
firming the conclusions of the Court of Appeal, did limit the application
of the protective statute of subordinated work, excluding, among the oth-
ers, the right to a wage and working time. Moreover, the Cassazione has
2.
16 Zoppoli, Antonello, La collaborazione eterorganizzata: fattispecie e disciplina, in:
WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.IT, 296 (2016).
17 Corte costituzionale, 23.03.1993, No. 121.
18 Cassazione, sez. lav., 24.01.2020, No. 1663.
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deemed irrelevant any investigation of the very meaning of “hetero-organi-
sation”, on the assumption that, by recognizing the entitlement to the pro-
tective statute of subordination, Article 2 (1) constitutes a remedial provi-
sion. In the view of the Cassazione, the legislator does not intend to classify
a new typology of work relationship, focusing, on the contrary, on the posi-
tive effects that the remedy will have on the worker. What remains obscure
is how to figure out when a work relationship falls within the scope of Ar-
ticle 2 (1) without having any idea of the real meaning of “hetero-organisa-
tion”. By abdicating its supreme interpretation role, the Cassazione puts
that provision at risk of unconstitutionality for the reasons mentioned in
the above.19
Finally, yet importantly, nothing is said about the social security aspects,
neither by the legislator nor by the Cassazione. However, remaining
consistent with the clear statement of the legislator, “hetero-organised” col-
laborators shall fall within the scope of application of the General Social
Insurance System, in the Fondo Pensioni Lavoratori Dipendenti (FPLD).
Against this background, one could conclude that “hetero-organisation”
can be an option for entrepreneurs only if they have decided to bear any-
how the costs of subordination, renouncing, however, to the traditional
understanding of the managerial prerogatives it entails and opting in
favour of “autonomised subordination”. From a classification point of
view, “hetero-organised” collaborations are neither subordinated nor au-
tonomous. However, the subordination protective status applies, social se-
curity included. The practical effects of such a solution are not yet perceiv-
able.
Platform Work and its Varieties
How does all this apply to platform work? Since 2017, the Italian legislator
has intervened three times with reference to the possibility that work is
performed through “technological instruments”, platform included. This
has happened once via the already mentioned Act No. 81 of 22 May
2017,20 with reference to smart working (Article 18), and twice via Legis-
VI.
19 Ales, Edoardo, In favore dell’etero-organizzazione come “concetto” autonomo:
timeo danos et remedia ferentes, in: Massimario di Giurisprudenza del Lavoro, 73
(2020) 2, p. 19.
20 Perulli, Adalberto, Il Jobs Act del lavoro autonomo e agile: come cambiano i con-
cetti di subordinazione e autonomia nel diritto del lavoro, in: WP C.S.D.L.E.
“Massimo D’Antona”.IT, 341 (2017).
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lative Decree No. 81 of 2015, as modified by Act No. 128 of 2019, in Arti-
cle 2 (1) and Articles 47-bis ff., respectively, with reference to hetero-organ-
ised collaborations and autonomous work in the delivery sector.
Smart Working (on Platform) as a Modality of Subordinate Work
According to Article 18 of Act No. 81 of 2017, smart working (lavoro ag-
ile)21 is a modality of execution of subordinate work, freely agreed between
the parties, also organised by objectives, without predetermined working
time and place, in which work is performed partly inside and partly out-
side the premises of the undertaking, in the absence of a stable work sta-
tion. Nevertheless, work is understood to be smart also if performed regu-
larly in a place chosen by the worker for his or her personal convenience
within the limit of reasonableness (so-called hub). Maximum working
hour limits as provided by the law or collective agreements shall be re-
spected. The use of “technological instruments” is an option. Even if classi-
fied as subordinate work (Article 2094 ff. Civil Code), the legislator re-
quires the parties specifying, within the written individual agreement:
– its nature, i.e. open-ended or fixed-term, and, as for the latter, its dura-
tion and termination notice period which, however, cannot be less
than 30 days (90 in the case of workers with disabilities);
– how managerial prerogatives, with reference to control and disciplinary
powers, are exercised when work is performed outside the premises of
the undertaking;
– which instruments, if any, must be used by the worker;
– rest and disconnection periods, in cases where work is performed using
“technological instruments”.
Both open-ended and fixed-term agreements may be terminated for just
cause. Equal treatment between smart workers and those working within
the premises of the undertaking shall be guaranteed. The smart work
agreement shall be communicated to the competent labour authorities. By
introducing smart work, the legislator explicitly explains the goal, first, of
improving the performance of subordinate workers through the establish-
1.
21 Spinelli, Carla, Tecnologie digitali e lavoro agile, Bari: Cacucci 2018; Tiraboschi,
Michele, Il lavoro agile tra legge e contrattazione collettiva: la tortuosa via italiana
verso la modernizzazione del diritto del lavoro, in: WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo
D’Antona”.IT, 335 (2017); Magnani, Mariella, I tempi e i luoghi del lavoro. L’uni-
formità non si addice al post-fordismo (fn. 15).
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ment of new forms of organisation, also by objectives, in the absence of di-
rection and control, thus echoing “autonomised subordination”. On the
other hand, it aims at the improvement of the work-life balance, in partic-
ular by recognising a priority of smart work agreements signed with fe-
male workers within three years after the termination of maternity leaves,
from a clear “adult worker model” view,22 according to which care activity
is a woman’s job.
From a social security point of view, the fact that the legislator has clas-
sified smart work as a “modality of subordinate work” makes things very
easy, above all if one smart work day has the same value as an ordinary
working day as far as working time, wage and, therefore, contributions are
concerned. However, due to the lack of control over performance, above
all in cases where somebody is working off-line, the relationship shall be
built on mutual trust that allows for an aggregation of the elements men-
tioned above. The adoption of an achievement-oriented approach to work
organisation23 may be of great help to support such a perspective.
Platform Work as a Modality of Hetero-Organised Collaboration
An explicit reference to platforms, not to be understood as the employer or
the client, but only as the technical tool through which the modalities of
work are defined (see below), is provided by Article 2 (1) Legislative De-
cree No. 81 of 2015, as modified by Act No. 124 of 2019. As already illus-
trated above, one could think about “hetero-organisation”, to which the
protective statute of subordination applies, in terms of “autonomised sub-
ordination”, within the framework of an achievement-oriented approach
to work organisation. In such a framework, it is not at all problematic to
reconcile platform work with subordination that has abandoned the dog-
2.
22 Ales, Edoardo, Geschlechterspezifische Rollenmodelle und ihre Überwindung: das
Adult-Worker-Modell in der italienischen Gesetzgebung, in: Eigenverantwortung,
private und öffentliche Solidarität – Rollenleitbilder im Familien- und Sozial-
recht im europäischen Vergleich, Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren,
Frauen und Jugend, Forschungsreihe Band 3, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2008, pp.
195-211.
23 Ales, Edoardo, Is Performance Appraisal Compatible with the Employment Rela-
tionship? A Conclusive Plea in Favour of an Achievement-Oriented Approach to
Work Organisation, in: Addabbo, Tindara/Curzi, Ylenia/Fabbri, Tommaso/
Rymkevich, Olga/Senatori, Iacopo (eds.), Performance Appraisal in Modern Em-
ployment Relations. An Interdisciplinary Approach, London – New York –
Shanghai: Palgrave Macmillan 2020, pp. 255-263.
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ma of “hetero-direction”, above all if the very notion of work organisation
is an immaterial one.24 Indeed, a problematic point is the transnational na-
ture of “digital work”, above all if the principle of territoriality continues
to apply to labour law and social security, as is the case with the Court of
Justice.25 According to the Court, “in the absence of harmonisation or co-
ordination measures at Union level in the field concerned, the Member
States remain, in principle, free to set the criteria for defining the scope of
application of their legislation, to the extent that those criteria are objec-
tive and non-discriminatory”.26 Quite surprisingly, the Court offers no re-
flection on the notion of the “objective and non-discriminatory nature”,
thus apodictically supporting the territoriality principle of labour law.27 In
fact, in the view of the Court, “EU law does not (…) prevent a Member
State from providing that the legislation it has adopted be applicable only
to workers employed by establishments located in its national territory.” In
the same way, “it is open to another Member State to rely on a different
linking factor for the purposes of the application of its own national legisla-
tion.”28 It is evident that according to such an interpretation it will be diffi-
cult, even in case the “owner” of the platform is located in an EU Member
State, to advocate for the application of the more favourable social security
system. The consequence is to jeopardise the possibility for delocalised
(“digital”) workers to invoke the law of the country of origin of their “real”
employer and to favour the flourishing of fictitious employers (platforms)
in their country of establishment and vice versa.29
Platform Work as a Modality of (“False”) Autonomous Work
As already highlighted, Act No. 128 of 2019 adds a Chapter V-bis to Legis-
lative Decree No. 81 of 2015, with the very promising heading “Protection
3.
24 Ales, Edoardo, Subordination at Risk (of “Autonomisation”): Evidences and Solu-
tions from Three European Countries (fn. 14), p. 65.
25 CJEU of 18 July 2017, C‑566/15, Erzberger, ECLI:EU:C:2017:562. See Ales, Edoar-
do, Adapting Labour Law to “Digital” Work Between Scholarly Interpretation,
Case Law and Legislative Intervention", forthcoming essy in a book edited by Pe-
rulli, Adalberto and Treu, Tiziano.
26 CJEU of 18 July 2017, C‑566/15, Erzberger, para. 36.
27 Ibid., para. 38.
28 Ibid., para. 37.
29 Ales, Edoardo, Adapting Labour Law to “Digital” Work (fn. 25).
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of Work through Digital Platforms” (Articles 47-bis to 47-octies).30 Quite
surprisingly, however, Chapter V-bis does not apply to all forms of plat-
form work, but only to “autonomous workers who carry out activities of
goods delivery on behalf of others, in urban areas by bicycle or motor vehi-
cles”, the so-called riders (Article 47-bis). Of high interest, on the contrary,
is how the legislator defines digital platforms as “the software used by the
client (undertaking) for the delivery service, in order to fix the remunera-
tion due to the rider and to determine the way in which the service is per-
formed”. Therefore, in the legislator’s view, the platform is only an instru-
ment that can be used in order to organise work, and is not regarded as the
employer as such. This is a very important assumption, since it means that
the physical or legal person owning the platform can be held responsible
for the violation of any labour law and social security provision as a “nor-
mal” employer or client. Moreover, that person takes the risk that the self-
learning algorithm will act unlawfully, outside any possible human con-
trol. With the algorithm being no legal person, it cannot be sanctioned as
would happen to the real employer.
The contracts of the riders shall be in written form ad probationem,
meaning the absence of the written form does not effect the nullity of the
contract. In the absence of a written form, one may advocate the existence
of a subordinate contract, as it is useful to prove the actual conditions ap-
plied to the relationship and, if applicable, the infringement of workers’
rights. Riders shall receive adequate information on their rights and on
health and safety regulations. Failure to comply with this information duty
results in a violation of Legislative Decree No. 152 of 1997, implementing
the Written Statement Directive.31 Effective sanctions are provided in such
a case32 (Article 47-ter).
Riders shall receive remuneration (compenso) that, notwithstanding
their classification as autonomous workers, can be determined by national
30 Ales, Edoardo, Oggetto, modalità di esecuzione e tutele del “nuovo” lavoro au-
tonomo. Un primo commento, in: Massimario di Giurisprudenza del Lavoro, 72
(2019) 3, p. 719.
31 Directive 91/533/EEC. After 1 August 2022 Directive 2019/1152/EU of 20 June
2019, relating to Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions in the Euro-
pean Union.
32 According to Article 4 Legislative Decree No. 152 of 1997, the worker can contact
the Provincial Labour Office so that the latter obliges the employer to provide the
information required by the decree within fifteen days. If the employer does not
comply with the order, the worker is entitled to an indemnity that cannot exceed
the remuneration received in the last year and which must be determined based
on the seriousness and duration of the violations and the behaviour of the parties.
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collective agreements, signed by the comparatively more representative
trade unions at national level. This is a very controversial point since it im-
plies that in order to have their pay defined by collective bargaining riders
shall be represented by already existing unions, usually focused on subordi-
nate workers. The same reference to contratti collettivi, typical of subordi-
nate work, instead of accordi collettivi, typical of autonomous work, con-
firms the ambiguity of the legislative intervention. Yet, by defining pay,
collective agreements shall take into account the modalities of the provi-
sions of service and the organisation of the client (undertaking). In the ab-
sence of collective agreements, workers cannot be paid by the piece (deliv-
ery) and shall have a minimum hourly wage taking into account that al-
ready set by collective agreements of similar sectors. Such a provision
seems to be aimed at stimulating the conclusion of collective agreements
that could introduce piecework payment in the light of the modalities of
the provision of service and of the organisation of the undertaking.
In any case, workers shall be entitled to a supplementary indemnity, not
less than 10 percent of the minimum hourly wage, for work performed at
night or on holidays or in adverse weather conditions. The amount of the
indemnity is fixed by collective agreements or, in their absence, by Decree
of the Ministry of Labour (Art. 47-quarter). Wage setting through collective
agreements risks to clash with the case law of the Court of Justice. In fact,
as decided in FNV,33 a collective labour agreement, containing minimum
rates for self-employed persons who carry out for an employer the same ac-
tivity as his employees, falls outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU (and
therefore does not conflict with competition law) only where such workers
are “false” self-employed persons, i.e. workers who are in the same situa-
tion as employees. Since the legislator has explicitly classified riders as “re-
al” self-employed persons, the regulation or even the definition of criteria
determining their remuneration by collective agreements is difficult to rec-
oncile with what the Court has stated. One had to assume that the just
mentioned ambiguous approach has been adopted on purpose in order to
cast doubt on the “real” autonomous nature of riders and to avoid the
clash with competition law. However, the classification of riders as au-
tonomous workers seems to imply a non-rebuttable presumption such as
to exclude that they could be also hired as subordinate (hetero-organised)
33 CJEU of 4 December 2014, C‑413/13, FNV, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411, para. 42. Biasi,
Marco, Ripensando il rapporto tra il diritto della concorrenza e la contrattazione
collettiva relativa al lavoro autonomo all’indomani della l. n. 81 del 2017, in: WP
C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.IT, 358 (2018).
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workers, thus eliminating the comparator needed in order to make the
FNV doctrine applicable. Provisions regarding the remuneration of riders
will apply from November 2020.
Antidiscrimination law and the guarantee for the worker’s freedom and
dignity, as provided by the subordinate protective statute shall apply to rid-
ers. This is a further sign of the ambiguity mentioned above, taking into
account that, at least as far as antidiscrimination law is concerned, au-
tonomous work has its own rules. The refusal to accept a delivery does not
justify the exclusion of riders from the platform, nor does a reduction of
delivery opportunities, which is, on the contrary, a clear signal of the au-
tonomous nature of riders, since no subordinate worker can lawfully
refuse a task that has been required by the employer (Article 47-quin-
quies).34
Riders shall be insured against work accidents and occupational dis-
eases, which is not anymore a typical feature of subordinate work only.
Contributions are fixed according to the risk rate of the performed activity
with reference to the general minimum daily remuneration for Social Se-
curity and Assistance contribution (EUR 48.98 – INPS circular letter No. 9
of 29 January 2020), related to the days of actual activity. The physical or
legal person using the platform is responsible for the issue of work acci-
dents and occupational diseases legislation, as provided by Decree of the
President of the Republic No. 1124 of 30 June 1965, as well as of the
health and safety regulation, as provided by Legislative Decree No. 81 of 9
April 2008, (Article 47-septies). As far as social security is concerned, being
classified as autonomous workers, riders perform “an autonomous activity
for which no registration by a professional board is required”, thus falling
within the scope of application of the Gestione Separata (Article 2 (1) Act
No. 335 of 1995). Nevertheless, one may wonder whether as “false” self-
employed persons to whom a wage is paid as set by collective agreements,
they should not fall within the scope of application of the General Social
Insurance System, in the Fondo Pensioni Lavoratori Dipendenti (FPLD).
Although in a different way, compared to “hetero-organisation” protect-
ed as subordination, also in the case of riders, a further inconsistency is at
stake between their formal classification and the protective statute that the
legislator applies to them. In fact, that statute is closer to subordination
than to autonomy. Indeed, formally classified as autonomous workers, rid-
ers seem to have been provided by the same legislator with all that is need-
34 In the same vein see CJEU of 22 April 2020, C-692/19, Yodel,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:288, point 40.
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ed to be reclassified by the Court of justice as “false” self-employed work-
ers.
Conclusion
“Hetero-organised” collaborators and riders are paramount examples of a
clear trend towards the abandonment of a “tailor-made protective statute”
based on (old-fashioned) labour law classifications of activities, such as
subordinated or autonomous work. The current approach of the Italian
legislator consists of an “arbitrary” application of labour law and social se-
curity protective statute (as a “package”), according to a political assess-
ment of the weaknesses of specific groups of workers (“social types”), with-
out taking into account the way in which they are integrated into the orga-
nisation of increasingly “deconstructed” undertakings. From such a “pack-
age” perspective, the financing of pensions remains linked to contributions
either from wage or from annual income (for those classified as self-em-
ployed), within the framework of a (virtually) contribution-based system
of calculation of benefits, still run on a pay-as-you-go basis because of its
unspeakable financial imbalance. State pay-offs will be needed for many
years to come in order to support pensions that might be reduced substan-
tially in their amount, due to the abandonment of the retribution-based
system of benefits calculation. However, considering the high contribution
rate,35 the possibility of success for complementary pension funds remains
relatively low – unless the legislator decides to transform from option to
duty the use of the Trattamento di Fine Rapporto (Employment Termina-
tion Grant) in order to finance occupation pension schemes.36
The conclusion can be that the labour law classification of the work re-
lationship is still a relevant issue for social security although increasingly in
a way that does not necessarily coincide with the way of assessing the
needs of a certain category of workers in order to understand if new forms
of protection should be introduced that are specifically designed for them
in accordance with their degree of integration within the organisation of
an undertaking. The “package” perspective, according to which the subor-
dination protective status can be “attached” by the legislator to workers
VII.
35 Harmonised at 34 percent of wage/income both for subordinate and autonomous
work insured by the Gestione Separata, of which two thirds are paid by the em-
ployer/client.
36 Ales, Edoardo, Il sistema pensionistico a 25 anni dalla riforma, in: Rivista Giuridica
del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, 70 (2020) 3, forthcoming.
Edoardo Ales
114
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002, am 02.12.2021, 16:03:17
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
whose performance does not necessarily recall the features of “hetero-direc-
tion” (“hetero-organisation”, for instance), is a sweeping one that entails a
contingent choice on the part of the legislator, who decides to protect one
“politically sensitive” group (riders, for instance), whatever the configura-
tion of their social needs. In this view, further to the absence of “hetero-
direction”, one major point of reflection can be the lack of an exclusive
link to one unique employer that puts the worker in a “false-employee” or
“employee-unlike” position, in contrast to the position of the “false self-
employed” or the “employee-like” worker. Whether this can cause the
emergence of an intermediate category of work between subordination
and autonomy, in terms of coordination, is still a matter of debate. In any
case, such a solution would require the “design” of specific social security
schemes and the abandoning of the “package” approach.
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Chapter 5
Relationship between Employment Status and Scope of Social
Security Protection: The United Kingdom Example
Philip Larkin
Introduction
In common with many other advanced western economies, in both com-
mon law and civil law jurisdictions, the United Kingdom labour market
has experienced the proliferation of non-standard forms of employment, in
particular over the last decade and beyond. These developments have gen-
erated much academic and political comment. These forms of non-stan-
dard employment include part-time work, agency work, “zero-hours” con-
tracts,1 and “gig” work, in which workers are paid per piece of work sup-
plied through digital platforms.2 A further distinguishing feature of many
workers in the “gig” economy is that they are regarded as self-employed for
both revenue and social security purposes, rather than as employees, or
even as “workers”.3 The intermediate category of “worker” has a long pedi-
gree in UK legislation, going back to the Employers and Workmen Act
1875, designed to allow county courts an enlarged and flexible jurisdiction
in disputes between an employer and a “workman”.4 As a discrete category
within the labour market, “workers” are entitled to the national minimum
I.
1 These are work contracts in which the worker is not guaranteed a set number of
working hours weekly, and their weekly hours of work are liable to fluctuate con-
siderably, along with their weekly wage or salary.
2 The Rise of the Sharing Economy, The Economist, 9 March 2013, www.economist.
com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy.
Accessed 15 April 2020.
3 On certain occasions the UK courts have ruled that certain categories of “gig”
workers are, in reality, “workers” rather than self-employed persons. This will be
examined below.
4 See Pimlico Plumbers Ltd and Another (Appellants) v. Smith (Respondent) UKSC
29, at para. 8. Section 10 of the Employers and Workmen Act 1875 defines a
“workman” as a manual labourer working for an employer under “a contract of
service or a contract personally to execute any work or labour.”
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wage, and paid holidays, but are taxed at the same level as self-employed
persons, and are unable to bring claims in unfair dismissal.5
One problem which has frequently beset those in non-standard forms of
employment has been that many of them are prone to fall into the “pover-
ty trap” (whereby it remains more profitable for citizens, especially those
with dependent children, to sustain themselves through welfare benefit re-
ceipt rather than engage in gainful employment6), due to the irregular
weekly hours which they work, and subsequent varying wage rates. It is
fortuitous that the UK Coalition Government of 2010 - 2015 initiated both
a policy initiative and legislation to deal with the “poverty trap” while the
non-regular sector of the labour market was expanding. In the absence of
any form of judicially enforceable, entrenched, bill of rights in the UK
guaranteeing a minimum income and access to the basic means of life, it
remains for legislators to continue to address the problem of the poverty
trap.7 Parliament has made various legislative attempts to incentivise paid
work and subsequent employment skills acquisition, the most significant
being the introduction of Universal Credit (hereinafter: UC) in the Wel-
fare Reform Act 2012, a process which is still ongoing.8 In conjunction
with the introduction of the National Living Wage in 2016,9 it was antici-
pated in Government circles that UC, with its considerably lower claw-
back rates when recipients’ number of working hours and wages rise,
would lead both to an alleviation of poverty among low-paid families and
5 It should be mentioned, however, that workers who are not included in the “Pay
As You Earn” (PAYE) tax scheme for employers are not entitled to the financial
protection of the “Job Retention Scheme” initiated during the recent Covid-19
lockdown, as employees are. The Court of Appeal recently held in Adiatu v. Her
Majesty’s Treasury, CO/1636/2020, that this policy decision is compatible with the
relevant provisions in the ECHR.
6 The problem of poverty caused by wages of just subsistence level or even below
was first identified among agricultural workers in Southern English counties dur-
ing the 1790s, which obliged magistrates to instigate the “Speenhamland System”,
providing labourers a payment out of local rates based on the price of bread and
the number of people in their families. Essentially the same principle forms the
foundations of Family Income Supplement, Family Credit, Working Tax Credits,
Tax Credits, and, indeed, Universal Credit.
7 Indeed, the incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights into UK
law has made minimal impact on the increasing conditionality which has been a
feature of welfare legislation for more than three decades.
8 Universal Credit is gradually becoming operational in various regions throughout
the UK.
9 The National Living Wage replaced the National Minimum Wage in 2016 for citi-
zens over the age of 25.
Philip Larkin
118
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002, am 02.12.2021, 16:03:18
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
individuals, and an increase in the number of UK citizens accepting lower-
paid positions in the labour market.10 Such developments were expected to
have concomitant social benefits, with the civic virtues of industry and
thrift being inculcated in citizens, permitting the lower-paid to achieve the
economic independence which Hayek believed necessary for a “market or-
der” to flourish.11 By 2022 an estimated 7.2 million families will receive
Universal Credit, 3.9 million of whom will be in work.12
The aim of this chapter is to examine the relationship between employ-
ment status and the entitlement to social security, in particular UC, but in-
cluding other benefits, analysing the factors which could prevent their suc-
cessful operation. The chapter will also examine the question of whether,
and how, the Welfare Reform Act (WRA) 2012 can be made effective
through legislative and technological reform.
Evaluation of Non-Standard Forms of Employment
While it is difficult to arrive at exact figures for those in non-standard
forms of work, it has been estimated that by the end of 2019 there were
some 974,000 people in the labour market on zero-hours contracts,13 while
some 4.7 million people were estimated to be self-employed as part of the
gig economy,14 a number which had effectively doubled since 2016, and
II.
10 This must certainly have been a consideration for MPs at the time of the passage
of the Welfare Reform Bill, with the possible prospect of the UK leaving the
European Union and a restriction in the number of migrant workers to fill up the
low-paid positions in the labour market.
11 See Hayek, Friedrich, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume Three: The Political
Order of a Free People, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1979, p. 12. See also
Larkin, Philip, Universal Credit, “Positive Citizenship”, and the Working Poor:
Squaring the Eternal Circle?, in: Modern Law Review, 81 (2018) 1, pp. 114 and
121.
12 Citizens Advice. Universal Credit Needs to Adapt to the Modern Labour Market,
https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/Global/CitizensAdvice/welfare%20publications
/Summary%20briefing%20-%20UC%20and%20modern%20employment%20repo
rts%20.pdf. Accessed 16 April 2020.
13 Office for National Statistics, People in Employment on Zero Hours Contracts,
18 February 2020, https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplei
nwork/employmentandemployeetypes/datasets/emp17peopleinemploymentonzer
ohourscontracts. Accessed 17 April 2020.
14 See Statistical Services and Consultancy Unit (SSCU) and University of Hertford-
shire and Hertfordshire Business School (HBS), The TUC and University of Hert-
fordshire Joint Report Platform Work in the UK. 2016 - 2019, https://www.feps-e
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now represents 9.6 per cent of the adult working population of the UK.15
This steep increase demonstrates not only the omnipresence of the inter-
net, but also the volume of demand for the products and services provided
through digital platforms, which in turn creates the need for gig workers
particularly in large centres of population.16
It is possible that this significant move towards the digital platform
economy reflects not only the traditional Anglo-Saxon model flexibility of
the UK economy, but the increasing “atomisation” of the labour force into
a mass of self-employed individuals working off a digital platform also in-
dicates that internet technology now undermines Coase’s economic pre-
sumption formulated in the 1930s that the “firm” or company hiring em-
ployees under contract is the most efficient manner of production and di-
recting the productive capacity of each individual employee, rather than
continually contracting out for services.17 Certainly the trend is symp-
tomatic of the breakdown of the Fordist model in the UK, which involved
large collective numbers of factory employees manufacturing all compo-
nents of a particular product.18 In socio-legal terms, the dilution of the tra-
ditional legal forms of employment in favour of the fluidity of the gig
economy could represent what Delanty has labelled the “emerging crisis of
solidarity”19 not only in the UK but throughout Europe, hastened by reces-
sion, a development which manifests itself in the weakening of historical
ties between employer and employee in the labour market, and, impor-
tantly, as Veitch states, changes to traditional assistance offered to citizens
via the welfare state.20
urope.eu/attachments/publications/platform%20work%20in%20the%20uk%2020
16-2019%20v3-converted.pdf. Accessed 18 April 2020. See also Partington, Richard,
Gig Economy in Britain Doubles, Accounting for 4.7 Million Workers, The
Guardian, 28 June 2019.
15 See ibid.
16 For example, it was reported that London’s gig economy has grown by 70 per
cent since 2010. See Osbourne, Hilary, London’s “Gig Economy” has Grown More
than 70 Per Cent since 2010, The Guardian, 27 December 2016.
17 See Coase, Ronald Harry, The Nature of the Firm, in: Economica, 4 (1937) 16, pp.
386-405.
18 Davidov, Guy/Langille, Brian (eds.), The Idea of Labour Law, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2013, p. 45.
19 See Delanty, Gerard, Fear of Others: Social Exclusion and the European Crisis of
Solidarity, in: Social Policy and Administration, 42 (2018) 6, pp. 676-690.
20 See Veitch, Kenneth, Social Solidarity and the Power of Contract, in: Journal of
Law and Society, 38 (2011) 2, pp. 189-214.
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In the UK context, this crisis of solidarity is perhaps aggravated by the
welfare state regionalism effected by devolution, especially in Scotland and
Northern Ireland.21 In this theory the move away from the contributory
Bismarckian welfare state based on social insurance contributions to a
common fund is mirrored by developments such as the growth of the gig
economy, changes which serve to erode the various contractual links be-
tween different social groups and institutions. Even the Conservative Par-
ty, most closely associated with neo-liberal policies over the past four
decades in the UK, has been cognisant of these changes for over a decade
now:
Today the challenges facing Britain are immense. Our economy is
overwhelmed by debt, our social fabric is frayed, and our political sys-
tem has betrayed the people.22
Advantages of Non-Standard Forms of Employment
Whatever the negative effect on the traditional contractual labour market
ties the gig economy and zero-hours contracts may have, the fact that these
forms of work have proliferated to such an extent demonstrates how ad-
vantageous consumers find the services which they provide. The internet
permits consumers instant connection with gig workers to promote effi-
ciency, immediately linking individual demand to supply, reinforcing
Veitch’s notion of the new “cult of the consumer”, and the concomitant
notion that consumers should provide for their own care needs.23 Neither
are the benefits of non-standard forms of work confined to consumers:
from the onset of the economic recession the gig economy in particular
has helped create at least some income for a large sector of the working
population, those who were unable to secure traditional type employment.
One feature of the last economic downturn in the UK was that rates of
unemployment did not rise to the levels of the early 1980s, standing at 4.8
per cent in 2017.24 Furthermore, platform work provides a level of flexibil-
1.
21 See Simpson, Mark, Renegotiating Social Citizenship in the Age of Devolution, in:
Journal of Law and Society, 44 (2017) 4, pp. 646-673.
22 Conservative Party, Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: Manifesto 2010,
Conservative Research Department 2010.
23 See Veitch, Kenneth, Social Solidarity and the Power of Contract (fn. 20), p. 190.
24 This is practically equivalent to full employment. See Office for National Statis-
tics, UK Labour Market: Estimates of Employment, Unemployment, Economic
Inactivity and other Employment-Related Statistics for the UK, 15 March 2017,
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ity to crowd workers to set their own hours of work around their family
lives and other social commitments, a level of overall control which many
employees do not normally possess.25 For those citizens who already pos-
sess the status of full- or part-time employee, work in the gig economy of-
fers them the opportunity to supplement their income, with research indi-
cating that the pairing of employment and self-employment has grown
over 20 per cent over the past decade.26
Disadvantages of Non-Standard Forms of Employment
It is nevertheless difficult to avoid a number of significant disadvantages
which both the gig economy and zero-hours contracts contain for those
who work under them. The first is the obvious point that, having the sta-
tus of self-employed workers, they do not receive the statutory protection
their employed counterparts enjoy, such as the rights to the national mini-
mum wage,27 statutory sick pay and the rights to bring claims for unfair
dismissal and redundancy.28 Furthermore, because they do not make the
necessary national insurance contributions, they are not eligible for “new
style” contributory jobseeker’s allowance,29 and, being self-employed, can-
not receive Industrial Injuries Benefit for injuries sustained in the course of
employment.30 Neither do gig workers receive the protection of the tor-
2.
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employme
ntandemployeetypes/bulletins/uklabourmarket/mar2017. Accessed 20 April 2020.
25 See De Stefano, Valerio, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand
Work, Crowdwork, and Labour Protection in the “Gig” Economy, in: Conditions
of Work and Employment Series, International Labour Office, Geneva, 71 (2016),
p. 6, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/d
ocuments/publication/wcms_443267.pdf. Accessed 12 September 2020.
26 Office of Tax Simplification, The Gig Economy: An OTS Focus Paper, 2 Decem-
ber 2016, http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-gig-economy-an-ots-fo
cus-paper. Accessed 20 April 2020. See also De Stefano, Valerio, The Rise of the
“Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labour Protec-
tion in the “Gig” Economy (fn. 25), p. 6.
27 Contained in the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. It should be noted, how-
ever, that zero-hours contract workers are entitled to certain rights such as the
right to the national minimum wage and limits to working time.
28 These are contained in the Employment Rights Act 1996.
29 See below for a discussion of this.
30 Self-employed persons are eligible, however, for Council Tax reductions during
periods of economic inactivity, and are also entitled to the hosing benefit element
of UC. See below.
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tious doctrine of vicarious liability if they carry out a tort in the course of
their work, as do employees. However, for the purposes of this chapter the
central problem of non-standard forms of work is their lack of stability and
predictability of income for the worker. As De Stefano graphically asserts:
“income stability remains a mirage for most of the workers in the gig
economy […]: as praised in the words of one of the businesses’ man-
agers quoted above, one of the chief sources of flexibility is exactly the
possibility to hire people and “fire them after […] ten minutes”31.
Leaving aside the issue of the possibility of easy dismissal of gig and zero-
hours workers, the reality is that the hours of work and the number of jobs
(“gigs”) they carry out may vary daily, weekly, or even seasonally, leading
to an inevitable fluctuation in income, which in turn makes it difficult for
individuals and families to plan and budget. Adams and Deakin have asso-
ciated non-standard forms of work in the labour market with inequality
and precariousness, mainly because there is little certainty in terms of regu-
lar income.32 Indeed, zero-hours contracts and gig workers feature in
much of non-academic literature on that sector of the workforce which has
been labelled the “Precariat”.33 Irregularity of income has another negative
consequence for such workers, namely, that it presents significant difficul-
ties in the accurate calculation and delivery of social security benefits, in
particular Universal Credit, a form of benefit specifically designed,
amongst other purposes, to assist those on lower income. In order to un-
derstand the interrelation between non-standard contract workers and the
social security system, some background must be given on UC and other
relevant benefits.
31 See De Stefano, Valerio, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand
Work, Crowdwork and Labour Protection in the “Gig” Economy (fn. 25), p. 6.
32 Adams, Zoe/Deakin, Simon, Institutional Solutions to Precariousness and Inequali-
ty in Labour Markets, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge
Working Paper No. 463, September 2014, p. 1.
33 See, for example, Bloodworth, James, Hired: Six Months Undercover in Low-Wage
Britain, London: Atlantic Books 2019, and Standing, Guy, The Precariat: The New
Dangerous Class, London: Bloomsbury Press 2014.
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Universal Credit and Other Related Social Security Benefits
Universal Credit, Unemployment and Work
Although structurally and technically innovative, there is little that is con-
ceptually new in UC. Indeed, it builds upon the system of “tax relief pay-
ment”, or “tax credits” introduced by the first New Labour Government of
1997 - 2001, a payment administered primarily through the revenue au-
thorities, designed to support financially the family unit and provide par-
ents with the incentive to find and retain paid employment.34 The advan-
tage of the tax credit system was that recipients could avoid the stigma of
claiming a benefit, unlike Family Income Supplement and Family Credit
which preceded it, and together with the introduction of the national min-
imum wage35 it was hoped that paid employment would be sufficiently re-
warding to encourage one or both parents to remain in employment.36
Later New Labour governments developed the tax credits policy, with
Working Families Tax Credit and Disabled Persons Tax Credit being re-
placed by “working tax credit”, and forms of support for children through
tax and social security with a “child tax credit” in the Tax Credits Act
2002.37 Furthermore, by the time that the policy began in 1997, wage lev-
els for the lowest decile of the workforce had fallen to historically low lev-
els, as a result of deregulatory measures such as the abolition of Wages
Councils and the legislative neutralisation of trade unions during the years
of Conservative Government.38 These factors not only occasioned a reduc-
tion in “job security”, but also impacted negatively on employees’ ability
to negotiate reasonable wage increases.39
III.
1.
34 See Larkin, Philip, Universal Credit, “Positive Citizenship”, and the Working
Poor: Squaring the Eternal Circle? (fn. 11), pp. 114 and 117.
35 This was introduced in the National Minimum Wage Act 1998.
36 See Larkin, Philip, Universal Credit, “Positive Citizenship”, and the Working
Poor: Squaring the Eternal Circle? (fn. 11), pp. 114 and 117.
37 Wikeley, Nick, Tax Credits Act 2002: Annotated Legislation, London: Sweet and
Maxwell 2002.
38 See Puttick, Keith, 21st Century Welfare and the Wage-Work-Welfare Bargain, in:
Industrial Law Journal, 41 (2012) 1, p. 125. See also Larkin, Philip, Universal Cred-
it, “Positive Citizenship”, and the Working Poor: Squaring the Eternal Circle? (fn.
11), p. 117.
39 See Gregg, Paul/Wadsworth, Jonathan, Feeling Insecure? An Analysis of Job Tenure
from 1975 to 1995, Employment Audit, London: Employment Policy Institute
1996. See also Nickell, Stephen/Jones, Patricia/Quintini, Glenda, A Picture of Job In-
security Facing British Men, in: The Economic Journal, 112 (2002) 476.
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Viewed in their entirety, tax credits appear to have been instrumental in
improving the financial circumstances of a sizeable sector of the popula-
tion out of poverty: Gordon Brown, as Chancellor, claimed that the
means-tested Working Families Tax Credit, combined with child benefit,
was responsible for raising 1.2 million children out of poverty.40 The effec-
tiveness of tax credits in reducing inequality and aiding social mobility in
the UK is also evidenced by an OECD Report which demonstrates that
while during the period between the late 1990s and the early years of the
present decade the prospects of the poorest people in societies across the
world worsened, in the UK they actually improved dramatically.41 At the
beginning of the period some six in ten people in the bottom income
quintile were trapped in this position, but four years later this figure had
fallen to four in ten.42 This improvement in social mobility is important,
because, as the Report emphasises, lack of social mobility can damage the
foundations of growth in modern market economies, leading to the under-
development of human talent and a dearth of spending power and a subse-
quent shortfall in investment in the economy.43 The improvement itself is
held to be a triumph of policy design, namely, the development of tax
credits to ensure that paid work was sufficiently rewarding, and a mini-
mum wage which steadily increased during the relevant period.44 How-
ever, the tax credits system contained certain flaws, the main one being the
high level of clawback which claimants experienced when their working
hours, and subsequently salaries, increased, thus acting as a disincentive for
both couples and individuals to engage further with the labour market,
and ultimately become financially self-sufficient.45
The introduction of UC was brought about by two main policy aims.
The first is to achieve maximum participation in the labour market by en-
suring that paid employment will always be more lucrative than benefit re-
40 The measurement of poverty for these purposes is a household with less than 60
per cent of median national income. See Households Below Average Income
Statistics Department for Work and Pensions (11 April 2002). See also Lee, Natal-
ie, The New Tax Credits, in: Journal of Social Security Law, 10 (2003) 1, p. 10.
41 OECD, A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social Mobility, OECD Pub-
lishing, Paris, 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264301085-en. Accessed 30 July
2020.
42 Ibid., p. 23. See also Strauss, Delphine, Social Mobility Progress at Risk as EU Di-
vorce Saps Economy, Financial Times, 13 July 2018.
43 Ibid., p. 23.
44 See Larkin, Philip, Universal Credit, “Positive Citizenship”, and the Working
Poor: Squaring the Eternal Circle? (fn. 11), p. 117.
45 See ibid.
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ceipt. The second is to achieve greater administrative efficiency in terms of
time and cost. UC, the outline structure of which is contained in the WRA
2012,46 is essentially a form of income-based benefit, which incorporates
six former means-tested benefits and tax credits,47 and is administered and
disbursed entirely by the Department for Work and Pensions.48 These re-
forms were motivated by more than efficiency: it was also intended to sim-
plify the system for claimants, since it proved difficult in practice to under-
stand how the different tax credits and benefits they applied for related to
each other.49
UC itself is an income-based benefit, although a remnant of social insu-
rance-based is represented in the “new style” jobseekers allowance (JSA),
which is payable to those claimants who have made sufficient national in-
surance contributions in the last two tax years before the claim.50 In order
to be eligible for UC, the claimant must be at least 18 years old, be in
Great Britain, not receiving education, and has accepted a relevant
46 As with other welfare and tax credit legislation, the outline structure of UC is
contained in the Welfare Reform Act (WRA) 2012, while much of the detail is set
out in Regulations.
47 Income-based jobseeker’s allowance, income support, income-related employ-
ment and support allowance, housing benefit, working tax credit, and child tax
credit. This abolition is contained in WRA 2012, Section 33. See also McKeever,
Gráinne, Social Citizenship and Social Security Fraud in the UK and Australia, in:
Social Policy and Administration, 46 (2012) 4, pp. 465 ff., and McKeever, Gráinne,
Balancing Rights and Responsibilities: The Case of Social Security Fraud, in: Jour-
nal of Social Security Law, 16 (2009) 3, p. 139.
48 This marks a change from the previous system of tax credits, which were adminis-
tered entirely by the revenue authorities.
49 To exemplify the complexity of the previous system, a claimant with children in
rented accommodation might have had to claim four different benefits from
three different authorities. This was complicated by the fact that entitlement to
tax benefits were calculated on the basis of an entire tax year, whereas four of the
six benefits abolished by the WRA 2012 were calculated weekly and paid fort-
nightly. See Mesher, John/Poynter, Richard/ Wikeley, Nick/Wood, Penny, Universal
Credit, Volume V: Social Security Legislation 2013/14, London: Sweet and
Maxwell 2014, p. 4. See also Larkin, Philip, Universal Credit, “Positive Citizen-
ship”, and the Working Poor: Squaring the Eternal Circle? (fn. 11), p. 118.
50 New style JSA and UC may be claimed together, if the individual or household’s
finances do not reach sustenance level on JSA alone. Unlike UC, new style JSA
may be claimed even if the claimant or their household have more than £16,000
in savings. See the Welfare Reform Act 2012 (Commencement No. 11 and Transi-
tional and Transitory Provisions and Commencement No. 9 and Transitional and
Transitory Provisions (Amendment)) Order 2013, SI 2013/1511. New style JSA
claimants are subject to the more rigorous UC claimant commitment and the
sanctions which accompany this.
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claimant commitment.51 Furthermore, claimants and households with fi-
nancial resources over a certain threshold are not eligible for UC.52 Section
1 of the WRA 2012 sets out the categories of claimant to whom UC may
be awarded, namely, single persons, and couples jointly, both in and out of
work.53 This section of the WRA also outlines the structure of UC, affirm-
ing that it consists of a standard allowance, and separate amounts for chil-
dren and young persons, for housing, and for other particular needs or cir-
cumstances.54 The detailed rules on UC claims are contained in the Uni-
versal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s Allowance and
Employment and Support Allowance (Claims and Payments) Regulations
2013.55 To create a notional link between receipt of UC and the labour
market, it is paid fortnightly so as to reflect the reality that some 75 per
cent of the working population now receive their earnings monthly and in
arrears.56
Probably the most progressive reform made by the WRA 2012 is to
change the manner of calculation of UC from that of tax credits, enhanc-
ing the incentive for families and individuals to enter and remain in the
labour market. The “work allowance”57 allows considerably higher earn-
ings disregards than other income-based benefits such as income support
or jobseeker’s allowance. Claimants should thus be able to retain more of
their earned income before their UC award is reduced, and if the figure
calculated for earned income during the assessment period does not exceed
the applicable work allowance then no deduction is made from the maxi-
mum amount.58 Furthermore, once the reduction begins, claimants will
only lose 65 per cent of the increase in their income rather than 100 per
51 Section 4 of the WRA 2012.
52 Section 5 of the WRA 2012. The threshold figure is £16,000.
53 Section 1 of the WRA 2012.
54 Section 1 (3) (a) – (d).
55 SI 2013/380. See also WRA 2012, Sections 3 and 4.
56 See Puttick, Keith, 21st Century Welfare and Universal Credit: Reconstructing the
Wage-Work-Welfare Bargain Part 2, in: Industrial Law Journal, 41 (2012) 2, p.
239.
57 The structure of the “work allowance” and “higher work allowance” is set out in
the WRA 2012, Section 8 (3) and UC Regulations 2013, Regulation 22. The high-
er and lower work allowances are each applied at six discrete rates which are spec-
ified in a table which forms part of Regulation 22.
58 See Mesher, John/Poynter, Richard/Wikeley, Nick/Wood, Penny, Universal Credit,
Volume V: Social Security Legislation 2013/14 (fn. 49), p. 4. See also Larkin,
Philip, Universal Credit, “Positive Citizenship”, and the Working Poor: Squaring
the Eternal Circle? (fn. 11), p. 125.
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cent, a reform which accounts for the significant difference in outcome be-
tween working claimants on jobseeker’s allowance and those on UC.59
This reform in particular does make some headway in reducing the long-
enduring disincentives for individual citizens and families of different
types to engage with the labour market, particularly in the light of the
post-2010 Coalition Government’s commitment to ensure that 85 per cent
of childcare costs for the least affluent UC recipients would be made by
public funds.60
One might expect those citizens engaged in non-standard forms of work
in particular to benefit from these reforms, occupying as they do many of
the lower-paid positions in the labour market. The reforms also demon-
strate a genuine desire on the part of legislators to remedy the shortcom-
ings of the existing tax credits system.61 It should also be noted that, like
tax credits, UC may also be claimed by the self-employed, including the
large number of gig workers, an important continuity since the self-em-
ployed proportion of the UK labour market began to rise since the early
years of the century, and increased from 3.8 million in 2008 to 4.6 million
in 2015, a trend hastened by the economic recession beginning in 2007.62
Given that some 60 per cent of those families in poverty are actually work-
ing families,63 one might expect UC to be instrumental in improving the
living standards of such citizens. Seen through the prism of the WRA
2012, individual citizens are viewed very much as producers who should be
economically active, rather than simply possessors of unearned rights, and
in keeping with the view of Grover and Stewart that such reforms have
been shaped by:
[…] ideas with a long standing tradition in England: that economically
inactive people are lazy, and react rationally to the availability of social
security by making themselves inactive, or prolonging their inactivi-
ty.64
59 See Larkin, ibid.
60 See Wintour, Patrick/Mason, Rowena, Prime Minister Pitches to Families with
Childcare Cash, The Guardian, 18 March 2014.
61 See ibid.
62 See Office for National Statistics. Trends in Self-Employment in the UK: 2010 to
2015, https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/empl
oymentandemployeetypes/articles/trendsinselfemploymentintheuk/2001to2015.
Accessed 10 July 2020. These figures also include gig workers.
63 See ibid.
64 Grover, Chris/Stewart, John, Modernising Social Security? Labour and its Welfare-
to-Work Strategy, in: Social Policy and Administration, 34 (2000) 3, p. 236.
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Universal Credit, New Style ESA, and Incapacity for Work
Both zero-hours contract workers and gig workers may also be eligible to
claim “new style” Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) if they are
incapacitated or unable to work because of illness, and have made suffi-
cient national insurance contributions over the past two tax years before
the claim, and eligibility for this benefit also extends to the self-em-
ployed.65 ESA was first introduced by the last Labour Government in the
Welfare Reform Act 2007, replacing the former system of incapacity bene-
fit and income support. Unlike UC, which was promoted primarily on the
message of encouraging citizens to engage with the labour market, ESA
was introduced for the more stringent purpose of ensuring what has been
named “positive citizenship”, or to almost coerce citizens back into the
labour market and productivity as soon as possible.66 The Welfare Reform
Act 200767 is paradigmatic of the ideology which has underpinned much
welfare reform legislation over the past four decades, reducing further the
importance of national insurance benefits while rendering them more dif-
ficult to attain, with entitlement linked to increased conditionality.68 As
one UK former Secretary of State for Social Security asserted, “[…] people
who earn a modest wage resent seeing neighbours, apparently as fit as
themselves, living on invalidity benefit”69. This did not prevent the Labour
Government from presenting the legislation as providing an opportunity
for citizens to find fulfilment in the labour market, thus demonstrating the
continuity in ideology at the foundation of welfare reform:
The reforms in the Bill set out a new direction of travel for our welfare
system. They are underpinned by a belief in an active enabling welfare
state that sees tackling poverty and social exclusion, with no-one left be-
hind and no-one written off.70
2.
65 The transition from ESA to “new style” ESA is set out in Regulation 23 of the
Universal Credit (Transitional Provisions), Regulations 2013, SI 2013.
66 See Larkin, Philip, Incapacity, the Labour Market and Social Security: Coercion
into “Positive” Citizenship, in: Modern Law Review, 74 (2011) 3, pp. 385 ff. It
should be mentioned that receipt of UC is also hedged around with conditionali-
ty.
67 And the Welfare Reform Act 2012 which superseded it.
68 See Larkin, Philip, Incapacity, the Labour Market and Social Security: Coercion
into “Positive” Citizenship (fn. 66).
69 HC Deb vol 236 cols 135 - 136 24 January 1994. This was the original core reason
for replacing the former invalidity benefit with Incapacity benefit.
70 John Hutton MP, HC Debs vol. 449 col 616 24 July 2006.
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As with UC, emphasis was placed on the idea of aspiration, and that citi-
zens should strive to better their own social position through engagement
in paid employment. For those non-standard workers who have made suf-
ficient national insurance contributions, it is indeed possible to claim ESA,
which has a contributory and non-contributory element, modelled closely
on new style jobseeker’s allowance.71 Income-based ESA has been abol-
ished by the WRA 2012,72 but its essential structure was retained in the
WRA and the Universal Credit Regulations 2013.73 The basic entitlements
are relatively uncontroversial, but in Section 37 of the WRA 2012 and Reg-
ulations 38 and 39 of the UC Regulations the key concepts of “limited ca-
pability for work” and “limited capability for work-related activity” the
self-conscious aim is to place focus on what work the claimant can actually
do, rather than their incapacity or illness.74 In combination with these, the
Work Capability Assessment, the framework for which is set out in the
Regulations,75 is designed to be a more stringent form of test than the per-
sonal capability assessment which preceded it. The majority of incapacitat-
ed UC claimants go through the first element of the procedure, which is
the assessment of limited capability for work, usually decided on the basis
of a face-to-face interview, and is judged on a series of activity descriptors,
and scores are awarded for each activity.
The WCA was designed to modernise comprehensively the nature of
those tasks prevalent in the contemporary labour market, and incapability
to perform a task must arise from a specific bodily disease or disablement,
or a mental equivalent. Establishing limited capability for work entitles the
claimant only to the basic UC allowance, and the extra components they
may receive will depend upon whether it is judged that they do or do not
have limited capacity for work-related activity. This involves a claimant
having to undergo more rigorous assessment and a person is deemed to
have such a limited capability if, by reason of their physical or mental con-
dition, at least one of the criteria contained in Schedule 9 to the UC Regu-
lations applies to him or her. Those who fail to establish such limited capa-
71 See Larkin, Philip, Incapacity, the Labour Market and Social Security: Coercion
into “Positive” Citizenship (fn. 66), p. 398. See also Wikeley, Nick/Laurie, Emma,
Welfare Reform Act 2007, Annotated Legislation, London: Sweet and Maxwell
2007.
72 Section 33 of the Welfare Reform Act 2012.
73 SI 2013/376.
74 See Larkin, Philip, Incapacity, the Labour Market and Social Security: Coercion
into “Positive” Citizenship (fn. 66), p. 398.
75 Schedules 6 to 9 to the UC Regulations 2013.
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bility will receive the work-related activity component of UC, and are
obliged to attend one or more work-focused interviews, the aim being to
assess the claimant’s chances of obtaining or remaining in work, and help-
ing them back into the labour market.
New style ESA and UC for incapacitated claimants may have a special
relevance for both zero-hours contract workers and those engaged in the
gig economy: the introduction of the ESA coincided with some of the
most arduous years of the economic recession, when positions in tradition-
al forms of employment contract tended to be scarce. Even in the early
years of the operation of income-based ESA statistics demonstrated that
work capability assessments resulted in more than 66 per cent of ESA
claimants being judged fit to work, with the decision of the Department
for Work and Pensions being upheld in 62 per cent of appeals.76 Given
that the unemployment rate did not rise hugely during the recent reces-
sion, it is highly likely that many of those deemed fit for work or work-
related activity may have been directed towards, or simply found, work in
either the gig or zero-hours sector of the economy, work which frequently
does not require a high level of skills or training. One of the central factors
in the growth of digital platform and other such activity could have been
the operation of the Welfare Reform Acts of 2007 and 2012, with
claimants seeking to enter the labour market in any capacity not only to
avoid legislative sanctions, but due to the opprobrium of an increasingly
unsympathetic British public.77 As Taylor-Gooby notes, it is this revival of
lack of empathy for the less materially well-off that distinguishes the UK
from continental Europe, and ensures that UK welfare legislation tends to
be “sharper-edged and cruder” than that in continental nations.78 It is un-
likely that attitudes have changed greatly since the tailing-off of the last re-
cession: they may even have been fortified by the knowledge that there ap-
pears to be a surfeit of positions in the non-regular economy.
76 Work Capability Assessment Statistical Release, para. 3, January 2010, https://
www.gov.uk/government/statistics/employment-and-support-allowance-work-ca-
pability-assessment-july-2010. Accessed 10 July 2020.
77 A British Social Attitudes Survey, drawn up roughly at the early operation of the
WRA 2012, indicated that the working population are less tolerant of the “plight”
of their less affluent, unemployed counterparts in low-income social groups, espe-
cially if they perceive that benefit recipients are malingering.
78 This survey is cited in the Economist 26 January 2008.
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The Legislative Benefit Cap
One central point which should be mentioned for the purposes of back-
ground information is that all welfare benefit recipients and their family
units in the UK are subject to a legislative benefit cap, or limit, which was
also contained in the Welfare Reform Act 2012,79 representing another re-
form in the overall wide-ranging review of the social security system car-
ried out by the Coalition Government, and as part of the austerity mea-
sures effected simultaneously. Introduced in April 2013, by 2014 some
36,471 households had experienced benefit reductions, with 17,102 being
in London.80 Originally set at £26,000 per household, the level of the cap
was reduced to £20,000 for families from autumn 2016.81 Like the WRA
2007, the benefit cap is credited with encouraging many citizens to enter
or re-enter the labour market, with figures in 2014 indicating that some
8040 households had come off the benefit cap, and that 40 per cent of
those who came off the cap had found gainful employment.82 Lord Freud,
Minister of Welfare Reform, also stated:
Our reforms are creating an alternative to life on benefits and already
we are seeing an increasing number of people changing their circum-
stances so they are no longer subject to the cap.83
It is entirely plausible that many people seeking to escape the financial
strictures of the benefit cap, and to avoid the legislative sanctions con-
tained in the Welfare Reform Act 2012 for those not deemed to be taking
sufficient steps to find employment, have accepted zero-hours contracts or
are online platform workers. The benefit cap has been subject to legal chal-
lenge on the grounds that it infringed provisions of international human
3.
79 The framework for the benefit cap is contained in Sections 95 - 96 of the WRA
2012, and the Benefit Cap (Housing Benefit) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/2994, and
the Benefit Cap (Housing Benefit and Universal Credit) (Amendment) Regula-
tions 2016, SI 2016/909.
80 See Department for Work and Pensions, Benefit Cap: Number of Households
Capped to December 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/benefit-cap-
number-of-households-capped-to-december-2013. Accessed 28 April 2020.
81 Apart from the London area, where the cap was reduced to £23,000, due to in-
creased living costs.
82 See Department for Work and Pensions, Benefit Cap: Number of Households
Capped to December 2013 (fn. 80).
83 Cited in BBC News. Thousands Hit by Government Benefit Cap Now in Work, 6
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rights law, but, in two majority decisions, the Supreme Court ruled that
the relevant human rights law had not been breached.84 As usual with is-
sues relating to social policy and social security law, it was felt by some of
the judges85 that deliberations and action on such matters are best ad-
dressed in the political arena of the legislature.
Non-Standard Forms of Work and the Social Security System
It would be inaccurate for the Coalition Government to claim that it had
not been given advance warning of some of the main issues which could
beset the operation of UC, which has caused perhaps most problems espe-
cially for those working non-standard contracts. While the operation of
UC has revealed a variety of design defects in UC, it is this latter category
of people that the sole focus will be upon. Referring to legislative measures
towards simplicity and administrative efficiency, Baroness Hale stated that
while such aims were self-evidently laudable, there was a good reason why
the social security is so complicated in nature: the multipurpose welfare
system must cope with a great number of life situations, which inevitably
means that it must be, by nature, inherently complex.86 A similar thesis is
expounded by Harris, who argues that despite the longstanding ambition
of both Labour and Conservative Governments to merge the tax and bene-
fit systems in order to achieve administrative savings and a simplification
of the frequently labyrinthine bureaucracy in both welfare and revenue
systems, the life situations which both branches of law cover remain as
complex as ever.87 These views were also shared by Sainsbury,88 Brewer,89
and even the Policy Exchange on the Standing Committee for the Welfare
IV.
84 The cases are R (SG and Others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
[2015] UKSC 16, and R (DA & Ors) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
and R (DS & Ors) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions UKSC 21.
85 Lord Wilson, for example, in R (DA & Ors) v Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions; R (DS & Ors) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2019] UKSC
21.
86 See Hinchy v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 16 at para
48.
87 See Harris, Neville, Law in a Complex State: Complexity in the Law and Structure
of Welfare, Oxford: Hart Publishing 2013, pp. 60-61.
88 Committee Debate – First Sitting: House of Commons 22 March 2011, col. 6.
89 Ibid.
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Reform Bill.90 In addition, the increased atomisation of the labour force,
the factors which compel increasingly more citizens to accept non-stan-
dard forms of work, and the move towards what Bauman has called the
“society of consumers”,91 has further compounded an already tangled so-
cio-economic situation in the UK. Indeed, some commentators represent-
ing the more populist right of the political spectrum actively promoted the
growth of the gig economy as a means of encouraging activism among un-
employed citizens.92 During the parliamentary debates relating to the pas-
sage of the Welfare Reform Bill 2012, John McDonnell MP93 stated that in
his own parliamentary constituency many of the jobs on offer tended to be
casual and low-paid, with many of his constituents working on zero-hours
contracts in which weekly rates of pay can fluctuate significantly.94 He may
also feasibly have mentioned the then growing number of gig workers in
the economy, a development which had not yet really attracted a great de-
gree of public attention.
The calculation of tax credits for those on non-standard contracts was al-
ready problematic under the previous system, and it appears that some of
the same issues still beset the UC system. Before it came into operation,
Seddon and O’Donovan criticised vociferously the information technolo-
gy-dominated “industrial design” of UC, viewing it as fundamentally
flawed, and they also predicted huge disruptions in its service flow, dupli-
cation of effort, and, as a result, rising costs.95 These authors cite Adam
Smith’s notion of the division of labour to suggest that the administration
of UC will actually be less efficient than that of tax credits, since in the case
of the latter the burden of administrative tasks were shared by both the De-
90 This was Matthew Oakley, Head of Economics and Social Policy at Policy Ex-
change. See ibid. M. Oakley was acting as an expert witness in the Committee De-
bate.
91 Bauman, Zygmunt, Does Ethics have a Chance in a World of Consumers, Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press 2008, Chapter 3.
92 See Kirkup, James, Help Welfare Claimants to Join the Gig Economy, Daily Tele-
graph, 3 February 2016. See also Bulman, May, Amber Rudd Says People Should
Take Zero-Hour Contracts to void Having Benefits cut, The Independent, 19 De-
cember 2018. Amber Rudd MP was then Secretary of State for Work and Pen-
sions.
93 Member of Parliament for Hayes and Harlington and former Deputy Leader of
the Labour Party.
94 HC Deb vol col 988 9 March 2011.
95 Seddon, John/O’Donovan, Brendan, The Achilles Heel of Scale Service design in So-
cial Security Administration: The Case of the United Kingdom’s Universal Credit,
in: International Social Security Review, 66 (2013) 1, pp. 1 ff.
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partment for Work and Pensions and the tax authorities.96 To at least some
extent these predictions have been borne out in the operation of the WRA
2012.
Non-standard work activities in the UK cover a wide variety of fields,
and are not confined to courier work or other forms of manual or lower-
skilled tasks. Research carried out in 2018 gave a broad definition of the
gig economy, more comprehensive than that commonly understood.97 The
same research demonstrated that the age profile of those involved in the
gig economy was skewed towards those aged 34 and under,98 and more
likely to be based in London.99 While the provision of courier work was
the most common type of gig activity, performing other types of job found
through websites or apps was almost as common, and it was found that
this could range from low-skilled work to professional work such as web
development or work in the creative industries or media.100 Very signifi-
cantly, 25 per cent of survey respondents reported that they earned an
hourly income of less than £7.50 per hour, which was then the national
minimum wage, while the level of annual average earnings from the gig
economy overall was relatively low, with 41 per cent stating that they nor-
mally earned less than £250 weekly through their services.101 In addition,
87 per cent of everyone involved in the gig economy said that they had
earned less than £10,000 in the past 12 months.102 It is noteworthy, never-
theless that even with the issues which beset the gig economy, it was stated
by Taylor that many self-employed persons experience greater financial
96 See ibid, pp. 3-5.
97 For example, the term was held to include not only individuals using platforms
which play an active role in facilitating work and taking a proportion of the pay
or charging providers’ fees for using the platform (such as Deliveroo or TaskRab-
bit), but also the ad hoc provision of labour to either individuals and businesses,
and, importantly, people providing services who are either freelancers or have
set up a one-person business to offer their services, and people for whom the gig
economy is the main source of income and those who use it to top up their in-
come from other sources. See the Department for Business, Energy and Industri-
al Strategy. The Characteristics of those in the Gig Economy: Final Report, p. 12,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/687553/The_characteristics_of_those_in_the_gig_economy.pd
f. Accessed 30 April 2020.
98 Only some 10 per cent of the sample survey were aged 55 or over. See ibid, p. 14.
99 Some 24 per cent of the gig economy workers are based in London. See ibid., p.
17.
100 See ibid., p. 5.
101 See ibid., p. 6.
102 See ibid.
Chapter 5: The United Kingdom Example
135
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002, am 02.12.2021, 16:03:18
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
certainty than other labour market groups such as agency or zero-hours
contract workers.103 It might be expected that these would be exactly the
people who would benefit from UC and the operation of the WRA 2012,
and certainly many of these would come within its remit.
However, it is at this interface between the labour market and the social
security system that real problems arise: for many, if not all, online plat-
form workers and zero-hours contract workers, in whatever field they may
be engaged, experience weekly and monthly fluctuations in earnings, and,
unlike previous forms of benefit, UC is paid monthly in arrears. UC itself
has been observed to operate most effectively for those engaged in tradi-
tional working arrangements of fixed hours and paid a fixed income each
calendar month.104 Yet in one survey on UC claimants, it was discovered
that less than 50 per cent reported that they were being paid monthly, a
finding backed up by analysis from the Resolution Foundation, which un-
covered that 58 per cent of claimants moving on to UC were paid fort-
nightly or weekly in their current or previous job.105 This held true for
non-standard contract workers, whose income tends not to be received
monthly (gig workers are remunerated per job), and, although the overall
value of their annual benefit entitlement does not change, those trying to
combine non-monthly wages with a monthly benefit.106 For example, it is
possible for a zero-hours contract worker, who may be paid weekly, and,
due to the fact that each month does not contain the same number of
weeks, their earnings in each calendar month will vary, since during some
months they will receive four wage payments and in others five. This will
undoubtedly lead to fluctuating UC payments, and subsequent problems
in household budgeting. Furthermore, when two four-weekly wage pack-
103 Taylor, Matthew/Marsh, Greg/Nicol, Diane/Broadbent, Paul, Good Work: The Tay-
lor Review of Modern Working Practices, Independent Report, July 2017. See
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/627671/good-work-taylor-review-modern-working-practices-rg.
pdf. Accessed 30 April 2020.
104 See Citizens Advice. Universal Credit and Modern Employment: Non-Tradition-
al Work, https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/Global/CitizensAdvice/welfare%20p
ublications/Universal%20Credit%20and%20non-traditional%20employment.pd
f. Accessed 30 April 2020.
105 See Brewer, Mike/Finch, David/Tomlinson, Daniel, Universal Remedy: Ensuring
Universal Credit is Fit for Purpose, The Resolution Foundation, October 2017,
p. 6, https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2017/10/Universal-Cred
it.pdf. Accessed 10 May 2020.
106 See Citizens Advice. Universal Credit and Modern Employment: Non-Tradition-
al Work (fn. 104), p. 16.
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ets are paid in the same month, this can push the overall earnings consider-
ably over the threshold level, entitling the claimant to no UC for that
month, causing difficulties for those used to a set amount of tax credit ben-
efit.107 For a benefit which was designed to inculcate regular habits of in-
dustry and thrift among recipients, one survey discovered that of over 800
working families receiving UC, 43 per cent stated that they were never able
to put money aside as savings, while only 17 per cent were reported being
able to do so regularly,108 and this lack of flexibility in household budget
prevents recipients from being able to plan for UC fluctuations. Zero-
hours contract workers have the added problem of varying weekly income,
causing them to have to make multiple claims in order to erode their sur-
plus earnings.109 Another problem which has beset many UC claimants
has been the waiting time for the benefit, and it frequently takes some five
to six weeks for the first payment to be made, a period during which those
already in a precarious financial position can fall into poverty, requiring re-
course to non-governmental sources of help such as charity food banks.110
The self-employed status of many gig workers, in combination with the
irregularity of their earnings, brings to the fore a further factor compound-
ing their frequent precarious financial position. In addition to not usually
receiving a monthly wage or salary, gig workers and ordinary self-em-
ployed persons also face the inevitability of income fluctuation according
to the vagaries of the market. Self-employed persons’ access to UC is sub-
ject to them being deemed “gainfully self-employed”,111 a process which
involves potential claimants undertaking a “Gateway Interview” carried
out by Jobcentre Plus112 Work Coaches who tend to lack specialist knowl-
edge in assessing small business plans and activity for viability. It was not-
107 See ibid., at p. 17. Those familiar with tax credits are becoming fewer as the op-
eration of UC progresses.
108 Citizens Advice. Universal Credit and Modern Employment: Non-Traditional
Work (fn. 104), p. 18.
109 This problem was specifically mentioned by the Social Security Advisory Com-
mittee. See The Universal Credit, Miscellaneous Amendments, Savings and
Transitional Provisions, SI 2018 No. 65. Report by the Social Security Advisory
Committee, January 2018.
110 See Purves, Libby, The State has Earned Universal Discredit, The Times, 23 Octo-
ber 2017.
111 The definition of “gainful self-employment” is contained in Regulation 64 of the
Universal Credit Regulations 2013, SI 2013/376.
112 The Jobcentre Plus serves not only as a form of labour exchange but also as a
means of executive body which effects social security legislation and policy in
the UK.
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ed by the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee that viabili-
ty interviews of this nature require specialist knowledge and understand-
ing of business development (knowledge usually beyond the remit of work
coaches), since, in its view, it is vital that the DWP supports potentially
successful businesses while not wasting resources on unsustainable ven-
tures.113 One key UK Government policy aim over the past decades, of
both main political parties, has been to encourage entrepreneurship and
individual self-reliance among citizens, and online platform and freelance
workers could certainly be said to adhere to these criteria.
Like other self-employed UC claimants, online platform and other gig
workers are subject to a “Minimum Income Floor” (MIF), which assumes
that they are making a certain minimum amount of monthly income.114
For the majority of claimants the MIF is the equivalent of a full-time work-
er’s (which equals 35 hours weekly) wage on the national living wage. For
the first year of business new self-employed persons are exempt from the
MIF, a period known as the “Start-up Period”, the rationale given by the
DWP for this idea being that it is “to encourage individuals to increase
their earnings through developing their self-employment” and to address
“[…] flaws in legacy benefits which allowed self-employed claimants to re-
ceive state support while declaring low or zero earnings”115. The Resolu-
tion Foundation, a UK think tank, has voiced doubt about the effects of
the MIF on self-employed UC claimants:
Applying the MIF on a monthly basis could leave self-employed work-
ers much worse off than employees, despite having identical incomes.
This situation would arise as a result of a self-employed person’s UC
award being capped by the MIF when their income is low, without
then being recovered in months when they earn more.116
113 See the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, Self-Employment
and the Gig Economy: Thirteenth Report of Session 2016-17 HC 847, 1 May
2017.
114 This is set out in Regulation 62 of the Universal Credit Regulations 2013, SI
2013/376.
115 Reported in Citizens Advice. Universal Credit and Modern Employment: Non-
Traditional Work (fn. 104), p. 16. It did constitute a valid concern among legisla-
tors that directors of small and medium-sized enterprises would deliberately pay
themselves a very basic salary in order to be able to avail of UC.
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The point was also underscored in the House of Commons Work and Pen-
sion Committee Report that the vagaries of self-employment, including
seasonal variations in trade or payments made for ongoing work can easily
confuse the true picture of annual income generation.117 While this Report
correctly suggests that this factor could deter people from self-employ-
ment,118 for those who do not possess a high degree of skills, English lan-
guage ability or education, there may be no alternative to persevering in
online platform work, and perhaps taking on more than one set of online
jobs in order to keep income at a reasonably steady level, while their finan-
cial situation continues to remain precarious. This is in addition to the
pressures from the social security system set out above which propel citi-
zens towards the gig economy. The uncertainty surrounding the interme-
diate category of “worker” was also noted, with many of such workers be-
ing on very flexible contracts and being similarly vulnerable to fluctua-
tions, whether as employed or self-employed persons.119
Judicial Action in the Sphere of Non-Standard Work
On a number of significant occasions the UK courts have operated inde-
pendently from legislation and used their common law powers to rule that
some groups of people who engage in categories of labour market activity
actually have the status of “worker” when previously they had been la-
belled and treated as self-employed gig workers by the on-line platform in-
stitutions for which they work. These developments could be declared as
progressive insofar as they allow such people certain rights, such as the
right to the national living wage. The most important of these cases is
Aslam and Others (Claimants) v. Uber BV and Others (Respondents),120 in
which two drivers for the online platform Uber, formerly classed as self-
employed gig workers, claimed that they had the right to the national min-
imum wage and the right to be paid annual leave under the Working Time
Regulations 1998,121 rights enjoyed by both employees and workers.122
V.
117 See Citizens Advice. Universal Credit and Modern Employment: Non-Tradition-
al Work (fn. 104).
118 See ibid., p. 16.
119 See ibid., p. 17.
120 [2017] IRLR 4.
121 SI 1998/1833.
122 The definition of “worker” is contained in Section 230 (3) (b) of the Employ-
ment Rights Act 1996.
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The Employment Tribunal held that the drivers fitted the relevant criteria
under section 230 (3) (b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. There were
a number of reasons for this decision, the main one being that Uber in re-
ality exerted a substantial amount of control over the drivers. Furthermore,
Uber had engaged in conduct reminiscent of an employer, with the plat-
form company deducting fares from the drivers’ weekly pay without notice
and enforcing the relationship between driver and passenger. The Tribunal
also found persuasive the ruling of the North California District Court in
Uber Technologies Inc. v. Berwick,123 in which case it was decided that Uber
was not simply selling a software package, but rather taxi rides. The Tri-
bunal’s decision was later upheld by a majority of the Court of Appeal. Ini-
tially there were significant reverberations from the ruling in Aslam, partic-
ularly when it brought to public attention the reality that the existing
structure of the gig economy permitted it to operate with 20-30 per cent
less in labour costs,124 and that online platform providers had been able to
evade paying their workers the national minimum wage.125 Also, in the af-
termath of the decision the Government announced a six month review of
modern working practices with a special focus on self-employment and
non-standard forms of work.126 The precedent in Aslam had further legal
impact, for example, in Dewhurst v. CitySprint127 also involving a courier
formerly labelled an online platform worker, and it was held that she was
entitled to worker protection. Here, the tribunal focused upon whether
the drivers were obliged to provide their services. It was discovered that the
hiring procedure involved a two day induction, training on how to per-
form the job, and the supply of uniform and other equipment, so, in reali-
ty she could not be described as self-employed.128
However, the courts’ approach to the gig economy has not been one of
uniform extension of worker rights to all online platform workers. When
Deliveroo workers brought the issue of their employment status before the
123 No. 15 – 546378.
124 Kessler, Sarah, The Gig Economy Won’t Last Because It’s Being Sued to Death,
Fast Company. 17 February 2015, http://www.fastcompany.com/3042248/the-gig
-economy-wont-last-because-its-being-sued-to-death. Accessed 4 May 2020.
125 Croft, Jane, Uber Challenged on UK Driver’s Status, Financial Times, 20 July
2016.
126 Taylor, Matthew/Marsh, Greg/Nicol, Diane/Broadbent, Paul, Good Work: The Tay-
lor Review of Modern Working Practices (fn. 103).
127 ET/220512/2016 of 5 January 2017.
128 Another case in which worker protection was extended to online platform couri-
er workers was in Addison Lee Ltd v. Lange and Others UKEAT/0037/18/BA.
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Central Arbitration Committee,129 it was concluded that they were self-
employed platform workers. Again, the central factor in the decision was
the seemingly genuine ability of Deliveroo couriers to substitute other peo-
ple to carry out their online platform duties.130 Neither is the finding of
employment law “worker” status by the courts necessarily entirely benefi-
cial to the individual in question: while it was held in Pimlico Plumbers Ltd
and Another (Appellants) v. Smith (Respondent)131 that although the
plumber who had previously been labelled self-employed was in reality a
worker, he was not able to claim the substantial amount of back-dated ho-
liday pay he believed that he was owed.132 As former Supreme Court judge
Lord Sumption has argued, courts are not the appropriate forum in which
to formulate elements of social policy.133 Furthermore, declaring that
someone is a worker does not necessarily entail that their schedule of
working hours and monthly pay remains at a constantly steady level in or-
der to facilitate the regular payment of UC.
Social Security Reforms for the 21st Century UK Labour Market
Given the consumer-led demands for the products and services which the
gig economy provides, and its growing importance in the labour market, it
is highly unlikely that Parliament can or will create legislation to trans-
form all non-standard contracts into contracts of employment. Although it
is possible to overstate the popularity of the flexibility of gig work, for at
VI.
129 This is an independent body which has the function of deciding whether any
particular group of workers have the right to be part of a trade union or form a
trade union of their own.
130 See Butler, Sarah, Deliveroo Riders Lose High Court Battle to Gain Union
Recognition, The Guardian, 5 December 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/bu
siness/2018/dec/05/deliveroo-riders-lose-high-court-battle-gain-union-recognitio
n. Accessed 10 July 2020.
131 [2018] UKSC 29.
132 See Butler, Sarah, Gig Economy: Worker Loses Pimlico Plumbers Holiday Pay
Claim, The Guardian, 20 March 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/business/20
19/mar/20/gig-economy-worker-loses-pimlico-plumbers-holiday-pay-claim.
Accessed 10 July 2020.
133 Lord Sumption was inveighing against excessive judicial activism in the name of
social justice, stating that Parliament was really the only place where these issues
could be decided on collectively. See Lord Sumption, The Limits of Law, The
27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, Kuala Lumpur, 20 November 2013, https://ww
w.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131120.pdf. Accessed 10 July 2020.
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least a significant section of self-employed platform workers it remains an
important consideration, as does the status of self-employment. In the af-
termath of the Deliveroo decision the company welcomed the decision by
stating that it was “[…] a victory for riders who have consistently told us
the flexibility to choose when and where they work, which comes with
self-employment, is their number one reason for riding with Deliveroo”134.
It is also the case that those in non-standard work contracts constitute
one of the groups most in need of social protection, and the operation of
UC still remains a flawed form of assistance. However, given the problems
in UC outlined above, it should be remembered that what Adams and
Deakin have called the “standard employment relationship” (SER), which
may be defined as work which is carried out on an integrated physical site,
on a continuous or indeterminate basis, by reference to a standard unit of
working time such as a complete working day or week, continues to be a
core legal and economic institution of market economies.135 These authors
assert that the rise in non-standard work is not entirely driven by social
and technological factors external to the legal system, but rather it consti-
tutes a response to developments within the law and the wider framework
of legal developments, and that the stricter the degree of protection for
core workers, the more likely it is that non-standard work will come to be
acknowledged as discrete categories in their own right and regulated as
such.136 Although referring primarily to agency and part-time work, these
authors’ ideas on regulation could also be applied to gig and zero-hours
contract workers. The recommendation for greater regulation of non-stan-
dard forms of work has also been made by the Resolution Foundation,
which, recognising that the number of zero-hours contracts in the labour
market had appeared to have reached a plateau, suggested that legislation
should provide a legal right to guaranteed hours for anyone who has been
working regular hours on a zero-hours contract for at least three
months.137 Given that research has demonstrated that over 25 per cent of
134 See Butler, Sarah, Gig Economy: Worker Loses Pimlico Plumbers Holiday Pay
Claim (fn. 132).
135 See Adams, Zoe/Deakin, Simon, Institutional Solutions to Precariousness and In-
equality in Labour Markets (fn. 32), p. 4.
136 See ibid., p. 18. See also Schömann, Klaus/Rogowski, Ralf/Kruppe, Thomas, Labour
Market Efficiency in the European Union, Employment Protection and Fixed
Term Contracts, London: Routledge 1998.
137 See Tomlinson, Daniel, The UK’s Tight Labour Market and Zero Hours Con-
tracts, 21 February 2018, https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/comment/the-u
ks-tight-labour-market-and-zero-hours-contracts/. Accessed 8 May 2020. See also
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men working in low-paid part-time work wanted more working hours,138
this would at least have the effect of ensuring security of income for those
who wish regular hours of work, while allowing easier calculation of UC
for the worker and their family unit. It would also bring more citizens into
the SER category, with all the attendant rights which this status brings.
One alternative manner of providing social protection for non-standard
workers may be to replace UC with some form of universal basic income
(UBI), obviating the need for the complex calculations inherent in UC.
This is a solution which has been suggested in several quarters, and essen-
tially would mean that every UK citizen would be paid a certain sum of
money, dependent on their personal circumstances, such as family size,
disability, and employment status, which could take the form of a lump
sum payment.139 Some jurisdictions have already experimented with a uni-
versal basic income, including Finland and Luxembourg,140 while in the
UK the city of Hull applied in early 2020 to be the first region to pilot test
such a scheme.141 However, given the political and financial capital which
has been expended on unrolling the UC system, it is unlikely that any gov-
ernment will seek to jettison the project in the near or medium future.
Neither can it be proved definite that universal basic income would pro-
vide any more efficient protection, since, as with UC, the complexities of
human life and life situations will remain, and it is possible that the gener-
alised nature of the payment may not provide sufficient financial cover for
certain disabilities or other contingencies:
[…] advocates of UBI either unconsciously or wilfully fail to acknowl-
edge that the current system is designed to provide specific payments
for people in specific circumstances (e.g. caring, disability, high hous-
ing costs, high childcare costs). If you sweep all of that away, you ei-
Kamm, Oliver, Zero-Hours Contracts are an Example of More Rules Needed, Not
Fewer, The Times, 30 April 2018.
138 Clarke, Clarke/Bangham, George, Counting the Hours: Two Decades of Changes
in Earnings and Hours Worked, London: Resolution Foundation 2018, https://w
ww.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2018/01/Counting-the-hours.pdf.
Accessed 8 May 2020.
139 See Russell, Jenni, Basic Income for All Could End the Benefits Trap, The Times,
10 December 2015.
140 See Ametepe, Fofo, The Effectiveness of Luxembourg’s Minimum Income, in: In-
ternational Social Security Review, 65 (2012) 1, pp. 99 ff.
141 See Halliday, Josh, Hull Asks to be First UK City to Trial Universal Basic Income,
The Guardian, 19 January 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jan
/19/hull-universal-basic-income-trial. Accessed 8 May 2020.
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ther have to level up, giving a massive boost to people without those
specific needs (at huge cost), or you create a fall in income for those
with them. Neither is remotely acceptable in the real world.142
Given the somewhat confused situation in the labour market which non-
standard contract workers inhabit, it is entirely conceivable that similar
problems would affect them as have arisen under UC. The Luxembourg
experience of UBI has not been one of uniform success, with a large per-
centage of the households eligible for the funds not taking them up, and
an even larger percentage of EU migrants to the country do not take up
UBI.143 The abolition of UC would also preclude the possibility of reforms
being made to the existing system, with its main flaw being that the ad-
ministration of UC did not receive adequate funding, which had been cut
quite drastically during the austerity programme of the Coalition Govern-
ment.144 Other changes to UC have been recommended to assist self-em-
ployed gig workers, such as specialist work coach advice, a legislative ban
on declaring workers self-employed simply because their contracts offer
none of the benefits of employment, and a temporary cessation of opera-
tion of the Minimum Income Floor until an independent review has been
conducted of how UC can be reconciled to the realities of self-employ-
ment.145
Conclusion
The notion of social protection for non-standard workers in the labour
market places UK governments in a difficult position. On the one hand,
they have the duty to provide social protection to all citizens, and especial-
ly those who fill lower-paid and often unskilled but very necessary pos-
itions in the economy, but on the other there exists the fear that over-regu-
lation could cost jobs, especially among non-standard workers, and the de-
VII.
142 See Goulden, Chris, Universal Basic Income – Not the Answer to Poverty, The
Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 25 April 2018, https://www.jrf.org.uk/blog/univer
sal-basic-income-not-answer-poverty?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIhqWsua-k6QIVC7Tt
Ch3KrgR3EAAYASAAEgLyl_D_BwE. Accessed 8 May 2020.
143 See Ametepe, Fofo, The Effectiveness of Luxembourg’s Minimum Income (fn.
140), p. 107.
144 See Nelson, Fraser, If Universal Credit becomes Mrs May’s Poll Tax, She Only has
Herself to Blame, The Telegraph, 20 October 2017.
145 See Citizens Advice. Universal Credit and Modern Employment: Non-Tradition-
al Work (fn. 104), pp. 19-20.
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sire on the part of large employers to keep the market as flexible as possi-
ble.146 Despite its flaws, the WRA 2012 and UC do go at least some way
towards providing some social protection to this precarious sector of the
labour market, and it does appear that governments are now cognisant
that reforms must be made to UC, with £1.7 billion being invested during
2018-19 to increase the work allowance element of the benefit, a decision
welcomed by anti-poverty campaigners.147
However, it is possible that the entire concept and structure of Universal
Credit (UC) was outdated148 and unfit for purpose even from the moments
of its inception, and may not assist the very people in the labour market
who were supposed to benefit most from it, the main reason being that
UC (as with tax credits) was designed largely with a specific set of employ-
ment relationships in mind, mainly the traditional “master” and “servant”
relationship.149 With the proliferation of different forms of work contract
in the UK labour market, one might assert that UC is, to some extent, al-
ready redundant in terms of both conception and structure. Furthermore,
the growth of self-employment currently permits companies to evade mak-
ing a proportionate contribution to the UK’s social insurance system and
revenue, and the reality that non-traditional forms of employment almost
inevitably involve irregular patterns of weekly working hours, makes the
calculation and administration of UC both difficult and expensive. It may
be that there are limits to the efficacy of legislation in ensuring that non-
standard contract workers and their families are able to sustain themselves
and in encouraging citizens to remain in self-employment in the gig econ-
omy, which seems destined to continue and expand with the advance of
technology. Perhaps the optimum solution to maintaining regular and sta-
ble payments of UC to gig workers in particular also lies in technology,
with some form of integration of revenue authorities and digital platform
software, so that gig workers have taxes automatically deducted from their
earnings, relieving them of the burden of calculating this for themselves,
146 Aldrick, Philip, Reform of Gig Economy will Cost Jobs, Claim Business Groups,
The Times, 12 July 2017.
147 Anderson, Harriet, An Important Step in Tackling In-Work Poverty – JRF Re-
sponds to the Budget, 29 October 2018, https://www.jrf.org.uk/press/important-s
tep-tackling-work-poverty-jrf-responds-budget. Accessed 9 May 2020.
148 It will be argued below that Universal Credit in particular was designed primari-
ly with those in full-time employment contracts in mind.
149 As set out in the landmark cases of Yewens v. Noakes 6 QBD 530, and Ready
Mixed Concrete Ltd v Secretary of State for Pensions and National Insurance
[1968] 2 QB 497.
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and these calculations could be reported to the Department for Work and
Pensions.150 Certainly the WRA 2012 demonstrates the drawbacks inher-
ent in creating legislation designed to provide social protection while fo-
cusing on a labour market which is changing at such a rapid pace.
150 Estonia already has integrated their tax system with the digital platforms of
transport apps so that drivers pay tax as they earn. See Silva, Rohan, The Gig
Economy is Here to Stay – Now Give the Workers Rights, London Evening
Standard, 16 November 2017.
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Chapter 6




The digital age is one of the drivers that results in a shift away from stan-
dard employment and towards various new forms of flexible employment,
a process which represents a wider problem for the labour market and for
society as a whole.1 As for the Netherlands, this country is already a cham-
pion of flex work. It was one of the largest growers in the EU for both tem-
porary work and solo self-employment with 4.7 percentage points of
growth in the 10 years prior to 2018.2 With a 30 percent flex share of work-
ers, the Netherlands occupied third place in 2018 in the EU, with only
Poland and Spain – which have a particularly high percentage of tempora-
ry workers – having a larger share of flexible work. Greece, where the share
of self-employed persons in agriculture is particularly high, has almost as
much flexible work as the Netherlands.3 There are many factors that ex-
plain this trend, including typically Dutch institutional factors. These in-
clude: the liberal registration policy of self-employment by the Dutch Tax
and Customs Administration prior to 2016, generous fiscal exemptions for
I.
1 Digital Labour Platforms and the Future of Work: Towards Decent Work in the
Online World, International Labour Office – Geneva, ILO, 2018, https://www.ilo.o
rg/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wc
ms_645337.pdf. Accessed 16 August 2020; Pesole, Annarosa/Urzi Brancati, Cesira/
Fernández-Macías Enrique/Biagi, Federico/González Vázquez Ignacio, Platform Work-
ers in Europe, EUR 29275 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxem-
bourg, 2018, doi:10.2760/742789, JRC112157, http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/r
epository/handle/JRC112157. Accessed 17 April 2020.
2 Information from the Dutch Statistical Bureau CBS based on Eurostat data, https://
www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/dossier/dossier-flexwerk/hoofdcategorieen/flexwerk-in-nederland-
en-de-eu. Accessed on 17 April 2020.
3 Information from the Dutch Statistical Bureau CBS based on Eurostat data, https://
www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/dossier/dossier-flexwerk/hoofdcategorieen/flexwerk-in-nederland-
en-de-eu. Accessed on 17 April 2020.
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the self-employed, and previous labour law reforms which regulated (and
in doing so: facilitated) flexible employment relationships.4
The digital economy may result in an increase and diversification of
flexible work forms due to platform activities5 and changes in production
methods in general. It may also expose groups of lower- and middle-in-
come earners to labour-related risks, in particular unemployment; tradi-
tional factory workers are replaced by robots and administrative personnel
are made redundant due to the introduction of the latest smart computer
applications. Indeed, while technological change and the shift to flexible
forms of employment have long been heralded as something positive for
both the economy and society, there is now growing evidence that there
are also negative effects to be taken into account. Thus, in a recent report
written for the Netherlands Independent Commission on the Regulation
of Work, the OECD noted that the solo self-employed are less productive
than employees with equivalent characteristics. Moreover, it was pointed
out that high shares of non-standard employment (combined with strict
employment protection legislation on standard contracts) may lower the
resilience of labour markets to economic shocks since such contracts are
more cyclical in nature. Furthermore, it was pointed out in the OECD re-
search that, because many non-standard workers are worse off in many as-
pects of job quality, such as earnings, job security or access to training, a
rise in non-standard employment tends to contribute to higher inequality.6
These and other drawbacks that have come to the fore have resulted in a
growing consensus in the Netherlands’ policies that the trend towards flex-
ible work has gone too far, or at least that something must be done to
strengthen the position of those who do not work in standard full-time
4 Eindrapport Interdepartementaal Beleidsonderzoek Zelfstandigen zonder person-
eel, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2015/10/02/eindrapport-i
bo-zelfstandigen-zonder-personeel. Accessed on 25 September 2020.
5 Cf. inter alia Schoukens, Paul/Barrio, Alberto/Montebovi, Saskia, The EU Social Pillar:
An Answer to the Challenge of the Social Protection of Platform Workers?, in:
European Journal of Social Security, 20 (2018) 3, pp. 219-241, https://journals.sage
pub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1388262718798393.
6 OECD Input to the Netherlands Independent Commission on the Regulation of
Work, summarized in Annex 5 of Commissie Borstlap. In at voor land willen we
werken. Naar een nieuw rapport voor de regulering van werk. Eindrapport van de
Commissie voor de Regulering van Werk (Commissie Borstlap), 23 January 2020,
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2020/01/23/rapport-in-wat-vo
or-land-willen-wij-werken. Accessed 16 August 2020.
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employment.7 This growing consensus affects both labour law and social
security law and the way these two areas are linked.
The purpose of this contribution is to offer a broad overview of the
Netherlands’ state of protection of non-standard workers (defined as every-
one without a permanent contract of employment) under social security
law. The objective is to map out what new approaches have been taken in-
to consideration in order to fill protective gaps for these persons. It is di-
vided into three parts:
(1) a description of the present state of social security law (Section III);
(2) an analysis of policy objectives, legislative change and proposals for
change made by successive governments in the Netherlands and by of-
ficial advisory agencies since 2010 (Section IV); and
(3) an overview of lessons that may (not) be learned from the Dutch expe-
rience (Section V).
These three parts are preceded by a short description of the Netherlands’
system and the logical setup of this contribution connected to this system
(Section II). The last Section V dealing with the lessons can also be read as
a conclusion. This contribution focuses on public social security law.
While regular excursions to (individual and collective) labour law and fis-
cal law are required, these fields of law are not the subject of separate ana-
lysis.
The System in the Netherlands and Logical Setup of this Contribution
The Dutch social security system bears the marks of different schools of
thought, preferences and approaches in the history of European social se-
curity. Pre-war social security was in keeping with the continental, corpo-
rate approach, which was reflected in the first social insurance schemes
that were based on the involvement of employer and employee organisa-
tions at sectoral level. After World War Two, social insurance was influ-
enced more by the Beveridge approach to social security. This is visible in
the emergence of national insurance, in Dutch: volksverzekeringen. This is a
system of residence-based schemes that are based on the insurance princi-
ple and provide minimum income protection. National insurance schemes
II.
7 Brink, Barbara/Vonk, Gijsbert, Naoorlogs universalisme in het huidige socialezeker-
heidsdebat, in: Beleid & Maatschappij, 47 (2020) 2, pp. 149-168, https://doi.org/10.
5553/BenM/138900692020047002004. Accessed 16 August 2020.
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in the Netherlands have been introduced for the risks of old age (AOW
1957), death (AWW 1959, currently Anw), children (AKW 1972), incapaci-
ty for work (AAW 1975) and special medical expenses (ABWZ 1976, cur-
rently Wlz). The present public/private insurance system for curative care
(Zvw) can also be characterised as a national insurance scheme.
No national insurance schemes have been created to cover unemploy-
ment and sickness. Instead, there are employee insurance schemes (WW
and ZW). The Sickness Benefit Scheme (ZW) is partly replaced by a civil
law liability for the employee to continue to pay wages for an extended pe-
riod of two years (Article 7: 629 Civil Code). The risk of incapacity for
work currently also falls within the exclusive scope of an employee insu-
rance scheme (the WIA Act, the Dutch Work and Income (Employment
Capacity) Act). The former national insurance for incapacity for work
(AAW) was abolished in 1998; it survived some time as a separate insu-
rance scheme for the self-employed until that scheme was also abolished in
2004.
A system of social assistance and social care creates a general non-con-
tributory safety net. The 21st century also marks the start of social al-
lowances being paid through the taxation system. These social-fiscal al-
lowances are paid by the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration and are
gradually reduced as employees earn more. Allowances are paid as com-
pensation for rent, healthcare contributions, childcare and children. These
allowances fall under the regime of uniform concepts in the Awir (Dutch
General Act on Income-Related Schemes). They are also fully residence-
based.
The above description sets the scene for the further composition of this
contribution. For it has to be borne in mind that, in principle, the whole
problem of social security protection for non-standard workers does not
exist in areas where national insurance schemes (and universal social fiscal
allowances) have been established. The reason is that these are residence-
based schemes and do not make any distinction between employees and
the self-employed or, for that matter: between those who are economically
active and those who are not. This observation also largely holds true for
the financing of this part of the system. Contributions for the general so-
cial insurance schemes (with the exception of the curative care insurance
Zvw) are integrated within the system of general income tax and are, as
such, levied by the taxation authorities. All income from non-wage labour
is subject to both national insurance contributions and general taxation li-
ability. As there is a separate contribution liability for employee insurance
schemes, there is a need to qualify the income as either generated from
wage labour or non-wage labour. But within this wide band of non-wage
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labour all income from any economic activity is taken into account. There
are no minimal income thresholds. The liability for taxation and national
insurance contributions may be reduced by a number of tax credits. It is
possible that for persons on low income the amount of tax credits which
they are entitled to is higher than the amount of tax. In such cases, a per-
son cannot fully offset their tax credits with the tax he or she has to pay. At
least this is the case for single persons. When a person has a fiscal partner
the situation may be different, when that partner earns an income which is
high enough to incorporate the combined tax credits.
The foregoing implies that the problem of social security protection for
non-standard workers in the Netherlands can be defined with reference to
three major issues: 1) demarcation between those who are considered to be
employees for the purposes of the employee insurance schemes and those
who are not, i.e. the category of the self-employed at large (necessitated by
the fact that there is a mixed system of employee and national insurance
schemes and, parallel to that, between wage tax and general income tax);
2) protection against the risks for which only employee insurance schemes
have been established (i.e. unemployment, sickness and incapacity for
work); and 3) coverage for extra-minimal protection for old age and death
through the occupational pension system (in view of the fact that the na-
tional insurance schemes for old age (AOW) and for death (Anw) only pro-
vide flat rate minimum subsistence benefits, which in the Netherlands sys-
tem are supplemented by wage-related additions to be accrued on the oc-
cupational pension system).
The description of the present state of social security law for non-stan-
dard workers in the next section is set up according to this order. Thereby
it has to be borne in mind that the analysis cannot always be limited to so-
cial security law, as there are important linking pins in the legal regime
with both labour law and fiscal law.
The Present State of Social Security Law for Non-Standard Workers
Demarcation between Those Who are Considered to be Employees and Those
Who are Not
In first instance, the distinction between employees and self-employment
plays a specific role in the employee insurance schemes set up for the risks
of illness (ZW), incapacity for work (Wet WIA) and unemployment
(WW). Employees are insured under the employee insurance schemes. An
employee is a natural person who has concluded an employment contract
III.
1.
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under private or public law and has not yet reached standard retirement
age.8
Main Rules
An employment relationship under public law is based on an appointment
by a public body. These employees are called civil servants. An employment
relationship under private law is a relationship based on an employment
contract as defined in the Dutch Civil Code. Whether or not the employ-
ment relationship has these features is dependent on the three classical cri-
teria of personal work, wage and subordination. Employment practices op-
erate on the basis of a variety of non-standard forms of employment. Only
the agency contract is regulated in the Dutch Civil Code as separate from
the general employment contract (Article 7:690 Civil Code). Other forms
of non-standard employment, such as part-time work, on-call work, etc. are
directly dealt with under the general employment contract rules set out in
Article 7:610 Civil Code.
The Role of Case Law
Traditionally, it is pointed out that the Dutch Social Security Court
(CRvB) uses a different basis than the Civil Court in establishing whether
or not there is an employment relationship. Whereas the Civil Court at-
taches more importance to the parties’ intentions when determining their
employment relationship, the CRvB focuses on the factual relationship ex-
isting between the parties. In doing so, the CRvB aims to stop parties from
acquiring a benefit or being granted a waiver of contributions on the basis
of the contractual relationship. However, the significance of this difference
in approach between the two courts should not be overemphasised. Recent
years have seen a trend towards more convergence.9
But apart from this, jurisprudence is very much meandering and devel-
oping on a case-by-case basis. This can be illustrated by the case law on the
status of post distributors, triggered by the FNV trade union. The largest
postal company, PostbedrijfNL had traditionally resorted to employees
a)
b)
8 Article 3 (1) ZW, Article 3 (1) WW, Article 3 (1) WAO and Article 8 (1) Wet WIA.
9 Cf. Klosse, Saskia/Vonk, Gijsbert, Hoofdzaken socialezekerheidsrecht, The Hague:
Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2019, pp. 67-70.
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working for a wage but suddenly introduced a new business model in
which the post deliverers were required to conclude contracts for services
as solo self-employed workers with the company. Many courts ruled this to
be a bogus construction but on appeal the Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of
Law10 and the Amsterdam Court of Law11 confirmed that the solo self-em-
ployed workers did indeed deliver post for PostNL as solo self-employed
workers. According to the courts, the parties’ intention as well as the actu-
al performance of the work indicated that the parties’ wanted to conclude
a contract for services.
Another illustration of the ad hoc nature of the jurisprudence is the case
law on Deliveroo personnel, also initiated by the FNV trade union. On 23
July 2018, the Amsterdam District Court was of the opinion that a Deliv-
eroo worker does not have an employee status in view of the clear inten-
tion of the parties expressed in the agreement12, but on 15 January 2019
the Court changed its mind and reached the decision that such a worker is
deemed to be an employee, this time going beyond the mere formal ex-
pression of the intention of the parties and carefully looking at the materi-
al conditions of the case13. For example, in the latter case, the formal possi-
bility of replacement by another person was disregarded because replace-
ment did not occur in practice.
Extending and Limiting the Scope of Application of the Employee
Insurance Schemes on the Basis of Legal Fiction
The definition of “employee” for the purpose of the employee insurance
schemes is not limited to employees who are employed on the basis of a
private or public employment contract. It also includes persons working in
other employment relationships. These employment relationships are
treated in the same way as employment relationships in which employee
insurance is compulsory. The term “fictitious employment relationship” or
“employment relationship by legal definition” is then used. Article 4 of the
Dutch Sickness Benefits Act/Unemployment Act (ZW/WW), for example,
stipulates that an employee is the person who performs work for which he





13 ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2019: 189 and 2010.
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ployed entrepreneur in the fiscal sense. In specific circumstances interme-
diaries are also treated as employees. Article 5 ZW/WW extends the con-
cept of employee further to musicians, professional sportsmen and women
and homeworkers, at least inasmuch as they are not already classified as
employees under private law.
These groups that are also brought within the scope of the employee in-
surance schemes are referred to in Dutch as “rariteiten”, or rarities. A statu-
tory instrument called the Rariteitenbesluit regulates the conditions under
which the scope of the employee insurance schemes is extended to include
special groups. Examples of these groups are: small contractors for work,
intermediaries and their agencies (commercial agents, representatives etc.),
share-fishermen, interns, conscripts, executives of cooperative societies,
homeworkers and their agencies, musicians and artists, professional sports-
men and sportswomen and the remaining group of “people performing
professional services”. Sex workers are also included. Inasmuch as flexible
workers qualify themselves as one of these groups and meet the set require-
ments, they are included in the insurance.
The most diverse group of people to whom the scope of the employee
insurance schemes is extended, is a residual category of “people perform-
ing professional services”. To qualify for compulsory insurance, several
conditions have to be met. For instance, the scope of the work relationship
is subject to certain minimums in terms of the number of working hours
or duration of the work and earnings (at least 40 percent of the statutory
minimum wage).
Finally, for the sake of completeness, it must be noted that the employ-
ee insurance acts do not only allow for an extension of insurance to per-
sons without an employment contract. There are also general exclusions
applying to persons who do have such a contract. Thus, persons working
fewer than four days a week in a private person’s household fall outside the
scope of the employee insurance schemes (Article 6 (1c) ZW/WW): clean-
ers, gardeners and home carers, etc.
No (Formal) Definition of “Self-Employed Worker”
While there is a (not so) clear definition of “employee” for the purposes of
both labour and social security law, a similar definition of a “self-employed
person” is notably absent in the Netherlands. The self-employed work on
the basis of different contracts is regulated in the Civil Code, i.e.: 1)
overeenkomst tot aanneming van werk, i.e. producing work of a physical na-
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van opdracht, i.e. commissioned work (Civil Code Article 7:400). The sec-
ond contract form is the dominant one for the self-employed. Despite the
absence of a positive legal definition of self-employment, a number of posi-
tive indications have developed in the administrative practice of the tax au-
thorities which play a major role in the practical assessment of the person’s
status as employed or self-employed. Below in the final part of this subsec-
tion I will pay further attention to this.
Practical Assessment of the Nature of the Employment Relationship by
the Taxation Authorities
In practice, the distinction between being defined as an employee or as a
self-employed person may not be an easy one. In order to offer more cer-
tainty, the taxation authorities play an important role in certifying the em-
ployment relationship. This system of certification, however, has run into
rough political weather. The former system of registration of self-employed
workers that was in force until 1 May 2016, i.e. the “VAR” (Declaration of
Independent Contractor Status), imposed the risk of a wrongful registra-
tion on the employee. This made it attractive to employers to use (bogus)
self-employed workers rather than employees working for a wage. In order
to overcome this problem, the Wet DBA (Wet Deregulering Beoordeling
Arbeidsrelaties – Act on the Deregulation of Judging Working Relation-
ships) entered into force on 1 May 2016. This act introduces a system of
prior mandatory certification of the employment relationship by the taxa-
tion administration. This new legislation shifted the risk for a wrongful as-
sessment of the employment relationship from the employee to the em-
ployer. Amidst increasing legal uncertainty as to how employment rela-
tionships had to be qualified and due to a variety of implementation prob-
lems, the operation of the new act was soon suspended, pending the con-
struction of yet another new assessment system. At the time of writing, this
is still the case. In the meantime, employment relationships are not active-
ly monitored by the tax authorities and enforcement measures are limited
to manifestly fraudulent situations.
Generally speaking, the tax administration makes use of a variety of cri-
teria for establishing employee insurance contribution liability and payroll
tax liability. The criteria are set out in the Handreiking beoordelingskader ar-
beidsrelaties (guidelines for assessing employment relationships)14. These el-
e)
14 www.belastingdienst.nl.
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ements are derived from tax and social security law (which in their turn
partly refer to labour law definitions). Examples are, inter alia: registration
with the Chamber of Commerce, profit, the number of hours spent work-
ing for a company, the possibility of replacement, capital investment, en-
trepreneurial risk in the case of no payment, the number of customers, and
how he or she actively presents him- or herself as a self-employed person to
the public.
Protection of the Self-Employed against the Risks for which only Employee
Insurance Schemes have been Established (i.e. Unemployment, Sickness and
Incapacity for Work)
Sickness
Solo self-employed workers are not entitled to continued payment during
illness, nor can they apply for a sickness benefit on the grounds of ZW. For
a safety net in the event of sickness solo self-employed workers today have
to rely on private insurance (referred to as AOV) or alternatively join a
broodfonds (literally: bread fund). Below, both options will be described.
Self-employed workers seeking to take out private incapacity-for-work
insurance (AOV) have to go through a technical and medical acceptance
procedure. In the first case, the insurance company assesses what condi-
tions it will attach to the insurance and whether it indeed wishes to offer
insurance. The insurer offers AOV insurance based on the principle that
the insurer is free to decide to do so or not, as long as this does not contra-
vene mandatory legislation, for example on non-discrimination. During
the medical acceptance procedure, the medical adviser’s assessment plays a
major role. This defines the risk. The insurer then establishes whether the
self-employed worker seeking insurance is eligible for AOV and if so, un-
der what conditions. The medical adviser must be in a position to act ob-
jectively and independently of the insurer and, on the basis of Article 7:435
of the Dutch Civil Code, the adviser should duly observe the professional
medical standard. Generally speaking, the self-employed worker seeking
insurance has no choice and will have to accept the examination. While
the contribution rate and the amount and duration of the benefit formally
depends on what is agreed between the parties, in practice there is no
room for negotiation for the self-employed worker. Four out of every five
solo self-employed workers have not taken out AOV, usually because they
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contributions of around 7 or 8 percent of their annual income.15 Research
conducted by the Social and Economic Council (SER) in the Netherlands
shows that to receive a benefit of EUR 32,000 a year, contributions of
about 15 percent have to be paid.
Due to the high cost of private insurance, broodfondsen are increasingly
seen as the better alternative.16 They are an intriguing phenomenon emerg-
ing from civil society initiatives. The funds are set up by a mutual agree-
ment between small groups of solo self-employed workers in various occu-
pational branches, designed to provide income protection during sickness
of one or more of the members (for up to a maximum of two years). A
group of self-employed workers deposit a specific amount each month on
their own bank account. How much this is depends on the benefit they
will need in the event of sickness. When a member falls ill, he or she can
receive an annuity from the fund, the level of which depends on their de-
posits into the fund. When a member leaves the fund, their deposits in the
fund are returned. An individual can only join such a fund after being in-
troduced by a participant. The maximum size of a fund is 50 participants,
in order to maintain the small-scale character which allows for mutual
trust. The broodfondsen are new, but at the same time reminiscent of the
types of mutual aid that came into being in the guilds and similar institu-
tions a long time ago. This approach remains a relatively marginal, but
continuously expanding phenomenon.17
Unemployment
There is no private insurance for the self-employed against unemployment.
Indeed, according to the Bond van Verzekeraars, the umbrella organisation
of private insurers, this risk does not lend itself to private insurance. There
are merely some residual forms of protection for the self-employed in the
public WW scheme. Thus, for example, unemployed persons who aim to
b)
15 Pension Advice 2017/85.
16 Hilhort, Pieter, Sociale veerkracht als vangnet, in: s&d, 5 (2011) 6, p. 151.
17 In April 2020, there were about 562 broodfondsen for more than 20,000 persons.
Between 2010 and 2018, the broodfondsen paid out in total almost EUR 3.1 mil-
lion to 452 solo self-employed workers who had fallen ill. This is EUR 6,800 per
person. The average duration of the incapacity for work was almost six months,
cf. Broodfondsen: de stand van zaken, 1 April 2020, https://www.broodfonds.nl/n
ieuws/nieuws/broodfondsen_de_stand_van_zaken. Accessed 17 April 2020.
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start their own company in self-employment, can take advantage of the
Starters’ Scheme (Article 77a WW).
Incapacity for Work
When the various national insurance schemes were established, self-em-
ployed workers were not included in the mandatory insurance schemes
against long-term incapacity for work. However, in the 1970s this was in-
creasingly seen as a shortcoming in view of the universal ambitions of the
social security project. This culminated in the General Act on Incapacity
for Work (AAW). While there were few thresholds for access to (partial)
invalidity benefit, married women who were not the breadwinner of the
family were excluded. When EU law opened the gates for this group to
join the AAW, the system became untenable. In 1998, the act was replaced
by two schemes, one of which was for self-employed workers: the Self-Em-
ployed Persons Act on Incapacity for Work (WAZ). This act was to be
short-lived. It was considered to be too paternalistic and too expensive. In
2004, when neo-liberalism was still running high, the WAZ was abolished.
From then onwards, the self-employed were supposed to look for solutions
on the private insurance market. Private insurance alternatives turned out
to be not as popular as expected. It now appears that more than two out of
every three self-employed workers have not taken out private insurance
against incapacity for work, with a strong overrepresentation amongst the
low earners.18 There is an increasing awareness that this figure, which in-
cludes large numbers of dependent self-employed workers, is not accept-
able and that something needs to done to improve their protection (see be-
low Section IV).
Coverage for Extra-Minimal Protection for Old Age and Death through the
Occupational Pension System
Every resident of the Netherlands is entitled to an AOW benefit on reach-
ing the standard retirement age, solo self-employed workers included. The
c)
3.
18 Klosse, Saskia, Flexibele arbeid, gebalanceerde bescherming, in: Kremer, Monique/
Went Robert/Knottnerus, André (eds.), Voor de zekerheid, de toekomst van flexi-
bel werkenden en de moderne organisatie van arbeid, Den Haag: Wetenschap-
pelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid 2017, pp. 213-230.
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AOW pension is a flat-rate minimum benefit. For supplementary pension
entitlements people have to rely on the second and third pillar pensions ar-
rangements.
Second Pillar
Solo self-employed workers are usually excluded from pension systems in
the second pillar. Mandatory professional pension schemes for solo self-
employed workers only exist for the medical professions and civil-law no-
taries. Both employees and self-employed workers participate in these pro-
fessional pension funds. There are also branch pension funds for solo self-
employed workers like plasterers and painters, but these operate on a vol-
untary basis. Employees who continue to work in self-employment have
the option to continue to save for their pension voluntarily for up to ten
years. However, the contributions for this are high; the self-employed per-
son has to pay both the employee and employer contribution. It is proba-
bly because of this that interest in this option is so low. For solo self-em-
ployed workers who do not earn business profits this option is given only
for the duration of three years. In recent years, several initiatives have
arisen for pension funds for solo self-employed workers. But to date, there
is little interest in these facilities.
Third Pillar
One quarter of all solo self-employed workers has made no arrangements
for their old age in the third pillar. Better pension arrangements tend to be
made as the business becomes more profitable. In most cases, people save
or invest, and investing in their own home is also popular. Self-employed
workers do have several tax benefits in relation to their provision for old
age.19 First of all, there is the annuity contribution deduction, a fiscally at-
tractive way to save or invest for an old age benefit. In addition, advantage
can be taken of the Fiscal Old Age Reserve (FOR). In 2019, up to 9.8 per-
cent of the profit subject to a maximum of EUR 8,946 can be deducted
a)
b)
19 Goudswaard, Kees and Caminada, Koen, Pensioenen voor zelfstandigen, in: Kre-
mer, Monique/Went Robert/Knottnerus, André (eds.), Voor de zekerheid, de
toekomst van flexibel werkenden en de moderne organisatie van arbeid, Den
Haag: Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid 2017, pp. 231-256.
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from the profit. This is a deferred tax debt; the Tax and Customs Adminis-
tration will still have to be paid later when the pension materialises. Since
2016, there is a tax concession that ensures that self-employed workers are
not required to have recourse to their pension savings when they apply for
social assistance. As a result of this measure it is hoped that the self-em-
ployed will start to save more, knowing that their pension is safe when
they are in danger of having to rely on social assistance.
Policy Objectives, Legislative Change and Proposals for Change
Fighting Bogus Self-Employment and Enforcing Labour Law Protection
Long before 2010, the starting year of the first government led by the liber-
al conservative leader Mark Rutte, there were discussions about whether or
not more protection and rights should be available to non-standard work-
ers. The tone of the debate has changed over time. While during the turn
of the century the flexible labour market was still often promoted as some-
thing positive for the economy and society, in subsequent years more at-
tention was paid to the disadvantages of a flexible labour market strategy.
Due to the sharp increase in numbers, the solo self-employed are very
much at the heart of the Dutch debate. The growth of solo self-employ-
ment is increasingly seen as problematic. Solo self-employment is seen as a
problem for workers when the registration of the employment relation-
ship is not correct or is bogus (schijnzelfstandigheid), or when the self-em-
ployed are highly dependent on a small number of commissioners
(afhankelijke zelfstandigheid).20 The problem of dependent self-employment
is most manifest in lower-paid work, because the workers lack the negotiat-
ing position to keep up a decent income. Bogus self-employment is reject-
ed in full because it does not only impact negatively upon the protection
of the lower-paid workers but also because it corrupts the foundation of
tax and contribution liability.
For a long time, the debate about solo self-employment failed to result
in any conclusive results, both in labour law and in social security law. In
the discourse, it is often pointed out that the group of self-employed per-
sons is very differentiated in nature, so therefore difficult to catch in uni-
IV.
1.
20 This distinction was made by IBO 2015.
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form policy measures.21 On the one hand, it is precisely freedom and op-
portunities that truly self-employed workers seek and benefit from. On the
other hand, there are concerns about dependent and bogus self-employed
workers who are more or less forced to become self-employed because they
would otherwise be made redundant. It is for the latter reason that initially
policy measures have focused strongly on reducing bogus self-employment
and enforcing the rules of labour law. The currently stranded initiative for
the Tax and Customs Administration to introduce a new assessment sys-
tem (Employment Relationships (Deregulation) Act) described earlier in
Section III.1.e), is one example of such efforts.
Another example is the Act Combating Bogus Self-Employment that en-
tered into force on 1 January 2016. Bogus self-employment is defined as
the situation in which a person officially performs work as a self-employed
person while the facts and circumstances indicate the existence of an em-
ployment contract. In other words, it occurs when the factual situation is
different from the situation as it is presented (on paper) with the aim of
improperly competing on working conditions.22 The bill for combating
bogus constructions introduced inter alia an extended system to the hirers’
liability.23
Also changes in the minimum wage legislation introduced in July 2017
were clearly inspired by the need to improve the possibilities for the en-
forcement of labour standards. While the changes extended the operation
of the minimum wage legislation to more forms of marginal solo self-em-
ployment,24 they simultaneously introduced different techniques for estab-
lishing the minimum wage in order to facilitate the work of the labour in-
spectorate. Thus, for example, the piece-wage scheme was adjusted in such
21 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Achtergrondkenmerken en ontwikkelingen
van zzp’ers in Nederland, 1 December 2014, https://docplayer.nl/13379-Achtergro
ndkenmerken-en-ontwikkelingen-van-zzp-ers-in-nederland-1-12-2014-gepubliceer
d-op-cbs-nl.html. Accessed 16 August 2020; Rijksoverheid. IBO-eindrapport Zelfs-
tandigen zonder personeel, April 2015, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten
/rapporten/2015/10/02/eindrapport-ibo-zelfstandigen-zonder-personeel. Accessed
16 August 2020.
22 Parliamentary papers II 2014/15, 32108, 2.
23 Set out in Article 7:616a-616f of the Dutch Civil Code which replaced Article
7:692 of the Dutch Civil Code.
24 For a more elaborate explanation, Vonk, Gijsbert/Jansen, Annette, Social Protection
of Marginal Part-Time, Self-Employment and Secondary Jobs in the Netherlands,
in: WSI Study No. 9, November 2017, pp. 34-35, https://www.wsi.de/de/faust-de-
tail.htm?sync_id=7974. Accessed 16 August 2020.
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a way that it is easier to establish whether the payments made fall below
the minimum wage.
Confronting the Great Divide
Gradually the concerns about bogus and dependent self-employment are
being overshadowed by a wider concern about a growing gap in the
Netherlands between those who have relatively stable socio-economic pos-
itions and profit from welfare growth and those who lag behind. This gap
is visible in the labour market where lower-qualified workers represent a
much higher share in flexible and uncertain work relationships than high-
er-qualified workers (dual labour market). It is also visible in society as a
whole, a phenomenon which in the Dutch discourse is often referred to as
the Kloof (great divide). In particular the Social and Cultural Planning Bu-
reau (SCP) has been active in exposing this divide. Thus, for example, in
an influential report published in 2014 about the divide, called Verschil in
Nederland, the SCP distinguished between six groups according to their
economic, social, and cultural capital characteristics. Four groups repre-
senting 70 percent of the population do relatively well. These are the estab-
lished elite (15 percent), young professionals (13 percent), the working
middle class (27 percent) and comfortable pensioners (17 percent). How-
ever, on the other side of the spectrum we find two other groups who suf-
fer economic insecurity and various forms of social exclusion, and these
are the unsecure workers (14 percent) and the precariat (15 percent). In
this manner a “soft divide” between the have and have-nots is clearly visi-
ble.
Over the last ten years, various public advisory agencies have called for
action to confront the great divide, often stressing the advantages of uni-
versalism in social protection, without, however, making this very con-
crete.25 In particular, the agencies refrained from explicitly addressing the
“open wound” in Dutch social security for the self-employed, namely the
absence of a public insurance scheme for incapacity for work, caused by
the abolition of the AAW (1998) and WAZ (2004). Apparently, this was
considered to be too politically sensitive or unrealistic.
A different attitude can be found amongst stakeholders and indepen-
dent academics who have put forward various proposals to address the lack
2.
25 Brink, Barbara/Vonk, Gijsbert, Naoorlogs universalisme in het huidige socialezek-
erheidsdebat (fn. 7), pp. 149-168.
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of social protection for non-standard workers. These range from a differen-
tiated system of social security protection for all workers (Klosse),26 an ex-
tension of the fictitious labour relationship in the employee insurance
schemes to more categories of solo self-employed and atypical workers (De
Jong),27 to the introduction of a completely new labour code which regu-
lates various categories of labour in a coherent manner (Houweling).28
The first idea has been presented by the Maastricht professor of social
law, Klosse, basing herself on previous work of interdepartmental think
tanks. She envisages the rules of fiscal law, labour law and social security
protection as a house to which all workers have access. Once inside the
house there are four different chambers, access to which depends not only
on the qualification of a worker as a self-employed or employed person,
but also on the degree of economic dependence, as opposed to self-re-
liance. Thus, economically dependent employees will be entitled to the
full package of labour law and social security protection, while self-reliant
self-employed persons will merely enjoy certain fiscal stimuli. But this is
not the end of it because economically dependent self-employed persons
will equally enjoy large sections of traditional labour law and social securi-
ty protection, while those employees who are self-reliant will have less pro-
tection under labour law and opt-outs in social security.
The second idea was advocated inter alia by De Jong for platform work-
ers in her award-winning Master thesis at the University of Groningen.
The default situation for all platform workers should be that they are statu-
torily subject to obligatory insurance for the employee insurance scheme.
Only if the platform satisfies certain predetermined statutory requirements
on governance and the treatment of their workers, the platform can apply
for an exemption on behalf of their workers.
The third idea is advocated by the Rotterdam professor of labour law,
Houweling. He suggests that the degree of labour law and social security
protection should not be dependent on the formal contractual relationship
26 Klosse, Saskia, Flexibele arbeid, gebalanceerde bescherming (fn. 18), pp. 213-230.
27 De Jong, Febe, Platformwerk als fictieve dienstbetrekking. Scriptie Rijksuniver-
siteit Groningen, 2 November 2018, https://www.ser.nl/nl/actueel/Nieuws/nomin
aties-scripties-scriptieprijs-2020. Accessed 24 June 2020; Van den Berg, Lucy, Plat-
formwerk, biedt het Rariteitenbesluit Soelaas?, in: Tijdschrift voor Recht en Ar-
beid, (2019) 15.
28 Houweling, Ruben, Modernisering van het arbeidsrecht, in: Tweede Kamer der
Staten-Generaal (ed.), Ambtelijk rapport Onderzoek varianten kwalificatie arbei-
dsovereenkomst, pp. 91-100, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id
=2017D14208&did=2017D14208. Accessed 17 April 2020.
Chapter 6: The Dutch Example
163
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002, am 02.12.2021, 16:03:18
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
but on the quality of protection itself. Thus, for example, it is clear that all
workers, regardless of their status and contract form should be protected
against discrimination. On the other hand, severance should only be avail-
able to those who have a contractual relationship with an employer.
Houweling proposes the introduction of a Code for all Work Relations
which is to not only spell out the material rules of protection but which
must also specify which categories of persons come under each of these
rules.
None of these initiatives have been taken up by the government. In-
stead, reform has rather focused on incremental changes in labour law and
social security legislation. In particular, reference must be made to the Wet
Werk en Zekerheid (WWZ) of 2015 (Act on Work and Security) and the Wet
Arbeidsmarkt in Balans (WAB) which entered into force on 1 January 2020
(Act on a Balanced Labour Market). The first act aimed, among other
things, at making the systems of flexible labour law, dismissal law and
labour law more activating and to reduce the growing divide between per-
sons with a permanent and those with a flexible contract.29 One of the re-
forms concerns the so-called Chain Regulation in Article 7:668a of the
Dutch Civil Code, intended to prevent employers from being able to keep
workers endlessly in a flexible employment relationship. The Chain Regu-
lation limits the maximum number of temporary contracts that can be en-
tered into consecutively and the maximum duration of these. The WWZ
reduced the maximum contract duration from three to two years, thus lim-
iting the possibilities for employers to keep workers on temporary con-
tracts.
In many respects, the WAB – which followed four years later – can be
seen as a technical amendment to the WWZ. This is visible in the recali-
bration of some rules on dismissal law and the Chain Regulation. A more
substantive change involved the introduction of a new calculus for the
contributions for unemployment benefits. These contributions no longer
fluctuate according to the branches of industry and occupation, but ac-
cording to the number of employees with a fixed-term employment con-
tract as compared to flexible labour contracts. Employers with more flexi-
ble workers are liable to pay a higher contribution. The latter change is the
first social security measure of a more radical nature with a direct financial
consequence; it involves a form of pricing of flexible labour for the em-
ployers.
29 Parliamentary papers II 2014/15, 33818, 3.
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In 2017, the latest government of Rutte III announced more substantive
measures to confront the dual labour market by curbing the growth of so-
lo self-employment.30 The most eye-catching proposal included in the
coalition programme included the following segmentation of workers ac-
cording to their level of income: workers who earn less than 125 percent of
the minimum wage defined in the statute or a collective labour agreement
(less than between EUR 15 and EUR 18 per hour) will be deemed to have
an employment contract. The duration of the employment should be
longer than three months.
This proposal never made it because it was deemed to be contrary to EU
law.31 An alternative, but still substantive proposal was tabled to introduce
minimum tariffs for the solo self-employed.32 According to this proposal,
which is deemed not to be contrary to EU law, self-employed workers will
be entitled to a minimum tariff of EUR 16 an hour. This rate is higher
than the minimum subsistence norm in the Netherlands; it is calculated so
as to include a number of indirect costs, such as preparation, marketing,
insurance against sickness, and incapacity for work. High-earning self-em-
ployed workers (earning more than EUR 75 an hour) will be given an opt-
out for wage tax and the employee insurance schemes. The idea, which has
been widely criticised for imposing far too much red tape on small, lower-
qualified solo self-employed workers, has – at the time of writing – still not
been sent to Parliament in the form of a concrete legislative proposal.
Lastly, for the sake of completeness, I will mention that preparations are
underway to re-introduce the presently dormant system of prior certifica-
tion of the employment relationship by the tax authorities. The failed sys-
tem of model agreements is to be replaced by a web module which offers
commissioners of work the possibility to obtain an assessment of the na-
ture of the employment relationship based on the answers to a number of
questions raised in this module. This system is to be operational in 2021.
Borstlap Commission
Another sign that the government is prepared to contemplate more funda-
mental change is the initiative to charge an independent commission with
3.
30 Vertrouwen in de toekomst’ Coalition Agreement 2017-2021; VVD, CDA, D66 en
ChristenUnie, 10 October 2017.
31 Parliamentary Papers II, 2018/19, 31311, No. 212.
32 Proposal for internet consultation of 28 June 2019, https://www.internetconsultat
ie.nl/minimumbeloningzelfstandigen. Accessed 10 April 2020.
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a wide-reaching mandate to investigate whether the entire regulatory sys-
tem for work is still up to date. The Commission, which is often referred
to as the Borstlap Commission (named after its chairman Hans Borstlap)
gave its verdict in its final report in January 2020.33 The shortest answer to
the question raised by the government is that the regulatory framework is
no longer up to date. According to the report, this threatens the economic
potential of the Netherlands, ensures that groups of workers are structural-
ly dependent on precarious and low-quality work and thus also threatens
social cohesion. The Commission recommends that the Netherlands
should quickly work on an integral redesign of the rules surrounding work
in the areas of employment law, social security, taxation and personal de-
velopment during the career. At the time of writing there is no official cab-
inet reaction to the report, but on the whole, it is well received in the pub-
lic opinion.
Three recommendations of the Borstlap report need to be highlighted
because of their direct relevance for the topic of this contribution. First of
all, according to the Commission, flexible contracts should no longer be
encouraged: temporary work should be truly temporary and the cost of the
uncertainty should be reflected in the price of temporary work. This rec-
ommendation signals the end of decades of flexible employment strategies
pursued by the respective Dutch governments. The fixed employment con-
tract is rehabilitated as the default standard for employment relationships.
Indeed, secondly, the Commission is of the opinion that the variety of
currently existing contract forms should be reduced to three forms only:
dependent employment, self-employment and agency work. Cross-over
forms of labour and hybrid contract forms are to be abolished. In order to
avoid artificial incentives that pull labour away from its natural contract
form into another, the fiscal and social security treatment of all three con-
tract types must the equal. In other words, the price of labour may not
fluctuate according to contract form.
Thirdly, the former also implies that for the risk of incapacity for work a
new mandatory public insurance scheme at a minimum level for all work-
ers must be introduced. The Commission refers to a volksverzekering, so it
is better to speak of a compulsory social insurance for all residents who re-
ceive remuneration from work. Earnings-related supplements, either statu-
tory or occupational, must complement this system. This proposal signals
a change of heart in the political debate about public versus private social
security which has been raging over decades. They imply a restoration and
33 Commissie Borstlap. In at voor land willen we werken (fn. 6).
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an extension of the public universal insurance system. It is expected that
concrete legislative proposals to this effect will be tabled in the second half
of 2020. Finally, reference is made to the proposal to introduce a universal
scheme for occupational training. According to its proposal, everybody
will receive a personal development budget at birth, to which employers
will subsequently contribute.
Conclusion: Lessons (not) to be Learned from the Dutch Experience
From this overview it follows that in the Netherlands non-wage earners are
excluded from the protection of most of the corpus of labour law and of
employee insurance schemes against sickness, unemployment and incapac-
ity for work. Neither are they likely to be covered by collective second pil-
lar pensions which supplement the universal state pension scheme. There
are exceptions for special categories of self-employed workers who enjoy li-
mited job and social security protection. These are diverse groups like
artists, franchise holders, sales agents, homeworkers, etc.
As mentioned in the introduction, over the last decades the Netherlands
has experienced a sharp increase in both solo self-employment and flexible
employment. This can partly be explained by measures to encourage flexi-
bility on the labour market, leading inter alia to the liberal registration pol-
icy of self-employment by the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration pri-
or to 2016, generous fiscal exemptions for the self-employed, and previous
labour law reforms which regulated (and in doing so: facilitated) flexible
employment relationships. We have seen that growth in non-standard
labour is increasingly seen as problematic. While attention focused initial-
ly mostly on the problem of bogus self-employment and lack of social pro-
tection for individuals who occupy a place in the lower echelons of the
flexible labour market, the concerns have gradually shifted to the detri-
mental effects of a dual labour market on the economy and society as a
whole. Reducing flexible work and bringing it back to its very essence is
now seen as a way of confronting the great divide between stronger and
weaker groups of citizens and as a way of investing in human capital.
This shift is reflected in the nature of the measures successive govern-
ments have taken or have contemplated. Initially, these measures were
mostly practical, focusing for example on offering more legal certainty by
introducing a certification of employment relationship by the tax authori-
ties and combating bogus self-employment by simplifying legislation and
strengthening enforcement measures. More recent measures are more ro-
bust in character, including a system of minimum tariffs for the self-em-
V.
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ployed and introducing forms of pricing of flexible labour. If it is up to the
Borstlap Commission, the reforms should spill over to structural changes
in the regulation of labour, but if and how these ambitions will materialise
in the post COVID 19-era remains to be seen. At the time of writing, i.e. at
the height of the coronavirus crisis, the government priority has been to
respond to the economic effects of this crisis by introducing a temporary
income support regime for the self-employed who are faced with a reduc-
tion or cessation of business activity. For our subject of social security, the
most exciting prospect will be the re-emergence of a universal scheme for
basic protection against incapacity for work, which had existed until 1998
(and further in its revised form until 2004). The abolition of the universal
scheme for incapacity for work around the turn of the century has proven
to be a historical anomaly. If this is to be translated into a lesson, it is: Do
not temper with broad solidarity institutions, because once abolished they
are very hard to reintroduce.
Another lesson is that it is worthwhile to continue to invest in a proper-
ly functioning registration system of work relationships. Despite all its
mishaps and teething problems, the binding registration may qualify as an
interesting practice from a comparative point of view. This is because the
registration system does not only provide legal certainty, but can also oper-
ate as a steering instrument to regulate employment relationships in a pro-
active manner according to policy objectives pursued. Thus, for example,
when the feeling is that solo self-employment should be tested more vigor-
ously in relation to the traditional criteria of the employment contract, this
can be done by changing how authorities judge the labour relationship as
part of the registration system. While the previously existing system of the
VAR-verklaring failed to realise this ambition because it was too liberal and
shifted the burden of wrongful registration too much to the worker, the
new system of so-called model agreements (which seeks to address these
wrongs) failed because of implementation problems. But this does not
mean to say that the system cannot work. Arguably, the new approach
should be given time and space to be tried out. The latest government of
Rutte III is taking its time. It announced the development of a new web
module in 2017 which should give clarity to employers/commissions of
work of the status of the worker as employee or self-employed worker. But
at the time of writing, the module is still not fully in operation. However,
there are first signs of hope. The web module has completed its test phase
and is now entering its first pilot phase. In a letter to Parliament of 15 June
2020, the Minister of Social Affairs reported to Parliament that the test
phase shows that the web module provides clarity in a large number of cas-
Gijsbert Vonk
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es.34 Only in 25 percent of the cases the commissioners of work received a
declaration of self-employment. In 27 percent of the cases the web module
could not create sufficient clarity, but in 48 percent of the assignments, the
web module indicated employment, which means that an employment
contract is probably required. This last relatively large percentage could be
seen as an indication that the web module steers employment relationships
in the direction of the employment contract, or at least that it does not
bias in favour of solo self-employment in the way that the previous system
of VAR declarations did. Indeed, the Minister warned that companies who
wanted to establish working relationships with self-employed workers
should structure such relationships differently in the future. Perhaps the
web module can also work as a stepping stone towards the creation of
more legal certainty for platform workers, in the sense that platforms who
engage such workers and who use the web module will realise in time that
the workers do not necessarily have the status of solo self-employed work-
ers merely due to the fact that they work for platforms.
34 Cf. Voortgangsbrief werken als zelfstandige, Minister van Sociale Zaken en
Werkgelegenheid, 15 June 2020, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/202
0/06/15/webmodule-zzp-start-als-pilot. Accessed 25 September 2020.
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Chapter 7 
Collective Agreements and Social Security Protection for
Non-Standard Workers and Particularly for Platform
Workers: The Danish Experience
Natalie Videbæk Munkholm
Introduction
In Denmark, the flexibility of employers to align their labour with the ebb
and flow of a fluctuating market goes hand in hand with a strong social
security system, providing income benefits as well as fully funded retrain-
ing opportunities for persons whilst unemployed or otherwise not receiv-
ing salaries. A solid and broad social security system is an essential element
of the Danish flexicurity system.
The Danish Constitution in Section 75 (2) provides, that “any person
unable to support himself or his family shall, when no other person is re-
sponsible for his or their maintenance, be entitled to receive public assis-
tance, provided that he shall comply with the obligations imposed by
statute in such respect”. The provision gives the right to any person resid-
ing lawfully in Denmark; citizenship is not a prerequisite. The specific
state assistance is established in the social legislation. In 1933, as part of the
“Kanslergade compromise”, the social security system underwent a major
reform, ensuring that social security measures were provided to everyone
in a rights-based system on objective criteria, and without a loss of other
types of fundamental citizens’ rights.1
The social security system consists of a range of public social security
benefits awarded in case of sickness (sick leave benefits), childbirth and
parental leave (maternity/parental leave benefits), unemployment for those
not insured (basic living benefits), and retirement (early retirement pen-
sions and old-age retirement pensions). Some social security measures are
co-financed by compulsory employer insurance, such as coverage for acci-
I.
1 Petersen, Jørn Henrik/Petersen, Klaus/Christiansen, Niels Finn (eds.), Dansk
Velfærdshistorie, Vol. 1 and 2, Odense: University of Southern Denmark Publish-
ing 2011.
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dents at work and occupational diseases. Unemployment benefits are co-
financed by personal private membership (unemployment insurance bene-
fits). Occupational pensions for early retirement and old-age retirement are
also contribution-based. In addition, a number of benefits in kind are of-
fered to everyone regardless of their connection to the labour market, such
as residence-based universal health care regardless of employment status,
universal family benefits, public childcare from age 0 which is heavily sub-
sidised, and free secondary and tertiary educations.
In addition to the social security measures in legislative acts, collective
agreements improve the content as well as the scope for persons eligible
for social security measures. In Denmark, 84 percent of all workers are cov-
ered by a collective agreement, i.e. 100 percent in the public sector and 67
percent in the private sector. The unionisation rate is also very high at an
average of 74 percent for all workers in Denmark. The social partners are
highly valued by the legislators and participate in the rule-making. Partici-
pation takes place in standing expert committees advising the Government
on topics relating to the labour market, as well as in ad hoc expert commit-
tees when reforms are considered. In addition, the social partners on their
own account negotiate and bring joint proposals to the Government for
new steps in regulation aiming at addressing aspects that are particularly
current challenges to the market. One recent example is the joint proposal
by the main social partners to provide minimum salaries for workers in the
goods transportation sector in order to counteract abuse of the rules on
cabotage transportation. More recently, the social partners worked closely
with the Danish Government to negotiate a number of efficient help pack-
ages to avoid and reduce lay-offs during the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. In
addition, the social partners contribute in all consultation procedures on
legislation aiming at the labour market and interaction with social security
measures.
With regard to social security measures, the public social security system
is supplemented by the social partners by additional social benefits, such as
occupational pensions, paid sick leave and paid maternity/parental leave.
Likewise, the public system is supplemented by the social partners extend-
ing certain labour protections to persons in non-standard work such as
platform workers.
The close involvement of the social partners in committees and councils
recently resulted in a reform of the unemployment insurance system, with
a view specifically to erasing systemic barriers for persons in non-standard
employment, such as platform workers. As part of the former Govern-
ment’s overall focus on changes to the labour market and the drive to in-
clude everyone in the system, an interdisciplinary Disruption Council was
Natalie Videbæk Munkholm
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established for two years (2017-2019), with a view to discussing risks and
opportunities and to producing policy and regulatory recommendations.2
One risk identified was the poor match between the way work is now per-
formed – in a combination of different types of employment and self-em-
ployment, including platform work – and the system for being eligible for
unemployment insurance benefits, based on the more traditional full em-
ployment or full self-employment.3 A tripartite work group presented rec-
ommendations for a reform allowing for all income to count in the Unem-
ployment Insurance Benefit System.4 The proposal was adopted, and the
new regulation for Unemployment Insurance came into force on 1 January
2018.5 In other social security areas, similar developments have not yet tak-
en place.6
In Denmark, a person can provide work either as an employee/worker7
or as a self-employed person. This binary divide regulates rights under
labour law, as well as in most other areas of law, including social security
law.8 There is no general definition of who is an employee in Danish
labour or social security law, and the assessment of belonging to one or the
other category can vary across legal bases. The categorisation in labour law
and social security law is made on the basis of the factual circumstances in
a case-by-case approach. In labour law, it is possible to have a status as em-
ployee under one act, and a status as self-employed under another act. The
respective status as either employee or self-employed in the social security
system, however, often decides on the method for being eligible for bene-
fits, and on which types of income to use for calculation of the amount of
benefits. This will be further explained below.
2 About the Disruption Council, an initiative of the former Government see https://
www.regeringen.dk/partnerskab/. Accessed 21 July 2020.
3 Output from the Disruption Council includes No. 3: A modern and flexible labour
market, https://bm.dk/media/9598/output-fra-disruptionraadet.pdf. Accessed 21
July 2020.
4 For recommendations of the work group see https://bm.dk/arbejdsomraader/kom
missioner-ekspertudvalg/arbejdsgruppe-selvstaendige-i-dagpengesystemet/oversigt-
over-hovedforslag/. Accessed 21 July 2020.
5 Amendment Act No. 1670 of 26 December 2017 to the Act on Unemployment In-
surance, https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2017/1670. Accessed 21 July 2020.
6 September 2020.
7 In Denmark, both terms are used interchangeably; there is only one category of
worker/employee.
8 Only in tax law has a third category recently been introduced for the income year
2018 and forward. The contents do not challenge the existing binary divide in
labour law or social security law.
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This chapter presents the overall social security measures in Denmark and
the implications of the uncertain employment status of non-standard workers,
in casu platform workers. Furthermore, the role of the social partners in de-
veloping the regulatory measures in tripartite negotiations, and in negotiat-
ing supplementing or specialised social security measures in collective agree-
ments for persons in non-standard forms of employment and particularly
for platform workers. The role of the social partners is then discussed, with
a view to highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the Danish experiences of
providing platform workers with access to the social security systems so far.
Social Security Measures – The Legislative Framework and Recent Reforms
Statutory acts provide the primary framework for most of the social securi-
ty elements. This includes sick leave (sygedagpenge) and maternity/parental
leave benefits (barsels/forældreorlovsdagpenge), basic living benefits (kontan-
thjælp), early retirement pensions in case of inability to work (førtidspen-
sion), and a small public old age pension (folkepension). Statutory acts also
provide the framework for unemployment insurance (arbejdsløshedsdag-
penge), but this is available only to members of unemployment insurance
associations, independent of the trade unions.
Sick Leave Benefits
The right to sick leave benefits is provided in the Act on Sick Leave Bene-
fits.9 This differs for employed and self-employed persons. It is a require-
ment that the person applying for sick leave benefits has a current connec-
tion to the labour market. This is established in the basis of a number of
working hours within a certain reference period.
Persons applying for sick leave benefits must choose whether to apply as
employed or as self-employed, as the hours cannot be accumulated across
different types of employment categories. The system uses the labour mar-
ket standard for assessing whether a person is in employment or not. Hours
can thus be counted towards being eligible either as employed or as self-em-
ployed. The system for being eligible for sick leave benefits differs for em-
ployees and self-employed persons. Non-standard employees and self-em-
ployed persons are covered by the right to sick leave benefits, but may have
II.
1.
9 Statutory Act on Sick Leave Benefits No. 68 of 25 January 2019.
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trouble achieving the required number of working hours, either as em-
ployed or as self-employed persons. Non-standard or self-employed persons
are often caught between systems, and can end up without sick leave bene-
fits. The local municipality assesses the status as employed/self-employed.
There is a free public complaints procedure, but so far, no complaints have
been heard about a right to sick leave benefits from the platform company
as employer or from the local municipality.
The payment of sick leave benefits is shared between the employer/self-
employed and the local municipality. The employer pays for the first two
weeks of benefits for their employees on sick leave, after which the local
municipality takes over. Employees can be entitled to receive salaries rather
than sick leave benefits during sick leave, whereas such a right requires ex-
plicit legal basis.10 This section focuses only on the right to public sick
leave benefits.
An employee in current employment is entitled to receive sick leave
benefits. The first 30 days of sick leave benefits are paid by the employer, if
the employee has been employed with the employer in the last 8 weeks pri-
or to his/her sickness and has worked a minimum of 74 hours with the em-
ployer during those 8 weeks.11 After the first 30 days of sick leave, the local
municipality pays the sick leave benefits. If the work relationship with the
employer does not entitle to employer-paid sick leave benefits, but the
work history entitles to municipality-paid sick leave benefits, the employee
will receive sick leave benefits from the local municipality from day 1.
Non-standard workers, such as casual workers and platform workers who are
not genuinely self-employed, who have worked the required hours, are eligi-
ble to receive sick leave benefits from the employer during the first 30 days
of sick leave. For workers in casual employment, where the work is provid-
ed on an ad-hoc basis at the initiative of the employer, from day to day and
without a set number of working hours or days per week, the biggest chal-
lenge is that sick leave benefits compensate for the loss of income during
sick leave, and is therefore conditional on the employee being employed
and having missed working hours/expected income due to the sickness.
This is not an issue in ongoing employments, with planned or expected
working hours during the sick leave. For workers performing work on a
casual basis, such as 0-hour contracts, on-call employees or platform work-
ers, this criteria is difficult to fulfil, as eligibility presupposes being “em-
10 A right to salaries during sick leave can be provided either by special statutory
law, e.g. Section 5 of the Salaried Employees Act or by collective agreement.
11 Section 30 of the Sick Leave Benefits Act.
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ployed” the day before the sick leave as well as having missed working
hours during the days when off on sick leave. An administrative ruling has
assessed how to handle casual workers in this respect.12 The ruling stated
that casual workers are only viewed as “in employment” in periods where
the worker is actually currently working for the employer. If the casual
work, on the other hand, has ended on a day earlier than the day before
the leave, the criterion of being “in employment” is not met. Elements
such as having agreed to an average working time, a notice of termination,
how and for how far ahead the work is planned, whether the employer is
obliged to offer assignments, and whether the worker is obliged to accept
offers of assignments can indicate a current employment relationship. If
the employment is assessed as current, it is of less influence that the work-
er is not performing work specifically on the day before the leave. If the
worker, on the other hand, is not viewed as in current employment and is
not working on the day before the leave, he or she is not eligible for sick
leave benefits. In this case, there is no need to go on to assess whether the
requirement of working hours has been met.
Platform workers would face the same challenge as casual workers. Plat-
form workers who have worked regularly over a longer period of time, and
have worked a considerable amount of hours each week, and where there
are e.g. a number of assignments lined up for the future days, could per-
haps be considered in “current” employment with planned working hours,
and thus fulfil this requirement for sick leave benefits from the platform
company and the local municipality. The typical contract of work for plat-
form workers may not have elements indicating that the work is current.
Most platform workers would most likely be assessed as not in current em-
ployment, if they did not perform assignments the day before the leave.
Genuinely self-employed persons are entitled to sick leave benefits from
the local municipality after two weeks of self-financed sick leave.13 Sick
leave benefits require that the self-employed person has been conducting
business to a substantial degree (more than 50 percent of part-time, i.e.
18.5 hours per week) during at least 6 out of the last 12 months. The infor-
mation provided by the self-employed platform worker is used as a starting
point. If the number of months with the required level of activities is less,
hours in employment prior to being genuinely self-employed can be in-
12 Section 2.1.2.10 and Ruling 100-15 in Guideline 9510 of 26 June 2018; cf. Appeal
Committee Ruling 100-15 on the right to sick leave benefits, https://www.retsinfo
rmation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=176826. Accessed 21 July 2020.
13 Cf. Section 42 of the Sick Leave Benefits Act.
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cluded. Self-employed persons can take out a voluntary private insurance
granting a right to sick leave benefits from the municipality from day one
or day three respectively, instead of financing the first two weeks of sick
leave themselves. This applies to genuinely self-employed persons also in
non-standard work relationships, such as platform workers. This means
that platform workers who have worked less intensively with their busi-
ness, i.e. for less than 18.5 hours per week, or who have worked for less
than 6 months, are ineligible for sick leave benefits from the municipality.
The system for sick leave benefits is difficult for persons in non-standard
employment, in particular for those who are not in a stable work relation-
ship with foreseeable work tasks. This applies also to platform workers. If
assessed as employees, the biggest hindrance is being considered in “cur-
rent” employment, as there are often no mandatory assignments or work-
ing hours for platform workers. If assessed as genuinely self-employed,
they would have to finance the first two weeks of sick leave out of their
own pocket, unless having taken out the voluntary sick leave insurance. In
reality, periods of being indisposed for providing work in causal employ-
ment, 0-hour-contracts or via platform work would, to a large extent, be at
risk of having to be self-financed by the worker, regardless of employment
status.
Maternity Leave Benefits
The right to take parental leave and to receive benefits during parental
leave is governed by the Act on Entitlement to Leave and Benefits.14 Also
concerning access to maternity/parental leave benefits, non-standard em-
ployees and self-employed persons are covered, but may have trouble
achieving the required number of working hours in order to be eligible,
either as employed or as self-employed persons. The purpose of the Act is
to ensure all parents a right to take leave in case of pregnancy, childbirth
and adoption, and that parents connected to the labour market are entitled
to receive benefits during these periods of leave.15 The Act applies to all
parents and both employees and self-employed persons have a right under
2.
14 Statutory Act No. 67 of 25 January on Entitlement to Leave and Benefits in the
Event of Childbirth (The Maternity Leave Act).
15 Section 1 of the Act on Entitlement to Leave and Benefits.
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the Act to receive benefits.16 Maternity/parental leave benefits are paid to
employees as well as to self-employed persons by the local municipality.
Employees and genuinely self-employed persons are in most aspects
treated equally under the Act. One difference is that the Act grants em-
ployees a right to take parental leave, which can be enforced vis-à-vis the
employer. Self-employed persons must plan their own work schedules and
their own periods of leave. The assessment of whether one is considered to
be an employee or self-employed is based on the labour law assessment.17
Employees are eligible for maternity/parental leave benefits on terms simi-
lar to being eligible for sick leave benefits. Employees are eligible only if
employed on the day before the leave, and having worked a minimum of
160 hours within the last four months.18 Being employed on the day be-
fore the leave is taken literally.19 For persons in non-standard employment
with atypical employment patterns, such as part-time work, fixed-term
work, casual work or temporary agency work, assessment of the end date
will be determined inter alia from a work schedule.20 The 160 working
hours for being eligible are counted on the basis of income and working
hours registered with the tax authorities.21 If the hours are not registered
(unknown working hours), the number of working hours are calculated
on the basis of registered income divided by an hourly income rate,22
which in 2020 is set at DKK 202 per hour.23
Persons in non-standard employment, including platform workers who are as-
sessed as employees must be “in employment” on the last day before the
16 Sections 2 and 2 (2) of the Act on Entitlement to Leave and Benefits.
17 Section 4 (1) in Executive Order No. 953 of 17 September 2019 on the Calcula-
tion of Maternity Leave Benefits.
18 Section 27 (1) (1) of the Maternity Leave Act. Additional requirements apply.
19 Section 2.1 in Guideline No. 9510 of 26 June 2018 on Employment Requirements
for the Right to Maternity or Parental Leave Benefits, Vejledning om
beskæftigelseskravet for ret til barselsdagpenge.
20 Section 2.1.1 of Guideline No. 9510 of 26 June 2018.
21 Section 27 (2) of the Maternity Leave Act.
22 Section 2 (2) of Executive Order No. 953 of 17 September 2019 on the Calcula-
tion of the Employment Requirement and Calculation of the Rate of Benefits for
Maternity and Parental Leave, Bekendtgørelse om opgørelse af beskæftigelseskrav og
beregning af barselsdagpenge mv, set each year in January by the tax authorities.
23 Section 2 (2) of Executive Order No. 953 of 17 September 2019, Section 2 (8) of
the Executive Order on Supplemental Occupational Pension, Bekendtgørelse om
Arbejdsmarkedets Tillægspension, No. 1385 of 25 November 2015. The level in Sec-
tion 2 (8) is amended each year, and in 2020 is set at DKK 211.93 for men and
DKK 191.39 for women, https://indberet.virk.dk/sites/default/files/ukendt_arbejds
tid_timeloenssatser.pdf. Accessed 21 July 2020.
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leave. The rules regarding maternity leave benefits reflect the rules for sick
leave benefits on this issue, see above. The assessment of being in “current”
employment is uncertain for persons in casual work, on 0-hour contracts
and engaged in platform work under the current legislation. Particularly as
regards platform workers and the requirement of having worked 160
hours, the income for platform workers will most likely not be registered
with the tax authorities as a number of working hours, but instead as a to-
tal income. In this case, the number of working hours must be calculated
at the rate of DKK 202 per hour. Most hourly rates for platform workers in
Denmark are considerably lower than DKK 202 per hour. The hours calcu-
lated for platform workers, and any other worker in non-standard employ-
ment with an hourly rate of less than DKK 202, would then not reflect the
actual hours worked.
A genuinely self-employed person is entitled to parental benefits if the per-
son for 6 months out of the last 12 months has had activities amounting at
least to half of the normal weekly working hours.24 All hours with activi-
ties as a self-employed person can be included, as the calculation is not li-
mited to hours with assignments.25 The authorities take as a starting point
the information provided by the self-employed person for the number of
hours in activities as a self-employed person.26 If specific circumstances
give rise to doubt, the authority can ask for further information. This ap-
plies also to genuinely self-employed workers in non-standard work rela-
tions, such as genuinely self-employed platform workers. It is doubtful
whether “logging on” and being available for assignments counts as “hours
with activities as a self-employed person” in relation to being eligible for
Maternity Leave Benefits.
The rate of benefits received depends on the income before taking
leave.27 The amount is capped, in 2019 at DKK 4,355 (approx. EUR 581)
per week,28 and the cap is the same for the employed and the self-em-
24 Section 28 (1) of the Act on Maternity Leave.
25 Section 5 of Executive Order No. 953 of 17 September 2019.
26 Section 3.1 of Guideline No. 9510 of 26 June 2018.
27 Section 32 of the Act on Maternity Leave. The manner of calculation is provided
in chapters 8 and 9 of the Act, in Sections 6-21 of the Executive Order 953 of 17
September 2019, and further explained in the Guideline on Calculating Rates of
Benefits for Maternity and Parental Leave, No. 9829 of 27 September 2019, Vejled-
ning om beregning af barselsdagpenge. Only registered and otherwise documented
income counts.
28 Maximum benefits per week for employees and self-employed persons are the
same, cf. Sections 35 (1) and 37 of the Act on Maternity Leave. The maximum lev-
el in 2019 is set at DKK 4355 (approx. EUR 581) per week.
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ployed. The income level is calculated either on the basis of income in em-
ployment or on the basis of income as a self-employed person.29 The in-
come sources are not cumulated.
For employees, the benefits are paid for a number of hours per week at a
certain rate per hour, reflecting the levels before commencing the leave.
Benefits are paid on the basis of the average hourly income and the average
weekly hours before the leave.30 For employees with varying weekly work-
ing hours, such as many workers in non-standard employment, the num-
ber of hours is calculated from the average working hours per week during
the last 4 weeks before the commencement of leave.31 For employees with
unforeseeable working hours, the number of hours is calculated using the
total income and dividing it by the hourly rate of DKK 202 in 2020.32
These calculations then arrive at a number of average weekly working
hours, and an average payment per working hour for the employee.
For workers in non-standard employment, where the number of working
hours is not registered by the employer, such as platform workers perform-
ing work via a platform company, the working hours are considered “un-
known”. The number of hours will be calculated on the basis of the overall
income divided by the set hourly rate of DKK 202. This means that plat-
form workers, and other workers in non-standard work relationships
where the employer does not register the working hours but rather the in-
come, are likely to be eligible for fewer hours of maternity/parental bene-
fits per week. This results in reduced benefits per week, compared to em-
ployments where the weekly or monthly working hours are registered by
an employer.
For the self-employed, the benefit rate is based on the annual income as a
self-employed person the year before the commencement of leave, regard-
less of the hours worked.33 The annual tax return, Årsopgørelsen, is used as
the basis.34 This applies to all self-employed persons, including platform
29 Section 4 of Executive Order No. 953 of 17 September 2019. The tax authorities’
assessment is the starting point for categorising the income, unless this would be
in breach of a labour law assessment, cf. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 953 of
17 September 2019.
30 During the 3 months just prior to the commencement of the leave, cf. Section 33
(1) of the Act on Maternity Leave.
31 Section 11 of Executive Order No. 953 of 17 September 2019.
32 Set in the Executive Order on ATP, mentioned above, in 2020 on average
amounting to DKK 202 per hour.
33 Section 6 (1) of Executive Order No. 953.
34 Section 6 (2) and 7 (1) of Executive Order No. 953.
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workers who are genuinely self-employed. The benefits will match the in-
come, regardless of working hours, but cannot exceed the cap.
In particular non-standard workers in casual employment will have dif-
ficulties obtaining a right to benefits during maternity and parental leave,
similar to the difficulties of obtaining a right to sick leave benefits. The
problem lies in the “current” employment status, where the employment
must not have ceased prior to commencing the leave. If eligible, workers
in non-standard employment, where the employer does not register the
working hours, in particular platform workers, can encounter problems
with the calculation of the hourly benefits. As the working hours are un-
known, the calculation results in reduced weekly maternity benefits. Gen-
uinely self-employed persons who have worked a significant amount of
hours over at least 6 months have better access to maternity and parental
leave benefits from the local municipality. Their rate of benefits will match
the annual income in the tax returns, the year before commencing the
leave.
These major problems with sick leave benefits and maternity leave bene-
fits for persons with more fragmented work relationships that do not re-
semble the standard unlimited full-time employment with one employer,
or for genuinely full time self-employed persons are evident. These issues
surfacing in particular due to the non-standard character of the work pat-
terns in fragmented work was to a certain degree solved by the reform of
the unemployment insurance system in 2018 focusing on global income
rather than hours worked.
Unemployment Insurance
Income during periods of unemployment can be divided into two separate
sources: Unemployment Benefits, Arbejdsløshedsdagpenge, which is an insu-
rance-based source relying on membership of unemployment benefit asso-
ciations;35 and Basic Social Assistance, Kontanthjælp, provided by the local
municipality, for those who are not members hence not insured. More
than 70 percent of employees are members of an unemployment insurance
fund.36 Unemployment insurance is almost fully state-financed, with a
3.
35 Now independent of trade unions and available across industries.
36 Mailand, Mikkel/Larsen, Trine P., Study: Hybrid Work – Social Protection of Atyp-
ical Employment in Denmark, WSI Institute of Economic and Social Research,
Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, March 2018, p. 5, https://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_wsi_stud
ies_11_2018.pdf. Accessed 21 July 2020.
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small fee-based contribution. Membership fees are tax-deductible, i.e. sup-
plementing state-financing. The rules on Unemployment Insurance Bene-
fits (UIB) are provided in the Act on Unemployment Insurance.37
In 2018, the unemployment insurance system underwent a substantial
reform with a view to adapting the system to the changed labour market
reality.38 The system now focuses on the activities of a person, rather than
on the employment status of a person. The amendment was a response to
recommendations by the Disruption Council, which pointed to the rigidi-
ty of the existing categorisation of persons as either employees or as self-
employed in two separate pillars in the system, which was not reflecting
the modern pattern of fragmented or atypical employments.39 The reform
entailed that all income earned can be cumulated towards being eligible
for unemployment benefits. This adapts the current system of unemploy-
ment insurance benefits to the work reality of persons in atypical employ-
ments, including self-employment.
All forms of work count, i.e. either self-employed work, A-employment
(primary employment), B-employment (supplementary employment), or
honorarium-based employment. The assessment of income generated from
either self-employed or employed work in the Act on Unemployment In-
surance is aligned with the definition in tax law.40 Any activity with the
purpose of generating income on the basis of personal work activities can
be viewed as self-employment if one of five criteria is met. One of these cri-
teria is registration with the Central Business Registry, unless the tax au-
thorities tax the income as salaries in employment.41 Registration with the
Central Business Registry is a prerequisite for contracting as a self-em-
ployed person in Denmark. Registration is carried out online via a simple
registration of information without a test, it is immediate and completely
free of charge. Having registered a business with the Central Business Reg-
istry is not in itself decisive for the status as genuinely self-employed in re-
lation to unemployment benefits, but an individual assessment of the sta-
tus should be carried out. The tax authority’s assessment is a primacy-of-
37 Statutory Act No. 199 of 11 March 2020 on Unemployment Insurance.
38 Statutory Amendment Act No. 1670 of 20 December 2017 to the Act on Unem-
ployment Insurance.
39 See Proposal for Amendment to the Act on Unemployment Insurance, L88,
2017-18, https://www.ft.dk/samling/20171/lovforslag/l88/index.htm. Accessed 21
July 2020.
40 Section 57a of the Act on Unemployment Insurance.
41 Section 57a (1) of the Act on Unemployment Insurance.
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facts test, to a large extent resembling the labour law assessment of em-
ployment status.42
Membership of an Unemployment Insurance Association for one year is
a prerequisite for unemployment benefits.43 Everyone, regardless of em-
ployment status can be a member of an unemployment insurance fund,
also self-employed persons. A person seeking unemployment insurance
benefits must first of all be unemployed. For self-employed persons, whose
work under self-employed status is the primary or sole source of income,
this requires the person to close and liquidate all self-employed activities.44
If the self-employed work is a secondary or supplementing source of in-
come, the relevant activities must be reduced. In order to be eligible for
benefits, the person must document a connection to the labour market.
This must be documented in the form of an accumulated income over the
last three years, a total of DKK 233,376 in 2019 (EUR 31,117). All income
earned as an employee as well as income earned as a self-employed person
are accumulated towards meeting the income level. Supplementing work
also counts.45 In order to count income from “employment”, the work
must be performed in a traditional employment relationship, i.e. on terms
similar to pay and working conditions in collective agreements for the type
of work performed.46 Hours worked in non-standard work relationships,
where the salaries are not similar to those in collective agreements, such as
is the case for most platform workers, would in this regard not count as
hours in “employment”.
The rate of benefits is calculated as hourly rates on the basis of all in-
come within a set reference period.47 All types of registered income are ac-
cumulated to form the basis for calculating the rate of benefits.48 Unem-
ployment benefits can be granted as supplementing unemployment benefits
for persons temporarily in part-time employment.49 Supplementing unem-
42 Tax Legal Guidelines 2020-21, C.C.1.2.1 Self-Employed Work, Delimitation to-
wards Employees, https://skat.dk/skat.aspx?oID=2048530&chk=216701. Accessed
21 July 2020.
43 Statutory Act No. 1213 of 11 October 2018 on Unemployment Insurance.
44 Sections 13 and 20 of Executive Order No. 1182 of 26 September 2018 on Self-
Employment in the Social Security System.
45 Section 53 (3) and (15) of the Act on Unemployment Insurance.
46 Section 53 (6) of the Act on Unemployment Insurance.
47 Section 46 (1) and Section 49 (2) of the Act on Unemployment Insurance.
48 Section 53 (15) of the Act on Unemployment Insurance, and preparatory works
to the Amendment Act No. 88 of 17 November 2017, p. 13.
49 Section 59 of the Act on Unemployment Insurance.
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ployment benefits are available for a period of up to 30 weeks.50 Only per-
sons performing work in part-time employment or in self-employment as a
secondary or supplementing source of income can be eligible for supple-
menting unemployment benefits. Genuinely self-employed persons whose
main or sole income is under self-employed status, such as is the case for
some platform workers, cannot receive supplementing unemployment
benefits.
Access to Unemployment Insurance Benefits for workers in non-stan-
dard work, such as platform workers and workers providing work in a
number of work-relations, is in principle more flexible now, as eligibility
and calculation of benefits can be based on an accumulated income from
any type of work, employed as well as self-employed. However, income
from employment can only be included, if it is earned on terms similar to
those in collective agreements, which primarily refers to a certain level of
remuneration. This is an obstacle, as e.g. much non-standard work, includ-
ing most forms of platform work, is not remunerated at the level of collec-
tive agreements. Income received by workers under self-employed status
can count fully towards being eligible for unemployment benefits and to-
wards calculating the rate of unemployment benefits that can be received.
A genuinely self-employed person who has a business as his or her primary
source of income must however cease activities in the business before be-
ing eligible for such benefits. If persons in non-standard work are eligible
for unemployment insurance, supplementing unemployment benefits can
be awarded for up to 30 weeks if these persons temporarily work part-time.
If work under self-employed status generates the primary income, supple-
menting unemployment benefits cannot be awarded.
Cash Benefits
Basic Cash Benefits, Kontanthjælp, are provided by the local municipality,
for those who do not receive unemployment insurance. The Cash Benefit
rate is significantly lower than unemployment insurance rates. The rules
on Cash Benefits are provided in the Act on an Active Social Policy.51 The
Act on an Active Social Policy was not amended as part of the unemploy-
ment insurance reform. The Act on an Active Social Policy continues to
categorise persons as either employees or as a self-employed.
4.
50 Section 60 of the Act on Unemployment Insurance.
51 Act on Active Social Policy No. 981 of 23 September 2019.
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Cash Benefits are available to persons who are unable to provide for
themselves, including by way of savings, who are not provided for by a
family member, and who do not receive other benefits.52 Eligibility is
based on assessment of the current financial situation of the household, i.e.
it is means-tested. In order to be eligible, the person must have had ordi-
nary full-time employment for 2.5 years within the last 10 years.53 Further-
more, the person must be available for job offers, and must actively pursue
employment.54 Actively pursuing employment for persons that are mar-
ried or who have received Cash Benefits for one year requires a demonstra-
tion of a minimum of 225 working hours within the preceding year.55
These working hours can be accrued via employment on terms similar to
those in collective agreements56 via self-employment as a supplementing
source of income57 or via substantive self-employment with activities of a
minimum of 18.5 hours per week.58 For the self-employed, the hours are
calculated on the basis of annual income from the business in the preced-
ing calendar year.59 Access to Cash Benefits furthermore requires that the
applicant is unemployed and available for work. For self-employed per-
sons, this means that the company has to be shut down.
For workers in non-standard employment, such as platform workers, access to
Cash Benefits requires that the applicant has held ordinary employment
for 2 years and 6 months within the last 10 years. Furthermore, when the
worker has received Cash Benefits for one year, or if the worker is married,
the worker must in addition document 225 working hours within the pre-
ceding year. The 225 working hours can be performed in employment, but
only hours performed on terms similar to those in collective agreements
count, i.e. not hours provided by performing work via a digital platform.
Alternatively, the 225 working hours can be performed to generate sec-
ondary income as a self-employed person, or in terms of substantial self-
employment if the work is carried out during at least 18.5 hours per week.
Platform work that is substantial genuine self-employed platform work
52 Section 11 (2) of the Act on Active Social Policy.
53 Section 11 (8) of the Act on Active Social Policy. Certain groups, such as young
persons who have not had the opportunity to work 2.5 years, are subject to differ-
ent criteria.
54 Section 13 (1) and 13a of the Act on Active Social Policy.
55 Section 13f (6) and (7) of the Act on Active Social Policy. If this requirement is
not met, the rates are reduced, cf. Section 13f (2).
56 Section 13f (14) of the Act on Active Social Policy.
57 Section 13f (15) of the Act on Active Social Policy.
58 Section 13f (16) of the Act on Active Social Policy.
59 Section 11 (9) of the Act on Active Social Policy.
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would in this case count towards the 225 working hours. Ministerial guide-
lines provide, as a starting point, that work performed via digital platforms
counts as self-employed working time.60 The company of the platform
worker would, accordingly, have to be shut down in order for the respec-
tive worker to be eligible for Cash Benefits.
There have been no accounts of the situation of platform workers that
had their profile with a platform company deactivated temporarily or per-
manently by unilateral decision on the part of the platform company. This
presents a new situation, where the assessment of the status of the platform
worker would most likely depend on the circumstances of the deactivation
decision. A permanent deactivation made unilaterally by the platform
company resembles a termination in employment. Deactivations of self-
employed platform workers would influence only the provision of work
via that particular platform, and as assessment of being genuinely self-em-
ployed is not dependent on the business relationship with one customer
only, this would not in itself be sufficient to document that a genuinely
self-employed platform worker has ceased business. The platform worker
could already be – or could choose to be – registered with another plat-
form company providing the same kind of services. As mentioned, this has
not yet been assessed by administrative or judicial review.
Retirement Pensions
Pensions in Denmark consist of public and private pension programs, in a
three-pillar system: state-funded public old-age pension, employer/employ-
ee funded private occupational pensions, and employee-funded private
pensions. About 90 percent of all workers have supplementary private pen-
sions, either in the form of occupational pension plans or individual pen-
sion plans.
The public old-age pension scheme is a universal, residence-based, non-
contributory, statutory old-age pension scheme, regulated in the Act on
Social Pensions.61 The public old age pension scheme is designed to secure
a decent minimum standard of living for all citizens of pension age. The
pension is paid out to everyone who resides in Denmark and who has lived
5.
60 Ministry of Employment. Statement in Collaborative Economy and the Basic So-
cial Assistance System. Statement No. 9433 of 14 June 2018, https://www.ft.dk/sa
mling/20171/almdel/BEU/bilag/378/1911151.pdf. Accessed 28 July 2020.
61 Act on Social Pensions No. 983 of 23 September 2019.
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in Denmark for a significant part of their working life, currently amount-
ing to 30 years between the age of 15 and retirement age.62 The public old
age pension scheme consists of a flat-rate benefit. In 2020, the age for being
eligible for public pension is 66 years (planned to increase over the next
decades). The public pension is the same for retired employees and retired
self-employed persons, irrespective of any earlier income sources and lev-
els. The number of years of permanent residency influences the rate.63 De-
pending on marital status, household income and/or income earned, the
flat-rate can be supplemented or reduced.64 This includes reduction for in-
come earned via platform work performed as an employed or self-em-
ployed person.
Occupational pension schemes are provided in collective agreements,
often as industry-specific plans with an appointed pension provider.65 Oc-
cupational pension schemes are applicable only to employees who work in
a company that is covered by a collective agreement. If provided, the em-
ployer is obliged to make pension contributions to the agreed private pen-
sion fund of the employee. Payment to the employees directly, as part of
their salaries, would be a breach of the collective agreement. Employer
contributions are typically set at a percentage in addition to the salaries,
e.g. 5-15 percent in private employment and 10-17 percent in public em-
ployment. The employee also contributes, typically with half of the em-
ployer’s percentage, which is withdrawn from the salaries and deposited in
the pension fund alongside the employer’s contribution. Employee de-
posits are tax-deductible. The collective agreement determines which
groups of employees are covered. This could include traditional employees
as well as freelancers working on terms similar to employees. Genuinely
self-employed persons do not have access to the occupational pension
schemes provided in collective agreements. Genuinely self-employed plat-
form workers must make their own private pension agreement, and pay
the pension contributions out of their own earnings.
62 Section 2 and 3 of the Act on Social Pensions. The number of required years of
residence for being eligible fluctuates over time with the political climate.
63 Section 5 of the Act on Social Pensions.
64 Section 15 and 27 of the Act on Social Pensions.
65 Except for Civil Servants, Tjenestemænd, who are a special group of public em-
ployees (approx. 6.50 percent of public employees, approx. 1.95 percent of the en-
tire workforce). Source: Statistics Denmark, Work, Income and Assets Tables
2018 with a special public retirement scheme. In 2018, the number of Tjen-
estemænd was 54,640, out of 832,557, being 6.56 percent of all public employees,
i.e. is approx. 30 percent of the entire work force in 2018.
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Platform workers who are employees or “false self-employed” persons
could technically be covered by a collective agreement. Collective agree-
ments can obligate the platform company to make contributions to occu-
pational pension schemes of the platform workers’ choice, including
mandatory contributions from the platform worker. In reality, by far most
platform workers are not covered by an occupational pension scheme,
obligating the employer to make pension contributions in addition to
their salary. Platform workers who are not covered by a collective agree-
ment do not receive pension contributions paid by the employer. They are
left to make their own savings from their remuneration.
Private pension schemes can be established by self-employed persons
and employees alike. The terms are set by the private pension provider. De-
posits into pension plans with life-long payments are tax-deductible. De-
posits into pension saving accounts with lump sum payments (or a set
number of payments) are tax-deductible up to a certain amount each year.
Due to the character of non-standard work with fluctuating income, such
as platform work with irregular earnings, it can be difficult to engage in a
private pension plan with set contributions each month.
The overall question for platform workers with regard to retirement
pensions is whether they do engage in private pension schemes supple-
menting the public old-age retirement pension, as does 90 percent of the
workforce in Denmark. Very few platform workers are covered by a collec-
tive agreement with provisions on mandatory employer contributions. In
reality, it is the platform workers themselves who must take the initiative
to establish a private pension plan with a pension provider of their choice.
As a private pension scheme is established at the initiative of the worker
rather than set in a collective agreement at the commencement of employ-
ment also in younger years, it is likely that this takes place only at a later
stage in their career. It is a simple fact that very few young people choose
to start their own pension plan at the beginning of their career. A second
issue is the question of earning interests on the pension deposits, as there
could be a difference between the industry-wide occupational pension
schemes with appointed pension providers, and the privately established
pension schemes with any form of pension provider. Workers who gener-
ate their main income through platform work over a large portion of their
lives are likely left with considerably less in pension income compared to
the average workers in Denmark.
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Occupational Injury Insurance
Statutory acts mandate employers to contribute to the public occupational
injury insurance system as well as take out private occupational accident
insurance. Any size employer must insure their employees. This duty rests
also with self-employed persons who are their own employer.
Liability for industrial injuries is regulated by the Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act.66 The Workers’ Compensation Act covers persons engaged to per-
form work for an employer in Denmark.67 The work can be paid or un-
paid and may be permanent, temporary, or casual. The employer is under
a duty to take out occupational accident insurance and contribute to the
public occupational injury insurance for all employees.68 The Workers’
Compensation Act grants employees a number of compensatory benefits
in case of injuries incurred when performing work, inter alia compensa-
tion for loss of ability to work and compensation for permanent injuries. If
an employer has not taken out insurance as prescribed, and one of the em-
ployees becomes injured at work, the public Labour Market Insurance will
provide the benefits to the employee irrespective of the violation by the
employer.69 The funds are then retrieved by the Labour Market Insurance
from the employer.
The Workers’ Compensation Act applies to employers. An employer is
defined as the entity with an economic interest in the work as well as hav-
ing the right to instruct and control the work. If this is not clear, an entity
can be the responsible employer under the Act according to an overall as-
sessment of the social and occupational status of the parties.70 In this, the
formal setup of the self-employed company is assessed as well as the rela-
tionship between the self-employed and the alleged employee. The assess-
ment takes into consideration the social purposes of the Act in the interest
of general society. Genuinely self-employed persons are not covered by the
definition of employee in the Act, and are not insured by an employer. In-
stead, genuinely self-employed persons have the option of voluntarily tak-
6.
66 Act on Workers’ Compensation No. 977 of 9 September 2019.
67 Section 2 (1) of the Act on Workers’ Compensation.
68 Sections 48 and 50 of the Act on Workers’ Compensation.
69 Section 52 of the Act on Workers’ Compensation.
70 This was established in early case law under the Act e.g. Supreme Court ruling
U.1920.529 H, cf. detailed analysis in Magnus Nørgaard, Sørensen, Plat-
formsøkonomien og arbejdsskadesikringsloven, 2018, https://law.au.dk/fileadmin
/Jura/dokumenter/forskning/rettid/Afh_2018/afh27-2018.pdf. Accessed 28 July
2020.
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ing out an insurance for themselves.71 If the genuinely self-employed per-
son has not taken out insurance against occupational injury, the costs must
be borne by themselves in case of injury, unless a third party is liable for
the injury according to personal injury law.
For platform workers this entails, that the platform company can be
viewed as the employer, due to a traditional assessment of the relationship
between the platform worker and the platform company, including an as-
sessment of the degree of instruction and control of the platform compa-
ny. If this is not clear, the formal company setup of the platform worker
will be considered as part of an overall assessment. In addition, the overall
protective purpose of the regulation will be considered as part of the over-
all assessment. For this reason, the platform company is, in relation to in-
dustrial injury insurance, more likely to be assessed as an employer under
the Workers’ Compensation Act due to the protective purpose of the regu-
lation. Platform companies could be obliged under the Workers’ Compen-
sation Act to provide coverage for platform workers who provide services
as self-employed persons but without a formal business setup outside of
the relation to the platform company. If a platform company has an injury
in connection with work and the platform company has not taken out in-
dustrial injury insurance, the Labour Market Insurance will cover the pay-
ments incurred to the platform worker, and have the payments reimbursed
by the platform company. Genuinely self-employed platform workers are
not covered by the definition of employee in the Act, and are not automa-
tically insured by an employer. Instead, genuinely self-employed persons
can take out voluntary occupational injury insurance for themselves. Gen-
uinely self-employed platform workers must take out cover against the fi-
nancial risk of occupational injuries themselves.
No complaints have been assessed on occupational injuries of platform
workers and the question of liability of the platform company in its role as
employer. Many platform companies offer a special occupational injury in-
surance that can be taken out by platform workers with self-employed sta-
tus. The insurance scheme is provided especially for platform work by a
private insurer.
71 Section 48 (2) of the Act on Workers’ Compensation.
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The Role of Social Partners in Improving Social Security for Platform
Workers
Social partners participate in improving social security measures in several
ways. Occupational retirement pensions with mandatory employer contri-
butions are found only in collective agreements. Sick leave benefits are reg-
ulated by statutory acts, but some collective agreements improve the rights
of the employees to receive salaries during sick leave and/or during mater-
nity/parental leave. Furthermore, some agreements include additional
work-life-balance elements, such as days off in the case of children’s illness,
additional days off for seniors, etc. These elements could be extended as
terms of work also to platform workers, if the negotiations for collective
agreements for platform workers are continued. The Danish social partners
have used a number of ways to improve the social security rights of plat-
form workers.
First of all, the social partners have a long history of being closely con-
sulted or directly involved in tripartite negotiations with the Government
and in expert committees on reforms affecting social security and the
labour market. The role of the social partners representing both employers
and employees is essential to the legislators when preparing regulations
aimed at the labour market and is well-established in Denmark – by tacit
understanding, as there is no legislation obliging the legislators to include
the social partners. This is understood as making rules of a better quality
and, as such, with better effects on the market, as well as with the support
of employers as well as employees for reforms. This respected role in soci-
ety is a preunderstanding of the social partners, and part of the goodwill in
society – with rule-makers, workers and employers alike. For platform
workers, this was very clear in the negotiations for the 2017 reform of the
unemployment insurance system, which aimed at moving away from cate-
gorising platform work and at setting up a universal income model.
Second, the social partners extend negotiated rights in collective agree-
ments to non-standard groups of workers. Negotiating agreements specifi-
cally for persons in non-standard work had taken place several times before
the emergence of platform work, such as for e.g. freelance journalists and
photographers. Negotiating agreements that cover platform workers has
likewise taken place. Three models have been used for this: A tailor-made
collective agreement for the Danish platform company Hilfr offering clean-
ing services to private users, an accession agreement with the Danish plat-
form company Voocali offering translation services to private and public
entities, and temporary agency work models used by the platform com-
III.
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panies meploy offering logistics services, and Chabber offering restaurant
staff temps.
The most innovative development was the negotiation of a tailor-made
collective agreement for the platform company Hilfr as a pilot-project in
2018. The platform company Hilfr was set up in 2017 by three young
Danes, who started the platform making use of digital technology to
match small cleaning jobs with a wider audience of cleaners. The platform
is the second largest platform offering cleaning services in Denmark, with
216 cleaners and 1.700 customers.72 The entrepreneurs initiated contact
with the trade unions, as a way to develop their business and give their
platform a competitive edge in the market.73 The platform company own-
ers negotiated with 3F, the largest trade union in Denmark for unskilled
workers. In 2018, the parties agreed to the Hilfr-agreement.
The agreement entails74 that cleaners at the Hilfr platform are either
FreelanceHilfr or SuperHilfr. SuperHilfr are covered by the agreement, Free-
lanceHilfrs are not. The agreement ensures that a SuperHilfr is employed by
Hilfr.dk, and works at an hourly minimum rate of DKK 141.21 has a right
to paid holidays, and to sick leave benefits. The agreement settled the issue
of scope with an innovative provision stating that freelancers automatically
obtain employee status as SuperHilfrs after 100 hours of work via the plat-
form. However, freelancers who wish to transfer their status from free-
lancer to employee before having worked 100 hours can notify Hilfr of
this, and in this case the agreement covers new work assignments accepted
after the notification. Likewise, freelancers who wish to remain freelancers
after 100 hours of work facilitated by the platform must inform Hilfr of
this decision, and in this case they will not obtain employee status and will
not be covered by the collective agreement. In reality, the agreement was
based on a fully individual opt-in-opt-out mechanism for the individual
cleaner.75 The agreement instituted a pension plan for cleaners above the
age of 20, with employer contributions at 4.15 percent and employee con-
72 https://hilfr.dk. Accessed 28 July 2020.
73 Anna, Ilsøe, The Hilfr Agreement, Negotiating the Platform Economy in Den-
mark, FAOS Research Paper No. 176, March 2018, https://faos.ku.dk/publikation
er/forskningsnotater/rapporter-2019/Rapport_176_-_The_Hilfr_agreement.pdf, p.
6. Accessed 28 July 2020.
74 Collective Agreement between Hilfr ApS. CBR.no.: 37297267 and 3F Private Ser-
vice, Hotel and Restaurant, 2018, https://www2.3f.dk/~/media/files/mainsite/forsi
de/fagforening/privat%20service/overenskomster/hilfr%20collective%20agreemen
t%202018.pdf. Accessed 28 July 2020.
75 This element was heavily criticised.
Natalie Videbæk Munkholm
192
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002, am 02.12.2021, 16:03:18
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
tributions at 4 percent. In addition, all employees were covered by a health
care plan, also paid by employer contributions. The right to pension con-
tributions is earned after a minimum of 320 hours of paid employment
with Hilfr within a 3-year-period. The agreement protects against dismissal
by stating that deletion or depersonalisation of the employee’s profile on
the platform can only take place after a 2 weeks’ notice in writing, and a
discretionary decision of dismissal must be based on substantial reasons re-
lating to the company or the employee.
The Hilfr agreement was in force from 1 August 2018 to 31 July 2019.
The parties are currently renegotiating the terms, and the provisions have
been extended to cover SuperHilfrs in the negotiations. The agreement has
shown that it is possible to create a collective agreement for platform
workers that is fully adjustable to the special working situation of platform
workers. However, as is clear, having a special agreement for platform work
comes at a cost. In the Hilfr agreement, the cost was to sacrifice an essential
principle of industrial relations, namely that the individual worker and
employer cannot derogate the protections of the collective agreement to
the detriment of the worker by individual opt-in-opt-out provisions. How-
ever, as mentioned, no cases have arisen since the agreement came into
force in August 2018.
The pilot project has also shown that it is possible to clarify the status of
persons providing work via digital platform by way of collective agree-
ment. This is a supplementary aspect of concluding collective agreements
that could have a normative effect also on clarifying the rights and duties
between the parties in matters regulated by statutory acts, such as manda-
tory occupational injury insurance. The fact that the agreement determines
who is an employee under the agreement could have some bearing on the
public social security systems regarding eligibility – in that working hours
in employment are counted towards eligibility for sick leave benefits, ma-
ternity/parental leave benefits, and towards the requirement of 225 hours
of annual work for continuing to receive basic living benefits from the lo-
cal municipality. The assessments under these regulations are based on the
assessments of employment status carried out in labour law. The project
has shown that it is possible to engage in negotiations with platform own-
ers, with a view to establishing the working conditions for service
providers along the existing Danish standards for work, specifically with
regards to social security contributions similar to those of more standard em-
ployment relationships. The platform is to pay sick leave benefits for the
first 30 days of sick leave, and to make contributions to occupational pen-
sion schemes.
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A specific learning point to take home from the Hilfr agreements during
their first year of existence was the response of the users. When booking
assistance, the user can choose between a FreelanceHilfr, at individual
hourly rates, and a SuperHilfr covered by the collective agreement starting
at 141.21 DKK per hour. 1 out of 7 cleaners in Hilfr, approx. 14 percent,
are SuperHilfrs, covered by the collective agreement.76 Approximately 35
percent of all assignments are however carried out by a SuperHilfr. This
large proportion indicates a preference to use SuperHilfrs, despite the ser-
vices being performed at a higher rate. There are no empirical studies on
why the end users prefer SuperHilfrs. Explanations could be that the users
prefer to engage persons that provide work on approved terms, or to avoid
circumvention of the Danish model. More details can be found in a new
report on Hilfr agreements and lessons learned.77
The pilot project did not give guidance on future negotiations with
more uncooperative platforms. Hilfr.dk initiated the negotiations by con-
tacting the trade unions. However, the largest platform company provid-
ing cleaning services to private homes, HappyHelper, has refused to enter
into negotiations at all. A further unclear topic is that there is yet to be a
specific judicial review of the right of trade unions to engage in industrial
action against digital platforms as a follow-up to potential unsuccessful ne-
gotiations with uncooperative platform companies. Earlier caselaw on
non-standard workers and causal self-employed persons may suggest that
industrial action is indeed possible, but caselaw has not yet confirmed this
in relation specifically to non-standard workers on platforms.
Another agreement negotiated in 2018 was the Voocali agreement.78 The
Voocali agreement was an accession agreement. Voocali.com is an interpreta-
tion platform company which offers interpretation services to public and
private entities. The agreement entails that interpreters, who are employ-
ees, are provided with all the rights of the Collective Agreement for White
76 32 out of 212 in all, cf. Denmarks Radio. Kun hver syvende rengøringsmedarbe-
jder er på banebrydende overenskomst, 27 November 2019, https://www.dr.dk/ny
heder/penge/kun-hver-syvende-rengoeringsmedarbejder-er-paa-banebrydende-over
enskomst. Accessed 28 July 2020.
77 Anna, Ilsøe, The Hilfr agreement (fn. 73).
78 HK Danmark, HK indgår overenskomst med platformsvirksomhed, 1 October
2018, https://www.hk.dk/aktuelt/nyheder/2018/10/01/hk-indgaar-overenskomst-m
ed-platformsvirksomhed. Accessed 28 July 2020. The accession agreement is avail-
able in Danish at https://www.hk.dk/-/media/dokumenter/raad-og-stoette-v2/freel
ancer/erklringvoocalihkprivatendelig.pdf?la=da&hash=F220F50F58285F3F4681F9
AE6A81E2E716EF953C. Accessed 28 July 2020.
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Collar Workers in Trade, Knowledge and Service,79 as negotiated between
HK Privat, the largest union for salaried employees, and Dansk Erhverv, the
Danish Chamber of Commerce. The parties agreed to conclude a special
collective agreement for freelance interpreters at Voocali.80 This agreement
entails81 that freelance interpreters receive a guaranteed fee agreed to in the
collective agreement with HK Privat, transportation supplements, a no-
show fee in event of cancellation, a requirement of objective reasons for
being excluded from the platform, registration of taxes for freelancers
without a Business Registration Number, no restrictions with regards to
carrying out assignments outside of Voocali.com, and data portability to
take their user ratings with them. The freelance agreement did not include
occupational pensions, retraining programmes, additional tax registra-
tions, a complaints mechanism for ratings, as these elements were part of
the future negotiations envisaged in mid-2018. The rates were negotiated
on the basis of the salary statistics, which includes salary, holiday pay,
hardship allowances, sickness pay, supplements, employee fringe benefits,
pension contributions on the part of the employer, special holidays, educa-
tion costs and insurance. These elements were not separated in the agree-
ment, and the rates for the freelancers included these elements indicating
that the freelancers themselves should put aside money from the salaries to
cover these additional costs, also those relating to pension payments and
sickness pay. The freelance agreement was in force for one year in a trial
basis. The agreement was renegotiated in 2019, and now also covers police
interpreters82 providing services via Voocali.com.
Finally, a few platform companies have chosen to provide services un-
der terms similar to those of the Act on Temporary Agency Workers. This
is the case for the platform companies Chabber,83 offering catering person-
nel such as bartenders, chefs, waiters and receptionists, and meploy, offer-
ing temporary work agents to retail, production, warehouses. Chabber is an
79 https://www.danskerhverv.dk/siteassets/mediafolder/dokumenter/03-overenskoms
ter/overenskomster-2017-2020/funktionaroverenskomsten-2017-2020.
80 Standard contracts and terms for freelancers available at https://www.hk.dk/-/med
ia/dokumenter/raad-og-stoette-v2/freelancer/appendix41.pdf?la=da&hash=62EC78
D86F778B2EAC6042E523299052. Accessed 28 July 2020.
81 Appendix 7.4 to the Agreement between Voocali and HK Privat, https://www.hk.
dk/-/media/dokumenter/raad-og-stoette-v2/freelancer/appendix74.pdf?la=da&hash
=4F6B32877A1D5F6A50AD08129D961D6A. Accessed 28 July 2020.
82 HK Danmark, Ny aftale for polititolke skal sikre fair vilkår i nyt udbud, 29 July
2019, https://www.hk.dk/aktuelt/nyheder/2019/07/29/ny-aftale-for-polititolke-skal-
sikre-fair-vilkaar-i-nyt-udbud. Accessed 28 July 2020.
83 Chabber Homepage, https://www.chabber.com/. Accessed 28 July 2020.
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online freelance platform, tailor-made to the hotel and restaurant industry.
Freelancers are employed by Chabber, and the latter platform takes care of
salary payments and tax registration. Rather than direct payments between
the customers and the freelancers, the company ProLøn84 has tailored a so-
lution so salaries are paid out by Chabber to the freelancers. In Chabber’s
Terms and Conditions the user entity is defined as the employer, obliging
the user entity to pay the Chabber employee all benefits under the collec-
tive agreement applicable at the user entity, with Chabber administrating
the payments and registrations. meploy is a Danish platform company
matching the needs of temporary workers in the retail, warehouse and pro-
duction sectors. meploy is set up like a temporary work agency. The tempo-
rary work agencies provide services based on an equality principle, mean-
ing that temporary agency workers will receive salaries and benefits similar
to those of the other workers in the user entity. If the user entity is covered
by a collective agreement, Chabber and meploy will receive these rates. If
the user entity is not covered by a collective agreement, Chabber and
meploy will receive the rates of the other workers in the user entity. Chab-
ber and meploy do not have their own collective agreements for the tempo-
rary agency workers, and as such any right to pension contributions, sick-
ness pay, and other benefits depends entirely on the user entity. meploy is a
member of Dansk Industri, the Confederation of Danish Industry, a pri-
vate business and employers’ organisation representing approximately
11,000 companies in Denmark.85
However, the biggest amendment to the social security status of non-
standard workers and the self-employed was not the platform agreements
but the statutory amendment in 2017 for unemployment insurance. In this
regard, the important and essential role of the social partners in tripartite
negotiation and consultation with the Government in any matters relating
to the labour market and social security system was evident and also a pre-
requisite for aiming to make the interaction between the labour market
and the social security system a smooth and dynamic match. The unem-
ployment insurance reform was a good example, and the reform could be
seen as a consequence of unemployment insurance traditionally being an
issue provided by the trade union membership and insurance-based. The
sick leave benefit and maternity/parental leave benefit scheme, however,
have not yet been reformed to match the new labour market. This lack of
84 https://proloen.dk/kundecases/chabber/. Accessed 28 July 2020.
85 DI Digital, meploy, 1 April 2019, https://www.danskindustri.dk/brancher/di-digit
al/nyhedsarkiv/manedens-medlem/meploy/. Accessed 28 July 2020.
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reform could be explained by the fact that these types of benefits are seen
as traditionally part of a fully public social benefit system, rather than relat-
ed to trade union membership or insurance.
For social security rights, in order to counteract abuses, only hours
earned in employment that resembles the terms provided by collective
agreements used to be counted towards being eligible. This element is of
less significance in the reformed unemployment insurance system, as the
focus switched to income, which can be accumulated from any type of
work, rather than status. The element is still significant with regard to all
other social security measures. However, as illustrated, being covered by a
collective agreement improves the retirement pensions of employees com-
pared to pension rights following from statutory legislation only. Manda-
tory employer contributions to the occupational pension schemes of their
employees follow only from collective agreements. These schemes in col-
lective agreements are normative also for employment relationships that
are not covered by collective agreements. Employers not covered by a col-
lective agreement sometimes opt to offer company-level pension schemes
as an avenue to attract and keep qualified employees, either as a company
policy or negotiated in the individual employment contracts. For platform
workers, however, there are no indications that they are offered occupa-
tional pension plans or similar in their contracts. Occupational pensions
are still left to the private initiative of the platform worker.
Likewise, many collective agreements improve the rights during sick
leave by providing a right to sickness pay. Salaries during sick leave and
partial salaries during maternity/parental leave are provided for white col-
lar workers in the White Collar Workers’ Act. Collective agreements can
extend these rights to other groups of workers not covered by the White
Collar Workers’ Act. Salaries during maternity/parental leave likewise have
a normative effect for relationships not covered by a collective agreement,
as an employee benefit provided by the company.
Additionally, collective agreements often improve the work-life balance
of employees, e.g. by providing periods with paid leave during maternity/
parental leave, or days off in case of children’s sickness. These provisions
are mandatory only for employers covered by a collective agreement stipu-
lating these rights. However, the provisions are normative also for employ-
ment/self-employment not covered by a collective agreement. This can be
either in the form of general company level policies to this end, or of nego-
tiated provisions in individual employment contracts. There is, however,
no indication that such work-life balancing provisions have as yet been
part of the regulations of platform companies.
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The categorisation of the platform workers is still unclear and heavily
debated by practitioners, tax authorities, social security authorities, and
labour lawyers. Recently, the competition law authorities have established
a task force monitoring digital platforms as potentially in breach of compe-
tition law. In August 2020, the Competition Authority task force issued
their first ruling on the platforms HappyHelper and Hilfr.86 Both platforms
were found in breach of competition law by posting minimum prices for
the services on their websites, concerning the platform workers who are
genuine self-employed. For Hilfr, the Competition Authority did not find
that the current collective agreement established “an employment situa-
tion” as understood in competition law. The Hilfr platform agreed to en-
sure that the persons covered by the collective agreement are more clearly
“employed”. The implications of this ruling and development are not yet
certain.
At the same time, the social partners and the platform companies them-
selves have made significant progress in Denmark with regards to ensuring
decent working conditions for platform workers, as well as some progress
in including social security measures alongside. The drivers of this devel-
opment have primarily been the platforms themselves, wanting to use digi-
tal technology to meet the demands of the market and at the same time
ensure decent working conditions for the platform workers. The public
discourse on the status of platform workers and the role of collective agree-
ments has likewise intensified over the last years. There is an ongoing dia-
logue between the trade unions and the platforms, with a view to inform-
ing the platforms about certain problems for the service providers. Negoti-
ations for new collective agreements are currently taking place with the de-
livery platform JustEat.87
Conclusion
The Danish experience with improving the social security of platform
workers yields a number of learning points. First of all, the drivers in the
first wave of platform companies and collective agreements were the plat-
form companies themselves, looking to align their company with the Dan-
ish model as well as to create a competitive edge to their platform with the
IV.
86 https://www.kfst.dk/pressemeddelelser/kfst/2020/20200826-rengoringsplatforme-fj
erner-minimumspriser/. Accessed 28 July 2020.
87 Anna, Ilsøe, The Hilfr Agreement (fn. 73), p. 18.
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customers. The first wave of collective agreements used different strategies
for providing the platform workers with basic working conditions, i.e. the
tailor-made collective agreement of Hilfr.dk, the accession agreement of
Voocali with a tailormade freelance agreement as a supplement, and the
temporary agency strategies of Chabber and meploy. Across these attempts,
the focus was on essential working terms rather than social security mea-
sures. In particular, the lack of mandatory employer pension contributions
is clear, as is sickness pay and pay during maternity/parental leave. To this
end, the Hilfr.dk and Voocali.com agreements are still pending, whereas
Chabber and meploy delegate these matters to the user entity in principle
providing the platform workers with a better coverage and additional
benefits – at par with the standard workers with the user entity.
Second, the lack of focus on social security matters could be seen in con-
tinuance of the reform of the unemployment insurance system in 2017,
changing a system of accruing working hours in either employment or self-
employment in order to be eligible for unemployment benefits, to a sys-
tem of accrual of rights based on universal income. The reform received a
lot of public attention, as it was the first tangible result of the work in the
highly promoted Disruption Council of the former Government. How-
ever, as has been described above, the reform is still experiencing systemic
setbacks for platform workers.
Collective agreements for platform workers can improve social security
in areas where the public system is less strong, such as in areas with a low
public system for platform workers, most notably retirement pensions.
Also in areas where the public system is not yet aligned smoothly with new
ways of providing work, such as sick leave and maternity/parental leave
benefits, and occupational injury insurance, collective agreements could
clarify the status of platform workers and in this way assist their accrual of
rights in the public benefits system. Most influential to the social security
of platform workers was, however, the amendment to the statutory act on
unemployment insurance changing the accrual method to universal in-
come from all types of work, rather than single-employment-based accrual
either in employment or self-employment.
The outcomes from the first attempts are varied. The uncertain status of
platform workers has spurred attention also from the competition authori-
ties. For the sake of the companies and of the platform workers as well as
the users and broader society, it would be recommended that the stake-
holders engage in dialogue on how to assess and distinguish between free-
lancers working on terms more similar to employees and freelancers work-
ing on terms more similar to genuine self-employment via the platforms.
This clarification and understanding could also pave the way for more col-
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lective agreements for platform workers as the preferred avenue of improv-
ing not only the basic working conditions of platform workers, but also
their overall social security coverage in their active work life, when injured
at work, when on sick-leave and maternity/parental leave, and during their
retirement.
The involvement of social partners in the rulemaking of the legislators,
the invitation to be part of the consulting and negotiation of new initia-
tives is probably the most influential element. The social partners are al-
ways close to new developments and influence the systemic choices of the
legislators. This cooperation is not based on any legally binding instru-
ments, but is at the free choice of the legislators at any time. This influ-
enced the 2017 reform of the unemployment benefit insurance system,
and recently resulted in a historic proposal by the social partners to the leg-
islators for statutory regulation of minimum pay in the transportation in-
dustry for foreign transporters with a view to counteracting abuse and cir-
cumvention of the collective agreements in this specific sector.88 Such dual
and tripartite negotiations could perhaps over time also open up further
dialogue at the political level to provide solutions for platform workers.
There are still questions outstanding with regard to collective agreements
and platform workers, such as the lawfulness of collective action against
platform companies and, in this respect, the status of the platform work-
ers, how categorisations of the platform workers in collective agreements
can influence assessments in the public social security system. There have
been no complaints reviewed under the Hilfr agreement or the Voocali
agreement.
The platform companies in Denmark provide services within all areas.
The work performed is not new, but the form of organising the work is
new and based on digital technology which has a number of administra-
tive benefits. The work is performed on non-standard contracts; however,
this is not necessarily precarious work. Some platform companies offer ser-
vices by highly skilled workers, some offer services in highly regulated ar-
eas, and some in less regulated and more at-risk areas. Platform companies
are different and vary in their social and commercial outlook, much like
other types of companies. In this, the platform companies represent a new
form of company model rather than new forms of work. The need for so-
cial security of persons performing work has likewise not changed – per-
sons are still in need for social security. The fragmentation of work pat-
88 Aftale om vejtransport, January 2020, https://www.bm.dk/media/12316/aftale-om-
vejtransport.pdf. Accessed 28 July 2020.
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terns, as well as the uncertain and fragmented categorisation of the status
of platform workers under the variety of social security regulation and col-
lective agreements, contribute to the social security status of platform
workers being indeed very uncertain. The steps forward taken by the Dan-
ish Government and the social partners in providing the 2017 reform of
unemployment insurance, as well as by the social partners in testing collec-
tive agreements tailormade for platform workers have definitely improved
the status. However, the agreements were made with friendly platform
owners, and so far no industrial action has been taken against more unco-
operative platform companies in Denmark. Also, the preliminary results
focused on parts of the social security system and parts of social security
provisions in the collective agreement. The learning points and good re-
sults from these processes could form a better starting point for the next
wave of focus on the rights of platform workers – their overall standing in
the social security system in Denmark, allowing them to be part of the
Danish flexicurity system also when utilising the new digital forms of flexi-
ble work made possible by platform work.
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Chapter 8 




A new business model – a version of the umbrella company, or egenanställ-
ningsföretag as they are called in Swedish – has been adopted in Sweden.1 It
is not a new phenomenon – it was first seen in Sweden during the 1990s2 –
but it was not until the collaborative economy developed that the industry
grew, as the business model suits the digitalised world well.3 In the collab-
orative economy some platforms assign umbrella companies as middlemen
to handle the transactions between the umbrella company worker and the
client (service consumer).4 The parties rarely meet in real life: all contacts
I.
1 Eurofound, New Forms of Employment, Publications Office of the European
Union, Luxembourg, 2015, pp. 118 ff., https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/defa
ult/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef1461en.pdf. Accessed 12 September
2020, those companies are called umbrella companies. See also Government White
Paper SOU 2017:24, Ett arbetsliv i förändring – hur påverkas ansvaret för ar-
betsmiljön?, pp. 159 ff.
2 For more on the historical development of umbrella companies in Sweden see
Government White Paper SOU 2017:24 (fn. 1), pp. 159 ff.
3 It is difficult to determine how widespread the business model is and how many
umbrella company workers there currently are. According to the branch organisa-
tion, the number of umbrella company employees grew from 4,000 in 2011 to
44,000 in 2017 (see homepage of the Egenanställningsföretagens Branschorganisa-
tion, http://www.egenanstallning.org/index/news. Accessed 19 June 2019), and
according to the Government White Paper SOU 2017:24 (fn. 1), p. 167, 18,650 per-
sons worked at 7 (big) umbrella companies in 2015. There were approximately
29,500 active umbrella company workers in 2018 and 32,300 during 2019, accord-
ing to the Swedish Statistic Service (SCB), https://www.scb.se/AM0103. Accessed
19 June 2020. In this book chapter the focus is not on the number of workers but
on the fact that it is a phenomenon that exists and is here to stay.
4 The term service consumer is used in the same way as in the European Commission,
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, COM (2016) 356 final, of 2
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between them are conducted electronically. The Swedish umbrella com-
panies’ business model is that the umbrella company worker (to be) finds
an assignment. He either bids for work on a digitalised platform or finds it
in some other way. If successful, the umbrella company worker (to be) ne-
gotiates both the working conditions and the remuneration with the
client. The umbrella company worker (to be) then makes sure the client
has signed a contract with the umbrella company. The umbrella company
worker is employed by the umbrella company on a short fixed-term em-
ployment contract for the duration of the assignment. When the work is
done the client is invoiced by the umbrella company. Once the client has
paid the umbrella company, the platform worker is credited his remunera-
tion, after deductions for tax, social security contributions, and the um-
brella company’s commission.5
Umbrella companies are promoted as an easy way for people who do
not want the administrative burden of having a company of their own, to
work and concentrate on their work performance instead of on adminis-
tration. Umbrella companies attract many different types of performing
parties, both in the digitalised economy and in the “old” economy in tradi-
tional freelance sectors like journalism, acting etc. In Sweden, it is the em-
ployer and not the employee who pays taxes and social security contribu-
tions to the Swedish Tax Agency. Self-employed persons with a Business
Tax Certificate pay themselves and the administrative burden of being self-
employed is significant compared to that of being an employee. There are,
from a social security perspective, no particular reasons for using umbrella
companies since e.g. the social security fees are the same for employees and
self-employed persons.
Swedish umbrella companies have a trade organisation where member-
ship is conditioned on companies taking responsibility for the performing
parties during the time they are working.6 The organisation’s point of view
is that the performing parties are employed by the umbrella companies for
the duration of their assignments and that the umbrella companies take
full responsibility for their umbrella company workers. Umbrella com-
June 2016, p. 3, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-35
6-EN-F1-1.PDF. Accessed 20 August 2020.
5 See Government White Paper SOU 2017:24 (fn. 1), p. 161 ff, p. 198; the Swedish
Tax Agency, https://www.skatteverket.se/privat/skatter/arbeteochinkomst/inkomste
r/egenanstallning. Accessed 15 June 2020; Eurofound, New Forms of Employment
(fn. 1), p. 120.
6 See homepage of the Egenanställningsföretagens Branschorganisation, http://www.
egenanstallning.org. Accessed 30 March 2020.
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panies of a similar construction can be found in France and Austria.7 In
France and Austria the employment in itself does, however, not seem to be
as important for the umbrella companies’ identity as it is in Sweden. In
France, portage salarial is described as a construction in between employ-
ment and self-employment.8 In contrast to the Swedish system, portage
salarial in France is regulated in the statutory legislation.9 In Sweden, there
is no particular regulation about umbrella companies, so it is the already
existing legislation that applies to umbrella companies. In Austria, some of
the umbrella companies are described as not-for-profit organisations.10
That is not a suitable description of umbrella companies in Sweden, which
make up a special business model in a particular niche of the labour mar-
ket. Their reason for handling administration is that they are commercial
companies that make their profit by charging a percentage of the worker’s
income.11 Platform and other companies that do not want to employ em-
ployees need a middleman who can take on the responsibilities of the em-
ployer during assignments. This explains the demand for umbrella compa-
ny services in the collaborative economy.
In Section II, I will analyse the legal prerequisites in Swedish labour leg-
islation for the umbrella companies’ business model and the concept of
employment in labour law. I will then analyse the concept of employment
in social security legislation, and the particular gaps and problems in the
social security system and in unemployment insurance for umbrella com-
pany workers in Section III. In Section IV, the importance of supplemental
social security benefits in industry-wide collective agreements are present-
ed. In Section V, I will present conclusions. I will, for instance, analyse the
umbrella companies’ role as employers and in whose interest they operate.
I will also analyse the business model’s significance for the social security
protection of umbrella company workers with the intention of determin-
ing whether or not umbrella companies are a possible way of extending
7 Eurofound, New Forms of Employment (fn. 1), pp. 118 ff.
8 Kessler, Francis, Chapter 10: New Forms of Employment in France, in: Blanpain,
Roger/Hendrickx, Frank/Wass, Bernd (eds.), New Forms of Employment in Euro-
pe. Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations Series Volume 9, Alphen aan den
Rijn: Wolters Kluwer 2016, pp. 203 f.
9 Article 8 of the Law of 2008; see Kessler, Francis, Chapter 10: New Forms of Em-
ployment in France (fn. 8), p. 203 f.
10 Eurofound, New Forms of Employment (fn. 1), pp. 118 ff.
11 Frilands Finans e.g. charges 6 per cent, see homepage of Frilands Finans, https://w
ww.frilansfinans.se/fragor-och-svar/. Accessed 18 July 2020.
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the social security protection to include this group of vulnerable employ-
ees and self-employed persons. 
Legal Prerequisites in Swedish Labour Legislation for the Umbrella
Company Business Model
Basics
The Swedish variety of umbrella companies does not exist in the other
Nordic countries, in spite of the fact that these countries have seen similar
developments in the collaborative economy.12 There might be several rea-
sons for this. In this section, I will analyse the prerequisites in Swedish
labour legislation that have created a demand for this particular business
model and the statutory regulations that have aided its emergence.
The Swedish legislation is built on a binary system where the perform-
ing party is either employed or self-employed. The concept of employment
in the 1982 Employment Protection Act is wide and covers both the con-
cept of “workers” and that of “employees” as referred to in other coun-
tries.13 The Swedish Labour Court has not yet14 decided on any cases
where they have had to determine whether umbrella company workers
and platform workers are employees according to the concept of the em-
ployee in the 1982 Employment Protection Act, or whether they are self-
employed. It may very well be the case that the Labour Court will regard
the relationship between the umbrella company and the umbrella compa-
ny worker as one of employment with a short fixed-term contract. If the
statutory act only allowed permanent full-time employment, there would
be no legal prerequisites for the business model. In this respect, the 1982
II.
1.
12 Eurofound, New Forms of Employment (fn. 1), pp. 118 ff. and Hotvedt, Marianne
Jenum/Munkholm, Natalie Videbæk, Labour Law in the Future of Work, Fafo-pa-
per 2019:06, https://www.fafo.no/pillar-vi. Accessed 20 August 2020.
13 The legislation in the United Kingdom, unlike in Sweden, separates employees
from workers (cf. Section 230 (1)-(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996) and the
concept of the worker is broader and different from the concept of the employee,
see Kenner, Jeff, Inverting the Flexicurity Paradigm: The United Kingdom and Ze-
ro Hours Contracts, in: Ales, Edoardo/Deinert, Olaf/Kenner, Jeff (eds.) Core and
Contingent Work in the European Union: A Comparative Analysis, Oxford: Hart
Publishing 2017, pp. 153-183.
14 There have been cases where the Court has had to decide whether umbrella com-
pany workers are employees in terms of the Unemployment Insurance Act, with
differing results, see below.
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Employment Protection Act is flexible and allows very short employment
contracts and offers generous possibilities for fixed-term employment.
A Wide Concept of Employment in Labour Law15
The employee is identified in an overall assessment of relevant criteria.16
The concept of employment is based on a core criterion: a contract by which
a performing party must personally perform work on behalf of another party.17
The core criterion is so important that it must always be present. In addi-
tion to the core criterion there are other circumstances of importance to
the Labour Court when they make their overall assessment of all relevant
criteria. The list varies depending on the author.18 Examples of circum-
stances taken into account are:
2.
15 See further Westregård, Annamaria, The Notion of “Employee” in Swedish and
European Union Law: An Exercise in Harmony or Disharmony?, in: Carlson, Lau-
ra/Edström, Örjan/Nyström, Birgitta (eds.), Globalisation, Fragmentation, Labour
and Employment Law: A Swedish Perspective, Uppsala: Iustus Förlag 2016, pp.
185-204; Westregård, Annamaria, Collaborative Economy: A New Challenge for
the Social Partners, in: Ahlberg, Kerstin/ Herzfeld Olsson, Petra /Malmberg, Jonas
(eds.), Niklas Bruun I Sverige. En vänbok, Uppsala: Iustus Förlag 2017, pp.
427-438; Westregård, Annamaria, Digital Collaborative Platforms: A Challenge for
Social Partners in the Nordic Model, in: Nordic Journal of Commercial Law, 1
(2018), pp. 92 ff., https://doi.org/10.5278/ojs.njcl.v0i1.2486. Accessed 18 July 2020;
Westregård, Annamaria, Key Concepts and Changing Labour Relations in Sweden,
Nordic Future of Work Project 2017-2020: Working Paper 8. Pillar VI, 2019,
https://www.fafo.no/pillar-vi. Accessed 20 August 2020.
16 For more about the overall assessment, see Westregård, Annamaria, The Notion of
“Employee” in Swedish and European Union Law: An Exercise in Harmony or
Disharmony? (fn. 15), pp. 185-204; Westregård, Annamaria, Collaborative Econo-
my: A New Challenge for the Social Partners (fn. 15), pp. 427-438; Westregård,
Annamaria, Digital Collaborative Platforms: A Challenge for Social Partners in
the Nordic Model (fn. 15), pp. 92 ff.; Westregård, Annamaria, Key Concepts and
Changing Labour Relations in Sweden (fn. 15).
17 Originally Adlercreutz, Axel, Arbetstagarbegreppet, Stockholm: Norstedts 1964, p.
186, 276 ff. and later Malmberg, Jonas/Bruun, Niklas, Ds. 2002:56 Hållfast arbetsrätt
för ett föränderligt arbetsliv, Stockholm: Fritzes 2002, p. 111 n. 63 identified the
set of relevant circumstances or criteria, all of them fundamental prerequisites
(grundrekvisit).
18 Adlercreutz, Axel, Arbetstagarbegreppet (fn. 17), p. 186 and pp. 276 ff.; Malmberg,
Jonas/Bruun, Niklas, Ds. 2002:56 Hållfast arbetsrätt för ett föränderligt arbetsliv
(fn. 17), p. 111 n. 63; Källström, Kent/Malmberg, Jonas, Anställningsförhållandet:
inledning till den individuella arbetsrätten, Uppsala: Iustus 2016, p. 26; Sigemen,
Tore/Sjödin, Erik, Arbetsätten: En översikt, Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolter Kluwer
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Is the work performed under the principal’s leadership and control
(salaried employment) or not (self-employment)? Is the workload mea-
sured by duration (employment) rather than by specific duties (self-em-
ployment)? Does the performing party have only one principal (salaried
employment) or several (self-employment)? Who owns machinery and
equipment (employees use the employer’s equipment and the self-em-
ployed provide their own equipment)? What are the parties’ intentions?
This is a criterion of special interest when it comes to umbrella companies,
as the parties have signed a fixed-term employment contract for the dura-
tion of the assignment. Does someone become an employer just because
the parties have concluded an employment contract as umbrella com-
panies and umbrella company workers do?19
The intention of the umbrella company and the umbrella company
worker is for the umbrella company worker to have a fixed-term employ-
ment contract for the duration of the assignment. If the Labour Court has
to decide whether a relation is to be considered an employment according
to the 1982 Employment Protection Act, the Court balances the different
interests between the contracting parties. In labour law it is the real cir-
cumstances between the parties rather than the intention of the parties or
the written contract that matters most for the overall assessment. In cases
of “false self-employment” the Labour Court ignores the contract. In such
cases the employment contract may instead create “false employees”. An
umbrella company is definitely not an ordinary employer. A self-employed
person could probably perform the same assignment without the umbrella
company. On the other hand, it would not be problematic for the Labour
Court to follow the intention of the parties, were it beneficial for the weak-
er party – here the umbrella company worker. In a recent Government
White Paper, umbrella company workers were recognised as employees,
see Section III 3 below.20 The Swedish Labour Court has not yet had a case
where they have had to decide whether umbrella company workers should
be regarded as employed by the umbrella company.
2017, p. 31; Inghammar, Andreas, The Concept of “Employee”: The Position in
Sweden, Restatement of Labour Law, in: Waas, Bernd/van Voss, Guus Heerma
(eds.), The Concept of Employee, Oxford: Hart Publishing 2017, p. 686; Lunning,
Lars/Toijer, Gudmund, Anställningsskydd: En lagkommentar, 11th Edition,
Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer 2016, p. 27.
19 Westregård, Annamaria, Key Concepts and Changing Labour Relations in Sweden
(fn. 15), p. 9 ff.
20 Government White Paper SOU 2020:26, En sjukförsäkring anpassad efter indivi-
den, p. 62 ff.
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One circumstance that speaks for a wide employment concept is that it
was the legislator’s intention according to the travaux préparatoires that the
concept of employment should, in dubious cases, be interpreted as if there
was an employment in hand.21 This statement in the Bill to Parliament22
was about the concept of employment in the 1976 Co-Determination Act
(1976:580), but it has been repeated by the Supreme Court according to
the 1992 Pay Guarantee Act in the case of bankruptcy.23 Whether the inter-
pretation principle is still valid for the Labour Court has been put into
question and the principle has been found to probably not be valid when
the concept is interpreted in social security legislation.24 As we will see in
Section III below, the concept of employment is interpreted differently in
social security legislation than in labour law. This can prove fatal for the
umbrella company worker, who can be employed by the umbrella compa-
ny for the duration of the assignment but after the assignment be regarded
as self-employed according to the 1997 Unemployment Insurance Act and
therefore not be entitled to unemployment benefits in the same way as
other short fixed-term employees.
The employer is “the party on whose behalf the employee performs
work”.25 In the private sector, where the umbrella companies operate, the
concept of the employer in the labour legislation is based on the principle
of the legal subject. This means that the employer is the legal or physical per-
son who concludes the employment contract. In this business model it is
the umbrella company that signs the employment contract with the per-
forming party and therefore is the employer according to this principle.
21 In Sweden, the legislation is interpreted according to the sources of the statutory
acts. If the interpretation of the statutory act is unclear, the travaux préparatoires
are important sources, particularly Government White Papers (SOU) and Bills to
Parliament (proposition). The content of statutory acts is clarified by caselaw, and
here the Labour Court’s rulings are of special interest. The doctrine in the legal
literature has an impact, especially the arguments about how to interpret the oth-
er sources. See Fahlbeck, Reinhold/Sigeman, Tore, European Employment and In-
dustrial Relations Glossary: Sweden, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2001, p. 286 ff.
22 Bill to Parliament (prop. med förslag till arbetsrättsreform) 1975/76:105 bil. 1 pp.
309 and 324 and Lunning, Lars/Toijer, Gudmund, Anställningsskydd: En lagkom-
mentar (fn. 18), p. 26.
23 Supreme Court ruling NJA 1996, p. 311.
24 Lunning, Lars/Toijer, Gudmund, Anställningsskydd: En lagkommentar (fn. 18), p.
26.
25 Section 1 (2) of the 1976 Co-Determination Act (1976:580).
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No Requirement for Duration of Time
Another prerequisite in the concept of employment that is crucial for the
umbrella company business model is that the labour law concept of em-
ployment in the statutory regulation (the 1982 Employment Protection
Act) does not demand any duration of time. An employment can be very
short and last only a few hours or even minutes. There are restrictions in
some collective agreements that prohibit very short fixed-term employ-
ment, but as there are no collective agreements at industry or local level at
the moment, there are no such restrictions for umbrella companies.26
Generous Possibilities for Fixed-Term Employment
The generous possibilities in statutory regulations for fixed-term employ-
ment in Sweden are essential for the umbrella companies’ business model.
The business model is that umbrella company workers have short fixed-
term contracts for the duration of an assignment. This is possible due to
Section 5 and 5(a) of the 1982 Employment Protection Act. The legislation
3.
4.
26 In the recent White-Collar Employee Agreement between the white-collar trade
union Unionen and Almega (the employers’ organisation for the Swedish service
sector), there is a special form of fixed-term employment which must exceed a
minimum employment period – missing in the law – of seven days, unless the
employer and the employee specifically agree on a shorter period. If this rule is
abused there are restrictions. The regulations concerning automatic conversion to
permanent employment are extended to a total period of three years – a year
more than the law requires – in a five-year period. This regulation is particularly
important as it covers the service sector where a lot of the “new” precarious forms
of employment exist (Section 2.2. and 2.3. of Collective agreement between Unio-
nen and Almega concerning tech and media companies for the period 1 May
2017 to 30 April 2020. The new regulations are in Section 2.2. and valid from 1
November 2017. See also Labour Court ruling 2015 No. 50, reinterpretation of
the previous rules. The regulation is the same in all Almega’s 22 collective agree-
ments for white-collar workers).
Another example is the Restaurant Collective Agreement, which regulates em-
ployment for single days (anställning för enstaka dagar). The employee is entitled
to refuse the work offered if the minimum chargeable time is three hours a day.
Here, the parties have struck a balance between the employer’s interest in only
having staff in place when there is work to be done, and the employee’s interest
in having to endure no more short fixed-term employment than is necessary and
in rules for minimum hours (4 § 1.2. Anställning för enstaka dagar in the collective
agreement between Visita and Hotel and Restaurant, HRF for the period 1 April
2017 to 31 March 2020).
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allows a general fixed-term employment for a maximum of two years
(within a frame of five years) and after that the employment is converted
into a permanent employment. General fixed-term employment, in con-
trast to other forms of work, entails that employers can hire on a tempora-
ry basis without having to give particular reasons for why the positions are
temporary.27 The statutory regulation on fixed-term employment is what
distinguishes Sweden from the other Nordic countries, where legislation
does not to the same extent allow fixed-term employment. This is probably
a crucial element of the expansion of umbrella companies in Sweden as
opposed to the other Nordic countries, as the concept of employment is
similar in all Nordic countries and platform work has developed at about
the same level (except, so far, in Iceland).28
Short fixed-term employment is regarded as a problem for the employ-
ees. In a Government White Paper (SOU 2019:5 Tid för trygghet) the inves-
tigating committee presented a legislative proposal with the intention of
improving the conditions for employees with short fixed-term employ-
ment contracts. If an employee has more than two short fixed-term em-
ployment contracts within 30 days, the time between the employment
should also be regarded as employment in accordance with the 1982 Em-
ployment Protection Act and its statutory regulations about re-employ-
ment (after twelve months if the employer rehires someone within nine
months)29 and conversion to permanent employment (after two years
within a frame of five years). It is currently uncertain if the proposal will
be turned into legislation. Nothing in particular is said about umbrella
company workers. There will be application difficulties in respect to both
re-employment and conversion to permanent employment owing to the
umbrella companies’ special business model.
Umbrella Companies and Temporary Work Agencies
Umbrella companies operate in much the same way as temporary work
agencies, with one difference being that it is the employer who decides
when a temporary employee works, while an umbrella company worker
5.
27 Bill to Parliament (prop. 2006/07:111 Bättre möjligheter till tidsbegränsad anställ-
ning, m.m.), p. 32; Lunning, Lars/Toijer, Gudmund, Anställningsskydd: En lagkom-
mentar (fn. 18), p. 251.
28 Hotvedt, Marianne Jenum/Munkholm, Natalie Videbæk, Labour Law in the Future
of Work (fn. 12).
29 Section 25 in the 1982 Employment Protection Act.
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decides for himself when to work and then “hires” an employer. From a
labour perspective, temporary agency workers in Sweden are also em-
ployed between assignments and receive a salary. The employer provides
them with work. Umbrella company workers are not employed between
assignments and find their own assignments. From a social security per-
spective umbrella company workers will have problems entering social se-
curity between their assignments as their legal status is unclear, see Section
III 3 and 4 below, while temporary agency workers, who are employees, do
not encounter the same problems.
If an umbrella company is judged to be a temporary work agency, the
consequence is that its employees are entitled to the basic working and em-
ployment conditions set down in the end user’s collective agreements and
other binding general provisions.30 The question of whether umbrella
companies are covered by the 2012 Agency Work Act (2012:854) depends
on the interpretation of the definition of temporary work agencies in Sec-
tion 5 (1). When the statutory act was passed, umbrella companies were
not mentioned in the preparatory work for the Bill to Parliament.31 At the
time, the digital economy was still in its infancy and the umbrella com-
panies were few. According to the statutory act, temporary agency work is
when a company employs temporary agency workers in order to assign
them work for users, under the company’s supervision and direction. If a
company instead places its employees to perform a particular job under its
direction for another company, then that is considered contract work,
which is not covered by the 2012 Agency Work Act.32 The decision
whether a company should be considered a temporary work agency or not,
must also correspond to the interpretation under the Temporary Agency
Work Directive.33 There have not yet been any cases in the Labour Court
determining whether umbrella companies should be regarded as tempora-
ry work agencies in accordance with the 2012 Agency Work Act.
30 Sections 5 (3) and 6 in the 2012 Agency Work Act (2012:854).
31 Government White Paper SOU 2011:5, Bemanningsdirektivets genomförande i
Sverige; Government Bill Prop. 2011/12:178 Lag om uthyrning av arbetstagare.
32 Government White Paper SOU 2011:5 (fn. 31), p. 55; see also Labour Court rul-
ing 2006 No. 24 on contract versus agency work.
33 Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 19
November 2008 on Temporary Agency Work.
Annamaria Westregård
212
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002, am 02.12.2021, 16:03:18
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Umbrella Companies and the Concept of Employment according to Social
Security Legislation and Unemployment Insurances
The Concept of Employment in Social Security Legislation
The concepts of employee and employer are not defined in the same way
in social security legislation as they are in labour law. There is a close con-
nection between the concepts in social security legislation and tax law, but
the concepts in labour law are different. In the social security regulations,
an employee is defined as someone who has an income from employment.
Income from employment or income from business is identified according
to tax law.34
There is no general definition of the employer in tax and social security
legislation, as it mirrors the concept of the employee. When needed, the
concept of the employer is defined in statutory regulation. An example is
statutory rule in the Social Security Act, which stipulates that remunera-
tion of less than 1,000 SEK a year (1 EUR is around 10.50 SEK) is always
regarded as income from employment and that the person (whether legal
or natural) who pays the remuneration is regarded as an employer.35 The
main reason for identifying the employer in tax and social security legisla-
tion is that according to the 2000 Social Insurance Contribution Act
(2000:980) employers pay tax and social fees for their employees. The em-
ployer’s responsibility for paying tax and social fees in some cases goes be-
yond even the concept of employment. These responsibilities also include
principals that hire independent self-employed persons without a regis-
tered firm.36 Self-employed persons deemed to be owners of a business pay
taxes and social fees themselves. In Sweden, there is little difference in so-
cial security expenses between hiring a self-employed person or having an
employee do the work.37 The umbrella companies pay both taxes and so-
III.
1.
34 See e.g. Supreme Court ruling NJA 1982, p. 784. Chapter 6 Section 2 and Chapter
25 Section 10 of the 2010 Social Insurance Code (2010:110) that refers to persons
who according to Chapter 13 Section 1 in the 1999 Income Tax Law are approved
for a Business Tax Certificate.
35 Chapter 25 Section 7 of the 2010 Social Insurance Code.
36 Chapter 2 of the 2000 Social Insurance Contribution Act (2000:980); see also Käll-
ström, Kent, Employment and Contract Work, in: Comparative Labour Law &
Policy Journal, 21 (1999) 1, p. 162.
37 For 2020, the total mandatory employer contribution (social security fee) is 31.42
per cent of paid gross salary. It is the same for employees and for the self-em-
ployed. The employer’s contribution is based on the whole income. The benefits
to the individual are limited to 8 price base amounts (380,000 SEK), https://www.
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cial fees for the umbrella company workers so in this sense they are em-
ployers. This does not mean that the umbrella company worker will be re-
garded as an employee, since the concept of the employee does not mirror
the concept of the employer (see Section III 3 and 4 below about social se-
curity and unemployment benefits for umbrella company workers).
The main reason for identifying the umbrella company workers as ei-
ther employees or self-employed in social security legislation is to decide in
the binary legal system which statutory regulation about access to and the
calculation of benefits will apply, as there are different regulations for em-
ployees and self-employed persons. One of the most significant and impor-
tant aspects of the Swedish social security system is that the self-employed
are covered in a way that does not give them the exact same protection, but
similar protection to that of employees. Despite the regulations creating
far from exact parity, they still offer much more protection than the social
security system, from which the self-employed are excluded. As we will see
in the analysis in Section III 4 and 5 below, there are still gaps and prob-
lems in both the accessing and calculation of benefits.38
There are also parts of the social security system that are similar for self-
employed persons and employees. One example is occupational injury an-
nuity and injury insurance. Anyone who works in Sweden is insured
against occupational injury (illness and accidents at the workplace, while
travelling to and from work, or at home if you have to stay at home be-
cause of an epidemic like the Covid-19 crisis).39 The insurance is mandato-
ry and covers both employees and self-employed persons, which means
that both are entitled to occupational injury annuity if approved by the So-
cial Insurance Agency. The insurance against occupational injury covers
the self-employed, here defined as those operating a company as a simple




38 For a more general description of the Swedish social security system for employ-
ees, self-employed and precarious workers (like platform workers and others with
untraditional employment contracts), see Westregård, Annamaria, Protection of
Platform Workers in Sweden, Nordic Future of Work Project 2017-2020: Work-
ing Paper 12. Pillar VI. 2020, https://www.fafo.no/pillar-vi. Accessed 20 August
2020.
See also Johansson, Caroline, Autonomous Workers and Social Security – A
Swedish Example, in: Revista del Ministerio de Trabajo Migraciones y Seguridad
Social, 144 (2019), pp. 89-102.
39 Chapters 39-42 in the 2010 Social Insurance Code.
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partnership (kommanditbolag), but also assignment workers (tillfälliga upp-
dragstagare). If the classification of some employees is unclear this can pose
a problem, since they may not fit into either of the insured categories (em-
ployees and self-employed persons). The aim of the Swedish legislator is to
create parity in the social security system between employees and genuine-
ly self-employed persons, but also between different business models and
company structures. This can be seen in the reforms of the last decade. In
2010, social security and tax regulations were reformed with the express
ambition of encouraging all types of work, including work performed in
non-traditional forms.40 Complementary reforms were initiated or carried
out in 2018 and 2019.41 The legislator also investigated the possibilities of
improving the protection in the social security system with a focus on the
collaborative economy and platform workers. The investigation has not re-
sulted in any concrete suggestions of improvements since more analyses
and research will be needed.42
The “Intention of the Parties” Criterion
Within tax law, changes were made ten years ago to facilitate the start-up
of small businesses, and these changes will also affect the concept of em-
ployment in social security, since this relies on the concept in tax law. An
amendment called the Reinfeldt amendment was added to Chapter 13 Sec-
tion 1 of the 1999 Income Tax Act. The aim was to facilitate the issuing of
2.
40 Legislative Bill (prop. 2009/10:120).
41 A legal change in SFS 2018:670 and Legislative Bill (prop. 2017/18:168 Stärkt för-
säkringsskydd för studerande och företagare); proposal for legal changes in Gov-
ernment White Paper SOU 2018:49, F-skattesystemet – några särskilt utvalda
frågor; inquiry for new legislation in Kommittédirektiv Dir. 2017:56 Trygghet
och utveckling i anställning vad gäller arbetstid och ledighet; Kommittédirektiv
Dir. 2018:8 En ny arbetslöshetsförsäkring för fler, grundad på inkomst; Dir
2018:26 En trygg sjukförsäkring med människan i centrum; Government White
Paper SOU 2019:2, Ingen regel utan undantag – en trygg sjukförsäkring med
människan i centrum. In the inquiry for legislation, Government White Paper
SOU 2019:41, Företagare i de social trygghetssystemen is the intention to create
more explicit regulations for calculating SGI for the genuinely self-employed op-
erating with a company as a simple partnership (enskild firma), the qualification
days in sickness insurance to create parity between different company forms, an
analysis of the regulations on part-time sickness benefits and, generally, a focus on
the collaborative economy and platform workers.
42 Government White Paper SOU 2019:41, Företagare i de sociala trygghetssyste-
men, pp. 106 ff. and 122.
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Business Tax Certificates (godkänd för F-skatt) and to thereby make it easi-
er to start businesses with one or few principals.
The amendments to the legislation seem to be more or less a codifica-
tion of existing caselaw.43 Just as before, an overall assessment is made to
determine the level of independence. The difference is that now, particular
criteria are emphasised and the travaux préparatoires therefore have greater
importance. The intention of the parties is one example of a criterion given
special weight, while the number of clients is accorded less importance.44
Other criteria mentioned in the text include the degree to which the con-
tractor is dependent on the principal and how much he is involved in the
principal’s operations. The fact that the principal determines how, when
and where the work is to be carried out, or that it is to be carried out on
his premises and with his equipment does not, according to the preparato-
ry works, automatically mean that the contractor is under the principal’s
supervision and that there is an employment at hand.
The present rules for Business Tax Certificate approval have resulted in
more people being hired as sole traders, even though they are actually em-
ployed (“false” self-employed). The Ministry of Finance appointed an in-
quiry to look at possible alterations to the legislation.45 In the Government
White Paper (SOU 2018:49) the commissioner was particularly critical of
the fact that the former employer can be the new company’s only client
and that the importance of the intention of the parties is given. The final
Government White Paper (SOU 2019:31) however decided not to change
the concept of employment but to improve and facilitate the Swedish Tax
Agency’s ability to follow up and ensure that those approved for a Business
Tax Certificate fulfil the business criteria to avoid classification as false self-
employed in tax law (and social security legislation).46
In labour law, it is the real circumstances between the parties rather
than the intention of the parties or the written contract that matter most
for the overall assessment, particularly if it is a question of classifying “false
self-employment”. In tax law, on the other hand, the intention of the parties
is a very important criterion for the overall assessment when deciding
whether the performing party is self-employed or not. The intention of the
parties does not seem to be of the same importance when deciding if um-
43 See Supreme Administrative Court, 2001 ref. 25 (RÅ 2001 ref. 25) and Council of
Legislation’s comments and Legislative Bill 2008/09:62 F-skatt åt fler, p. 25.
44 Legislative Bill 2008/09:62, pp. 25-26.
45 Dir. 2017:108 Översyn av F-skattesystemet.
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brella company workers will receive social security benefits. This is despite
the fact that the employment concept in social security legislation is nor-
mally connected to the concept in tax law. Here again, the real circum-
stances seem most important, probably owing to the interest in avoiding
that “false employees” receive benefits from a third party (Swedish Social
Insurance Agency or unemployment insurance funds), see Section III 3
and 4 below. The result of the different approaches in different areas of
legislation is that someone might well be regarded as an employee in the
labour legislation but at the same time as self-employed in the social secu-
rity legislation and this is exactly what can happen to umbrella company
workers.
Social Security for Umbrella Company Workers47
How does the Swedish social security system function in respect to um-
brella company workers? There are problems at different levels. The first
problem pertains to whether the umbrella company worker is employed
or self-employed according to the legislation in question. This depends on
whether the umbrella company workers are regarded as employed by the
umbrella company or if the relation is regarded as something else, which
in the binary system means self-employed. If umbrella company workers
are regarded as self-employed, they are entitled to social security benefits
for the self-employed, which can be less favourable than benefits for em-
ployees.48 The second problem is that if umbrella company workers are re-
garded as employees according to the parties’ intentions, they share the
same problem in sickness insurances as other employees with irregular in-
termittent on-demand employment. If a person engaging in on-demand
work becomes ill and does not have work scheduled, the Swedish Social
Insurance Agency investigates if there is any job at all on the labour mar-
ket that he or she can perform, just as they would with an unemployed
person who becomes sick. This makes it more difficult for on-demand
workers than for ordinary employees to receive sickness benefits. The on-
demand worker also receives sickness benefits at unemployment benefits
3.
47 Sickness and injury benefits and parental allowance benefits are regulated in the
2010 Social Insurance Code (2010:110). For further details see Westregård, Anna-
maria, Protection of Platform Workers in Sweden (fn. 38), pp. 25 ff.
48 Both access to and calculation of benefits for employees and self-employed are
regulated in the 2010 Social Insurance Code (2010:110) see Chapters 6, 25, 27 and
28.
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level, which is lower than ordinary sickness benefits. When umbrella com-
pany workers work with an assignment and have signed a fixed-term em-
ployment contract, they are entitled to sickness benefits if they were to be-
come ill during this period.
The legislator in Sweden has recently suggested a solution for persons
with on-demand work which entails that they will receive sickness benefits
for 90 days on the same conditions as other employees.49 Umbrella com-
panies and solo self-employed persons are particularly exempted from the
proposed legislation. The Government White Paper (SOU 2020:26) states
that although umbrella company workers are indeed employed by the um-
brella company on a general fixed-term employment,50 their fixed-term
employment is limited by their assignments for other clients. If their as-
signments were ended by the employer they would have been included in
the directive for investigation in the legislative committee (kommittédirek-
tiv Dir. 2018:26), but they are not. It is the umbrella companies’ special
business model that has resulted in the exclusion of umbrella company
workers from the suggested changes in the statutory regulations. The solo
self-employed are excluded since they are not employed at all by the princi-
pal.51 The developments in the legislative process described above are an
example of how the social security insurances are generally not adapted to
the particular working conditions of umbrella company workers, who
work with short assignments on an irregular basis.
Unemployment Benefits for Umbrella Company Workers
The Administrative Court of Appeal has in a few cases decided on whether
umbrella company workers are entitled to unemployment benefits accord-
ing to the 1997 Unemployment Insurance Act (1997:238). There are 25 un-
employment insurance funds in Sweden that administrate unemployment
benefits. They are regulated in the 1997 Unemployment Funds Act
(1997:239). Most of them are administrated by different unions but there
are also funds for the self-employed (Småa).52 A decision by the unemploy-
ment insurance fund about access to an insurance and calculation of bene-
fits for a certain individual can be appealed to the administrative courts. It
4.
49 Government White Paper SOU 2020:26, En sjukförsäkring anpassad efter indivi-
den, p. 62 ff.
50 According to Section 5 in the 1982 Employment Protection Act.
51 Government White Paper SOU 2020:26 (fn. 49), p. 71, reference 9.
52 See https://www.sverigesakassor.se/om-oss/in-english/. Accessed 19 June 2020.
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is of crucial importance for umbrella company workers whether they are
regarded as employees or self-employed. An employee is unemployed be-
tween assignments and thus entitled to unemployment benefits. An inde-
pendent contractor or a self-employed person is entitled to unemployment
benefits according to the statutory regulation for the self-employed but ac-
cess to unemployment benefits for the self-employed is far more compli-
cated. If umbrella company workers are regarded as self-employed they
will in most cases probably be denied unemployment benefits between as-
signments.53 As for unemployment insurance, the main difference be-
tween employees and the self-employed is that the self-employed have to
take a hiatus in their business operations (which they can do once every
fifth year) or close down the company in order to be eligible for benefits.
In practice, this means that short-fixed term employees are entitled to un-
employment benefits between assignments while self-employed persons
are not.
Whether the umbrella company worker is regarded as an employee or
self-employed depends on how the concept of employment is assessed ac-
cording to the Income Tax Act (1999:1229) as the 1997 Unemployment In-
surance Act (1997:238) refers to that concept of employment.54 The statu-
tory regulation on unemployment benefits unfortunately causes problems
for umbrella company workers, as they are sometimes regarded as inde-
pendent contractors (even if they do not have a company of their own) and
therefore as not being entitled to unemployment benefits between assign-
ments. It is difficult to foresee whether a person will be entitled to unem-
ployment benefits or not.
There are two legal questions here. The first concerns the role of the
umbrella company as an employer and what impact that role has for the
judgement, and the second concerns the question as to how the degree of
independence of the umbrella company workers is to be judged. The Ad-
ministrative Court of Appeal has in a few cases discussed the umbrella
53 When a self-employed individual shifts from working in his or her own company
to the unemployment insurance he or she either has to close down all business
activity completely or make a temporary hiatus in operations. The temporary hia-
tus can be made so that the company owner does not need to close down the
company in order to receive unemployment insurance. If a hiatus has been made
and the business activity has started again, a period of five years has to pass before
the company owner can receive unemployment benefits again under a new hia-
tus. This regulation is therefore of no use between assignments (Section 35 in the
1997 Unemployment Insurance Act).
54 Section 34 in the 1997 Unemployment Insurance Act (1997:238) refers to Chapter
13 Section 1 in the Income Tax Act (1999:1229).
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company’s role as an employer and what impact it will have for decisions
on whether the umbrella company worker is an employee or not accord-
ing to the 1997 Unemployment Insurance Act.55 The Court states that even
if the umbrella company formally is the employer, it is implied that the
employer’s responsibilities will not come into force. According to the
Court this, together with other operative facts, such as management, set-
ting of wages etc., means that the umbrella companies do not have the role
of an employer in the ordinary sense, and cannot from the perspective of
the 1997 Unemployment Insurance Act be regarded as employers in the
same way as other employers. The fact that the umbrella company acts as
an administrator and contract party “between” the umbrella company
worker and the client does not on its own make the umbrella company
worker an employee. If other circumstances indicate that the umbrella
company worker without the presence of the umbrella company would in-
stead have been regarded as an independent contractor, then the Court can
ignore that there is an employment contract between the umbrella compa-
ny and the umbrella company worker. In other words, if the umbrella
company worker could just as well have handled the client and the admin-
istration through a company of his own, without the umbrella company,
then the umbrella company worker will be regarded as an independent
contractor. He or she will then not be entitled to any unemployment bene-
fits between assignments.
Settled caselaw from the Administrative Court of Appeal varies and the
most essential criterion has been the degree of independence.56 The Adminis-
trative Court of Appeal balances different operative facts in each specific
case. In one case57 the Administrative Court of Appeal stated that the oper-
ative facts that pointed in the direction of the umbrella company worker
being an employee according to the 1997 Unemployment Insurance Act,
55 See e.g. Judgement of the Administrative Court of Appeal in Gothenburg of 11
May 2010 (Case No. 3059-09).
56 Judgement of the Administrative Court of Appeal in Gothenburg of 11 May 2010
(Case No. 3059-09); Judgement of the Administrative Court of Appeal in Gothen-
burg of 17 February 2015 (Case No. 911-15); see also the Swedish Unemployment
Insurance Board (IAF) appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court in the Judge-
ment of the Administrative Court of Appeal in Gothenburg of 11 May 2010 (Case
No. 3059-09), review not granted (Case No. 4218-10). See also report from the
Unemployment Insurance Board (IAF) Uppdragstagare i arbetslöshetsförsäkrin-
gen, 2016:3, pp. 15-16, about the particular difficulties relating to the solo self-em-
ployed.
57 Judgement of the Administrative Court of Appeal in Gothenburg of 17 February
2015 (Case No. 911-15).
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were that the worker was employed by the umbrella company, payed em-
ployee taxes (A-tax) and did not have a Business Tax Certificate for self-em-
ployment (F-skatt), that the umbrella company took all employers’ respon-
sibilities for him, that the client decided when and where the assignment
was to be carried out and that the worker did not market his services inde-
pendently but simply made his labour available. There were also operative
facts that pointed in the direction of the worker being an independent
contractor. The client’s first contact was with the umbrella company work-
er and not the umbrella company and the worker used his own computer
and camera. In this case the Administrative Court of Appeal decided that
the umbrella company worker was not an independent contractor and was
therefore entitled to unemployment benefits.
A new Unemployment Insurance Act has recently been put forward in a
Government White Paper.58 Regrettably, it does not propose any solution
to the problem of how to assess the degree of independence, so the prob-
lems will remain according to umbrella companies.59 One thing that
might, on the other hand, ease access to unemployment benefits for um-
brella company workers is that in the present legislation there is a qualify-
ing condition requiring a person to work a specific number of hours.60 For
umbrella company workers, and a lot of other non-traditional workers, it
can be difficult to prove the number of hours worked. This is one possible
explanation for why the unemployment benefits’ degree of coverage has
decreased in recent years. Out of all unemployed persons, only 40 per cent
receive unemployment benefits out of a loss-of-income insurance
scheme.61 It has been suggested that the minimum working hour condi-
tion be replaced with a minimum wage condition – relating to both a total
income and a minimum monthly income during four months.62
The varying judgements in settled caselaw have made it difficult to fore-
see whether an individual umbrella company worker will be entitled to
58 The Government White Paper SOU 2020:37, Ett nytt regelverk för arbetslöshets-
försäkringen.
59 The Government White Paper SOU 2020:37 (fn. 58), p. 209 f.
60 The basic work requirements are that the person has worked at least 80 hours a
month for 6 months during the last year or 480 hours in total, and at least 50
hours a month for 6 consecutive months during the last year, Section 12 in the
Unemployment Insurance Act.
61 See the Homepage of Arbetslöshetsrapporten, https://arbetsloshetsrapporten.se/er
sattning-akassa/. Accessed 20 August 2020.
62 The Government White Paper SOU 2020:37 (fn. 58), p. 260 ff.
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unemployment benefits or not.63 It seems important for the legislator and
the courts to find “false employees”, and that will have an impact on how
the interests are balanced between the Swedish Social Insurance Agency or
the unemployment insurance fund and the umbrella company workers.
The Importance of Collective Agreements – Supplemental Benefits
The Social Parties and New Phenomena in the Labour Market
The Nordic model relies on the regulation of the most important working
conditions being arranged through collective agreements, and not via the
statutory regulations. There are thus no statutory regulations on minimum
wages, overtime pay, guaranteed minimum working hours, and so on.
In Sweden, there are currently no collective agreements for umbrella
companies nor any industry-wide collective agreements specific to plat-
form work. This is probably due to the fact that Swedish platform com-
panies do not yet take on a more organised form as employers since they
imply that platform workers are self-employed.64 It seems likely that those
closest to collective bargaining and to concluding a collective agreement
are the umbrella companies – this is despite the lack of clarity about their
position as parties. The umbrella companies already have a trade organisa-
tion and claim that they are meeting their responsibilities as employers. A
stumbling block in collective bargaining is the business model with short
fixed-term employment. That all employees have permanent employment
is one of the most important issues for the unions.
The Swedish social partners are very good at handling new situations.
An example is the collective agreements for temporary work agencies – a
brand new service industry in Sweden born in the early 1990s.65 Almega
and LO, the blue-collar trade union, and again Almega and the white-col-
lar trade unions, arrived at a collective agreement for staff working for
IV.
1.
63 See report from Unemployment Insurance Board (IAF), Uppdragstagare i arbet-
slöshetsförsäkringen. 2016:3. p. 15 f., https://www.iaf.se/globalassets/dokument/ra
pporter/2015-2016/2016-3-uppdragstagare-i-arbetsloshetsforsakringen.pdf.
Accessed 20 August 2020.
64 Westregård, Annamaria, Digital Collaborative Platforms: A Challenge for Social
Partners in the Nordic Model, in: Nordic Journal of Commercial Law, 1 (2018),
pp. 104 ff., https://doi.org/10.5278/ojs.njcl.v0i1.2486. Accessed 20 August 2020.
65 Eklund, Ronnie, Temporary Employment Agencies in the Nordic Countries, in:
Scandinavian Studies in Law, 43 (2002), pp. 311-333.
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temporary work agencies in 2000.66 What is interesting about these two
collective agreements is that they cover the entire private sector. This
means that a temporary work employee can work in any of the sectors cov-
ered by the collective agreement and enjoy the same collective agreement
and conditions. The exact details of the agreements differ, but the princi-
ples are the same: both cover all temporary work employees, regardless of
the industry they are hired out to. Temporary work agencies and their em-
ployees are now considered to be a service industry in their own right.67
An industry-wide collective agreement for umbrella companies might have
a different construction than that of the temporary work agencies, but in
Sweden an industry-wide collective agreement is important in that it estab-
lishes an industry as a recognised industry. An umbrella company can con-
clude a collective agreement at company level.
66 The collective agreement on general employment conditions for temporary work
blue-collar workers, between Temporary Work Agencies Almega (Bemannings-
företagen Almega) and the blue-collar unions Fastighetsanställdas Förbund, GS-
Facket för skogs, trä och grafisk bransch, Handelsanställdas förbund, Hotell och
Restaurang Facket, IF Metall, SEKO-Service- och kommunikationsfacket, Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, Svenska Kommunalar-
betareförbundet, Svenska Livsmedelsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Musikerförbun-
det, Svenska Målareförbundet, Svenska Pappersindustriarbetareförbundet and
Svenska Transportarbetareförbundet, for 1 May 2017 to 30 April 2020.
The collective agreement on general employment conditions for temporary work
white-collar workers and professionals between Temporary Work Agencies
Almega and the white-collar workers and professional unions Unionen and the
Academic Alliance. The Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers is the repre-
sentative for the Academic Alliance. The Academic Alliance includes a variety of
professions, including university lecturers, physiotherapists, scientists, and engi-
neers, such as Akademikerförbundet SSR, Civilekonomerna, DIK, Sveriges Arbet-
sterapeuter, Fysioterapeuterna, Jusek, Naturvetarna, Sveriges Farmaceuter,
Sveriges Ingenjörer, Sveriges Psykologförbund, Sveriges Skolledarförbund,
Sveriges Universitetslärarförbund, Sveriges Veterinärförbund, for 1 May 2017 to
30 April 2020. The collective agreement for white-collar workers and profession-
als has one set of conditions used throughout the temporary work industry. The
blue-collar agreement has the same regulations for salary (§ 4-5) and working
hours (§ 7-9) in the industry where the person currently works. Other conditions
such as holiday pay and insurance (§ 10–22) are the same for temporary work em-
ployees, regardless of the industry.
67 See especially the blue-collar workers’ collective agreement (3) and the social part-
ners’ common declaration of intent; see also the agreement’s importance for tem-
porary work in the Government White Paper SOU 2011:5, Chapter 6.5-6.
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Supplemental Collective Agreements
The collective agreements between Sweden’s major federations contain im-
portant supplemental compensation to the state social security insurance
and pensions.68 All employers with a collective agreement, 92 per cent in
the private sector, are obliged in the collective agreement at industry level
to also keep their employees insured in accordance with the federal collec-
tive agreements. Those federal collective agreements contain sickness insu-
rance, occupational injury insurance, supplementary industrial injury insu-
rance, occupational life insurance, ITP-pension schemes for white-collar
workers and occupational pension schemes for blue-collar workers, occu-
pational group health insurance etc. There are also more supplemental
benefits in the industry-wide collective agreements.
If a collective agreement does not cover the workplace, the employees
do not get any of the benefits in the federal collective agreements. They
only have the state social security insurance levels on sickness and injury
benefits, parental allowance and retirement and old age benefits.69 An em-
ployer who is a not a member of any employers’ association with an indus-
try-wide collective agreement can, of course, sign up with a private insu-
rance.70 They are normally more expensive than the federal collective
agreement insurances. The collectively agreed federal social security
schemes, including pensions, normally offer better and cheaper terms than
other private social security schemes that are available for individual com-
panies, due to the large number of insured persons. This is one of the rea-
sons why, aside from regulation wages and working conditions, it is im-
portant for the umbrella company industry to conclude industry-wide col-
lective agreements.
2.
68 The federal level comprises the private-sector employers – the Confederation of
Swedish Enterprise and Industry (Svenskt Näringsliv – SN). The union represen-
tatives are the Swedish Federation of Professional Associations (Sveriges
akademikers centralorganisation – SACO) for academically qualified personnel,
the Federation of White-Collar Workers (Tjänstemännens centralorganisation –
TCO) for white-collar workers, and the Swedish Trade Union Confederation
(Landsorganisationen – LO) for blue-collar workers.
69 Westregård, Annamaria, Protection of Platform Workers in Sweden (fn. 38), pp.
27 f.
70 For more on industrial relations in Sweden, see Westregård, Annamaria, Sweden,
in: Liukkunen, Ulla (eds.) Collective Bargaining in Labour Law Regimes: A Glob-
al Perspective, Springer 2019.
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Conclusion
Are umbrella companies employers and umbrella company workers em-
ployees? The intention of the parties in the employment contract is that
there should be a short fixed-term employment for the duration of the as-
signment. The legal problem is that umbrella companies do not take on
the role of an employer in the usual sense. It is the umbrella company
worker and the client that have control of the assignments and over when
and how the work will be carried out. The umbrella company’s role is to
administrate taxes, social security fees, invoice the client and pay remuner-
ation. The umbrella company worker could however, with some adminis-
trative effort, just as well handle the situation as a self-employed worker
and does not actually need the umbrella company as a middleman.
Umbrella companies have found their own niche in the labour market
and are commercial enterprises that aim to make a profit. One reason why
umbrella companies are anxious to take on full employer’s responsibilities
from a labour law perspective, is that this will further their goal of creating
an industry of their own. If umbrella company workers are not employed
by the umbrella companies, there will in practice be very little that sepa-
rates them from ordinary accounting firms that administrate taxes and pay
out salaries etc. for small solo self-employed clients with a registered firm
of their own. Umbrella companies’ employer responsibilities are limited to
the duration of the assignment, so their burden is not particularly heavy.
In labour law the employment concept is wide, particularly in the rela-
tion between the contracting parties according to the 1982 Employment
Protection Act. Nothing speaks against the fact that the Labour Court can
decide on the relation between the umbrella company and the umbrella
company worker as being an employment according to the intention of
the parties in the employment contract. The labour legislation generally
tries to prevent classification of persons as “false self-employed” workers
and to reclassify them. The caselaw of the Labour Court shows that the
Labour Court is more cautious about classifying anyone as self-employed.
According to the principle of the legal subject, the umbrella company –
not the client – is the employer.
From an employment protection perspective, one problem for umbrella
company workers is thus short fixed-term employment and the precarious-
ness this creates in times of crisis, such as the Covid-19 crisis. Another
problem is that the working conditions for umbrella company workers,
with regard to e.g. minimum wage, overtime pay but also benefits supple-
mental to the Swedish social security insurances etc., have so far not been
regulated in an industry-wide collective agreement. Such agreements con-
V.
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stitute the normal way of regulating working conditions in Sweden, since
working conditions are for the most part not regulated at all in statutory
law, and if they are regulated, most of the labour legislation is semi-discre-
tionary.71 At the moment it is the umbrella company workers themselves
that negotiate the terms and conditions with the clients. Naturally, um-
brella companies, whose commissions are normally a percentage of the
workers’ commissions, will not allow remuneration to be too low. Hope-
fully, the social parties will in a traditional Swedish way find solutions for
the working conditions through an industry-wide collective agreement.
In tax law it has been a political goal to facilitate the setting up of com-
panies for sole traders. The concept of self-employment is therefore wider
there than in labour law. This will also reflect on how the concept is inter-
preted in social security legislation, as the concepts are linked by statutory
regulations. The employer’s responsibility to pay tax and social security
fees covers both employees and dependent contractors. Umbrella com-
panies therefore have to pay taxes and social security fees, regardless of
whether the umbrella company workers are employees or dependent con-
tractors (umbrella company workers do not have their own companies and
do not pay tax and social security fees themselves, according to the busi-
ness model). There is no legal contradiction in that an umbrella company,
from a social security legislation perspective, pays taxes and social security
fees for its fixed-term employees who are employees according to labour
legislation, while at the same time the umbrella company workers, when it
comes to social security regulations and unemployment insurance, will be
regarded as self-employed persons without current assignments instead of
as unemployed employees.
The concept of employment in social security legislation and with regard
to unemployment benefits is more limited than in labour law. The intention
of the parties in the employment contract has little impact when it comes
to classification in social security legislation. If the object is to identify em-
ployees, it is more important to determine whether the income comes
from an employment or from business activity, as this will determine
which statutory regulations are applicable: the ones for employees or the
ones for the self-employed. The aim in social security legislation seems
rather to be to identify “false employees” in order to avoid that e.g. um-
brella company workers are deemed entitled to benefits for employees if
they are in fact independent.
71 Westregård, Annamaria, Sweden (fn. 70).
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From a social security perspective, the main problem is that umbrella com-
pany workers so easily fall between the regulations for employees and the
self-employed, due to their significant level of independence. The uncer-
tain situation for umbrella company workers – at what level their social se-
curity and unemployment benefits should be calculated or indeed if they
should receive any at all – is naturally a huge disadvantage. This will also
in times of crisis make them more vulnerable than other employees. The
introduction of a “new” business model, like that of umbrella companies,
might rather – from a social security perspective – complicate than ease the
situation of the employees at the moment, since the uncertainty with re-
gard to how those new workers should be classified has increased. It might
not make a huge difference to the final decisions whether umbrella compa-
ny workers are entitled to e.g. unemployment benefits. Without the um-
brella companies, a large part of the umbrella company workers would
probably automatically have been regarded as self-employed persons in-
stead of as employees; at least some of them are regarded as the latter now.
The problem of access to and calculation of benefits at basic level in the
social security insurance for a new business model in Sweden remains for
the legislator to solve. So far, the legislator has not shown much interest in
including umbrella company workers in the inquiries for new legislation
to improve the statutory regulations for this vulnerable group.
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Chapter 9 
The Influence of the Platform Economy on the Financing of
Social Security: the Spanish Case
Borja Suárez Corujo
Introduction
So far, the debate on the future sustainability of social security has mainly
focused on the impact that ageing populations will have on public expen-
diture. Due to the demographic change – growing numbers of pensioners
whose life expectancy is longer – the upward trend of pension expenditure
has placed social security and public pension systems, in particular, at the
centre of the debate on the long-term budgetary and economic policies
since the end of the 20th century. However, it should not be overlooked
that, along with the process of ageing, the sustainability of social security
systems will also be challenged by the rise of the platform economy. With
robotisation embedded as a component part of the “digitalisation of the
economy” phenomenon, the platform economy is transforming employ-
ment and labour markets1 in a way that threatens to undermine the foun-
dations of welfare state institutions. Along these lines, labour law is facing
the question of how to preserve the traditional guarantees which have his-
torically balanced the relationship between labour and capital. But like-
wise, this deep transformation threatens the current design of those social
security systems where benefits are primarily based on previous contribu-
tions made by employers and employees.2 It is therefore not an exaggera-
tion to say that the framework of the debate on the long-term sustainabili-
ty of social security systems has changed. Leaving aside the still unknown
I.
1 Degryse, Christophe, Shaping the World of Work in the Digital Economy, 1 January
2017, ETUI, Brussels, p. 2, https://www.etui.org/sites/default/files/Foresight%20bri
ef_01_EN_web.pdf. Accessed 7 August 2020.
2 See Economic Policy Committee/Social Protection Committee, Joint Paper on
Pensions 2019, 22 January 2020, Brussels, p. 44, https://europa.eu/epc/system/files/2
020-01/Joint-Paper-on-Pensions-2019.pdf. Accessed 07 August 2020. In this Joint
Paper an appropriate, though insufficient, reference to this technology-driven
transformation and its consequences on the sustainability of pension systems is
made.
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impact of Covid-19, from now on policymakers will have to tackle two ma-
jor structural transformations: population ageing and the emergence of the
platform economy. This paper will draw attention to the latter, focusing
on the issues regarding its financial side and taking Spain as a study case.
More in particular, the aim of this article is to reflect on how this major
technological shift could modify the financing structure of Bismarckian so-
cial security systems. Given the fact that in this model social security is
principally financed through social contributions, my argument is that de-
pendence on such a model could seriously harm the financial balance of
the system once the platform economy gains greater weight. Therefore, po-
tential weak points in the system need to be tackled through a progressive
redesign of social security financial resources or a reconfiguration of bene-
fits. After some considerations on the legal classification of platform work-
ers, my attention is drawn to two of the main factors that pose financial
risks. One is that some platform-like service provisions could be excluded
from the obligation to pay social contributions because of, for example,
their sporadic character. The other is that the growth of “just-in-time”
work will normally entail lower social contributions even if the activity is
based on an employment relationship.
Further, I will carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages of
the three possible paths that Bismarckian systems (taking Spain as a case
study) could follow in the coming scenario.
The first option would imply preserving the same financial structure,
basically based upon contributions. Such a solution would surely lead to
benefit cuts since the system would not have the capacity to overcome the
financial burdens caused by ageing. A reflection on the negative conse-
quences that this situation would create for platform workers, among the
more vulnerable workforce, seems appropriate. The second and third op-
tions would be initially channelled through the increase of State funds and
deployed in two different manners. This broader involvement of the Gov-
ernment in financing social security could prompt a reduction of funds
coming from contributions in order to maintain public expenditure. This
could represent a first step towards a more Beveridgean system which fo-
cuses on reducing poverty through assistance benefits and encourages the
development of occupational (or even individual) private plans. Again, a
specific analysis of the capacity of platform workers to engage in these
complementary schemes should be thoroughly analysed. The alternative is
that this increase in tax-based financing would not call into question the
current financial structure where contributions determine both the fund-
ing of the system and the granting of benefits. Two main questions are to
be examined. One deals with the tax options to implement said increase.
Borja Suárez Corujo
232
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002, am 02.12.2021, 16:03:18
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
The proposal of a “robot tax” merits an in-depth study, as well as the pros
and cons of direct and indirect (earmarked or non-earmarked) taxes. Like-
wise, attention should be paid to how the career paths of platform workers
will necessitate a potentially large-scale change to the design of social bene-
fits.
The Legal Classification of Platform Workers
Up to now, analysis concerning the influence of economic activities based
on the use of online platforms has mainly concentrated on how (labour)
law treats these new forms of work and the ability of the applied regu-
lation to secure decent working conditions. According to Spanish law,
what is the appropriate legal classification of this type of contractual rela-
tionship? Theoretically, we find three possible classifications with regard to
the respective workers.
Two of these types of platform “collaborators” (using a neutral term)
fall outside the scope of labour law. First, they can be classified as indepen-
dent contractors or, to be more precise, self-employed workers who are in
business on their own account and, therefore, do not enjoy specific guar-
antees with respect to the digital platform. And second, still beyond the
employment relationship, the Spanish Self-Employed Workers’ Statute also
foresees an intermediate category: the so-called “economically dependent
self-employed workers” (in Spanish trabajadores autónomos económicamente
dependientes), who render services mainly (at least 75 percent of their in-
come) for one client. This type of “dependent contractor” reflects the com-
bination of features that makes it difficult to give a clear-cut response ac-
cording to traditional patterns; and it could certainly be an attractive solu-
tion for both parties as it offers a minimum level of professional guaran-
tees to the service provider while it gives the platform flexibility and re-
duced “labour” costs – basically, social security contributions. But, as a
matter of fact, it is not a real option in practice: the number of the eco-
nomically dependent self-employed workers has always been very low
since creation of this category in 2007, and has not been affected in any
way by the emergence of the platform economy despite the interest of plat-
forms.
As an alternative, platform collaborators can also be classified as em-
ployees falling within the scope of the Workers’ Statute enjoying all labour
guarantees with the corresponding employer obligations. But in Spain,
this is certainly not the case in practice since virtually all digital platforms
treat their “collaborators” – i.e. service providers – as independent contrac-
II.
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tors. As in other European countries, it is not surprising that this arguably
inadequate classification of a self-employed person has given rise to a con-
troversial debate on the employment status of platform workers – in most
cases, riders. And a good illustration of such a heated discussion is the high
number of court decisions that have been taken so far in Spain.3 In a previ-
ous research,4 I analysed the main evidence supporting both legal classifi-
cations – as employee or as self-employed person – based on Spanish case
law and the extent to which subordination plays a key role in determining
the characteristics of the relationship between the digital platform and its
collaborators.
From one perspective leaning towards the self-employed status, evi-
dence of independence – from subordination – stems from the following
contractual conditions. First, the most relevant one arguably is that work-
ing time is determined at the collaborator’s discretion, which means that
there is no fixed timetable and, even more importantly, that the very “col-
laborator” decides when to be active in the platform. Second, and along
the same lines, it is common that (s)he enjoys the freedom to refuse tasks
commanded through the platform. Third, it seems to show autonomy that
the performance of the activity is basically self-directed, notwithstanding
the existence of common instructions directed at all “collaborators”.
Fourth, the non-exclusivity of the contractual engagement, which is to say,
the possibility of “collaborating” with several platforms is generally consid-
ered a sign of independence (ancillary income). And, fifth, the fact that ac-
tivity-related spending is not compensated for by the platform could also
indicate that the service is provided on the worker’s own account.
Conversely, and thus leaning towards the employee status, evidence of
dependence of the “collaborator” on the platform is also frequently found
in practice, some of it being typical of the traditional idea of subordination
and some other showing new forms of such dependence. Firstly, in cases of
3 It should be noted that, despite the estimates that show very high numbers of plat-
form workers in Spain (see Urzi Brancati, Maria Cesira/Pesole, Annarosa/Fernandez
Macias, Enrique, New Evidence on Platform Workers in Europe, EUR 29958 EN,
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 2020,
doi:10.2760/459278 (online), p. 16), real figures seem to point at a more limited
proportion. Just as an example, a study published by a prominent Spanish Trade
Union, Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), quantifies the number of riders
working for delivery platforms as little more than 14,000, which represents a mere
0.07 percent of the active workforce (UGT 2019, 15).
4 Corujo, Borja Suárez, The “Gig” Economy and its Impact on Social Security: The
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work on-demand via apps, where the performance is physically carried out,
it is common to have “collaborators” fulfil certain conditions before they
are “activated”. Secondly, another sign of subordination lies in the person-
al dimension of the performance in the sense that it is not transferable.
Thirdly, according to the experiences analysed in Spain, the supremacy of
platforms is obvious in very different aspects: strict (no matter if indirect)
supervision and control; detailed indications of how to perform the tasks;
price fixing of services performed; sham incentives on “activation” that
hide a minimum level of availability. Fourthly, the fact that the platform is
allowed to “deactivate” “collaborators” in a wide range of circumstances
shows a sort of disciplinary power, one of the most typical characteristic of
employers. And fifthly, without being exhaustive, it is also a sign of subor-
dination of “collaborators” that the relationship established with the client
(payment included) is always channeled through the platform.
What is the Spanish courts’ view on this issue? The number of claims re-
lated to the legal classification of platform workers – always concerning de-
livery platforms, in most cases Deliveroo and Glovo – is growing5 and, as
we shall see, it appears to be favourable to the recognition of an employee
status. The first court rulings date back to 2018. At that point, first instance
courts did not have a clear-cut position: two court decisions held that the
services rendered through the platform by formally self-employed persons
really described a subordinate relationship and, therefore, recognised their
employee status6 whereas another ruling classified the claimant “rider” as a
self-employed person7. Throughout 2019 we found court decisions – up to
July coming from first-instance social courts – defending both positions
favourable or contrary to the employee status, with a slight tendency to-
5 Highly recommended is professor Beltrán de Heredia’s blog where he compiles ju-
dicial decisions on the employment status of platform workers in Spain and also in
a wide range of countries: Beltrán de Heredia Ruiz, Ignasi, Employment Status of
Platform Workers (national courts decisions overview – Argentina, Australia, Bel-
gium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Panama,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay), 9 December 2018,
https://ignasibeltran.com/2018/12/09/employment-status-of-platform-workers-natio
nal-courts-decisions-overview-australia-brazil-chile-france-italy-united-kingdom-uni
ted-states-spain/#spa2. Accessed 7 August 2020.
6 Judgement of Social Court No. 11 of Barcelona of 29 May 2018 and Judgement of
Social Court No. 6 of Valencia of 1 June 2018.
7 Judgement of Social Court No. 39 of Madrid of 3 September 2018.
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wards the former.8 This tie still existed when the “regional” – Autonomous
Communities – courts of Asturias and Madrid ruled the first appeals.9 But
from that point onwards, the state of play seemed to have changed (defi-
nitely?) leaning towards the employment status. The same High Court of
Justice of Madrid (Social Chamber) modified its view through a “plenary”
decision taken by its twenty-one members – the former decision had been
taken by a section of the court – who held that the claimant (Glovo rider)
had an employment relationship with the platform.10
8 Nine decisions classified riders as employees: Judgement of Social Court No. 33
of Madrid of 11 February 2019, Judgement of Social Court No. 1 of Gijón – As-
turias – of 20 February 2019, Judgements of Social Court No. 1 of Madrid of 3
and 4 – two rulings – April 2019, Judgement of Social Court No. 6 of Valencia of
10 June 2019, Judgement of Social Court No. 31 of Barcelona of 11 June 2019,
Judgement of Social Court No. 19 of Madrid of 22 July 2019, and Judgement of
Social Court No. 3 of Barcelona of 18 November 2019. On the contrary, six rul-
ings hold that there is not a subordinate relationship, but an activity that is car-
ried out on its own by self-employed persons (Judgements of Social Court No. 24
of Barcelona of 21 and 29 May 2019), in certain cases – to be more precise – by
economically dependent self-employed persons (see Judgement of Social Court
No. 39 of Madrid of 11 January 2019, Judgement of Social Court No. 4 of Oviedo
– Asturias – of 25 February 2019, Judgement of Social Court No. 1 of Salamanca –
Castilla y León – of 1 June 2019 and Judgement of Social Court No. 2 of Vigo –
Galicia – of 12 November 2019). See again Beltrán de Heredia Ruiz, Ignasi, Em-
ployment Status of Platform Workers (national courts decisions overview – Ar-
gentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Italy, The
Netherlands, Panama, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and
Uruguay), (fn. 5).
9 The Judgement of the High Court of Justice of Asturias (Social Chamber) of 25
July 2019 recognised the labour status, whereas the Judgement of the High Court
of Justice of Madrid (Social Chamber) of 19 September 2019 held that the rider
was an independent contractor.
10 See Judgement of the High Court of Justice of Madrid (Social Chamber) of 27
November of 2019. As Beltrán de Heredia highlights, the Court based its decision
on the following main arguments (see Beltrán de Heredia Ruiz, Ignasi, Employ-
ment Status of Platform Workers (fn. 5). First, a “primacy of fact principle” rules
and, therefore, it is facts and not labels which determine the attribution of em-
ployee status or non-status; along these lines, written documentation did not re-
flect the legal nature of the relationship and without any substantial change in
the fact situation the rider, who was initially classified as an independent contrac-
tor, turned into an economically dependent self-employed person. Second, in this
case there was subordination to the authority of the platform since it was said
platform that unilaterally established rates, and the rider’s activity was fully inte-
grated into the digital platform’s business. And thirdly, in order to carry out the
activity (delivery) what was relevant in economic terms was the app and not the
means provided by the rider.
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In some way, we could speak of a true turning point, given the fact that
all court decisions taken by high courts of justice (Social Chamber) or by
first-instance social courts since that ruling have stuck to that view defend-
ing the employee status of riders.11 And it is particularly relevant that in
some cases it was the result of an action taken by the Labour and Social
Security Inspectorate – and thus affecting more than 500 riders.12 Al-
though we still have to wait for the “final” decision of the Supreme
Court13, it seems that the judiciary clearly leans towards the employment
relationship. As a matter of fact, it is probable that this heated controversy
will have an end before that ruling sees the light of day on account of the
fact that the Spanish Government has finally taken a first step to regulate
this issue announcing its intention to present a bill that will reinforce the
employee classification of platform workers.14
The Platform Economy and its Impact on Social Security15
Much less attention has been paid to the implications of on-demand work
via apps on social security. It is true that there seems to be growing interest
in this issue, but in general terms these new research studies and political
III.
11 See Judgements of the High Court of Justice of Madrid (Social Chamber) of 18
December 2019, 17 January 2020 and 2 February 2020; Judgement of the High
Court of Justice of Castilla-León (Social Chamber) of 17 February 2020; and
Judgement of the High Court of Justice of Catalonia (Social Chamber) of 21
February 2020. Likewise, Judgement of Social Court No. 2 of Zaragoza of 27
April 2020 and Judgement of Social Court No. 21 of Madrid of 11 June 2020.
12 Judgements of the High Court of Justice of Madrid (Social Chamber) of 17 Jan-
uary 2020. Also Judgement of Social Court No. 2 of Zaragoza of 27 April 2020.
13 On 23 September 2020, the Supreme Court announced a judgement to be pub-
lished in the coming days whereby the employee status of riders is confirmed.
14 See the public enquiry previous to the draft of a bill on platform work that has
recently been opened by the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Economy
(Consulta pública previa a la elaboración de un proyecto normativo consistente
en la modificación del Real Decreto Legislativo 2/2015, de 23 de octubre, por el
que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley del Estatuto de los Trabajadores y de
la Ley 20/2007, de 11 de julio, del Estatuto del trabajo autónomo, sobre determi-
nados aspectos de la prestación de trabajo por cuenta propia y ajena del trabajo a
través de plataformas), http://www.mites.gob.es/ficheros/participacion/historico/c
onsulta-publica/2020/Proyecto_07_20200606_consulta_publica_gabinete_empleo.
pdf.
15 A short draft of Sections III, IV and V was first presented at the ISLSSL World
Congress 2018.
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initiatives have focused on platform workers and their conditions of access
to social security benefits as well as the serious risk of benefit inadequacy
they are exposed to.16 In this sense, ILO (2016) considers their work (in
their different profiles) as types of non-standard employment that demand
specific measures in order to improve access to benefits and to ensure
portability of entitlements. Likewise, the European Union has taken steps
to address the challenges of access to social protection for people in all
forms of employment – platform workers included – through the achieve-
ment of three objectives: ensuring effective coverage (access to social bene-
fits), transferability of social protection rights, and transparency (access to
user-friendly information on rights and obligations).17 Given that these dif-
ficulties in guaranteeing benefit adequacy are so crucial, it tends to be ig-
nored that there is also a very serious financial risk that threatens social
protection in the platform economy: the reduction or insufficiency of so-
cial contributions endangering the long-term financing of social security
and thus the adequacy of individual social benefits.18
Before focusing on the social security field, we should make some con-
siderations from a more general perspective on the impact that the process
of digitalisation of the economy could have on fair taxation and the sus-
tainability of State budgets. The question would be whether digitalisation
16 Very illustrative: Forde, Chris/Stuart, Mark/Joyce, Simon/Oliver, Liz/Valizade, Danat/
Alberti, Gabriella/Hardy, Kate/Trappmann, Vera/Umney, Charles/Carson, Calum, The
Social Protection of Workers in the Platform Economy, Study for the EMPL
Committee, 2017, European Union, Brussels, 2017, https://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/614184/IPOL_STU%282017%29614184_EN.pdf.
Accessed 7 August 2020. In particular regarding pensions in European Commis-
sion, Pension Adequacy Report 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/
publication/62f83ed2-7821-11e8-ac6a-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. Accessed 07
August 2020. An attempt of analysis of the different aspects of social security
in Suárez Corujo, Borja, The “Gig” Economy and its Impact on Social Security:
The Spanish Example (fn. 4).
17 Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on Access to Social Protection for
Workers and the Self-Employed 2019/C 387/01, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-co
ntent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019H1115%2801%29. Accessed 7 August 2020.
18 Implicit in: Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. White Book 4.0, 1
March 2018, p. 179, https://www.bmas.de/EN/Services/Publications/a883-white-p
aper.html;jsessionid=0A171136D7FF1D358063F3960C2C18E5. Accessed 7
August 2020; Spasova, Slavina/Bouget, Denis/Ghailani, Dalila/Vanhercke, Bart, Ac-
cess to Social Protection for People Working on Non-Standard Contracts and as
Self-Employed in Europe. A Study of National Policies, European Social Policy
Network (ESPN), Brussels: European Commission, 2017, p. 8, https://ec.europa.e
u/social/main.jsp?catId=1135&intPageId=3588. Accessed 7 August 2020.
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– and, in particular, the platform economy – affects the sustainability of
public finances. As the European Commission has acknowledged, “[…]
the growing challenge of ensuring that the digital economy is fairly taxed
has still not been adequately addressed”,19 leading to tax avoidance and/or
to the loss of tax revenues. In brief, in a globalised and digitally connected
world the redesign of tax systems appears to be a key issue in order to pre-
serve welfare state institutions and social fairness.20
In this regard, the legitimacy of the claim in favour of the reinforcement
of taxation of digital (in particular, platform) activities is based, at least, on
two aspects. The first one is that long-term economic projections are mod-
erately positive; as an illustration, the average annual potential GDP
growth in the EU for 2016-2070 is projected at 1.4 percent largely thanks
to a 1.5 percent average annual growth in labour productivity per hour
worked over the entire period.21 Therefore, there is no question that Euro-
pean member states will be significantly richer in thirty years’ time, despite
the much more modest trend of total EU population and, in particular, the
decrease of labour supply. If output is less dependent on labour, it is rea-
sonable to redesign taxation so as to keep its efficacy on collecting funds.
But, secondly, the necessity to adapt the tax system to a changing econo-
mic environment adds another factor that has to be taken into account:
numerous examples show that the quick development of platform business
and the way this business is being driven is partly related to an “ill” (busi-
ness-biased) motivation that seeks to reduce labour cost through eluding
or limiting the obligation to pay taxes (or social contributions). We need
19 European Commission, Second Phase Consultation of Social Partners under Arti-
cle 154 TFEU on a Possible Action addressing the Challenges of Access to Social
Protection for People in all Forms of Employment in the Framework of the Euro-
pean Pillar of Social Rights. Consultation Document C (2017) 7773 final, 20
November 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=18619&langId=en.
Accessed 17 August 2020. Note that these projections were made previous to the
Covid-19 crisis.
20 European Commission, Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompa-
nying the document Proposal for a Council Directive laying down Rules relating
to the Corporate Taxation of a Significant Digital Presence and Proposal for a
Council Directive on the Common System of a Digital Services Tax on Revenues
resulting from the Provision of Certain Digital Services, SWD (2018) 81 final/2,
21 March 2018, p. 5, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10102/2018/EN
/SWD-2018-81-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF. Accessed 17 August 2020.
21 European Commission, The 2018 Ageing Report, Underlying Assumptions &
Projection Methodologies, Institutional Paper 065, Brussels, November 2017, pp.
71-72, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/ip065_en.pdf.
Accessed 17 August 2020.
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to be conscious that this economic model – now questioned by the social
and economic consequences of the Covid-19 crisis? – destabilises the level
playing field for businesses putting at risk EU competitiveness and, more-
over, reduces financial contributions to social protection schemes.22
The threat of erosion of the social budgets associated with this major
technological shift affects all social security models. But my attention fo-
cuses on Bismarckian systems (social insurance schemes) given the special
vulnerability of social contributions – in this context the principal source
of financing – in the new economic environment. My argument is that this
dependence on employer and employee contributions could seriously
harm the financial balance of the system once the platform economy gains
greater weight. What is the best way to tackle this threat? And is it possible
to turn this risk into an opportunity to redesign an established institution-
al solution?23 Again Spain will be a reference case.
The mainly professional basis of this type of social security system
makes the contractual relationship between platform and service provider
particularly relevant. Legal classification (employment relationship or
not), but also the specific working conditions are key aspects in determin-
ing the level of contributions and therefore could end up generating a fi-
nancial risk to social security in three ways.
First of all, some platform-like service provisions can be excluded from
the obligation to pay social contributions if they are not registered with
any scheme of social security due to the terms in which the activity is car-
ried out. This could be the case, for example, if said activity has a sporadic
character or, more broadly, if the service provider’s income remains below
legal thresholds.24 Certainly, these sorts of situations are not new; the
22 Forde, Chris/Stuart, Mark/Joyce, Simon/Oliver, Liz/Valizade, Danat/Alberti, Gabriella/
Hardy, Kate/Trappmann, Vera/Umney, Charles/Carson, Calum, The Social Protec-
tion of Workers in the Platform Economy (fn. 16), p. 40.
23 Eichhorst, Werner/Rinne, Ulf, Digital Challenges for the Welfare State, in: IZA Poli-
cy Paper No. 134, 2017, p. 10.
24 Gupta, Sanjeev/Keen, Michael/Shah, Alpa/Verdier, Genevieve (eds.), Digital Revo-
lution in Public Finance, Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund 2017,
p. 73. In Spain, the obligation to register with the Special Scheme of Social Secu-
rity for the Self-Employed is subject to the requirement that the activity must be
performed regularly (in Spanish, “de forma habitual”). Case law gives an answer
not using a time criterion, but pointing at a minimum level of (net) income,
equivalent to the national minimum wage. Considering the characteristics of plat-
form work, it is clear that a new rule is necessary in order to give an adequate re-
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difference now is that they are becoming more frequent as “gig” activities
increase and income distribution polarises.25 Furthermore, there is an addi-
tional risk (a major one in countries like Spain) of informality26 or under-
declaration of income to avoid such duties.
A second risk has to do with legal classification. There are well-known
implications in terms of the applicable contractual regulations. As we have
already seen, whether the service provider is to be considered an employee
of the platform or an independent contractor (or even a third, intermedi-
ate, category) is crucial in ascertaining whether said relation is subject to
labour law or not. But sometimes it seems that it is not sufficiently high-
lighted that it also has important consequences for social security, given
the fact that it will determine the correspondent scheme for registration.
And this is not a minor thing.27 On the one hand, there are still differences
in terms of social coverage28 and the risk of benefit inadequacy29. But, on
the other, since the amount of contributions diverges depending on the
scheme my interest here is the impact that such classification might have
on social security funding. From the perspective of the financial condition
of the system, and taking once again Spain as an example, the status of ei-
ther employee (registration with the General Scheme of Social Security) or
that of independent contractor (registration with the Special Scheme for
25 On the new social cleavage that has emerged between those working in highly
paid sectors, and those working in low-paid services, see Palier, Bruno, The Politics
of Social Risks and Social Protection in Digitalised Economies, Policy Network,
17 May 2018, https://policynetwork.org/opinions/essays/politics-social-risks-social-
protection-digitalised-economies. Accessed 17 August 2020.
26 OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2019: OECD and G20 Indicators, OECD Publishing,
Paris, 2019, p. 94, https://doi.org/10.1787/b6d3dcfc-en. Accessed 17 August 2020.
27 Note that the relevance of this issue is today more evident in the context of the
Covid-19 crisis. See an illustration in Rasche, Matthias, Coronavirus Highlights
Sick Pay Void for Platform Workers, Eurofound, 19 March 2020, https://www.eur
ofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2020/coronavirus-highlights-sick-pay-void-f
or-platform-workers. Accessed 17 August 2020.
28 The Covid-19 pandemic has openly – very often dramatically – shown the acute
vulnerability of platform workers, who in some countries have been forced to face
the economic, social and health consequences derived from the crisis without ac-
cess to adequate social benefits. That is the case, for example, for sickness protec-
tion in countries like Belgium, cf. Rasche, Matthias, Coronavirus Highlights Sick
Pay Void for Platform Workers (fn. 27).
29 It is certainly true that Spain has made significant progress in extending the (so-
cial protection) coverage of self-employed persons: full coverage against accidents
at work and occupational disease, and “unemployment” (cessation of activity) be-
came compulsory since 2019 (Royal Decree-Law 28/2018 of 28 December). Never-
theless, an important gap still remains in terms of adequacy as we will see below.
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the Self-Employed) makes a real difference in terms of average contribu-
tion: on average, self-employed persons pay only 60 percent of what em-
ployees pay in contributions. The legal design of this issue explains this
worrying outcome:30 employees contribute according to their real income
(salary), whereas self-employed persons are entitled to freely decide, within
certain limits, their contribution base. Not surprisingly – interested in un-
derestimation – the vast majority of them, circa 85 percent, opt for the le-
gal minimum base31 harming their future benefit rights, but also social se-
curity revenues at present. So we might conclude that, even if there is no
fraudulent purpose, not considering the service provider as an employee of
the digital platform will have a negative impact on the financing of social
security.32
And finally, the third and probably most relevant factor that exposes the
system to a risk of underfunding has to do with the new world of work
that will result from the process of major change (digitalisation) that the
economy is undergoing. To be more precise, what matters at this point is
that the growth of “just-in-time” work will normally entail lower social con-
tributions as a projection of the income linked to short-time activities.
Note that this trend is compatible with a – foreseeable – scenario where
the economy keeps on an upward path, showing the already mentioned
job polarisation.33 And note as well that this problem of low income and
30 Note that this unbalanced result is not caused by a divergence on the percentage
of the contribution base (relatively similar in both cases), but by the legal provi-
sions regarding such bases.
31 The current minimum contribution base stands at EUR 944 per month, in con-
trast with the corresponding General Scheme’s minimum base: EUR 1,050 per
month. After the significant increase of the minimum wage, such a difference
makes it more “attractive” in terms of labour costs to register with the Special
Scheme for the Self-Employed.
32 Spasova, Slavina/Bouget, Denis/Ghailani, Dalila/Vanhercke, Bart, Access to Social
Protection for People Working on Non-Standard Contracts and as Self-Employed
in Europe (fn. 18). As a matter of fact, the impact on the revenue side depends on
how the payment of contributions by self-employed persons is regulated: in
Spain, that difference exists but it is not that big once the self-employed are
obliged to contribute once all social risks are fully covered after the 2018 reform.
But the interest of digital platforms in the self-employment status is clear: the so-
cialist trade union UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores) estimates that delivery
platforms (Glovo, Deliveroo, Ubereats y Stuart) could be saving EUR 76 million
per year (UGT 2019, 31).
33 Autor, David/Mindell, David/Reynolds, Elisabeth, The Work of the Future: Shaping
Technology and Institutions, MIT Work of the Future, Fall 2019 Report, p. 22,
https://workofthefuture.mit.edu/report/work-future. Accessed 17 August 2020.
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subsequent low social security contributions does not only affect self-em-
ployed persons (especially in countries like Spain, if they choose their con-
tribution base), but also those activities based on an employment relation-
ship. In this regard, the response to the problem that we are facing is not
just a question of “ensuring neutral social protection against unemploy-
ment, sickness and other life circumstances independent of employment
status”,34 but a deeper, structural change that reflects the growing impor-
tance of capital with respect to labour.
As a matter of fact, this vulnerable position of platform workers is not
new and, above all, not exclusive of this type of service provision; on the
contrary, this characteristic is common to all forms of non-standard em-
ployment35 in a context where employers try to preserve the competitive-
ness of their enterprises mainly by seeking to reduce labour costs. How-
ever, rather than mitigating the problem, it appears to aggravate it, because
the extraordinary potential growth of the digital platform economy threat-
ens to turn what today is atypical into typical work.36
All in all, we might conclude that the role of social contributions as the
main source of financing of Bismarckian-type social security systems is,
partly at least, in question. In countries like Spain, it is itself a major struc-
tural change – the dimension varies depending on the specific characteris-
tics of the system – but its dimension becomes even more dramatic as this
transformation takes place at the same time as population ageing, the re-
tirement of the baby boom generation and a significant increase of pen-
sion expenditure. So at a moment when the social security system experi-
ences a significant increase in financial needs, its central financing pillar is
weakening, threatening long-term sustainability. Is there a margin to react
34 European Commission, Final Report of the High-Level Expert Group on the Im-
pact of the Digital Transformation on EU Labour Markets, April 2019, Luxem-
bourg: Publications Office of the European Union 2019, p. 42, https://ec.europa.e
u/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-impact-digital
-transformation-eu-labour-markets. Accessed 17 August 2020.
35 Matsaganis, Manos/Özdemir, Erhan/Ward, Terry/Zavakou, Alkistis, Non-Standard
Employment and Access to Social Security Benefits, Research Note 8/2015, Euro-
pean Commission, Brussels, 2016, https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platfor
m-economy/records/non-standard-employment-and-access-to-social-security-benef
its . Accessed 07 August 2020; OECD, The Future of Social Protection: What
Works for Non-Standard Workers?, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2018, https://doi.org
/10.1787/9789264306943-en. Accessed 17 August 2020.
36 Schoukens, Paul/Barrio, Alberto, The Changing Concept of Work: When does Typi-
cal Work Become Atypical?, in: European Labour Law Journal, 8 (2017) 4,
doi:10.1177/2031952517743871.
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and cope with this challenge so the main characteristics of said social insu-
rance systems can be preserved? Or are we on the verge of a radical shift?
Coping with the Financial Risks Associated with the Platform Economy?
Small Steps, So Far
Certain actions can be useful to partly correct the three problems that have
just been examined as causes of financial risks to social security. These
“flanking policies” could involve taking steps against those activities that
are developed outside the scope of the system and consequently without
the obligation to pay social contributions. In a benchmarking analysis we
come across legal reforms conceived to include sporadic or irregular activi-
ties within the scope of obligatory contributions. In some cases (France),
regulation has sought to give coverage to a wide range of activities – not
necessarily connected to platform economy – that, fraudulent or not, were
not taxed in the past.37 In others (Belgium),38 there has been a specific le-
gal response for platform workers limited so far to taxation, but that could
certainly favour future registration with the correspondent social security
scheme. Both orientations are not incompatible and could inspire legal re-
forms in countries such as Spain where there is a high proportion of irreg-
ular economy and where self-employed persons are only obliged to register
with social security (Special Scheme for the Self-Employed) in cases where
the activity is performed on a regular basis.39
Alongside the regularisation of activities that fall outside the scope of so-
cial security, we might find other actions aimed at increasing today’s low
contributions. Having noted the different positions occupied by employees
and self-employed persons (also) in the field of social security and its pro-
jection on the financing system, a first achievement would be to correct
the frequent cases of misclassification – platforms seeking to circumvent
IV.
37 See the French case (chèque emploi-service universel, Article L1271 Code du Tra-
vail).
38 Belgian law foresees an exemption from the payment of social security contribu-
tions for those working for digital platforms with earnings below 5,000 EUR, cf.
Schoukens, Paul/Barrio, Alberto, The Changing Concept of Work: When does Typi-
cal Work Become Atypical? (fn. 36), p. 318.
39 In fact, case law tries to give an answer not using a time criterion, but pointing at
a minimum level of (net) income, equivalent to the national minimum wage.
Given the low salary level characteristic of the Spanish economy the contribution
leak is easily imaginable: a new design of the social contribution system according
to real income seems to be an adequate response.
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applicable quality standards and rules governing the protection of workers
and, particularly, social security contributions.40 Adequate recognition of
professional status would reinforce the scope of the social security scheme
for employees (the so-called General Scheme in Spain) and favour an im-
provement of working conditions, including wages and, therefore, social
contributions. But there are two aspects that we have to take into account.
First, the Spanish ongoing experience shows very limited results in
terms of additional financial resources so far. Most of the judgements re-
garding legal classification of platform workers that have been mentioned
above derived from actions of dismissal brought before the courts by indi-
vidual workers claiming their status as employees. Only in isolated cases,
legal action has been taken by the Inspectorate of Labour and Social Secu-
rity on the grounds of misclassification of the so-called “collaborators”41.
Said legal actions were based on previous administrative actions by the
same Labour Inspectorate related to underpayment of social contributions.
To be more precise, the relevant aspect is not so much the amount of un-
paid social contribution42, but the identification of the individual entity
obliged to pay these: the digital platform, as the employer in the General
Scheme of Social Security; therefore, not platform workers as self-em-
ployed persons in their own Special Scheme.
And second, it is important to be conscious that the labour framework
itself is not enough as the increase of non-standard employment proves.
Furthermore, the positive impact stemming from the employee status has
probably a more individual than collective dimension. What is meant is
that enriching labour and social guarantees could possibly drive the rein-
forcement of benefit adequacy (in individual terms). But from the perspec-
tive of financing, the extension of “just-in-time” service provision will in-
evitably limit the amount of contributions paid by employers and employ-
ees even if the productivity growth benefits wages.
As an alternative – beyond the employment scope, the improvement of
the professional status of self-employed persons might also be a way of
40 Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. White Book 4.0 (fn. 18), p. 61.
41 See Judgements of Social Court No. 6 of Valencia of 1 June 2018 and 10 June
2019; Judgement of the High Court of Justice of Madrid (Social Chamber) of 17
January 2020; Judgement of Social Court No. 2 of Zaragoza of 27 April 2020 and
Judgement of Social Court No. 21 of Madrid of 11 June 2020.
42 The administrative actions claiming for social security contributions are not that
numerous so far. They have enabled the Labour Inspectorate to claw back a total
of app. EUR 20 million in social security contributions, an amount that is in-
significant in terms of social security funding.
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counterbalancing the financial risk to social security associated with plat-
form activities. Always focusing on Bismarckian systems, we observe a
growing attention paid to the unsatisfactory, in general terms, social pro-
tection “enjoyed” by this group.43 Again, it could be stated that there is a
margin for real progress in terms of adequacy (access to the system and ex-
tent of coverage).44 This is particularly the case for social schemes – like the
Spanish one – that exclude from registration the self-employed whose in-
come does not reach the legal threshold, and that enables said independent
contractors to choose their contribution bases without taking into account
real earnings. However, we should be conscious of the burden that paying
contributions represents for the self-employed, given the fact that in this
type of relationship those who are in business on their own account are the
only ones responsible for such duty. Once more, this step forward does not
seem to go very far.
To recap, we have shown the potential negative impact that the plat-
form economy could have on the financing of social security systems main-
ly based on contributions. On the one hand, we have pointed out dysfunc-
tional aspects concerning service provision through digital platforms (un-
defined labour status and social security framework) that could lead to a
serious drop of social contributions. While, on the other, we have also sug-
gested the adoption of certain measures that would improve the social con-
ditions of platform workers and reinforce contribution collection. Never-
theless, the digital transformation that enhances the platform economy is
so profound that it is to be acknowledged that those changes will not be
enough to guarantee the long-term sustainability of Bismarckian social se-
curity systems, especially if/when they have to face the retirement wave of
the huge baby boom generation. Further actions regarding sources of fi-
nancing are urgently needed.
Preserving or Transforming the Financial Structure of Social Security Systems
in a Context of Ageing?
Another relevant aim of this article is to carefully consider the advantages
and disadvantages of the three possible paths that a Bismarckian system
V.
43 OECD, Policy Responses to New Forms of Work, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2019,
p. 52, https://doi.org/10.1787/0763f1b7-en. Accessed 17 August 2020.
44 Forde, Chris/Stuart, Mark/Joyce, Simon/Oliver, Liz/Valizade, Danat/Alberti, Gabriella/
Hardy, Kate/Trappmann, Vera/Umney, Charles/Carson, Calum, The Social Protec-
tion of Workers in the Platform Economy (fn. 16), p. 51.
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like the Spanish one could follow in terms of financial structure reform in
the coming economic scenario associated with the platform economy. It is
certainly a major issue since this decision will be determinant of the design
of social security and its economic and social sustainability.
The first option would imply preserving the same financial structure of
social security, at this moment largely based upon contributions.45 We
have already examined legal reforms that could (partly?) offset the poten-
tial financial risk. In fact, it is reasonable to think that these amendments
will probably see the light of day sooner or later in all European countries
to guarantee minimum working conditions to platform workers. Focusing
on Spain, some important decisions in terms of revenue have been taken
by the Spanish Government in recent years. Particularly relevant was the
significant increase of the minimum wage (plus 22.3 percent in 2019 and
plus 5.5 percent in 2020), a controversial decision that did not hinder job
creation and that enabled, along with some other measures adopted by the
Royal Decree-Law 28/2018 of 28 December, on the revaluation of public pen-
sions and other urgent social, labour and employment measures,46 an impres-
sive increase of revenue (social contributions). Likewise, the steps taken by
the Labour Inspectorate and, foreseeably, by the Government to reinforce
the employment status of platform workers could also have some positive
(though very limited) impact.
Notwithstanding this actual – or hypothetical – achievement that cer-
tainly favours average contributions, it would be irresponsible not to ac-
knowledge that social security will not have the capacity to overcome the
financial strain caused by the structural weaknesses linked to labour pre-
cariousness and, above all, ageing. This demographic change stemming
from the retirement of the baby boom generation and, to a minor extent,
the upward trend of life expectancy will significantly push up pension ex-
45 In 2019, social contributions (124 billion EUR) accounted for circa 90 percent of
total public revenues of the Spanish social security system. That figure does not
include financial resources: a loan allocated by the State to the social security sys-
tem (13.8 billion EUR) and the withdrawal of assets from the Reserve Fund (3.6
billion EUR).
46 Said Royal Decree-Law 28/2018 foresaw full coverage against accidents at work
and occupational diseases (besides “unemployment”, i.e. cessation of activity) for
self-employed persons. Although the increase of contribution rate associated with
the new regulation is small (and gradual), the amount of social contributions col-
lected is growing: 174 million (accidents at work and occupational disease) and
144 million (cessation of activity). Whereas, conversely, expenditure on benefits
increases very moderately (Source: Secretary of State of Social Security and Pen-
sions).
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penditure – the main component of social security – requiring additional
resources throughout a time period of around twenty years.
That said, preserving the current financial structure would surely lead to
growing imbalances of the social security budget since the revenues com-
ing from employer and employee contributions will not amount to the re-
sources needed to pay benefits (mainly retirement pensions), even if fur-
ther legal adjustments are adopted and even in a context of solid economic
growth. In this respect, the evolution of social security in recent years has
shown how constrained employer’s and employee’s contributions are
when it comes to facing the maturation of social security and the process
of ageing of society. As we have just seen, in 2019 some decisions on the
revenue side of social security were taken by the Spanish Government with
a very significant growth of social contributions (an increase of 7.9 per-
centage points, EUR 9 billion in absolute terms). And yet, the social secu-
rity deficit still stood at a worrisome level (16.9 billion EUR, 1.5 percent of
GDP), despite having reduced in size with respect to 2018. Leaving aside
the uncertain consequences of the Covid-19 crisis, this type of situation –
budgetary deficit – could be bearable in the short term through public
debt, especially if the economic juncture is not favourable. But beyond
that, a “structural” (long-term) imbalance is not sustainable and would cer-
tainly end up giving way to reforms seeking a retrenchment of the spend-
ing by means of benefit cuts (eligibility-restricting or generosity-reducing
reforms). The result would be particularly negative for precarious workers,
platform ones included, assuming that a close connection between profes-
sional trajectory and benefits is basically preserved. What we would proba-
bly see is an exacerbated polarisation of the workforce that could leave all
those working in precarious conditions (low income) in a more vulnerable
social position: insufficiently protected by social security (no eligibilty for
benefits or less generous benefit enjoyment); and, due to their weak level
of income, with no capacity – or a very limited one – to obtain in the pri-
vate sector additional (retirement) savings to make up for the public short-
age. In view of this outcome, I would conclude that a different path should
be taken in order to preserve the sustainability of the social security system.
The second and third options would be initially channeled through the
increase of general government revenue from taxation (tax-financed bene-
fits),47 but deployed in two very different manners; in fact, one would
push the (originally) Bismarckian social security system towards a more
47 OECD, Policy Responses to New Forms of Work (fn. 43), p. 57.
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Beveridgean one, whereas the other would avoid this shift maintaining its
typical (mainly) contributive, earnings-related, design.
On reflection, it seems foreseeable that the stagnation of revenues com-
ing from social contributions caused by an increasingly digitalised econo-
my will give way to a broader involvement of the Government in financ-
ing social security. But we must be conscious that, if the outcome is an
equivalent level of total funds, this movement could have very serious im-
plications in terms of adequacy due to the growing (pension) spending as-
sociated with the ageing process. In other words, such a reconfiguration of
the financial structure could just mean a change in the financing sources
of social security without an alteration of the level of public expenditure.48
But this would entail a major shift in the system since the number of bene-
ficiaries (most of them pensioners) will peak in coming years: the level of
social insurance benefits is then to be reduced assuming that private instru-
ments will make up for such downsizing. In this regard, said shift (“path
switching”49) could represent a first step towards a more Beveridgean sys-
tem which in the specific field of pensions would correspond to what is
known as a “multi-pillar model of first generation”50. Here the role of so-
cial security – the public social protection system – is characterised by
mainly focusing on poverty prevention through the provision of assistance-
rooted flat-rate or means-tested entitlements;51 while, as a key supplement,
policy-makers encourage the development of occupational (normally also
individual) private plans. Again, the position of platform workers in this
scheme looks troubling, maybe not in terms of severe poverty, but certain-
ly in terms of risk of lack of protection and inequality.
Obviously, the problem does not lie in the (assistance) public pillar as it
could be an effective instrument to fight against (working) poverty. The
difficulties for non-standard workers (platform ones included) come from
48 To illustrate this remark, attention is drawn to the fact that the current level of
public pension expenditure stands at 12 percent of GDP in Spain. In coming
decades, the numbers of pensioners will sharply peak putting a strain on the pen-
sion system.
49 Ebbinghaus, Bernhard, Can Path Dependence Explain Institutional Change? Two
Approaches Applied to Welfare State Reform, MPIfG Discussion Paper 05/2,
2005, p. 17, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19916. Accessed 17 August 2020.
50 Natali, David, Pensions After the Financial and Economic Crisis, ETUI, Working
Paper 2011.07, Brussels, 2011, p. 7, https://www.etui.org/sites/default/files/11%20
WP%202011%2007%20WEB.pdf. Accessed 17 August 2020.
51 See Behrendt, Christina/Quynh Anh Nguyen, Ensuring Universal Social Protection
for the Future of Work, in: Transfer, 25 (2019) 2, p. 30,
doi:10.1177/1024258919857031. Accessed 17 August 2020.
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their precarious status in the labour market and their subsequent doubtful
capacity to engage in satisfactory terms in the complementary schemes (oc-
cupational or individual private plans).52 Two, at least, potential risks for
individuals within typical Bismarckian systems would then arise. First,
from a general point of view, the restrained role played by social security
and its redistributive mechanisms implies a greater dependence of individ-
uals’ social benefits on their professional trajectory. This would be particu-
larly harmful for workers in countries with highly precarious labour mar-
kets. In this sense, it is easy to anticipate that the same precariousness that
is suffered by atypical workers at the present time in Spain will also harm –
in fact, already is incipiently harming – the professional status of platform
workers. Second, even in countries where the quality of employment is
better, this reinforced close relationship between benefits and previous
wages brings along a serious risk of inequality. The “just-in-time” nature of
platform activities seems to bring downward total working time, leading
(inevitably?) to flat earnings. In such conditions, the saving capacity of
workers – badly needed to complement their public basic pension – is
more than doubtful.53 The alternative is that this increase in tax-based fi-
nancing would not call into question the current financial structure of Bis-
marckian inspiration where social contributions paid by employers and
employees largely determine both the funding of the system and the grant-
ing of benefits. As a correction, the reform of the financial structure would
consist of a deeper involvement of the State in funding social security –
progressively seeking less dependence on said contributions.
Drawing our attention once again to Spain, in the short term this deep-
er involvement of the State in the financing of social security would be
useful to correct a structural flaw by which certain expenditure items (i.e.
operating expenses of social security, measures for the promotion of em-
ployment and temporary reduction of contributions, or subsidies to special
52 Private pension schemes play a limited role in Spain: assets in pension funds held
133 billion dollars in 2018, 9.5 percent of GDP – in contrast to 60 percent of GDP
on OECD average. But it is particularly small when it comes to occupational
schemes. The proportion of workers participating in this type of plans is low: 1.9
million participants, approximately 10 percent of the total working population in
2019. With two additional problems: first, the number of workers covered is
frozen, has even been shrinking in recent years; and second, coverage is skewed to
permanent – often well-paid – workers, see www.inverco.es/en/38/0/104/2020/3.
Accessed 17 August 2020.
53 Economic Policy Committee/Social Protection Committee, Joint Paper on Pen-
sions 2019 (fn. 2), p. 61.
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schemes) are currently supported by contributions.54 In the medium term,
this more balanced design would provide for additional resources, the ones
needed to cope with the impact of the retirement of the baby boom gener-
ation and to compensate the (relative) loss of relevance of contributions.
And once this demographic phenomenon is exhausted, the system would
be in a better position to adapt its financial structure to the economic envi-
ronment.
In essence, this amendment would focus on reinforcing the redistribu-
tive component of social security, making it compatible with the preserva-
tion of the contributory (earnings-related) principle that defines social in-
surance schemes. It would mean smoothing the proportionality base of
benefits through redistributive measures that are tax-financed. And this
would be key to guaranteeing the adequacy (social sustainability) of bene-
fits. The reason is that said solidarity component goes beyond ensuring a
basic level of coverage, since it becomes useful to combat inequality in two
ways. On the one hand, the combination of contributory and non-contrib-
utory elements is important to reduce the dependence of workers on pri-
vate social protection mechanisms with a double effect of retaining high-
income workers within social security and thus strengthening the legitima-
cy of the system. And on the other, even more significant, the redistribu-
tion element turns to be the instrument through which social security of-
fers adequate access and coverage to platform workers – all non-standard
workers in general.
How to implement this deeper involvement of the State in the financ-
ing of social security? It could be said that the platform economy is one of
the factors that contributes to forging a deep trend whereby the distribu-
tion of income is shifting towards capital and against labour: capital is
gaining importance relative to labour in the functional distribution of in-
come; which is to say that the position of the owners of capital has been
reinforced to the detriment of workers, very especially those in more pre-
carious jobs. And the problem is that this shift comes with a continued de-
cline of the share of tax revenues from capital in overall taxation in a con-
text of economic globalisation. As a whole, both trends threaten to make it
increasingly difficult to count on contributions as a main source of financ-
ing social security. In this scenario, the already mentioned dependence of
54 As the Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (AIREF 2019, 56) has
pointed out, the transfer of expenditure responsibilities from the social security
system to the State would be one key measure to close the existing deficit in social
security (1.5 percent of GDP in 2019).
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social security financing on contributions calls for a response to preserve
the labour-capital trade-off. The answer could come from collective bar-
gaining if it could guarantee the transfer of productivity gains to wages,
but recent reforms in this field in the EU countries have been oriented to
weaken these instruments. Some experts also suggest favouring the access
of workers to the ownership of capital.55 In any case, neither of these solu-
tions would be satisfactory enough. At present, and looking ahead, the em-
phasis must be put on taxing.
We find different options to diversify the financing mix of social protec-
tion. Some of them are related to capital. In this purview, new taxes are be-
ing created in Spain such as the tax on financial transactions, consisting of
taxing all share purchase transactions carried out by financial operators,
and the tax on digital services, ensuring that revenues generated by large
companies that engage in certain digital activities not covered by the cur-
rent fiscal framework are taxed.56
But the most relevant proposal so far is the robot tax, understood as the
levy of a tax on the work performed by a robot. In fact, this new way of
taxation has specifically to do with the impact of machinery (robots) re-
placing work currently performed by workers. It is not unthinkable that a
rapid process of robotisation could demand an urgent and firm response of
the State aiming at both slowing down the speed of automatisation and
giving support to the redundant workers affected. There would be born
the idea of a robot tax to face a potentially major social problem.57 There
are alternative means to compensate for the loss of relevance of labour in
the financing mix in an emerging digital economy. Along these lines, envi-
ronmental taxes could play a role, especially in those countries, such as
Spain, where this type of taxing is still low. Note that both environment
and social security (pensions) are very closely linked to the concept of sus-
tainability and their intergenerational dimension. Likewise, consumption
55 Freeman, B. Richard, Who Owns the Robots Rules the World, IZA World of La-
bor 2015:5, doi: 10.15185/izawol.5.
56 Both bills are currently in Parliament. Though still modest in terms of revenue
(their impact amounts to 1.2 billion and 850 million EUR, respectively), they
trace a path that could provide for an increase of financial resources.
57 The Committee on Legal Affairs presented a motion for a European Parliament
resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics that included a specific reference to a
robot tax. However this remark was deleted from the text finally passed [Euro-
pean Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the
Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL))].
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taxes (value added tax, VAT) play a role as an increasingly relevant source
of financing.58
That said, an additional issue that should be seriously discussed is
whether these potential new sources of financing social security should be
earmarked. A well-known example is the French contribution sociale
généralisée (CSG), which is levied as a separate tax on different types of in-
come; but it can also be designed as part of general taxes on property or
consumers.59 In this way, earmarking could be an interesting solution to
partly replace (offset) contributions as a stable source of social security fi-
nancing. This motion for debate is still pending in Spain: the challenges to
the sustainability of its social security system urge to open it.
Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, attention has been drawn to the impact of the
rise of platform economy on the financing of Spanish social security, a typ-
ical Bismarckian system. To recap, the following concluding remarks
should be highlighted.
1. The rise of the platform economy and, in a broader sense, the process
of digitalisation will affect the sustainability of public finances. Al-
though long-term economic projections are moderately positive, we al-
ready observe that output is less dependent on labour. The conse-
quence of this shift of income distribution is that tax systems will have
to be (partly) redesigned to preserve welfare states. And in particular, in
this new economic environment the dependence of typical earnings-re-
lated (social insurance) social security systems on social contributions
threatens to seriously harm the financial balance of the system once the
platform economy gains greater weight. The question lies in assessing
the best way to tackle this threat.
2. Focusing on Spain, the emergence of the platform economy potentially
generates financial risks to the social security system which stem from
VI.
58 Spasova, Slavina/Ward, Terry, Social Protection Expenditure and its Financing in
Europe. A Study of National Policies, European Social Policy Network (ESPN),
Brussels: European Commission 2019, p. 122, doi: 10.2767/145960.
59 See, for example, the Belgian case where part of VAT revenue is earmarked for so-
cial security. See Hindriks, Jean/Baurin, Arno, Financement des pensions: rétro-
spectives et perspectives, in: Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique, 58
(2019) 1, doi: 10.3917/rpve.581.0097. 
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three circumstances. One, the exclusion from the obligation to pay con-
tributions of self-employed persons who are only obliged to register
with social security if the activity is performed on a regular basis in the
sense that a minimum level of income is reached. Two, legal misclassifi-
cation, given the fact that the inadequate – though frequently sought –
status of self-employment entails in practice a lower amount of contri-
butions. And three, lower social contributions as a projection of the in-
come linked to short-time activities, a new form of “atypical” employ-
ment progressively becoming typical.
3. Some steps could be taken in order to adapt the system to the new eco-
nomic environment and to cope with these financial risks. Namely, reg-
ularise activities that fall outside the scope of the Special Scheme for
the Self-Employed; implement a new system of social contribution for
self-employed persons; and, above all, correct legal misclassification of
platform workers through an adequate recognition of their professional
status (employees) by reinforcing the scope of the General Scheme of
Social Security.
4. Nevertheless, these measures will not be enough to tackle the major
challenges faced by a typical Bismarckian social security system. On the
one hand, the role of social contributions as the main source of financ-
ing of an earnings-related system of social security is partly in question
due to the already mentioned shift of income distribution towards capi-
tal – against labour. And, on the other, the population is ageing as a
consequence of a longer life expectancy and the retirement of baby
boomers, bringing along a substantial increase of pension expenditure.
5. In order to preserve its long-term sustainability, the financial structure
of the Spanish social security system should be adapted. It is important
to note that not doing so in a context of population ageing would im-
ply growing imbalances due to the financial strain caused by said pro-
cess of ageing that would probably lead to reforms seeking a retrench-
ment of expenditure and causing an exacerbated polarisation of the
labour force.
6. A first (and, in my view, unsatisfactory) response would be the increase
of State funds to offset the foreseeable stagnation of social contribu-
tions. In this case, we would see a change in the financing sources of
social security without altering the level of public expenditure. In an
ageing society, it would entail that social security focuses on poverty re-
lief moving towards a Beveridgean system where precarious (platform)
workers face great difficulties to ensure an adequate social protection
given their limited ability to enrol second pillar schemes.
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7. The alternative takes a different path: increasing State funds to offset
the stagnation of social contributions while preserving the current
earnings-related system and its financial structure. This deeper involve-
ment of the State in funding social security would enable the Spanish
system to cope with the impact of ageing and, at the same time, rein-
force its solidarity component to guarantee the adequacy of benefits. Its
implementation in Spain demands a major tax reform to increase tax-
revenue-to-GDP.
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Chapter 10
Social Security in the Platform Economy: The French
Example – New Actors, New Regulations, Old Problems?
Francis Kessler
Introduction
Digital technologies have led to new business models bearing various
(mostly positive) names, e.g. “platform economy” or “collaborative econo-
my”. The only common factor of all these models is, however, that digital
technology is used and that in most cases a physical workplace is not neces-
sarily required for these activities. The organisation model of digital plat-
forms is based on a triangular relationship.1 A platform can play the role of
an intermediary between a professional service provider and a “(platform)
user-consumer”, or of an intermediary between a “non-professional user-
provider” and a “user-consumer”. Work could be paid in each situation,
but the provided work could also be without any payment. There is a great
variety of business models active in multiple sectors, each of which has its
own market characteristics.2
Both the overall organisation of the French social security scheme and
the status of the worker influence the financing of social security. The
compartmentalisation of social protection systems between employees and
self-employed persons, and between the different categories of self-em-
ployed persons is one of the core characteristics of the French basic social
security organisation (sécurité sociale). Apart from family benefits and
health care, French Social Security includes several schemes, each covering
one or more specific socio-professional categories:
– The general scheme covers employed persons and any person entitled
to residence rights for family benefits and health care benefits. Unem-
I.
1 Dirringer, Josépha, L’Avenir du droit de la protection sociale dans un monde
ubérisé, in: Revue française des affaires sociales (RFAS), (2018) 2, p. 34.
2 Petropoulos, Georgios, An Economic Review on the Collaborative Economy, Policy
Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy. Study for the IMCO Committee,
May 2016, pp. 6, 12 f., https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.ht
ml?reference=IPOL_IDA(2016)595358. Accessed 19 June 2020.
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ployment insurance is not part of the administrative organisation of
sécurité sociale for historical reasons; it is instituted as a special fund.
– The specific schemes are geared for self-employed persons; most of the
latter are managed by the general scheme,3 while some of them – espe-
cially the so-called “liberal professions” (attorneys, medical doctors,
etc.) – have kept their own old age and invalidity pension systems.4
French self-employed workers are not insured against unemployment,
accidents at work or occupational diseases.
– The agricultural regime (Mutualité sociale agricole) covers employed and
self-employed workers in agriculture.
– “Special schemes” cover employees who are not in the general scheme
(e.g. public servants, employees of SNCF and of the French utility com-
panies providing gas and electricity).
3 Social security for self-employed workers (“Régime social des indépendants“ – RSI)
has been integrated in the general scheme as of 1 January 2020.
4 The construction of social protection in France is historically linked to the devel-
opment and structuring of the employed salaried workforce. However, although it
originally only covered employees, according to its founding order of 4 October
1945, the social security system was intended to cover all workers and their fami-
lies. However, the non-agricultural self-employed occupations strongly resisted this
generalisation for economic and sociological reasons, with the exception of com-
pensation for family benefits. A compromise was finally reached with the public
authorities, with the agreement that social security would be extended to self-em-
ployed persons, however through their own schemes to take into account the spe-
cific characteristics of their activities and aspirations. Established in stages, first in
the form of autonomous pension insurance schemes starting in 1948, then health
insurance schemes from the 1960s, the social security system for self-employed per-
sons is characterised by a juxtaposition of different basic social security schemes
which are themselves subject to a range of managing organisations. Membership
with these schemes is mandatory.
The pension scheme for traders and the pension scheme for craftspeople are both
managed by the Régime social des indépendants (RSI), which is under its way to be
integrated into the general scheme under the name of Sécurité sociale des indépen-
dants (SSI).
The pension scheme for the self-employed and the pension scheme for lawyers, are
respectively managed by different funds under an overall umbrella of the fund for
the self-employed (Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Vieillesse Profession Libéral, CNAV-
PL) and the national fund for the French bar (Caisse Nationale des Barreaux
Français, CNBF).
The health insurance scheme for traders, craftspeople and the liberal professions,
managed formerly by the Regime social des indépendants is now administratively in-
tegrated into the general schema via the SSI.
The health insurance scheme, pension scheme and occupational accident scheme
for farmers is managed by the agricultural social mutual scheme (MSA).
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While one can observe a (slow but steady) move towards a harmonisation
of the social protection schemes, there is a persistent gap between the costs
of contributions and the coverage of social risks. Compulsory complemen-
tary pay-as-you-go old age pensions schemes, compulsory private collective
health care insurance schemes, as well as complementary schemes on inca-
pacity and invalidity based on collective agreements provide for a substan-
tial part of social protection for employees. Self-employed persons who
choose to do so can take out optional complementary insurance with a
health plan or insurance company to top up their pension, health or un-
employment insurance. Since the so-called “Madelin” Act of 1994,5 they
have been able to benefit from tax advantages, whereby they can deduct
the amount of the contribution or insurance premium from their profes-
sional income. In 2013, within the framework of a National Inter-Profes-
sional Agreement (NIA), the French government required all employers
(irrespective of the size of their businesses) to offer private complementary
health insurance to their employees, and this agreement was taken over by
the legislator to become law. This “generalisation” of complementary
group health insurance to all employees is accompanied by tax incentives
which target both the nature of contracts (collective), the content of collec-
tive health insurance contracts, and the fact that the individual premium
has to be independent of the individual state of health of the insured (“re-
sponsible contracts”). In 2013, the “responsible contract” was still defined
as a contract that encourages compliance with the gatekeeping pathway
and does not reimburse non-refundable franchises but has to offer higher
packages for dental and optical care.6 The self-employed are not affected by
these compulsory private health insurances but they can fall under the
means-test criteria of the so-called “C2S” system.7
5 Law No. 94-126 of 11 February 1994 (Loi Madelin), in: Journal officiel de la
République française (JORF), No. 37, 13 February 1994, p. 2493 ff.
6 The “Subsidized Individual Supplementary Health Insurance Program” (“Com-
plémentaire Santé Solidaire”, CSS) enrols insured individuals who are entitled to
health care coverage on the basis of their employment or legal ongoing residence
in France and whose income is below an amount that is determined by their
household makeup. Income taken into account is that of the 12 months prior to
their application. CSS members’ health insurance expenses are covered by their
health insurance funds and by the delegated supplementary insurer (“organisme ges-
tionnaire”) which they have chosen. These insurers will benefit from a tax relief.
7 Individual complementary health contracts, whether publicly aided (C2S) or not,
will concern self-employed individuals, civil servants, students, precarious workers,
the long-term unemployed, some inactive persons and a majority of retired per-
sons. This population is composed of “good” risks and of “bad risks” such that it is
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Platform workers are not a particularly homogeneous group in terms of
legal status.8 In France, in relation to services provided to the user-con-
sumer of a particular platform, involved “platform workers” have the sta-
tus of either an employee – for example for the storage of goods by Ama-
zon – or that of a single-person limited company (entreprise unipersonnelle à
responsabilité limitée, EURL) combined with the status of micro-en-
trepreneur, which is a subtype of self-employed status (see below). Others –
especially the high-skilled work force – tend to opt for the single-person
corporation (SASU9): a president of such a simplified company is consid-
ered an employee of the company and so pays normal social security con-
tributions to the general system (except for unemployment insurance).10
“Platform work” is, in this case, the expression of individuals of a prefer-
ence for self-employed work or, of persons who may dread being submit-
ted to a hierarchy and prefer to work on their own, the wish to deliver a
higher performance under the conditions of self-employed work. The con-
tractor can conclude a contract with the platform for the provision of ser-
vices (louage d’ouvrage, as defined in Article 1710 of the Civil Code). The
advantage for the platform lies in the set of conditions applicable to the
difficult to state how the risk structure of the individual collective health insu-
rance market will evolve and whether this will result in an increase in premiums
rates.
8 For alternative classifications: European Commission, “Don’t Gig Up!” State of
the Art Report. Working Paper 2/2019, April 2019, p. 5, http://www.ires.fr/index.
php/etudes-recherches-ouvrages/documents-de-travail-de-l-ires/item/5935-n-02-201
9-don-t-gig-up-state-of-the-art-report. Accessed 15 June 2020; Allaire, Nolwenn/
Colin, Nicolas/Palier, Bruno/Tran, Laurène, Covering Risks for Platform Workers in
the Digital Age. Working Paper. Sciences Po, Chaire numérique, gouvernance et
innovations institutionnelles, 1 May 2019, p. 10, https://www.sciencespo.fr/public
/chaire-numerique/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/covering-risks-plateform-workers-
digital-age.pdf. Accessed 15 June 2020.
9 A SASU (société par action unipersonnelle) is a one-man company and a simpli-
fied version of an SAS (société par action simplifiée), which can be set up by a
single person. The minimum capital is EUR 37,000 or EUR 25,000 if you want
your stock to be publicly traded. Abdelnour, Sarah/Méda, Dominique, Les nou-
veaux travailleurs des applis, Paris: PUF, 2019.
10 As an example, many UBER Drivers opt for single-owner limited liability com-
panies (EURL), simplified shareholder company (SAS), or simplified single-share-
holder company (SASU). According to preliminary results, more than 30 percent
of UBER independent drivers have a SAS-SASU status, 15 percent are auto-en-
trepreneurs (AE), 15 percent have a EURL/SARL/EI/EIRL status, whereas others
are employees or cumulate different statuses. Abdelnour, Sarah/Bernard, Sophie,
Vers un Capitalisme de Plateforme? Mobiliser le travail, Contourner les régula-
tions, in: La nouvelle revue du travail, 13 (2018) 2, doi: 10.4000/nrt.3797.
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manpower: fee-for-service arrangement, possibility to terminate the con-
tractual relationship at any time, and possibility to circumvent labour law
and social contributions and unemployment contributions as an employ-
ee.
In this context, several parallel discussions have taken place. A “classi-
cal” debate has been on the labour law status of the worker sometimes
leading to the requalification of service contracts to employment contracts,
which has implications for the social security status of the platform work-
ers. Classification as an employee will result in the payment of social con-
tributions related to that status. The Court de Cassation, the French highest
court in private litigations, has held on 28 November 201811 that delivery
riders working for online delivery platforms are to be treated as employees
rather than self-employed workers. French Uber drivers also claimed to be
in a subordination relationship with Uber. The French Court of Cassation
has decided to reclassify the contractual relationship between Uber and a
driver as an employment contract. Indeed, when connecting to the Uber
digital platform, a subordination relationship has been established be-
tween the driver and the company. Hence, the driver does not provide ser-
vices as a self-employed person, but as an employee.12 Consequently, the
French Social Security Recovery Agency, i.e. the institution in charge of
collecting social security contributions (Union de recouvrement des cotisa-
tions de Sécurité Sociale et d’Allocations Familiales, URSSAF) has publicly
claimed that the regularisation of the reclassification of platform workers
as employees is Uber’s responsibility, who is required to declare and pay
social security contributions for its drivers. The French Social Security au-
thority also stated that they “may subsequently initiate actions on their
own initiative to check whether the expected regularisation has indeed
been carried out”.13
This chapter will deal with the financing of social security stricto sensu.
We will examine the major outputs of a discussion mostly driven by a taxi
11 Cour de cassation, Social Chamber of 28 November 2018, Case No. 137
(17-20.079), ECLI:FR:CCASS:2018:SO01737, https://www.courdecassation.fr/juris
prudence_2/chamber_sociale_576/1737_28_40778.html. Accessed 16 July 2020.
12 Cour de cassation, Social Chamber of 4 March 2020, Case No. 374 (Uber), https://
www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/20200304_arret_uber_english.pdf. Accessed 16 July
2020.
13 Taquet, François, Les démêlés d'Uber avec l'Urssaf... : Uber 1/Urssaf, JSL, 2017,
No. 433, p. 27 ; Dernièrement, Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 2, 28 novembre
2019, 18-15.333, F-P+B+I (No. Lexbase: A3474Z4G); Meiffret-Delsanto, Karine, Re-
cours à un auto-entrepreneur et contrôle URSSAF: attention au redressement!,
Lexbase Social, 2020, No. 809 (No. Lexbase: N1858BYH).
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drivers’ riot against VTC drivers,14 by the creation of a professional associa-
tion of self-employed VTC drivers (called “union”) and by the requalifica-
tion of self-employed persons as employees and the application of the cor-
responding social security contributions. In Section III, we will examine
the major output of this debate, namely specific legislative measures trying
to protect VTC drivers beyond the social security system. In Section IV, we
will examine the other path that has been chosen by the French legislator
on the income of short-term furnished rentals.15 With the so-called “Airbnb
rule” the French legislator has tried to combine two goals: collect social se-
curity contributions on income generated by such rental activity via a plat-
form, but also promote these individual activities by (partial) exemptions
of some of that same income. In Section V, the new anti-fraud measures
will be reviewed. Indeed, France has introduced, via Law No. 2018-898 of
23 October 2018, the obligation for all electronic platforms to transfer to
tax authorities the complete data on transactions, bank accounts used, and
all identification details, including those of the service provider. Under the
Amending Finance Act for 2016 and, in particular, the Anti-Fraud Act of
October 2018, platforms are now required to submit the data on income
received by each person renting out this kind of accommodation to the tax
authorities, which in turn share this information with the social security
collecting institutions. So as to understand these – most often very sophis-
ticated – sectorial rules, Section II will deal with the overall financial orga-
nisation of the French social security system(s).
14 In January 2016, French taxi unions had staged a nationwide strike, shutting
down roadways across Paris in a protest against ride-hailing companies like Uber.
Thousands of taxi drivers participated in demonstrations across Paris today, dis-
rupting traffic to and from the French capital’s two major airports. Protesters
burned tires at a major thoroughfare on the western edge of Paris, where police
used tear gas to disperse some, and two taxi drivers were injured after a shuttle
bus drove through a blockade at Orly airport.
15 In the area of short-term furnished rental, in particular relating to Airbnb, France
has adopted a complete regulation. The rules focus on owners who offer short-
term rental of dwellings they do not occupy, i.e. secondary residences. It is then
necessary, before any announcement online, to make an administrative pre-rental
declaration, and to address it to the mayor of the municipality where the housing
is located. The platforms are also responsible for and have an obligation to inform
the owners about their obligations, and must ask them for a declaration on the
honour attesting the respect of the rules. The municipal declaration number must
appear in the ad on the site. The platform must also ensure that an owner who
rents his own accommodation does not exceed 120 nights per year, beyond which
the dwelling can no longer be considered as his main residence.
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Financing Social Security: Main Principles
The French Social Security is mainly financed through contributions based
on income. All income earned from professional activities is subject to so-
cial contributions. Social security contributions are a major part of taxa-
tion in France, as they represent 37.1 percent of total tax revenues, and
with 17 percent of GDP, French social security contributions are the high-
est among OECD countries. The share nominally ascribed to employers is
also more important in France than in other countries, representing 11.3
percent of GDP, more than twice the OECD average of 5.2 percent.16 As a
general trend, the overall percentage of contributions is slowly decreasing;
the part of taxes or assimilated taxes is growing especially for employees.
The general scheme for employees and the “special schemes” for certain
categories of employees and civil servants are mainly financed through
contributions from both employees and employers. The rates applicable
differ according to the nature of the risk. These rates, set by decree, are uni-
form and are intended to apply to all employers and employees. Only the
rates for accidents at work are determined according to the activity and the
value of the risk specific to the company (i.e. the cost of accidents at work
or occupational illnesses arising for employees).
Although self-employed workers are now administratively integrated in-
to the general scheme, the level of their contributions is still slightly differ-
ent from that of employees and depends on the legal and tax status of the
company. Since 2009, a simple business status has been available to anyone
who wishes to establish a small business in France. The term micro-en-
trepreneur (formerly known as auto-entrepreneur) is the usual term for the
“régime micro-social” tax system. It is not a legal form (the legal status is still
that of one form of single company), but a simplified reporting system and
payment of contributions and social charges is effected by proportion of
turnover, according to the principle of “no turnover, no dues”. The micro-
entrepreneur is not registered for VAT and limits are imposed on annual
turnover: EUR 170,000 for commercial businesses and EUR 70,000 for ser-
vice professionals and artisans. Those adopting this status run the business
as a micro-entreprise, which leads to a rather complex and often changing
contribution system, i.e. the self-employed social security scheme, which
II.
16 Bozio, Antoine/Breda, Thomas/Grenet, Julien, Incidence of Social Security Contribu-
tions: Evidence from France, March 2017, https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/A
rticles/231ab136-d997-4563-9ece-f885dac3c8a5/files/1c6489fa-099b-4ed6-ab6a-0554
305997d3. Accessed 15 June 2020.
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could be summed up in (i) a liability to social security contributions based
on cash receipts, not on profit or loss, and (ii) relief for new micro-enter-
prises available at the rate of 50 percent for the first year of activity.
Earmarked taxes (impôts et taxes affectés, ITAF) are mandatory withhold-
ings that are explicitly earmarked for social security financing. These in-
clude the General Social Contribution (Cotisation Sociale Généralisée,
CSG), which alone amounts to more than half of all ITAF and various oth-
er taxes especially on the pharmaceutical sector. This CSG, but also the So-
cial Debt Repayment Contribution (Contribution pour le Remboursement de
la Dette Sociale, CRDS) are paid on employment income, replacement in-
come, property income, investment income and gambling income. All per-
sons treated as French residents for income tax purposes and subject to a
French compulsory health insurance scheme are liable to CSG at the fol-
lowing rates:
– 9.2 percent on employment income,
– 6.2 percent on “replacement incomes” (e.g. daily sickness benefits, un-
employment benefits, retirement pensions etc.).
Individuals drawing a French pension are either exempted from or liable
to CSG, CRDS and/or CASA (Contribution Additionnelle de Solidarité pour
l'Autonomie, Additional Solidarity Contribution for Autonomy17) as deter-
mined by their reference taxable income.
A steadily growing part of the value added tax is dedicated to the financ-
ing of social security. The main idea of what is sometimes called “Social
VAT” in the French debate is reducing the tax burden on labour via an ex-
emption from social security contributions by offsetting the loss of rev-
enue to the public finances caused by an increase in VAT. As an example,
VAT earmarked to finance social security reached EUR 10.1 billion in
2018; it had been no less than EUR 46 billion in 2019 according to the
projections of the High Council for the Financing of Social Protection.
This is mainly due to the 6-point reduction in the health insurance contri-
bution rate, estimated at almost EUR 23 billion.18
17 See: Comment s’applique la contribution de Solidarité pour l’Autonomie (Casa)?,
March 2020, https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F31408. Accessed
16 July 2020.
18 Haut conseil du financement de la protection sociale, Etat des lieux du finance-
ment de la protection sociale, May 2019, https://www.strategie.gouv.fr/sites/strate
gie.gouv.fr/files/atoms/files/hcfips-2019-05-10_etat_des_lieux_actualise.pdf.
Accessed 16 July 2020.
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First Legislative Initiatives to Take Account of the Platform Economy
The French Labour Code contains express provisions seeking to assimilate
particular typologies of workers, such as journalists, models, performing
artists, etc., to the legal regime applicable to standard employees and, as an
important consequence thereof, the application of the rules of the general
social security system to these categories. Also, Article L.311-3 of the Social
Security Code lists the professional categories that are integrated in the
general scheme, such as managers of limited liability companies and pri-
vate limited liability companies with minority or egalitarian remuneration,
chairmen and chief executive officers of public limited companies and pri-
vate limited companies, and chairmen of the cooperative banking com-
panies. However, the French legislator has, up to now, chosen another
path for “gig workers”.
The Premises: The Mettling Report and the France Stratégie Report
The issue of digital labour and the awareness of digital transformation
with its consequences on the labour market has re-launched the debate.
Two reports were published in 2015 within a short period of time: the
Mettling report “Transformation numérique et vie au travail” (digital trans-
formation and life at work)19 and the France Stratégie20 report “Le Compte
personnel d’activité (CPA): de l’utopie au concret” (the personal activity ac-
count: from utopia to concrete practices).
For its part, the Mettling report lays out recommendations in order to
“reintegrate the new forms of work into our social protection scheme”.
The report underlines that digital technology is increasing the number of
freelancers and the porosity between salaried activity and other forms of
III.
1.
19 It follows various reports on the topic since 2013, but it is the first study on the
implications of the digital transformation for the workplace. This work was com-
plemented by studies entrusted to several major consulting firms and a survey car-
ried out among 4,500 young company managers. It is based on interviews with a
number of leading figures in the trade union sector, but also with consultants,
and has resulted in thirty-six recommendations.
20 Stratégie, administratively called “Commissariat général à la Stratégie et à la
Prospective” (CGSP), is an institution attached to the Prime Minister. Its objec-
tive is to contribute to the determination of the broad guidelines for the nation’s
future and the medium- and long-term objectives of its economic, social, cultural
and environmental development, as well as to the preparation of reforms.
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work. It demonstrates the need for a set of rights attached to the person
and transferable from one company to another, from one status to anoth-
er. The new forms of work must also contribute to the financing of social
protection. Recommendation No. 17 of 36 proposes to update the ju-
risprudence concerning the classification as a salaried worker, by introduc-
ing a wider range of criteria, such as the level of autonomy at work, the
exclusivity of services, the decision-making of remuneration, etc.
The France Stratégie’s report states that “no one knows exactly what its
consequences will be for work and employment, but it is clear that its
emergence calls into question the belief in a generalized trend towards a
monoactivity wage model. It is therefore important, as a matter of urgen-
cy, to rethink the mechanisms for the protection and support of individu-
als for a world where there will be a plurality of activities and statutes”. In
2016, France Stratégie published another report called “Nouvelles formes de
travail et de la protection des actifs” (New forms of work and protection of
the workforce). It stresses the new risks to consider (fluctuation in rev-
enues for independent workers, accidents and disease for freelancers and
nomadic workers) and exposes (not so surprisingly) the different options
for a new social protection scheme, namely (i) to maintain the distinction
between employment and independent work, while broadening the scope
of salaried work and improving transition security, or (ii) to create a third
status for economically dependent self-employed workers, or (iii) to go be-
yond the distinction between employment and independent work, while
establishing a unique worker’s status.
The CESE (Conseil économique, social et environnemental) has also recom-
mended21 to develop the social dialogue between public authorities, social
partners and representative bodies of the self-employed; to promote the re-
sponsibility of third parties (social responsibility of platforms and BEC, ex-
tension of the status of “entrepreneur-salarié”, etc.); to secure the social
rights of the new independent workers, especially by allowing workers on
digital platforms to benefit from unemployment insurance in case of total
21 Thiéry, Sophie, Les nouvelles formes du travail indépendant, in: Les Avis du CESE,
Journal officiel de la République Française, November 2017, https://www.lecese.fr
/sites/default/files/pdf/Avis/2017/2017_25_travail_independant.pdf. Accessed 16
July 2020;
Conseil économique social et environnemental - The Economic, Social and Environ-
mental Council (ESEC) is a constitutional consultative assembly. It represents key
economic, social and environmental fields, promoting cooperation between dif-
ferent socio-professional interest groups and ensuring they are part of the process
of shaping and reviewing public policy.
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revenue loss. An IGAS report has discussed various scenarios regarding the
extension of the unemployment scheme to the self-employed.22
Legislative Attempts
The legislative attempts are exclusively aimed at “Uber drivers” or “VTC
drivers”.23 No overall rule for platform workers has been adopted yet.
First Attempt: Law on Work, Modernising the Social Dialogue of 2016
VTC platforms owe their success to a reduction in transaction costs (lack
of taximeters and dispatchers, integrated payment system), better alloca-
tion of resources (increased vehicle utilisation rate, reduced waiting time)
and, in principle, more efficient price information than taxis. Tensions be-
tween French taxi drivers and VTC (Uber) drivers in 2015, with Uber
drivers and taxi drivers taking aim – literally – at each other’s cars have
prompted the French legislator to become active. The so-called “Labour
Law” of August 201624 has established a legal framework under which the
relations between some digital platforms and workers are regulated and,
above all, has established a definition of collaborative platforms. The legis-
lator has defined the scope of its intervention. An “electronic platform”
(this is the terminology in the French Labour Code) is understood as a
“company that irrespective of its place of establishment puts into electron-
ic contact a client and a worker, with the purpose of selling or exchanging
a good or service”. This definition echoes the definition of Article L.111-7
of the French Consumer Code, which considers as an online platform
provider “any natural or legal person offering, on a professional basis, in-
cluding for free, an online communication service to the public that is
2.
a)
22 Inspection Générale des Affaires Sociales (IGAS), Rapport: Ouverture de l’Assur-
ance chômage aux travailleurs indépendants, No. 2017-096R, October 2017, http:/
/www.igas.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Rapport-Assurance_chomage_independants.pdf.
Accessed 16 July 2020. The IGAS is the French Government audit, evaluation and
inspection office for health, social security, social cohesion, employment and
labour policies and organisations.
23 French law distinguishes “taxis”, heirs of cabs and then of so-called square cars,
and “transport vehicles with drivers”, heirs of so-called discount cars.
24 Law No. 2016-1088 of 8 August 2016 (regarding work and modernising the social
dialogue), in: JORF, No. 0184, 9 August 2016.
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based on: 1) ranking or referencing contents, goods or services offered or
uploaded by third parties by using computerised algorithms; 2) allowing
several parties to get in contact with one another for the sale of goods, the
provision of services or the exchange or sharing of content, goods or ser-
vices”.
It also created a social responsibility for platforms by inserting Articles
L.7341-1 to L.7341-6 into the Labour Code. According to Article L.7342-1
of the Labour Code, “when the platform determines the characteristics of
the service provided or the good sold and fixes its price, it has, with regard
to the workers concerned, a social responsibility that is exercised under the
conditions provided for in this chapter”. Article 60 of the so-called “loi tra-
vail” conferred two specific rights concerning social protection on plat-
form workers. The regulation supports platform workers in receiving pro-
fessional training and introduces coverage against accidents at work to
these platform workers. This provision does not apply to all platforms, but
only to those that determine the characteristics of the service provided or
of the goods sold, and that fix the price of the service.25
The first part of this social responsibility requires the platform to cover
insurance costs related to the risk of occupational accidents.26 Platforms
must either reimburse the contributions paid by self-employed workers in
respect of their subscription to an insurance covering the risk of accident
at work or their subscription to voluntary insurance against accident at
work,27 or otherwise offer self-employed workers a collective insurance
contract covering the risk of accidents at work.28 When the self-employed
worker has taken out insurance covering the risk of accidents at work or
joins the voluntary insurance scheme for accidents at work, the costs are
covered by the platform if the self-employed worker has achieved a
turnover greater than or equal to 13 percent of the annual social security
ceiling.29 For 2020, the annual social security ceiling is EUR 40,524. The
worker’s turnover must therefore be equal to or above EUR 5,268.12
(EUR 40,524 x 13 percent). Where the self-employed person works for sev-
eral collaborative platforms, the costs shall be reimbursed by each of them
in proportion to the turnover which the self-employed person has achieved
25 Article L.7342-1 of the Labour Code.
26 Desbarrats, Isabelle, Quel statut social pour les travailleurs des plateformes
numériques? La RSE en renfort de la loi, in: Droit social, (2017) 11, p. 971.
27 Article L.7242-2 para. 1 of the Labour Code.
28 Article L.7242-2 para. 2 of the Labour Code.
29 Article D.7342-1 of the Labour Code.
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through it, in relation to the total turnover which he has achieved through
the platforms.30
The contribution due by the platform is equal to the contribution due
for voluntary insurance against accidents at work and occupational dis-
eases, assessed by means of an annual salary lower than a minimum deter-
mined on 1 April of each year calculated on the basis of the change in the
annual average of consumer prices, excluding tobacco, published by the
National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies on the penultimate
month preceding the date of revaluation of the benefits concerned.31 The
rate of the voluntary insurance contribution is equal to 80 percent of the
rate of the contribution for accidents at work and occupational diseases
fixed for the same type of activity.32 The maximum amount of contribu-
tion paid by the platform will therefore be calculated as follows33: accident
rate × 80 percent × reference minimum wage.
The overall financing of social security is concerned: each self-employed
person can deduct the cost of this insurance from his revenue. The decree
specifies that the worker who wishes to be reimbursed for these costs must
apply to the platform, justifying the costs and indicating the turnover
achieved. This request can be made online and free of charge. The plat-
form must inform its workers of the existence of such repayment terms.34
If the aforementioned conditions are met, the platform reimburses contri-
butions up to a ceiling equal to the contribution due under the voluntary
insurance for accidents at work and occupational diseases, calculated on
the basis of the minimum wage.35
The platform is exempt from this obligation if the worker adheres to the
collective insurance contract the platform puts in place for its workers,
provided that the platform contract offers guarantees at least equivalent to
those provided for by the individual insurance.36 In the absence of any in-
dication to the contrary, it does not seem that the worker must subscribe
to the collective insurance contract put in place by the platform. There-
fore, it would seem that the worker who prefers to take out voluntary or
individual insurance rather than subscribe to the collective insurance con-
30 Article D.7342-4 of the Labour Code.
31 The Decree of 4 May 2017 and the Interministerial Circular published on 8 July
2017.
32 Article D.24-6-11 of the Social Security Code.
33 Circular DGT-RT1-DGEFP-SDPFC-DSS-2C 2017-256 of 8 June 2017.
34 Article D.7342-5 of the Labour Code.
35 Article D.7342-2 of the Labour Code.
36 Article L.7342-2 of the Labour Code.
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tract will be able to obtain the reimbursement of contributions paid.
When the worker subscribes to a collective contract that includes guaran-
tees at least equivalent to those provided for in the voluntary insurance for
accidents at work, the contribution to this contract is entirely paid by the
platform.37
Many platforms have partnered with insurance companies to offer insu-
rance policies for accident and liability protection. Uber announced a part-
nership with AXA in July 2017, and in May 2018 it declared that it was ex-
panding the partnership on a European scale. Deliveroo also entered into a
partnership with AXA in March 2017. On their part, Brigad – a platform
connecting companies from all sectors with qualified freelancers and spe-
cialists in the hotel and restaurant business – offers its self-employed part-
ners (known as “Brigaders”) access to complementary health care at a ne-
gotiated rate, with progressive reimbursement by the platform according
to the worker's level of activity. There is no actual discussion on this topic
but a recent report of the French Senate states that these attempts to build
up private social protection beyond the social security system might be un-
successful given that “while they may be beneficial to workers, these initia-
tives fall short of genuine social protection in the face of major risks, in
particular that of accidents at work”.38
Second Attempt: Law to Choose One’s Professional Future of 2018
In a second attempt the so-called “Law to Choose One’s Professional Fu-
ture”39 the legislator tried to include additional provisions that would have
given platforms the possibility to set up a “social charter” in favour of these
workers. The purpose of this charter was to afford workers a higher level of
protection while setting aside any risk of reclassification of the contractual
relationship as an employer-employee relationship. Thus, the Constitution-
al Council has declared that the article related to Article 66 of the Law was
b)
37 Article L.7342-2 al. 2 of the Labour Code.
38 De Forssier, Michel/Fournier, Catherine/Puissat, Frédérique, Travailleurs des plate-
formes: au-delà de la question du statut, quelles protections? Rapport d’Informa-
tion No. 452 (2019-2020). Fait au nom de la commission des affaires sociales, 20
Mai 2020.
39 Law No. 2018-771 of 5 September 2018.
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adopted according to a procedure contrary to the Constitution and there-
fore void.40
Law on Mobilities of 2019
Following this unsuccessful attempt, the measure reappeared in the draft
of a “Law on Mobilities” (Loi d’orientation des mobilités), presented by the
Council of the Ministers on 26 November 2018 and adopted by the Na-
tional Assembly on 19 November 2019, and is still under discussion at the
Parliament; it offers platforms to voluntarily enter into a charter additional
social rights for the self-employed in return for the non-reclassification of a
legal relationship of subordination between the platforms and the workers.
Article 20 of the Law foresees that, through a charter, platforms offer addi-
tional social rights to self-employed workers. Among the various provi-
sions relating to VTC platforms the Law encourages the latter to set up so-
cial responsibility charters (forthcoming Articles L.7342-8 and L.7342-9 of
the Labour Code). This Article states that “the platform may establish a
charter determining the terms and conditions for the exercise of its social
responsibility, defining its rights and obligations as well as those of the
workers with whom it is in contact”. Concerning social protection, the Ar-
ticle adds that the charter specifies in particular “under its point 8° the sup-
plementary social protection guarantees negotiated by the platform and
from which workers may benefit, in particular for the coverage of the risk
of death, risks affecting the physical integrity of the person or linked to
maternity, risks of incapacity for work or disability, as well as the provision
of benefits in the form of retirement pensions, allowances or bonuses for
retirement”. This charter must first be validated by the administration re-
sponsible for measuring its relevance.
On 27 November 2019, the Constitutional Council was called on by
more than 60 Members of the National Assembly in an ex ante review pro-
c)
40 Constitutional Council Decision No. 2018-769 DC of 4 September 2018 “The last
sentence of the first paragraph of Article 45, last sentence, of the Constitution
states: “Without prejudice to the application of Articles 40 and 41, any amend-
ment shall be admissible at first reading if it is related, even indirectly, to the text
tabled or transmitted”. Introduced at first reading, Article 66 does not have any
link, even indirectly, with the provisions contained in the bill tabled on the Na-
tional Assembly’s desk. It was therefore adopted according to a procedure con-
trary to the Constitution”.
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cedure41 especially on Article 20. The Members of the National Assembly,
who referred the matter to the Constitutional Council, questioned the var-
ious aspects of this reform. The authors of the referral deplored the purely
“optional” nature of the social responsibility charter. In addition, the un-
certainties surrounding the legal value and normative scope of this charter
raised questions about its opposability. They also emphasised the presump-
tion of a non-salaried status for platform workers. According to them, the
option would seek to circumvent the judicial judge’s case law on the sub-
ordination relationship, whereas in a judgment of 28 November 2018, the
Social Chamber of the Court of Cassation opened the way for a possible
reclassification in relation to employee benefits.42 The legislator would
thus have favoured as far as possible the legal security of the economic
model of platforms to the detriment of the effective protection of the “self-
employed” in their relationship with these platforms. The initiators of the
referral also complained that the legislator had confined himself to listing
eight mandatory topics to be included in the charter without specifying
the minimum social guarantees that should apply to platform workers. Fi-
nally, the wording of the provisions concerned would establish, for several
reasons, a difference in treatment between self-employed persons in rela-
tion to a platform and that of other self-employed persons. According to
the law providing for the scope of the charter to be reserved for workers on
VTC, not all self-employed workers would be covered, nor even all work-
ers independent of electronic contact platforms. On the other hand, there
would also be a breach of equality between self-employed workers in rela-
tion to a platform having established a charter and those in relation with a
platform that has not engaged in this approach.
41 The Constitutional Council is seized on a mandatory basis with organic laws and
the regulations of the Houses of Parliament prior to promulgation of the former
and prior to the entry into force of the latter.
42 Cour de cassation, Social Chamber, 28 November 2018, No. 1720079 FPPBRI. In
this case, a rider filed a claim before the Court to obtain the reclassification of the
relationship with Take Eat Easy into an employment contract. The Labour Cham-
ber of the Court of Cassation admitted the status of employee, on the grounds
that the platform included a geo-tracking system to monitor the rider’s position
in real time and record the number of kilometers ridden. In addition, the compa-
ny held disciplinary power over the delivery rider (in particular based on the
bonus/malus system applied by the platform), and would give the rider instruc-
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The Constitutional Council has given its decision on 20 December
201943 regarding the conformity of the “Law on Mobilities” with the
French Constitution. Most of the provisions referred to the Constitutional
Council were validated, but the latter nevertheless censors the provision
which provided that compliance with the commitments established in the
charter cannot characterise a relationship of subordination between the
platform and the worker. For this matter, the Constitutional Council re-
calls that “while, in principle, workers in relation to a platform that has es-
tablished a charter exercise their activity independently, it is up to the
judge, in accordance with the Labour Code, to reclassify their relationship
as an employment contract when it is characterized by the existence of a
legal relationship of subordination”. Yet, the contested provisions were in-
tended to prevent such reclassification by the judge, which leads to a
change in the calculation of social security contributions and to sanctions
against the platform then considered as an employer.
New Sources of Financing in a Gig Economy: The Example of Rental of
Furnished Accommodation for Short Periods
France has adopted on 24 July 2019 a Digital Tax Bill.44 The tax consists of
a 3 percent levy applied to revenue derived from specific digital activities
by companies with a qualifying revenue of more than EUR 750 million
worldwide and EUR 25 million in France. The tax is applied retroactively
as of January 2019 with the first payments due in November 2019.45 As re-
IV.
43 Constitutional Council Decision No. 2019-794 DC of 20 December 2019.
44 Largely inspired by the EU Directive, for which no consensus was found.
45 The following services are subject to the DST:
“The supply, by electronic means, of a digital interface that allows users to contact
and interact with other users, including for the delivery of goods or services di-
rectly between those users”;
“Services provided to advertisers or their agents enabling them to purchase adver-
tising space located on a digital interface accessible by electronic means in order
to display targeted advertisements to users located in France, based on data pro-
vided by such users.
These services include, among others, the buying, stocking and diffusion of adver-
tising messages and the management and communication of users’ data.
The Law excludes from the scope the following services:
Direct sale of goods or services online;
Making a digital interface available as a primary means to provide users with digi-
tal content, communication services and payment services”.
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gards social contributions and, moreover, the financing of the basic social
security schemes, in principle all income derived from professional activi-
ties is subject to social contributions and results in affiliation to a social se-
curity regime (see above Section II). But the picture is a little more compli-
cated than that as shows the example of rental by private persons of fur-
nished accommodation. The rise of digital platforms in the economy of
seasonal rentals and their easy use have led to a tenfold increase in short-
term rentals: the social security contribution rules on the revenue generat-
ed by this type of activity largely via a digital platform (Airbnb, HomeAway,
HouseTrip, 9Flats, Wimdu, Abritel, SeLoger Vacances) shows the contradicto-
ry intentions of the legislator – which on the one hand tries to encourage
private initiative and new forms of earnings through digital platforms and,
on the other hand, wants these kind of earnings to contribute to the fi-
nancing of the social security system. The result is an extraordinarily com-
plex legislation especially because the legislator has chosen to keep the tra-
ditional categories and is only trying to adapt them to the “new economy”.
Definition(s)
The situation of people renting furnished accommodation for short peri-
ods has always been complex because there are two legal categories that
tenants now operating with digital platforms had to fit in: “bed and break-
fast” or “guest rooms” (chambre d’hôtes) and “furnished tourist accommo-
dation” (meublé de tourisme). The rental of bed and breakfast and furnished
accommodation is governed by the legislation concerning seasonal rentals,
i.e. the Tourism Code. As such, the stay may not exceed 90 consecutive
days whatever the form of short-term rental.
Bed and Breakfast
“Bed and breakfasts” are furnished rooms located in the home of a host
that are rented out for a fee, for one or more nights, accompanied by ser-
vices46 and in line with the rules of hygiene and sanitation47. The services
are a minimum: overnight stay, breakfast and the supply of household
1.
a)
46 Article L.324-3 of the Tourism Code.
47 Article D.324-14 of the Tourism Code.
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linen48. Tourists must be received by the host.49 The number of rooms
rented in the same dwelling may not exceed 5 and the number of persons
accommodated at the same time may not exceed 15.50
Furnished Tourist Accommodation
Furnished tourist accommodation means furnished villas, apartments or
studios, for the exclusive use of the tenant, offered for rent to a visiting
clientele who do not choose to live there and who are staying there for a
stay characterised by daily, weekly or monthly rentals (cf. Article L.324-1-1
of the Tourism Code).
Affiliation and Contributions
Bed and Breakfast
The will to promote the development of “non-professional” bed and break-
fast activities via a digital platform has led the legislator to introduce a
capped exemption of income from bed and breakfast rentals. When the an-
nual revenue (turnover excluding taxes) is less than 13 percent of the annu-
al social security ceiling (EUR 5,348) the lessor is exempt from social secu-
rity contributions because the rental activity is not of a professional na-
ture.51 The lessor is therefore not obliged to join the general scheme for
neither employees nor for the self-employed. However, when annual rev-
enues are below the above-mentioned threshold, they are subject to social
contributions on income from assets – namely, the CSG, the CRDS and
the solidarity levy52 – at the overall rate of 17.2 percent of taxable in-
come.53 If the income exceeds the cap, the bed and breakfast landlord affil-
iated to the general regime is subject to the rules of social security for self-




48 Articles D.324-13 and D. 324-14 of the Tourism Code.
49 Article D.324-13 of the Tourism Code.
50 Article D.324-13 of the Tourism Code.
51 Article D.611-1, II of the Social Security Code.
52 Ministry of social security DSS/SD5B/2013-100 of 14 March 2013, § 1-5.
53 Article L.136-8 of the Social Security Code; Ordinance No. 96-50 of 24 January
1996; Article 235 ter of the General Taxation Code.
54 Article L.611-1, 5 of the Social Security Code.
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Proprietorship (SP) or a Sole Proprietorship with Limited Liability (SPL)
for his rental activity and who benefits from the micro tax regime in calen-
dar year N is automatically subject to the micro entrepreneur social
scheme that same year.55 Turnover must not exceed EUR 176,200 in calen-
dar year N - 1 or N – 2.56
Furnished Tourist Accommodation
When the natural person’s gross annual income is less than or equal to
EUR 23,000, the lessor of furnished accommodation does not carry out a
rental activity on a professional basis and is not obliged to join the general
regime.57 Since 1 January 2017, it has been stipulated that rental activity is
regarded to be carried out on a professional basis, giving rise to contribu-
tions, when the natural person’s gross annual income exceeds EUR 23,000.
The lessor is obliged to join the general scheme as soon as this threshold is
reached.58 As soon as the annual income exceeds EUR 23,000 but does not
exceed EUR 70,000, the income from this self-employed activity is then
deemed to be of a professional nature and the person concerned can opt:
– to join the general social security scheme for employees;
– to join the self-employed scheme (Sécurité sociale des indépendants SSI);
– to join the micro-entrepreneur system within the SSI.
When the income exceeds EUR 70,000 in annual income, the income
from such self-employed activity is then of a professional nature and the
person concerned has the choice to join the general social security scheme;
if the annual income does not exceed EUR 85,800 the person has to join
the self-employed scheme SSI.59
b)
55 Official tax administration bulletin (BOFiP)-BIC-DECLA-10-40-10-
§ 100-01/06/2018.
56 Article 50-01.2 of the General Tax Code; Article L.613-7, I of the Social Security
Code.
57 Article L.611-1, 6 of the Social Security Code.
58 Article 155, IV 2 of the General Tax Code, Article L.611-1 6° of the Social Security
Code.
59 Article 293 B, I, 1 of the General Tax Code.
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Rental of Short-term Furnished Accommodation60










Maximum EUR 70,000 EUR 85,800 EUR 85,800
Basis for contributions Income Profit (Income- 60 per-
cent)
Anti-Fraud Measures: New Forms of Control
France has also reformed its laws and aims to facilitate the operations of
the platform economy. As work on a platform is done or organised via the
Internet and could easily escape the traditional regulatory framework, re-
porting often depends on the individual’s awareness and conscientious-
ness. Sometimes workers do not consider platform work as “work” and are
therefore unaware of their obligations.61 Article 10 of Law No. 2018-898 of
23 October 2018 relating to the fight against fraud modifies Article 242 bis
of the General Tax Code on the reporting obligations on platforms with
regard to users and the administration. This law simplifies the drafting of
the texts, by merging all the obligations of the platforms into a single Arti-
cle 242 bis of the General Tax Code. The main objective of the Anti-Fraud
Act is to require online platform operators to have a robust mechanism (i)
to inform their users about their tax and social obligations and (ii) to trans-
mit information to the tax authorities.
The Decree of 27 December 201862 issued for the application of Article
242 bis of the General Tax Code is thus a reminder of the fact that the plat-
forms are still required to inform the users, at the time of each transaction,
of “information relating to the tax regimes and social regulations applica-
V.
60 Bocquet, Michel/Bouvard, Michel/Canevet, Maurice/Carcenac, Thierry/Chiron, Jean/
Dallier, Pierre/Delahaye, Véronique/Gattolin, Arnaud/Guené, Claude/Lalande
Bruno/De Montgolfier Arnaud, Report made in the name of the finance committee
(1) on taxation and the collaborative economy: The Need for a Fair, Simple and
Unified System, No. 481, French Senate Ordinary Session 2016-2017, pp. 37-38.
61 European Social Insurance Platform (ESIP), Are Social Security Systems Adapted
to New Forms of Work Created by Digital Platforms?, 30 January 2019, https://esi
p.eu/images/pdf_docs/ESIP_Study_Platform_Work.pdf. Accessed 16 July 2020.
62 Arrêté of 27 December 2018 issued for the application of Article 242 bis of the
General Tax Code (NOR: CPAE1825922A).
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ble to these sums, the resulting reporting and payment obligations to the
tax authorities and social contribution collection agencies, as well as the
penalties incurred in the event of failure to meet these obligations”.63 The
decree also clarifies the thresholds above which these new platform report-
ing obligations are applicable. Pursuant to Article 242 bis of the General
Tax Code, platforms have to provide, in particular, the status of the indi-
vidual (statut de particulier) or professional indicated by the platform user
and the number and total gross amount of transactions carried out by the
user during the previous calendar year. The platforms must:
– provide for each transaction loyal, clear and transparent information
on the tax and social obligations of declaration and payment of the
lessor who carries out commercial transactions through the platform;64
– provide an electronic link to the websites of the administrations allow-
ing for compliance, where appropriate, with these obligations;
– send each year to the lessor an electronic document summarising the
sums received during the year through the platform;65
– send each year to the tax authorities a document summarising all the
information provided to the lessor.66
The assets concerned by the absence of a declaration are:
– furniture, household appliances and motor vehicles, with the exception
of works of art, antiques or collectibles for which the option provided
for in Article 150 VL of the General Tax Code has been exercised;
– furniture, other than precious metals, for which the sale price is less
than or equal to EUR 5,000.
However, this reporting exemption is limited to users whose cumulative
transactions over the year meet the following thresholds:
– the user has received income of less than EUR 3,000 over the entire
year;
– the number of transactions of the same user over the year is limited to
20.
Platforms have to send all this information electronically to the tax author-
ities by 31 January at the latest for users who have received more than
63 Article 23 L sexies of the General Tax Code.
64 Annex IV Articles 23 L sexies of the General Tax Code.
65 Article 242 bis, 2 of the General Tax Code, Annex IV Articles 23 L septies to 23 L
decies of the General Tax Code.
66 Article 242 bis, 3 of the General Tax Code.
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EUR 3,000 or made more than 20 transactions during the previous year.
This is the result of the implementation of the recommendation made by a
recent Commission expert report on Digital Transformation67 to set up a
“Single Digital Window in Europe” for the payment of taxes and contribu-
tions of platform workers that would allow a better fight against social se-
curity tax evasion, while being a further step towards a simplification of
procedures and a real single market for platform workers in Europe.68 This
annual reporting obligation by platforms has started to apply in January
2020 on the income received by users in 2019. In addition, it is now stipu-
lated that it is up to the tax authorities to send this information to the so-
cial security bodies (Article L.114-19-1 of the Social Security Code).
Conclusion
What can we learn from the French legislation on social security contribu-
tions facing the development of the “gig economy”? First of all, digital
platforms have, through their networking activities, not only changed con-
sumption habits but also the supply of certain services, creating new mar-
kets and, at times, distortions of competition. These upheavals have gener-
ated a legislation of social protection to the sometimes protective ambi-
tions of the beneficiaries, sometimes only as an incentive for the develop-
ment of the activity in question, or its restructuring. But the traditional
categories still remain, and the legislator did not wish or was not able to
create sui generis rules. The legislator has preferred to marginally modify
the already existing rules and create particular sub-categories of self-em-
ployment, to partially call into question already existing rules. The
question of financing social protection in a “new economy” has only been
tackled on the margins, under pressure from different groups with some-
times conflicting interests, which is reflected in a multitude of detailed
rules that do not respond to any overall logic but to situations that are
sometimes urgent but always high-profile. As a result, the Labour Code,
for example, which is in principle dedicated to employees, now contains
VI.
67 European Commission, Final Report of the High-Level Expert Group on the Im-
pact of the Digital Transformation on EU Labour Markets, April 2019, Luxem-
bourg: Publications Office of the European Union 2019, p. 42, https://ec.europa.e
u/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-impact-digital
-transformation-eu-labour-markets. Accessed 16 July 2020.
68 Viossat, Laurent-Charles, Les enjeux clés de la protection sociale des travailleurs de
plateforme, in: Regards, 55 (2019) 1, p. 85.
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rules for the self-employed and organises private insurance contracts with
reference to the rules on industrial injuries in the Social Security Code –
mysterious and complex ways indeed.
It must be noticed that an unprecedented collaboration between the tax
and social security authorities has been not only initiated but written
down in the law. Only specific issues related to specific social crises (e.g.
catastrophic social situation of self-employed service providers related to a
platform and anarchic development of rentals by private individuals) were
dealt with. It is to be feared that the foreseeable abysmal deficits in the so-
cial security health insurance for 2020, following the sanitary crisis linked
to COVID-19, will relegate the difficult issue of work via digital platforms
to the background from which it had only sporadically emerged.
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Chapter 11 
New Forms of Employment and Innovative Ways for the




The spreading of new forms of work performance is not a new topic as the
various ways of how people work have been changeable. Performance of
short-time work-tasks (gigs)1, working via platforms, renting (sharing) of
dwelling space via platforms and obtaining income from it – they are all
ways of performing work which ensure considerable income for a person.
In some cases, it is ancillary activity which earns a person additional in-
come. In other cases, it is a form of entrepreneurship that ensures the main
income to a person. In the literature of labour law the new forms of work
performance are discussed on a wide basis.2
New forms of work and changes in working conditions also challenge
the social protection system, which must support employment, the econo-
my and the well-being of society as a whole. As social protection requires
resources, the important questions are how to finance social protection in
I.
1 Duszyński, Maciej, Gig Economy: Definition, Statistics & Trends [2020 Update],
https://zety.com/blog/gig-economy-statistics?gclid=CjwKCAjwte71BRBCEiwAU_V
9h8jAgjCA9UmO2Eq8c51uiiT5f4pVQiosRk_uU1DSoJU1_2QeiHbArxoC0_wQAv
D_BwE. Accessed 12 May 2020.
2 See e.g. Perulli, Adalberto, The Legal and Jurisprudential Evolution of the Notion of
Employee, in: European Labour Law Journal, 11 (2020) 2, pp. 117-130, https://doi.
org/10.1177/2031952520905145. Accessed 12 May 2020. Risak, Martin/Dullinger,
Thomas, The Concept of “Worker” in EU Law: Status Quo and Potential for
Change, ETUI, 2018, https://www.etui.org/Publications2/Reports/The-concept-of-
worker-in-EU-law-status-quo-and-potential-for-change. Accessed 12 May 2020. For
Estonia: Erikson, Merle/Rosin, Annika, Legal Position of Workers: An Employee or
Independent Servant? (Tuleviku töötegija õiguslik staatus: Töötaja või iseseisev
teenusepakkuja?), in Estonian, https://www.riigikogu.ee/wpcms/wp-content/uploa
ds/2018/08/T%C3%B6%C3%B6tegija-%C3%B5iguslik-staatus.pdf. Accessed 12 May
2020.
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changed situations and how to simplify the collection of the necessary
means for financing social protection. Consequently, it is important that
the social protection system is able to provide sufficient and adequate pro-
tection for all those who are engaged in some form of activity. This does
not necessarily have to be a permanent activity. It is sufficient when work
is ensured through a number of different short-term activities and short-
term incomes.
Legislation in the area of social protection is widely based on the classi-
cal definition and principles regarding the employee (employment rela-
tionship) providing that both – the employer and the employee – must
contribute to social protection. Under circumstances in which it is not
clear whether the person performing work is an employee or not, there are
considerable limits to ensuring social protection. When, as is common, the
state collects the income tax based on the worker’s income, these taxes and
contributions required for social protection do not have to be related to in-
come only, but to the person receiving the income (and the activity per-
formed). Usually social protection is ensured to a person in a dependent
employment relationship. In single cases it is possible to provide protec-
tion also to sole proprietors.
This chapter analyses the scope of regulation of the social protection leg-
islation in Estonia and options of how new workers (platform workers)
can make sure they are covered by the required social protection schemes
(pension insurance, unemployment insurance, health insurance). New ini-
tiatives by the Estonian legislator in the field of financing social protection
in order to protect platform workers are also discussed.
New Forms of Employment
New options of work performance have spread in the Estonian economy.
There are numerous ways in which work can be performed via different
platforms. At the same time, there are micro entrepreneurs in Estonia who
earn income from entrepreneurship and have to pay only the income tax





https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002, am 02.12.2021, 16:03:18
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
New ways of work performance have not been regulated in the Estonian
legislation. According to the changes in the Public Transport Act3 the plan
had been to regulate the ridesharing service; however, significant differ-
ences in comparison with the prototypical taxi service are not provided.
The contractual relationship has remained unregulated on the legislative
level, and due to that decisions on the respective type of relationship have
to be made on an individual basis (whether employment relationship or
any other relationship under the law of obligations).
According to different data, at least 8 percent of the Estonian working-
age population is partially involved in new forms of work performance.4
Therefore, the need for social protection covering new forms of work per-
formance must not be underestimated. According to the Employment
Contracts Act, wages must be presented in the employment contract as a
gross amount.5 This requirement is relevant so that the employee does not
lose his salary if the state stipulates a reduction in certain payments. With-
holding social security payments and taxes is the responsibility of the em-
ployer.
Apart from the common forms of platform work, e.g. car sharing ser-
vices, courier services, house sharing through airbnb, sharing short-term
jobs (gigs) is common in Estonia. The sharing of gigs takes place through a
platform where companies can offer short-term employment and employ-
ees can enter into short-term contracts. With jobs offered through such a
platform, employees can perform a variety of gigs without having to com-
mit to a particular company for the long term. Such an opportunity opens
up a chance to work under different fixed-term employment contracts6
3 Sections 65 and 66 of the Public Transport Act (Ühistranspordiseadus) - RT I, 23
March 2015, 2, English translation https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/518012019010
/consolide. Accessed 12 May 2020.
4 See: https://www.riigikogu.ee/arenguseire-keskus/platvormitoo-saanud-eesti-inimes
te-jaoks-oluliseks-lisasissetuleku-allikaks/. Accessed 12 May 2020. According to a
survey carried out in Latvia, the spreading of new forms of work performance is
significantly more modest being only 1 percent. Piasna, Agnieszka/Drahokoupil, Jan,
Digital Labour in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from the ETUI Internet
and Platform Work Survey, ETUI, 2020, https://www.etui.org/node/31491. Ac-
cessed 12 May 2020.
5 Section 29 of the Employment Contracts Act (Töölepingu seadus) - RT I 2009, 5,
35, English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/509052019005/consolide.
Accessed 12 May 2020.
6 The possibility to apply fixed-term employment contracts is important in this case
of employment. According to the Health Insurance Act, an important condition is
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without the employee having to be associated with a specific company for
a longer period of time.
Telework can no longer be regarded as a new form of work. Although
teleworking means that the employee does not have to be physically
present at an office all the time, teleworking is indicative of a clearly iden-
tifiable employment relationship as well as of a dependent employment re-
lationship connected to social security coverage. Self-employment is not
considered a new form of employment. In a situation where a person is
self-employed7, work is regulated separately at the legislative level. Self-em-
ployment can be considered as one form of entrepreneurship. Due to the
current legal framework, in order to be self-employed, a person must regis-
ter in the Commercial Register.
Scope of Regulation of the Social Protection Rights
The Constitutional Framework of Social Protection8
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, a person has the
right of receiving support from the state in the following cases: old age,
loss of provider, incapacity for work or need. Concurrently, every person is
entitled to health protection as stipulated by the Constitution.9 The scope
of support and the terms and conditions for receiving benefits are estab-
III.
1.
that the employment contract lasts at least one month. If the duration of the em-
ployment contract is shorter than one month, the employee does not receive the
health insurance protection prescribed by law. Section 5 of the Health Insurance
Act (Ravikindlustuse seadus) - RT I 2002, 62, 377, English translation: https://www.
riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/524042020006/consolide. Accessed 12 May 2020.
7 In Estonian: füüsilisest isikust ettevõtja, sometimes the official English translation is
“sole proprietor”.
8 Also: Merusk, Kalle/Tavits, Gaabriel, Der Schutz der sozialen Grundrechte in der
Rechtsordnung Estlands, in: Iliopoulos-Strangas, Julia (ed.), Soziale Grundrechte
in den “neuen” Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union, Baden-Baden: Nomos,
2019, pp. 81-139; Tavits, Gaabriel, Estonia, in: The Right to Social Security in the
Constitutions of the World: Broadening the Moral and Legal Space for Social Jus-




9 § 28, The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia (Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus) - RT
1992, 26, 349, English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/521052015001/
consolide. Accessed 12 May 2020.
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lished by the law. It is the legislator’s task to ensure a minimum level of
social protection.
Within the meaning of the constitutional context, the right to health
protection does not automatically mean a right to health insurance for ev-
eryone.10 The right to health insurance is established for a person when so-
cial tax is paid by or on behalf of the person, or in cases where the person
is insured according to the law. In the latter case, health insurance is en-
sured according to the legislation irrespective of the payment of social tax.
According to the Estonian Health Insurance Act, health insurance is pro-
vided to all people who work on the basis of an employment contract or in
the civil service and for whom the employer pays the necessary taxes.11 If a
person has no income, or if no tax required for health insurance is paid by
the person or on behalf of the latter, then no health insurance protection is
guaranteed. The right to health protection in the Constitution denotes a
person’s right to emergency care.12 The state pays for this kind of care irre-
spective of whether a person is covered by health insurance or not.
The constitutional right to get support from the state in case of need pri-
marily denotes a situation in which a person has the right to get protection
under the social welfare regulation. The person is entitled to receive sup-
port only when he has no personal resources and support provided by the
state is the only option to improve the person’s economic situation. The
option to receive support due to age, loss of provider and incapacity for
work primarily depends on the circumstances under which, irrespective of
the person, the latter is not able to earn any income and due to which the
state is obliged to support the person.13
10 Nõmper, Ants/Annus, Taavi, The Right to Health Protection in the Estonian Con-
stitution, in: Juridica International, (2002) 7, https://www.juridicainternational.eu
/public/pdf/ji_2002_1_117.pdf. Accessed 2 May 2020.
11 Section 5 (1) of the Health Insurance Act (Ravikindlustuse seadus) - RT I 2002,
62, 377, English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/524042020006/cons
olide. Accessed 12 May 2020.
12 Section 6 of the Health Services Organisation Act (Tervishoiuteenuste korral-
damise seadus) - RT I 2001, 50, 284, English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.e
e/en/eli/529042020006/consolide. Accessed 12 May 2020.
13 This provision by its essence is taken over from the Constitution empowered in
1938. See: Siimets-Gross, Hesi, Social and Economic Fundamental Rights in Estoni-
an Constitutions between World Wars I and II: A Vanguard or Rearguard of Eu-
rope?, in: Juridica International, (2005) 10, https://www.juridicainternational.eu/p
ublic/pdf/ji_2005_1_135.pdf. Accessed 12 May 2020. The Constitution of the
Republic of Estonia is rather modest in regard to guaranteeing social rights and
only a minimal catalogue of social rights is provided. See also: Alexy, Robert,
Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses, in: Juridica, 2001, https://www.juridica.ee/article.
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The wording of the Constitution, as well as the current interpretation,
does not specify who should receive aid and under what conditions such
aid should be provided. Since, according to the Constitution, the receipt of
state aid is directly regulated through an ordinary law, the legislator has to
decide in each case under what conditions and to whom the specific aid
must be granted. According to the Constitution, all citizens of the Repub-
lic of Estonia and, in cases prescribed by law, also aliens have the right to
state aid.14 The Constitution does not stipulate any particular forms of em-
ployment or economic activities for persons to be entitled (whether they
are self-employed, employed under an employment contract, employed on
a short-term basis, etc.). Thus, according to the Constitution, social securi-
ty protection is to be universal regardless of the economic activity in which
a particular person is engaged. Pursuant to § 29 of the Constitution, every-
one has the right to freely choose his or her field of activity and profession.
Consequently, if such freedom is guaranteed pursuant to § 29 of the Con-
stitution, then in order to ensure the necessary social protection, the free-
dom provided for in the Constitution in choosing a profession and field of
activity must be taken into account. Thus, if a person is free to choose an
activity, this must be accompanied by the state-guaranteed social protec-
tion. A person must be able to receive state aid against the social risks pro-
vided for in § 28 of the Constitution, regardless of the form of economic
activity or field which the person has freely chosen on the basis of the Con-
stitution.15
As mentioned above, the social security system in Estonia today is main-
ly based on the fact that social benefits are provided to people who pay so-
cial tax or other social security contributions themselves or for whom such
tax or contributions are paid. When dealing with circumstances under
which a person receives some income from his activity, it does not automa-
tically mean that he is guaranteed social security benefits. All people who
exercise new forms of employment run the risk of not being covered by
health insurance or unemployment insurance and they might have no op-
portunity to contribute to the pension insurance. Although § 28 of the
php?uri=2001_eriv_ljaanne_p_hi_igused_eesti_p_hiseaduses. Accessed 12 May
2020.
14 § 28, Comment 23, The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. Comments
(Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne), Tallinn: Juura, 2017,
https://www.pohiseadus.ee/. Accessed 12 May 2020.
15 § 28, Comments 19, 20, 23, The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. Com-
ments (Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne), Tallinn: Juura,
2017, https://www.pohiseadus.ee/. Accessed 12 May 2020.
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Constitution gives everyone the right to turn to the state for aid in the
event of the risks specified in the Constitution, this right can be signifi-
cantly adjusted (restricted) on the grounds of law. Consequently, the Con-
stitution of the Republic of Estonia does not guarantee universal access to
the social protection system.
Pursuant to the Constitution, the General Part of the Social Code Act
specifies the purpose of social protection. According to Section 2 (2) of the
General Part of the Social Code Act,16 the objective of social protection is
to support and increase a person’s independent living and social inclusion,
create equal opportunities, achieve a high level of employment, prevent
unemployment, and support reconciliation of work and private life. The
goal of the Social Code has been determined in Section 1 (1). The Social
Code will contribute to ensuring social rights protected by the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Estonia, European Union law, and international
agreements binding on the Republic of Estonia. As one can see, the Gener-
al Part of the Social Code Act will also form part of the general principles
determined in § 28 of the Constitution.
Benefits Included in the Social Protection System and Personal Scope
Estonian social benefits can be divided into two categories depending on
the way in which the benefits are financed: 1) benefits which can be pro-
vided to persons working in an employment relationship where contribu-
tions are paid; 2) benefits paid from the state budget – in this case it is not
important for the receipt of the benefit whether separate taxes/contribu-
tions are paid, and it is also not important which kind of economic activity
the entitled person is engaged in.
Social protection benefits for the receipt of which different special-pur-
pose payments are required are:
(1) state pension insurance,
(2) health insurance,
(3) unemployment insurance,
(4) mandatory funded pension.
2.
16 General Part of the Social Code Act (Sotsiaalseadustiku üldosa seadus) - RT I, 13
March 2019, 157, English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/52103201
9012/consolide. Accessed 12 May 2020.
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Different legal acts concerning social protection define the scope of appli-
cation in a different way, and the circle of insured people is also different.
However, the common feature is the fact that the insurees have a perma-
nent income primarily based on an employment contract or work in the
civil service. Without the legal basis mentioned above, no corresponding
insurance payments have to be paid and no insurance protection is provid-
ed. Therefore, social protection is, in the first place, guaranteed to people
who work in dependent employment relationships. If work is performed
based on the contract under the Law of Obligations Act17 and without the
existence of a dependent employment relationship, the obligation to pay
social protection contributions exists, but the minimum level for contribu-
tions can be determined.18
According to the State Pension Insurance Act, the following are consid-
ered to be persons covered by pension insurance:19
(1) persons who, pursuant to the Social Tax Act, pay the pension insu-
rance part of social tax or for whom it must be paid;
(2) persons for whom the right to receive a state pension is derived from
other bases pursuant to this Act.
Due to the regulation mentioned, the important criterion is not work itself
or the nature of work; the important aspect is to make sure social tax is
paid. Whether the payment of social tax is guaranteed by the employer or
another person is irrelevant to the provision of social protection. What re-
ally matters is that social tax obligations are fulfilled and that social tax in
both pension insurance and health insurance budgets is collected.
17 Law of Obligations Act (Võlaõigusseadus) - RT I 2001, 81, 487, English transla-
tion: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/515012020004/consolide. Accessed 12 May
2020.
18 Section 5(2) 4) 5) of the Health Insurance Act (Ravikindlustuse seadus) - RT I
2002, 62, 377, English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/52404202000
6/consolide. Accessed 12 May 2020. In such a situation it is not necessary to be
registered as self-employed. In situations were the services are granted based on a
civil law contract, the person who receives services has to pay also social security
taxes and contributions, see Section 9 (1) 2 of the Social Tax Act (Sotsiaalmaksuse-
adus) - RT I 2000, 102, 675, English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/
527042020012/consolide. Accessed 12 May 2020.
19 Section 3 of the State Pension Insurance Act (Riikliku pensionikindlustuse
seadus) - RT I 2001, 100, 648, English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/el
i/530042020003/consolide. Accessed 12 May 2020.
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According to the Health Insurance Act20, the circle of persons covered
by health insurance is divided into three different categories:
(1) persons for whom the corresponding insurance tax must be paid. The
health insurance part of the social tax is usually paid by the employer,
in some cases also by the state (e.g. if the person is in the military ser-
vice of the Defence Forces). In the case of persons registered as unem-
ployed, the social tax necessary for obtaining health insurance is paid,
for example, by the Unemployment Insurance Fund;
(2) self-employed persons who have to pay social tax themselves in order
to receive health insurance cover; as mentioned above, there is an obli-
gation for self-employed persons to register in the Commercial Regis-
ter;
(3) persons treated as insurees. There is no obligation for these persons to
pay social tax (this group includes, for example, pregnant women, chil-
dren up to the age of 19, persons receiving a state pension21).
The Unemployment Insurance Act defines protected persons differently
than the State Pension Insurance Act and the State Health Insurance Act.
20 Section 5, Health Insurance Act (Ravikindlustuse seadus) - RT I 2002, 62, 377,
English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/524042020006/consolide.
Accessed 12 May 2020.
21 Section 5(4) of the Estonian Health Insurance Fund Act (Eesti Haigekassa seadus)
- RT I 2000, 57, 374, English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/527122
019003/consolide. Accessed 12 May 2020.
Persons equal to the insured are:
1) pregnant women whose pregnancy has been identified by a doctor or a mid-
wife;
2) persons under 19 years of age;
3) persons who receive a state pension granted in Estonia;
4) persons who have been found to have partial work ability or no work ability
under the Work Ability Allowance Act;
5) persons with up to five years left until attaining the retirement age who are
maintained by their spouses who are insured persons;
6) persons acquiring basic or general secondary education, persons acquiring for-
mal vocational education and higher education students who are permanent resi-
dents of Estonia and study in an educational institution in Estonia founded and
operating on the basis of legislation or in an equivalent educational institution
abroad, except for doctoral candidates that receive the doctoral allowance; 
7) a monk or a nun who is a member of a cloister registered in the register of reli-
gious associations.
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Pursuant to Section 3 (1) of the Unemployment Insurance Act22, the fol-
lowing persons are deemed to be protected by unemployment insurance:
employees, officials, natural persons providing services on the basis of a
contract under the law of obligations, public conciliators, members of a ru-
ral municipality or city government, rural municipality or city district el-
ders, a non-working spouse accompanying an official on a long-term as-
signment abroad, and a non-working spouse accompanying an official
serving in a foreign mission of the Republic of Estonia. All persons men-
tioned must have paid the unemployment insurance contributions on the
basis of and pursuant to the procedure provided in the Unemployment In-
surance Act. In addition to the type of activity, a fact that is also relevant is
that a person covered by unemployment insurance must have paid unem-
ployment insurance contributions. Without contribution payments, the
insured person will not have completed the unemployment insurance peri-
od, and in the absence of the unemployment insurance period, the unem-
ployed person will not be able to receive the unemployment insurance
benefits prescribed by law.
The above types of insurance are public. The state pension insurance is
administered by the Social Insurance Board, an agency under the Ministry
of Social Affairs. The Estonian Health Insurance Fund23 is responsible for
state health insurance. The Estonian Health Insurance Fund is a legal per-
son in public law. This status means that it is a public body, but not a state
agency. The activities of the Estonian Health Insurance Fund are adminis-
tered by the management board and supervisory board. At the same time,
the supervisory board of the Estonian Health Insurance Fund operates on
the basis of the tripartite principle. The supervisory board of the Estonian
Health Insurance Fund includes representatives of employees, employers
and the state. There is only one health insurance fund in Estonia. The Esto-
nian Unemployment Insurance Fund is also a legal person in public law. It
is not a state agency and the Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund is
not subordinate to any ministry. The activities of the Estonian Unemploy-
ment Insurance Fund are also managed by the Management Board and the
Supervisory Board. The Supervisory Board consists of representatives of
22 Unemployment Insurance Act (Töötuskindlustuse seadus) - RT I 2001, 59, 359,
English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/530042020008/consolide.
Accessed 12 May 2020.
23 Section 5 of the Estonian Health Insurance Fund Act (Eesti Haigekassa seadus) -
RT I 2000, 57, 374, English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/5271220
19003/consolide. Accessed 12 May 2020.
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employers, employees and the state. In Estonia there is one unemployment
insurance fund.
The last type of social protection that is relevant in the context of this
chapter is the mandatory funded pension.24 The mandatory funded pen-
sion is also called the second pillar of the pension system. Due to its gener-
al objectives, the mandatory funded pension is supplementary to the state
pension insurance, and one of the main goals of this pension is to provide
additional income for individuals of retirement age. With its initial pur-
pose, the mandatory funded pension is supported by a state-guaranteed re-
tirement pension. Mandatory funded pension funds are, by their nature,
private equity funds. The state does not directly intervene in the activities
of pension funds. The state only determines the rules where and to what
extent pension funds may invest the finances raised by them. There are sev-
eral mandatory funded pension funds in Estonia and a person has the op-
portunity to change the pension fund.25
In the light of the above, it can be concluded that three of the four
aforementioned benefits are linked to the obligation to pay social tax (ei-
ther through the beneficiary himself, e.g. in the case of a self-employed
person; or on behalf of the insured person, usually through an employer or
– in the case of civil servants – the authority which has employed the offi-
cial). In the case of unemployment insurance only, the insurance coverage
is not linked to the obligation to pay social tax.
Taxes and Contributions Foreseen for Financing Social Protection
As can be seen from the above, social tax forms an important part of the
financing of Estonian social protection benefits. The social tax was one of
the first taxes to be introduced as early as 1990, and from the outset it
3.
24 Section 40 of the Funded Pensions Act (Kogumispensionide seadus) - RT I 2004,
37, 252, English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/521012019010/cons
olide. Accessed 12 May 2020.
25 In 2021, the mandatory funded pension system will change. Under this amend-
ment, individuals will get the right to decide whether they want to withdraw
money from pension funds or whether they decide to continue with a mandatory
funded pension. Due to this principle, the mandatory funded pension will be-




reform). Accessed 12 May 2020.
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sought to finance state-guaranteed health insurance and state pension insu-
rance. Payment of the social tax is an employer’s obligation and it has to be
paid from the gross salary. It amounts to 33 percent of the gross sum. The
sum is divided into two: 20 percent is accrued in the budget of the state
pension insurance, while 13 percent is accrued in the budget of the health
insurance.26 The employee does not pay the social tax and the sum is not
reflected in his salary.
In general, and also taking into account the topic of this chapter, the so-
cial tax is levied under the following circumstances:
(1) on wages and other remuneration paid to employees in money;
(2) on wages and other remuneration paid to officials according to the
Public Service Act;
(3) on remuneration paid to members of the management or controlling
bodies of legal persons or the trustee in bankruptcy and members of
the bankruptcy committee in the bankruptcy proceedings of a natural
person;
(4) on the business income of a self-employed person, after deductions re-
lating to enterprise and permitted in the Income Tax Act have been
made;
(5) on remuneration paid to natural persons on the basis of contracts for
services, authorisation agreements or contracts under the law of obliga-
tions entered into for the provision of other services;
(6) on fringe benefits within the meaning of the Income Tax Act, ex-
pressed in monetary terms, and on income tax payable on fringe bene-
fits;
(7) on benefits paid on the basis of the Unemployment Insurance Act.
The minimum rate for the payment of social tax is approved annually by
the state budget. There is no upper limit on social tax. It all depends on the
payments made by a particular person.
Here, attention needs also to be paid to self-employed persons. A gen-
uine self-employed person (or FIE) is a natural person who is engaged in
business.27 Any natural person can be self-employed, including minors of
26 Section 7 of the Social Tax Act (Sotsiaalmaksuseadus) - RT I 2000, 102, 675, Eng-
lish translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/527042020012/consolide.
Accessed 12 May 2020.
27 The number of self-employed persons is decreasing. In 2010, there were 30,308,
and in 2018 there were 22,874 self-employed persons,
see Statistics Estonia, http://andmebaas.stat.ee/Index.aspx?lang=et&DataSetCode=
EM81. Accessed 12 May 2020.
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at least 15 years of age to whom consent has been given by the parent, or
whose active legal capacity to engage in economic activity has been extend-
ed by the court.28 Being self-employed does not preclude working for an
employer. As a self-employed person and a natural person are one and the
same person, a natural person can earn income in several ways (e.g. wage
income, income from the transfer of securities, income from business,
etc.), but in such cases it must be distinguished between different types of
income in a natural person’s income tax return. The self-employed person
pays social tax on the income received from his or her business, from
which the deductions related to entrepreneurship permitted by the In-
come Tax Act have been made, taking into account limits established in
the Social Tax Act. The period of taxation of the self-employed with social
tax is one calendar year, because the taxable income is determined on the
basis of the income tax return once a year.
The unemployment insurance contribution is divided into two parts, of
which 0.8 percent is paid by the employer and 1.6 percent by the insured
person or the employee. The main aim is to ensure the financing of the un-
employment insurance benefits based on the indicated sum.29 According
to the Unemployment Insurance Act, it is possible to use the part paid by
both the employer and the insured person for financing the services pro-
vided by the Unemployment Insurance Fund. The share paid by the in-
sured person cannot be used to pay benefits in the event of the insolvency
of the employer, nor to pay benefits in the event of collective redundan-
cies. According to the principles of the unemployment insurance scheme,
an unemployed person receives unemployment benefit only if the required
insurance period has been completed. According to the Unemployment
Insurance Act, the insured person is required to have had at least 12
months of insurance within the last 36 months. This principle is based on
the assumption that if the employee works on the basis of an employment
contract for at least four months per year, then within three years the in-
sured person will be able to gain the necessary insurance period. To gain
the insurance period, it is necessary that the unemployment insurance con-
tribution is received every month. According to the current practice of the
Supreme Court, an employee cannot suffer damage in a situation if the
28 Sections 9 to 11 of the General Part of the Civil Code Act (Tsiviilseadustiku
üldosa seadus) - RT I 2002, 35, 216, English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.e
e/en/eli/528052020001/consolide. Accessed 12 May 2020.
29 Sections 40 ff. of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Töötuskindlustuse seadus) -
RT I 2001, 59, 359, English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/5300420
20008/consolide. Accessed 12 May 2020.
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employer has not fulfilled his obligation and has not transferred the neces-
sary amounts to the Unemployment Insurance Fund.30 The employee can-
not transfer the corresponding amounts to the unemployment fund him-
self. The obligation to withhold and transfer unemployment insurance
contributions is the obligation of the employer.
The third special payment relates to a mandatory funded pension. Em-
ployees regularly pay 2 percent of their salary to a pension fund freely cho-
sen by them. As this is a mandatory funded pension, it means that all per-
sons who have reached the age of 18 years are obliged to join some pen-
sion fund and, when they receive a salary, they are obliged to pay a funded
pension contribution from that salary. Mandatory funded pension pay-
ment does not have to be transferred by the insured persons themselves,
such obligation generally lies with the employer. A direct obligation to pay
a mandatory funded pension payment rests solely with self-employed per-
sons who pay the said contribution once a year, not monthly. Persons
from whose remuneration the employer is obliged to pay social tax are
bound to pay the mandatory funded pension contribution.31
There are no more special-purpose taxes or payments established in the
Estonian legal system. The rest of the possible social benefits are paid di-
rectly from the state budget and in case of these benefits it is not important
whether the person is subject to a dependent employment relationship or
not.
When an employee works on the basis of an employment contract, the
above-mentioned taxes/contributions are mandatory. The social tax is paid
by the employer on the basis of the employee’s gross wages. The payment
30 Estonian Supreme Court, Case 3-3-1-58-14, E.T vers Eesti Töötukassa, 18 Novem-
ber 2014, https://www.riigikohus.ee/et/lahendid/marksonastik?asjaNr=3-3-1-58-14.
Accessed 12 May 2020. In case of pension insurance there is no relevant case law,
but the same principle could also be applied here.
31 The specifics of the financing of the mandatory funded pension must be referred
to here: according to the general scheme, the budget of the state pension insu-
rance (20 percent of the social tax paid by the employer) is also financed on the
basis of the social tax. If the person has also joined the mandatory funded pen-
sion, in addition to the above-mentioned 2 percent, the state contributes 4 per-
cent of the 20 percent of the social tax to the mandatory funded pension. Thus, if
a person is related to both the state pension insurance and the mandatory funded
pension, the tax burden is divided as follows: 2 percent plus 4 percent of the so-
cial tax that goes to financing the second pillar and 16 percent of the social tax
pension insurance part that is entered in the state pension insurance budget. See:
https://www.pensionikeskus.ee/en/ii-pillar/mandatory-funded-pension-ii-pillar/.
Accessed 12 May 2020.
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of the unemployment insurance premium is divided between the employ-
ee and the employer, while the mandatory pension fund is paid by the em-
ployee on the basis of his gross wages. When the worker does not work on
the basis of a definitely established contract, e.g. an employment contract
or some other kind of contract, then the nature of the remuneration re-
ceived is of a different kind and no social tax and unemployment insu-
rance contribution must be paid. Therefore, a substantial risk occurs that
persons working via a platform and providing a service are not entitled to
either – state pension insurance or health insurance. Hence, the allowances
and benefits ensured by the Estonian social protection system are of a limi-
ted nature: not all people receiving some kind of income must pay estab-
lished taxes and payments for the financing of social benefits. For instance,
if a person rents out his dwelling via airbnb, the periodical income is sub-
ject to income tax. Concurrently, according to the Social Tax Act the in-
come from the rental of one’s dwelling is not regarded as income, which
would give the host an opportunity to receive social benefits. Based on the
above, not any activity or any kind of income is of a nature which gives
people the required social insurance protection.
New “Workers” Outside of Social Protection32
General Tendencies of Development of Social Protection
Analysing possible future perspectives and labour market developments
until 2035, different development scenarios have been elaborated for Esto-
nia, as well as possible changes in social protection and its financing.33
(1) Diversification of employment forms and fragmentation of income is
likely. In the case of intermittent employment and income, longer ac-
counting periods for the accumulation of necessary seniority and in-
come, as well as individual savings accounts, would help to improve
IV.
1.
32 Also: Tavits, Gaabriel, Social Security Protection and New Forms of Employment:
Case of Estonia. In: Проблеми Реалiзацiï Прав Громадян у сферi Працi та
Соцiального Забезпечення, Harkiv: Pravo 2019, pp. 494-497.
33 Social Protection Models and their Suitability to Alternative Scenarios Reflecting
Cchanges in the Labour Market and Employment Rlations in Estonia (Tööga seo-
tud sotsiaalkaitse mudelid ja nende sobivus alternatiivsete tööturuarengute korral
Eestis), Praxis 2018 (in Estonian), http://www.praxis.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/
02/tooga_seotud_sotsiaalkaitsemudelid_raport_pdf. Accessed 12 May 2020.
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the coverage of social security schemes. The said perspective applies to
all the types of social protection mentioned above.
(2) Given the longer-term future trends in forms of work and risks of fi-
nancing social protection, it is also necessary to consider the introduc-
tion of new possible sources of financing. It must therefore be decided
whether to increase the rates of taxes and payments (social tax, unem-
ployment insurance contributions) used for financing within the cur-
rent system or to use other sources of central state revenue.
(3) In the case of long-term structural unemployment and underemploy-
ment, coverage should be improved through the introduction of em-
ployment and work-independent minimum protection schemes.
Speaking of future work, the possibility of introducing a citizen’s
salary, i.e. an unconditional minimum income protection, has also
been discussed here, although it is not a realistic measure to replace
the social protection system as a whole today or in the near future.
(4) Inequality may increase due to the polarization of skills and labour
market opportunities: better-skilled workers earn significantly more in
high-value-adding jobs than those engaged in routine and medium-
skilled jobs. Discussions on future work forms indicate the possibility
of introducing, in addition to more progressive income taxation, a
negative income tax, in which the state pays households a benefit
linked to the income tax rate if the declared income is below a certain
level.
Shortcomings in Health Insurance Cover
Occasionally, the sustainability and shortcomings of the Estonian health
insurance system have been analysed. Both legal and substantive issues
have been addressed. In 2018, a study was commissioned by the Ministry
of Social Affairs to find out how it would be realisable to ensure the most
universal feasible protection for persons insured in Estonia. This study
highlights the main topical areas of the Estonian health insurance sys-
tem.34
2.
34 Health Insurance Protection to Everyone or for the Chosen – How to Resolve
Gaps in the Estonian Health Insurance System? (Ravikindlustus valitutele või
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There are approximately 120,000 people of working age35 in Estonia
who do not have permanent health insurance. The vast majority of people
without health insurance have intermittent insurance coverage. This dis-
continuity is also due to the discontinuity of income and employment.
The reasons for the interruption or lack of insurance cover are found both
in the labour market and in the social security system. Health insurance is
often lacking due to irregular income or the nature of a person’s job. The
current Estonian health insurance system is not flexible with regard to dif-
ferent forms of work. Therefore, as one of the policy changes in Estonia, it
has been proposed to consider the possibility of taking into account the re-
ceipt of social tax for the last 12 calendar months in order to validate
health insurance, which would help to smooth out insurance disruptions
arising from irregular employment and income. There is no such waiting
period under the current health insurance system. Rather, it is based on
the amount of social tax paid. The only condition where a certain waiting
period is expected is related to the employment on the basis of an employ-
ment contract. Under the Health Insurance Act, health insurance cover
arises only after the employment relationship has lasted for at least one
month. There are no specific requirements for the length of the social tax
collection period. One alternative to increase health insurance coverage is
to move towards a universal health care system. Given the situation in Es-
tonia, it would mean a fundamental change as in order to access the state
health care system people would not have to make contributions from
their salaries (to buy so-called health insurance), but the right to state
health care services could automatically be accompanied by resident status.
The creation of an inclusive health protection system requires fundamental
changes in the financing of health care and in the state tax system. At
present, no such discussions are taking place, and the idea of creating uni-
versal treatment protection is not relevant.
In view of the above situation, the health insurance system and access to
it currently point to the fact that people who earn income from short-term
platform work or whose income is below the minimum amount of social
tax to be paid appear to be excluded from any health insurance coverage.
35 This makes approx. 14 percent of the whole working age population or less than
10 percent of the whole population of Estonia. See: Health Insurance Protection
to Everyone or for the Chosen – How to Resolve Gaps in the Estonian Health In-
surance System? (Ravikindlustus valitutele või ravikaitse kõigile — kuidas täita
lüngad Eesti ravikindlustuses?), pp. 13-14, Praxis 2018,
http://www.praxis.ee/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Ravikindlustus.pdf. Accessed
12 May 2020.
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Being excluded from health insurance coverage means that these persons
have no access to either primary care or specialist care. The main opportu-
nity for these persons to receive health care services is through emergency
medical care only.
Unemployment Benefits – Access for the Privileged
The Unemployment Insurance Act in force in Estonia does not allow for
those engaged in new forms of employment to receive unemployment in-
surance benefits, and such additional activities are also equated with work,
regardless of the size of income of a particular employee. According to the
law in force in Estonia, a person is registered as unemployed if he or she
does not have a job or activity that is considered to be an activity equiva-
lent to work on the basis of law. Due to the health insurance system, if a
person is registered as unemployed, he or she also has the right to receive
health insurance cover through the Estonian Unemployment Insurance
Fund. If a person provides a small-scale service through a platform, he or
she cannot be registered as unemployed, and, on the other hand, there is
no guarantee that he or she will receive sufficient income to pay the social
security contributions required to obtain health insurance cover. In a study
conducted in 2018, it has been found that the problem of unemployment
in Estonia correlates with insufficient social protection:36 benefit rates are
low and only a small part of the unemployed receive benefits or support,
so these measures fail to prevent people from falling into poverty.
Another problem is that the Unemployment Insurance Act is outdated
and the labour market has changed a lot since 2002 when the Act was
adopted. The current law provides social security for a traditional employ-
ment relationship. Both the employee and the employer pay unemploy-
ment insurance contributions. When the employment relationship ends
and the person registers as unemployed, the person receives compensation
from the unemployment insurance fund according to the length of gainful
activity. Many new forms of employment do not currently provide unem-
ployment insurance protection. For example, the Bolt car-sharing service is
not the driver’s employer, but only an intermediary service. Thus, the driv-
3.
36 Analyses of Principles of the Unemployment Insurance in order to avoid situa-
tions of need and support participation in the employment market (Töötuskind-
lustuse põhimõtete analüüs vaesuse ennetamiseks ja tööturul osalemise
toetamiseks), Praxis 2019, http://www.praxis.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/T%C
3%B6%C3%B6tush%C3%BCvitis30.05.2019.pdf. Accessed 12 May 2020.
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er is not a Bolt employee, but a business partner. As a self-employed per-
son, these hours are not taken into account when calculating the unem-
ployment insurance period or unemployment benefits when driving with
Bolt. In addition to drivers, couriers and board members, there is the same
problem with others, such as choirmasters, babysitters, beauty profession-
als, and so on. In other words, the circle of persons who work either
through the platform or perform rather short-term work tasks (work gigs)
currently remain outside the main and important areas of social protec-
tion. This, in turn, leads to a situation where short-term employment as
well as irregular incomes do not guarantee protection against the social
risks listed in § 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia.37
Entrepreneur Account – a New Opportunity
What is an Entrepreneur Account?
An entrepreneur account is intended to simplify the tax liability for pay-
ments received for the provision of services from one natural person to an-
other natural person or for the sale of goods to a natural or legal person.38
It is not allowed to transfer to the entrepreneur account the funds earned
from providing a service or selling goods during the period when the en-
trepreneur account holder is socially insured in another European Econo-
mic Area country39 or in a social security agreement country40 where this
income is subject to social security contributions. A person who has
V.
1.
37 At the time of completion of this chapter, the Ministry of Social Affairs has draft-
ed the Unemployment Insurance Act with the intention of making the unem-
ployment insurance system more flexible. Among other things, the changes allow
for small-scale work. It means that the requirement that a person registered as un-
employed has no job at all will be waived. See: http://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main/mo
unt/docList/f580df2f-4096-4828-9849-bbc859af99a6#TyHGsaPR. Accessed 12 May
2020.
38 Simplified Business Income Taxation Act (Ettevõtlustulu lihtsustatud maksus-
tamise seadus), English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/107072017002.
Accessed 12 May 2020. As of the end of 2019, there were 1,702 active en-
trepreneur accounts in Estonia. During the year, EUR 2,060,000 were received in
entrepreneur accounts, of which EUR 418,000 in taxes were paid. See https://arile
ht.delfi.ee/news/uudised/on-seda-siis-palju-voi-vahe-ettevotluskontodele-laekus-esi
mese-aastaga-ule-kahe-miljoni-euro?id=88806367. Accessed 12 May 2020.
39 The EU Member States, Norway, Liechtenstein, Switzerland.
40 Canada, Ukraine, Australia, Belarus.
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opened an entrepreneur account is not obliged to register as an en-
trepreneur and to calculate revenues and expenses. The owner of the en-
trepreneur account cannot be a VAT payer or be acting as a self-employed
person in the same or similar area of activity.
The entrepreneur account creates a new simple and affordable way of
doing business. Accounting and tax reports are not required when using
an entrepreneur account because the tax liability is calculated on the basis
of the payments to the entrepreneur account. An entrepreneur account
owner does not issue invoices because he or she is not an entrepreneur or
accounting entity. An entrepreneur account owner can provide services or
sell goods by verbal contract. However, if necessary he or she can also con-
clude a simple written contract containing relevant data on providing the
services or selling the goods.
An entrepreneur account is useful for any person who provides services
to other natural persons in areas of activity that do not involve any direct
expenses, or for a person who sells self-produced goods or handicraft goods
or goods with low material or acquisition costs. Examples include baby-sit-
ting, housekeeping, gardening, repair or construction services that do not
involve direct costs or in which a customer pays for the costs. An example
would be that a customer orders the repair or construction service and has
bought the tools and materials for the repair him- or herself. Another ex-
ample would be the sale of self-produced goods to natural persons as well
as to legal persons if the cost of the raw material or source material is low
compared to the selling price of the goods, such as is the case with the sale
of handicraft and art, or the sale of food, plants etc. grown or produced by
the natural person. An entrepreneur account is also an appropriate solu-
tion for new forms of entrepreneurship, such as payments received from
the provision of services from one natural person to another natural per-
son through ride-sharing service platforms, e.g., Uber, Bolt, etc.
Since the total amount received on the entrepreneur account (not only
the profit from the provision of the services or the sale of the goods) is
taxed with business income tax, it is not possible to deduct costs or expens-
es. Therefore, in the areas of activity that involve direct or high costs, it is
more beneficial to operate as a self-employed person or through a compa-
ny. For example, it is important to deduct the acquisition costs of the
goods from the income when selling goods or providing intermediation.
There is only one bank that offers such a possibility to open an en-
trepreneur account. A natural person can open an entrepreneur account
with LHV Pank (hereinafter Bank). By signing the agreement, the en-
trepreneur account owner will arrange for Bank to reserve business income
tax from the total amounts received on the entrepreneur account and
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transfer the business income tax to the Estonian Tax and Customs Board.
Bank informs the Estonian Tax and Customs Board of the details of the
person who has opened or closed the entrepreneur account and of the en-
trepreneur account number, and immediately transfers the business in-
come tax reserved from the total amounts received on the account within a
calendar month to the Estonian Tax and Customs Board. The free money
on the entrepreneur account can be used by the account owner in the
same way as money on a regular current account.
The Estonian Tax and Customs Board must carry out the following
tasks:
– transfer the taxpayer’s data received from Bank upon the conclusion of
the agreement of opening the entrepreneur account into the register of
taxable persons and delete the taxpayer’s data from the register upon
the end of the term of the entrepreneur account agreement;
– distribute the received business income tax if the taxpayer is an obligat-
ed person required to make contributions to a mandatory funded pen-
sion:
– an income tax rate of 20/55 of the business income tax rate,
– a social tax rate of 33/55 of the business income tax rate,
– a mandatory funded pension contribution rate of 2/55 of the busi-
ness income tax rate;
– distribute the received business income tax if the taxpayer is not an ob-
ligated person required to make contributions to a mandatory funded
pension:
– an income tax rate of 20/53 of the business income tax rate,
– a social tax rate of 33/53 of the business income tax rate;
– forward the data of the mandatory funded pension contribution to the
registrar of the pension register and the social tax data to the Estonian
Health Insurance Fund and the Estonian Social Insurance Board.
The business income tax rate is 20 percent of the total amount received on
the entrepreneur account if the amount does not exceed EUR 25,000 per
calendar year and 40 percent of the amount exceeding EUR 25,000 re-
ceived on the entrepreneur account per calendar year. If the amount re-
ceived on the entrepreneur account exceeds EUR 40,000 per calendar year,
the natural person is obligated to register as self-employed (FIE) or to es-
tablish a company (e.g. limited company or GmbH – in Estonian: OÜ) in
the Commercial Register and as a person liable to value added tax in the
Estonian Tax and Customs Board. The entrepreneur is required to keep ac-
counts for taxation purposes.
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Necessary Social Security Protection (Example: Health Insurance)
The important question is: Does a natural person get health insurance if he
or she is using an entrepreneur account (e.g. working via platform)? An en-
trepreneur account owner has the right to receive health insurance benefits
if the received social tax in a calendar month is to the extent of at least the
minimum social tax requirement. In 2020, the monthly rate of social tax is
EUR 540 and the minimum social tax obligation is EUR 178.20 per
month (540 × 33%). In order to get health insurance, social tax to the ex-
tent of the minimum social tax requirement for the previous calendar
month has to be received for the natural person. Health insurance begins
on the day following the receipt of social tax (10th day) and stops after one
month if the minimum social tax obligation is not fulfilled by the 10th of
the following month. Data on the person for whom the minimum social
tax liability has been received, is to be submitted by the Estonian Tax and
Customs Board to the Estonian Health Insurance Fund.
To illustrate this situation, two examples shall be given.
 
Example 1
If a person is operating only through an entrepreneur account to get
health insurance, he or she must receive at least EUR 1,485 per calendar
month for the provision of services or for the sale of goods, from which
the business income tax is EUR 297 (1485 × 20%) and of which social tax is
EUR 165 (297 × 33/55 for an obligated person required to make contribu-
tions to a mandatory funded pension). If the minimum social tax obliga-




In February 2020, a natural person earned EUR 400 under a service agree-
ment (concluded with a legal person) and the legal person paid a social tax
of EUR 132 (400 × 33%). In February, the natural person also received
EUR 800 on the entrepreneur account, of which the business income tax
was EUR 160 (800 × 20%) and social tax was EUR 96 (160 × 33/55). Thus,
in February a total of EUR 228 (132 + 96) of social tax was collected from
the natural person. In this case the natural person’s minimum social tax
2.
41 The minimum wage in Estonia is EUR 584 gross, the average in 2019 was
EUR 1,407, see https://www.stat.ee/et/avasta-statistikat/valdkonnad/tooelu/palk-ja-
toojoukulu/keskmine-brutokuupalk. Accessed 12 May 2020.
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obligation is fulfilled in February and he will get health insurance from
11 March.
Deductions in a natural person’s income tax return from the revenue re-
ceived on the entrepreneur account cannot be made (for example, tax-free
income, mortgage interests, training costs). Also the income tax part of the
business income tax is not included as paid or withheld income tax in the
income tax return of a natural person. At the same time, it is important to
take into account that the sums received on the entrepreneur account,
from which the social tax part has been deducted, are taken into account as
the annual income of the natural person and thus affect the amount of tax-
free income of the natural person.
An entrepreneur account owner can provide services and sell goods to
both private persons as well as to companies, non-profit associations, foun-
dations, legal persons in public law, state and local government authorities
and other persons. When providing a service to a resident company, non-
profit association, foundation and religious association which is a legal
person, it is only necessary to take into account the fact that these persons
will be subject to additional income tax (rate 20/80), which equates the tax
burden with the tax burden of a regular employment relationship. The ad-
ditional tax liability of a legal person is intended to prevent the routine
transfer of employment relationship to a more favourable entrepreneur ac-
count.
Therefore, in case of the service fee transferred to the entrepreneur ac-
count, it must be assessed who has received the service provided by the en-
trepreneur account holder, whether it was the employer (company) or the
employee, and whether it may be a case of the employer’s compensation of
expenses to the employee. When a natural person receives amounts on the
entrepreneur account that have been paid to a natural person from a resi-
dent company, non-profit association, foundation or religious association
which is a legal person (hereinafter also “a payer”) for providing services
and which are subject to taxation on the basis of the Simplified Business
Income Taxation Act, these persons will be subject to additional income
tax (rate 20/80) from expenses unrelated to business.
An entrepreneur account owner is obligated to inform the payer of the
fact that he or she provides the service through an entrepreneur account
and that the service is taxable under the Simplified Business Income Taxa-
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tion Act.42 If the entrepreneur account owner does not report that he or
she is providing the service through an entrepreneur account, the payer is
obligated to tax the payment made to a natural person for the service with
all labour (salary) taxes.
Entrepreneur Account – Sufficient for Social Protection?
The creation and operation of an entrepreneur account is one of the mea-
sures that enables new workers to earn an income and to pay all the neces-
sary contributions and taxes from this income in order to receive social
protection. In essence, it can be argued that opening an entrepreneur ac-
count is a new alternative to operating as a self-employed person or setting
up a single-member private limited company. Although the establishment
of a private limited company has been made quite simple in Estonian con-
ditions, the establishment of a private limited company and the existence
of its activities require special knowledge of accounting and timely pay-
ment of taxes. Therefore, it also takes quite a lot of time to administer the
activities of a private limited company. Creating an entrepreneur account
and owning it provides an opportunity to ensure the necessary social secu-
rity protection in a simplified manner in the case of small-scale income.
On the other hand, it is important that also in the case of an entrepreneur
account, a person’s income must be higher than the average salary. Other-
wise, it is possible to receive income and pay the necessary insurance pre-
miums from this income, but the necessary and required social security
protection (in the form of health insurance) is still not guaranteed.
The entrepreneur account and the income received in it indicate that
the person has an activity equivalent to work. If the amount received
through the entrepreneur account is not equal to at least the average salary
granted in Estonia, the owner of the entrepreneur account does not receive
health insurance cover and he or she cannot register as unemployed either.
The possibility of opening an entrepreneur account must be seen as one
of the important measures to bring new workers closer to possible social
protection and still give certain new workers access to social protection in
two important areas: pension insurance and health insurance. At the same
time, the entrepreneur account does not solve important problems related
3.
42 Simplified Business Income Taxation Act (Ettevõtlustulu lihtsustatud maksus-
tamise seadus), English translation: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/107072017002.
Accessed 12 May 2020.
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to social protection, but is part of ensuring the necessary social protection
for new employees.
Conclusion
The social protection rights are mainly targeted at people who are involved
in performing work in dependent employment, i.e. who work on the basis
of an employment contract or in the civil service. When a person is work-
ing on the basis of an employment contract, the main responsibility for
health insurance and the state pension fund lies with the employer, who
has to pay the insurance taxes/contributions established by the Estonian
legislation. The Estonian Social Tax Act also foresees an option that a self-
employed person must pay social tax, but for this he has to register in the
Commercial Register and also has the obligation to submit an annual re-
port of the economic activity.
The owner of the entrepreneur account does not have to register in the
Commercial Register; concurrently, there is no obligation to submit an an-
nual report of the economic activity. The implementation of the en-
trepreneur account gives the person short-term work assignments and
when the income per month is over the average gross wages of the state, it
is possible to ensure minimal social security protection (health insurance
and the state pension insurance). However, an important condition is es-
tablished saying that the turnover of the entrepreneur account must not be
bigger than EUR 40,000 per year. Otherwise, the obligation of paying VAT
applies. The obligation of paying VAT requires a different kind of book-
keeping and accounting system, and due to that different forms of en-
trepreneurship are required.
An entrepreneur account is a simple but effective system for those who
work with platforms. The employee only has to open a special en-
trepreneur account with the bank, and transfer the income from his/her
business to it. Other formalities are done for him/her in cooperation with
the bank and the Tax and Customs Board. While the number of ordinary
self-employed persons shows a declining trend, the number of en-
trepreneur account openers shows an increasing trend. The Tax and Cus-
toms Board plays an important part in the administration of the amounts
received in the entrepreneur account, and distributes the corresponding
amounts among the necessary types of social protection schemes.
The entrepreneur account can be considered a positive and necessary
tool, as it frees the platform worker from complicated accounting and re-
duces potential tax errors as well as the risk of the platform worker being
VI.
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deprived of social protection. The only important factor to be aware of is
the amount received in the entrepreneur account. Only working for the
minimum wage does not guarantee the minimum social protection, as the
income earned must definitely be higher than the average wage in the
country. Since the entrepreneur account was created only a year ago, it is
possible to review its usefulness and necessity after a while.
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Chapter 12




Is platform work changing the way in which we organise our work? If so,
to what extent does this have an impact on organising social protection in
our national social security systems? Is the EU – on the basis of its policy
monitoring procedures and, in particular, through its European Pillar of
Social Rights – saying anything on how to organise social protection for
platform workers? If so, is this enough in terms of concerted European ac-
tion or do we need additional (legal) measures coming from the EU? These
are the main questions that are put forward in this contribution addressing
the overall theme of the future role of the EU in a transborder perspective,
one of the major topics that came to the fore at the conference held at the
Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy in Munich on 12
and13 December 2019.
Platform work essentially refers to the organisation of professional activ-
ities through the mediation of a (digital) platform where supply of work
and demand for work can be exchanged (against remuneration). The facili-
tation of work through the means of an intermediary agent is not new; a
vast industry related to agency work emerged from it in the past. The nov-
elty now lies more in the digitalisation of these intermediary platforms; as
they are now internet-based and/or driven by an IT app(lication), quite
some opportunities have been created for a faster and more global work
organisation. Labour and services can thus easily be exchanges at a global
level though the “World Wide Web”; work can be performed from a dis-
tance and is not necessarily bound to the premises of the employer. It can
be performed at home, and depending on the complexity of the job, can
be done without too big an amount of instructions; the fact that the job
can be done almost instantly is considered as yet another asset, as the re-
strictions stemming from regular work-time patterns are avoided. Platform
work can be done on a free-lance basis (by self-employed persons), which
has potential with a view to cost reduction. In order to facilitate this global
I.
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approach to labour exchange, work activities are increasingly divided into
a series of sub-tasks which can be easily contracted out to an endless num-
ber of platform workers. Platform work is indeed often related to “gigs” or
“small tasks” which do not always require major skills and hence there is a
large pool of candidates who can perform the work. Platform work chal-
lenges the more traditional organisation of work and its underlying regula-
tory frameworks, in particular social security.
In this contribution, we will focus on the European Union and how the
EU institutions address the challenge of organising social security for plat-
form workers. Knowing that the main competence to organise social secu-
rity remains at Member State level (Article 153 of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union, TFEU), it may seem awkward to raise this
question from the outset. The EU can, however, intervene to provide sup-
port (Article 6 TFEU). All the more so when the Member States are con-
fronted with similar problems for which a solution is hard to find. With
the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) of 2016 the EU set itself a
common framework to monitor the social policies of its Member States in
terms of their social outcomes. One of the major goals of this Pillar is to
safeguard (enough) access to social protection for all workers and self-em-
ployed workers (principle 12). To that purpose, the Recommendation was
launched, inviting all Member States to provide to all professionally active
persons access to an adequate level of social protection. The Recommenda-
tion is considered to be an answer to the growing groups of non-standard
workers and self-employed persons that face exclusion from social security
because of their irregular work patterns, low levels of income or their au-
tonomous way of working.
For this contribution we address the question as to what extent the Rec-
ommendation responds to the challenges that platform work generates for
the organisation of social security. Since platform work did not really
emerge fully until after the EPSR and the Recommendation had (already)
been launched, in essence we are trying to figure out whether the Recom-
mendation is still relevant for the latest evolutions in work organisation. In
order to do so, we will first define the concept of platform work and subse-
quently indicate where it deviates from standard work forms. After this
definition, the major typical features of platform work that pose challenges
to our traditional social security will be assessed based on the provisions
set out in the Recommendation; finally, we will try to indicate where the
Recommendation (and its underlying EU vision on access to social protec-
tion) may fall short and what kind of action is (still) to be expected. After
this definition, we will have the major typical features of platform work
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that cause challenges to our traditional social security assessed against the
provisions of the Recommendation.
In a final section we shall address the question of whether the legal stan-
dards developed by the Recommendation are sufficient. And complemen-
tary to this question, what kind of EU legal action in the field of social se-
curity could still be relevant. The section takes up the discussion again in a
broader perspective and will by definition go beyond the strict set of prob-
lems surrounding platform work and its impact on the organisation of so-
cial security. That being said, platform work is to be considered as yet an-
other development in work organisation that urges the EU to develop
clearer rules in order to safeguard fair competition (i.e. an equal-level play-
ing field) on the internal market. Organising social security has an impact
on labour costs; this is true as well for platform work, even if only in the
sense that this new work form is often (falsely) used for legitimising a re-
duction in production costs and hence improving its competitive position
at the detriment of the worker. Common standards at EU level are needed.
In the final section, we call for more EU attention to the financing of so-
cial security rather than to the benefits side.
Platform Work as a New Non-Standard Work Form
Platform Work
Platform workers can be defined1 as persons selected online from a pool of
workers through the intermediation of a platform to perform personally2
on-demand short-term tasks for different persons or companies in ex-
change for income. It is evident that we restrict ourselves to platform activ-
ities that have a (potential) relation to professional work, leaving out plat-
II.
1.
1 As defined previously by us: Barrio, Alberto/Montebovi, Saskia/Schoukens, Paul, The
EU Social Pillar: An Answer to the Challenge of the Social Protection of Platform
Workers?, in: European Journal of Social Security, 20 (2018) 3, pp. 219-241.
2 Our focus is thus on persons who personally deliver the service and are not in a
position to have it carried out by another person. This means that the platform
worker is required to create a personal profile, to which reviews may be linked. In
some cases, this feature is expressly mentioned by the platform in its terms of ser-
vice. See Prassl, Jeremias/Risak, Martin, Uber, Taskrabbit, & Co: Platforms as Em-
ployers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork: in: Comparative Labour
Law & Policy Journal, 37 (2016) 3, p. 30. In other cases, it might be evident from
the personal character of the ratings.
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forms that are based exclusively in the non-profit sharing of property or
knowledge. The online character of platforms is one of the major defining
features, facilitating access and reducing transaction costs.3 Furthermore,
the fact that the platform acts as an intermediary between the person who
receives the service and the person who performs it means that, in its role,
the platform typically:
(1) possesses essential information about the relationship (e.g. the nature
of the tasks performed, remuneration, the identity of the parties, etc.),
(2) has a monopoly over the contact between the two parties in the rela-
tionship (i.e. the person performing the work and the person receiving
it may only contact each other through the platform),
(3) provides rules concerning the behaviour of both parties,
(4) may monitor compliance with such rules, and
(5) may sanction the lack of compliance with such rules by stopping tem-
porarily or permanently an individual from accessing the platform.
Finally, in the definition the on-demand4 nature of platform work is essen-
tial too. It means that the performance of a task is offered when and if a
person requests it, without any obligation by the platform to ensure that a
minimum amount of work is performed by the workers registered in it. It
goes without saying that significant periods of unremunerated time will
often exist, when a worker waits between tasks, for instance. This shows
what the fragmentation of work (assignments) can cause with regard to the
total working time (all tasks added), the irregularity of work time (tasks
can be done at whatever time of day and workers are thus not confined to
the traditional 9-to-5 time schedule) and the intermittency of work (tasks
do not always succeed one another without any transition, meaning that
persons are often confronted with non-remunerated waiting periods be-
tween assignments).
3 For some examples on the importance of the online character (which results,
among other things, in the use of apps), see Valenduc, Gerard/Vendramin, Patricia,
Work in the Digital Economy: Sorting the Old from the New, ETUI, Brussels,
2017, https://www.etui.org/publications/working-papers/work-in-the-digital-econo
my-sorting-the-old-from-the-new. Accessed 18 June 2020.
4 Kittur, Aniket/Nickerson, Jeffrey/Bernstein, Michael/Gerber, Elizabeth/Shaw, Aaron/
Zimmerman, John/Lease, Matt/Horton, John, The Future of Crowd Work, in: CSCW
2013 – Proceedings of the 2013 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Coop-
erative Work, 2013, pp. 1301-1307, https://doi.org/10.1145/2441776.2441923.
Accessed 18 June 2020.
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Platform Work Compared to Standard Work
Its definition makes clear that platform work deviates from normal (stan-
dard) work that traditionally forms the basis for labour regulations and
(work-related) social security schemes. In general terms, standard work is
understood to be subordinated, full-time work of an indefinite duration.
More specifically, it may be defined as the “stable, open-ended and direct
arrangement between dependent, full-time employees and their unitary
employer”. This definition not only contains the traditional elements5 of
the employment relationship but also refers to the outcomes of this tradi-
tional labour relationship, this being job security6 and income security7.
Atypical work deviates from one or more of these characteristics of the
standard work relationship. Originally, deviations could occur in relation
to one of the following (three) components:
(1) The subordinated relationship between worker and employer: the ab-
sence of such a relationship refers traditionally to autonomous (or self-
employed) work; the self-employed are mainly characterised by the
freedom to organise their work and their work time. Since they work
for various commissioners they can also spread their economic depen-
dency. Contrary to the full-time worker, their income is derived from
various clients.
(2) Full-time work: part-time work arrangements challenge in particular
the income security that normally originates from standard work.
Consequently, part-time work will create problems for traditional so-
cial security schemes that guarantee income security on the basis of in-
come replacement of labour income (wage). Part-time work often re-
sults in lower income, so the income replacement guaranteed by social
security is at risk of falling below minimum subsistence levels. Part-
time work (and covering part-time work in social security) often be-
2.
5 This being the presence of personal subordination, the bilateral character of the re-
lationship, and hence mutuality of obligations as a consequence, the wage as
(main) source of income that is provided in return to the offered labour, the eco-
nomic dependency as the worker depends fully for this income on the employer,
and a fixed workplace where the work is done, normally at the premises of the em-
ployer.
6 Labour contracts are concluded for an indefinite period and relate to full-time oc-
cupation.
7 The wage may be the only source of income but is guaranteed at a certain (mini-
mum) level and in case of loss of the position, income replacement is guaranteed
through the means of social security.
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comes an issue of poverty alleviation (combating poverty and social ex-
clusion). This is especially true for persons living alone or persons who
are head of the family. Part-time work will often demand that systems
provide corrective (supportive) income support.
(3) Indefinite work: contracts for specific fixed-time periods challenge
work security. Work is only guaranteed for the contracted time period,
which is by definition restricted in time (short). The workers risk inter-
mittent periods of (no) work (and consequently no income). As a re-
sult, social security will often function as a bridge covering intermit-
tent periods (of no work) by providing income replacement (see e.g.
schemes of temporary unemployment).
These major categories aside (part-time, fixed time or self-employed work),
we have recently been observing an increase of new kinds of atypical work
forms, such as on-call work, zero-hour contracts, solo self-employment, in-
ternships, self-employed workers active within management companies,
student work, interim work, agency work, crowd work, portfolio work
etc., with platform work being one of them. When we take a closer look at
these new forms8 we notice however that they are a further development
(to the extremes) of the traditional atypical work categories (part-time
work, fixed-time work or self-employment), sometimes even applied in
combination and including some new elements that deviate from standard
work (no remuneration, the triangular contractual relations, etc.). In some
situations, typical of work forms seen on platforms such as crowd work
and portfolio, hardly any of the traditional elements present in the stan-
dard work relationship are seen. It should not come as a surprise that this
in turn creates challenges for traditional (work-related) social insurance
schemes.
Platform Work as a Challenge for Organising Social Security
Platform work creates some challenges for the organisation of social securi-
ty systems. We shall enumerate a selection of some major challenges, based
on previous research work9:
III.
8 Barrio, Alberto/Schoukens, Paul, The Changing Concept of Work, in: European
Labour Law Journal, 8 (2017) 4, pp. 306-332.
9 Barrio, Alberto/Schoukens, Paul, The Changing Concept of Work (fn. 8), pp.
306-332; Barrio, Alberto/Montebovi, Saskia/Schoukens, Paul, The EU Social Pillar: An
Answer to the Challenge of the Social Protection of Platform Workers? (fn. 1), pp.
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What is “Work”?
The main aim of income replacement schemes, addressing risks such as old
age, unemployment and work incapacity, is to compensate the loss of in-
come when persons are no longer in a position to work. For these schemes
it is therefore rather crucial to have the concept of work well-defined, since
income originating from work is the main element around which the
eventual protection is organised. This is true for schemes with both a Bis-
marck and Beveridge signature, even if in Bismarckian social security
schemes the work-related income has even more relevance for financing
purposes (employee and employer contributions levied on wages).
Which activities are now considered to be work? Normally, two main el-
ements are taken into account for the application of social security: the
regularity of the activity and the intention to earn one’s living from the
performed activities. Most of the social security schemes are still based on
the assumption that the activity should be of a regular and repetitive na-
ture in order for it to be considered as a genuine work activity; this applied
at least for the default case reflecting standard work in subordination (the
“9-to-5” job).
When applied to platform work, it is not always easy in reality to find
out which of the activities can be considered as labour-related activities
and which cannot. This might be due to the fact that the scope of the activ-
ity (the gigs) is too marginal in nature to be considered as genuine work;
or it may be due to the fact that the generated income can only be indirect-
ly related to the platform activity (e.g. sponsorship granted to influencers).
In some cases, the activity may generate enough financial means but the
underlying activity cannot be considered as work (lack of regularity).
A second issue refers to the relationship between work and income:
what should be done when income is less work-related and based more on
returns from goods such as capital or property? It is currently already hard
to make the division between professional income and return from (invest-
ed) capital for the self-employed, and the latter kind of income source is
traditionally left out of social security financing.10 In many non-standard
1.
219-241; Barrio, Alberto/Montebovi, Saskia/Schoukens, Paul, The EU Social Pillar:
An Answer to the Challenge of the Social Protection of Platform Workers?, in:
Devolder, Bram (ed.), The Platform Economy. Unravelling the Legal Status of
Online Intermediaries, Cambridge – Antwerp – Chicago: Intersentia 2018, pp.
227-258.
10 Schoukens, Paul, Adequacy and Financing. Thematic Discussion Paper. Report for
European Commission, Brussels, 2020 (publication online to follow).
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work forms, the distinction between work-related income and other in-
come sources is becoming blurred, especially in the case of the prosumers,
platform workers, employee shareholders, self-employed shareholders also
performing professional activities within the ambit of the company in
which they are shareholders, etc. Work-related social security schemes face
problems in addressing income that is not strictly related to work, both
from the financing side (income as basis for the levy of contributions) and
from the income replacement side (previously earned income as basis for
the calculation of benefits). Income sources that are not strictly work-relat-
ed (such as income in nature, return on investment, income from movable
or immovable property) disqualify as a source for social security purposes.
But is this not somewhat unrealistic as in reality people may live on these
income sources and hence may risk losing them when confronted with
certain types of social risks?
Who is the Employer?
Determining the (main) employer is a key aspect for social security, in or-
der to identify who is responsible for paying contributions (financing), de-
ciding on redundancy (unemployment) and for granting the income re-
placement (work incapacity). Nevertheless, this is not always straightfor-
ward for several non-standard forms of work. Temporary agency work is a
field in which a great deal of effort has been put into overcoming this
problem, mostly through ensuring that agency companies remain respon-
sible for satisfying the obligations of the employer with regard to contribu-
tions. However, this challenge reappeared with significant force in the situ-
ation of platform work. Whether these workers are employed by the users
of the platform or the platform itself is an on-going discussion, the out-
come of which will have different consequences (employer responsibilities
for social security). Finally, it should be noted that, in the case of forms of
work as flexible as platform work, the same person is often active on sever-
al platforms almost simultaneously (while, at the same time, the person is
not necessarily active on all the platforms he is registered with), and these
platforms may be based in different countries, making it extremely diffi-
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Irregular Work Patterns
This problem is particularly clear in the case of thresholds to access certain
social insurance schemes, i.e. the requirement of having paid contributions
for a certain time within a specific period. As a consequence, persons in
atypical work forms are pushed out of social insurance schemes, as even
though they may end up accumulating a multitude of fixed-/part-time
work assignments, each of these assignments is too small to be taken into
account for social insurance purposes.
Again, regulations on temporary agency work have pioneered in tack-
ling this issue, and in some European countries employers, agencies and
trade unions have collaborated to create particular provisions to compen-
sate for some of the periods of inactivity which characterises the fragment-
ed careers of temporary agency workers. Another approach is to consider-
ably lower the threshold for accessing social insurance schemes such as the
unemployment scheme.11 Labour instability may also hinder the tracking
of periods of employment, as in some cases the person may perform work
for a few hours in a row with one employer, after which long periods of
inactivity may follow. Social security schemes should be redesigned to ac-
commodate these irregular work patterns where active periods followed by
periods of inactivity and/or work periods generating low income alternate
with high-income work assignments. Otherwise, schemes may miss out on
a large group of work activities that do not coincide with the traditional
work organisation characterised by full-time work assignments within a
fixed working time period (9-to-5 jobs).
Virtual Mobility of Platform Workers
In a similar manner, the discussion on the geographical aspect of work will
increase. New work forms applied in e.g. telework and platform work are
becoming more virtual. Most of our (work-related) social insurance
schemes start from a very physical concept of work: it is required that the
work is physically performed on a particular territory in order to be made
subject to a certain social security system. The EU coordination rules (in
particular Title II of Regulation (EC) 883/2004) follow this logic closely us-
3.
4.
11 Barrio, Alberto/Montebovi, Saskia/Schoukens, Paul, The EU Social Pillar: An Answer
to the Challenge of the Social Protection of Platform Workers? (fn. 9), pp.
227-258.
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ing the lex loci laboris principle as a basis to indicate the competent state in
case of cross-border activities: ultimately, the physical place where the per-
son is working determines the Member State competent for social security,
such as in the Partena-case.12 But also in national social security law it is
often required that work is performed on the territory where an employer
is based in order to have it taken into account for social security.
Can this still be upheld as a basic assumption now, in a world where
people organise their work in an increasingly virtual manner? Virtual work
as often applied in platform work makes long-distance work relations pos-
sible, where employers and employees are well-connected online but re-
main geographically very distant from each other. Moreover, due to IT
tools it is now much easier to carry out (parts of) the work at home. The
“geographical” relationship between employees, self-employed persons and
employers on the one hand, and the Member States on other hand will be-
come more virtual and hence will further complicate the applicable law
rules in their application.13 Persons do not necessarily organise their work
anymore in a given place.
The EU Recommendation on Access to Social Protection
The Recommendation as a Concrete Outcome of the European Pillar of
Social Rights
With the idea of socially counterbalancing the economic financing of the
monitoring procedures applied by the EU in the European Stability Pact14,
the EU Commission launched the European Pillar of Social Rights under
IV.
1.
12 ECJ of 27 September 2012, Case C-137/11, Partena vzw v Les Tartes de Chau-
mont-Gistoux SA, ECLI:EU:C:2012:593; see also: Schoukens, Paul, Social Security
Coordination and Non-Standard Forms of (Self-)Employment, in: Revue belge de
Sécurité sociale, (2019) 2, pp. 81-112.
13 For some examples, see the conference Employment, Social Policy, Health and
Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO), The Future of Work, Making it E-Easy,
Tallinn, Estonian Presidency, 13-14 September 2017, https://www.eurofound.euro
pa.eu/sr/events/future-of-work-making-it-e-easy-eu-presidency-estonia. Accessed 18
June 2020.
14 Beke, Joris/Schoukens, Paul, Fighting Social Exclusion under EU Horizon 2020. En-
hancing the Legal Enforceability of Social Inclusion Recommendations?, in: Euro-
pean Journal of Social Security, 16 (2014) 1, pp. 51-72 and Schoukens, Paul, EU So-
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the Presidency of Juncker. The programme, which should serve as a refer-
ence framework for assessing national social policies, contains a series of
fundamental social rights that will undergo further development via con-
crete European actions. In the end, The European Pillar of Social Rights15
was jointly announced by the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission in November 2017; it set out 20 principles and rights to sup-
port fair and well-functioning labour markets and welfare systems.
Principle 12 of the Pillar states that “regardless of the type and duration
of their employment relationship, workers, and, under comparable condi-
tions, the self-employed have the right to adequate social protection”. In
order to have this principle further developed, a proposal for a Council
Recommendation was launched by the European Commission on access to
social protection for workers and the self-employed,16 finally adopted in
November 2019.17
Interestingly, the Recommendation addresses all atypical forms of work,
and calls for proper social protection for different types of work, even
though they may be organised in a different way than traditional standard
work. An essential principle in the proposal for a Recommendation is the
neutral character of the labour status of the worker or self-employed work-
er: the basic principles shaping social security are equal for all professional-
ly active persons, whatever the kind of work or work status; yet at the same
time, social security should in its application respect as much as possible
the specific working circumstances under which the work is carried out. In
a way, it applied the general principle of equal treatment (underlying
Union citizenship as per Article 18 TFEU) to work-related social security:
the same rules should apply to groups of persons that are comparable;
however, by the same token, in situations where groups are different, the
rules need to be adapted in order not to apply one and the same rule to
different groups. The Recommendation, which seeks to ensure minimum
standards in the field of social protection of workers and the self-em-
ployed, applies to all traditional social insurance schemes related to labour
(i.e. unemployment benefits, sickness and health care benefits, maternity
15 European Commission, Proposal for an Interinstitutional Proclamation on the
European Pillar of Social Rights, COM (2017) 251.
16 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Recommendation on Access to
Social Protection for Workers and the Self-Employed, COM (2018)132.
17 Council Recommendation (EU) of 8 November 2019 on Access to Social Protec-
tion for Workers and the Self-Employed (Recommendation Access Social protec-
tion), OJ C 387/1, 15 November 2019.
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and equivalent paternity benefits, invalidity benefits, old-age benefits, and
benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases).18
Access to Social Protection
The Recommendation regulates access across four main angles: formal ac-
cess and effective access; adequacy of benefits and transparency. The Rec-
ommendation makes thus a clear distinction between formal and effective
coverage, the first referring to the elements conditioning the personal
scope of (work-related) social insurance, the latter mainly targeting entitle-
ment conditions to benefits. Formal coverage stems from existing legisla-
tion or collective agreements setting out that the workers are entitled to
participate in a social protection scheme in a specific branch.19 Effective
coverage refers to real protection in cases where workers and self-employed
persons have the opportunity to accrue adequate benefits and the ability,
in the case of the materialisation of the corresponding risk, to access a giv-
en level of benefits.20
Formal Access
In its final version that was accepted by all Member States the require-
ments regarding formal access have been levelled down for the self-em-
ployed. As some Member States had difficulties with the idea of a manda-
tory coverage for the self-employed for the eventuality of work incapacity
and work accidents, it has been decided to provide at least a voluntary cov-
erage for this group of workers. However, this creates a somewhat unbal-
anced approach by the Recommendation from the outset: it is difficult to
strive towards a comparable protection for all professionally active people,
yet at the same time accept that for the self-employed, access to social pro-
tection can be organised on a voluntary basis. This is especially problemat-
ic for the group of platform workers, as the issue of legal qualification –
are they wage-earners or self-employed – is still strongly disputed in the
2.
a)
18 But not family benefits; Article 3.2 of Recommendation (fn. 17). Not directly
linked to work-related protection, social assistance has been left out as well from
the scope.
19 Article 7, Sub. e of Recommendation (fn. 17).
20 Article 7, Sub. f of Recommendation (fn. 17).
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majority of Member States. The reason for this is the limited protection
the self-employed “enjoy”21 and hence the reduced cost of hiring them as
self-employed on platforms. Hiring platform workers as self-employed
freelancers is part of a deliberate business policy as (some major commer-
cial players in the) platforms want to cut labour costs as much as possible.
Asking now from Member States to make access to social protection avail-
able on a voluntary basis will not change much in this respect as the major-
ity of low-income (and high-income) self-employed do in the end not take
out social insurance when they are given the freedom to do so.22 The origi-
nal objective to create an equal-level playing field for all workers is thus se-
riously undercut in the Recommendation.
Effective Access
Of particular interest for platform workers are the provisions dealing with
effective coverage (Articles 9-10). The Recommendation establishes that
rules governing contributions and entitlements should not hinder the pos-
sibility of accruing and accessing benefits due to the type of employment
relationship or labour market status; and, moreover, that differences in the
rules governing the schemes between labour market statuses or types of
employment relationship should be proportionate and reflect the specific
situation of beneficiaries. Platform work is characterised by specific work
patterns, often leading to intermittent work periods (see above). Minimum
qualifying periods and minimum working periods may prove to be prob-
lematic to opening entitlement to benefits for these workers.
However, the Recommendation states that such minimum conditions
should not impede the effective building-up of social protection for per-
b)
21 Spasova, Slavina/Bouget, Denis/Ghailani, Dalila, Self-Employment and Social Pro-
tection: Understanding Variations between Welfare Regimes, in: Journal of
Poverty and Social Justice, 27 (2019) 2, pp. 157-175 and Spasova, Slanina/Bouget,
Denis/Ghailani, Dalila/Vanhercke, Bart, Access to Social Protection for People
Working on Non-Standard Contracts and as Self-Employed in Europe. A Study of
National Policies, European Social Policy Network (ESPN), Brussels: European
Commission, 2017.
22 European Commission, Behavioural Study on the Effects of an Extension of Ac-
cess to Social Protection for People in All Forms of Employment, Luxembourg:
Publications Office of the European Union, 2018 and Schoukens, Paul, Extending
Formal Coverage. Thematic Discussion Paper. Report for European Commission,
Brussels, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=21913&langId=en.
Accessed 18 June 2020.
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sons with an irregularly built up insurance record (Article 9, Para. 1, Sub.
a); the rules should be justified by a clear objective (e.g. financial sustain-
ability, insurance logics such as the respect of equivalence and/or the com-
bat of abuse); the reason for their introduction should thus be unrelated to
the labour status of the worker.
Consequently, time periods for the definition of qualifying periods or
waiting periods (full-time work equivalents per day or per week) may for
example be better reformulated in smaller time units (working hours), un-
der the condition that the total result of the smaller time units reflects the
same overall volume as that required for standard work. Similarly, the ref-
erence period during which the work time or income has to be earned can
be stipulated in a more extensive way as long as a comparable average in
workload or income is reached (e.g. work hours per year instead of per
day, week or month: e.g. at least X euros earned on average on a monthly
or yearly basis instead of per week or per month).
Adequate Benefits
The Recommendation calls for an adequate level of protection (Article 11).
What constitutes adequate protection? And how can adequate benefits lev-
els be guaranteed if at the financing side the income that serves as a basis
for the benefits calculation was anything but adequate? The Recommenda-
tion remains vague about the level of benefits as no clear figures or refer-
ences are to be found in the document: what is an “appropriate income re-
placement” or “a decent standard of living”? What is the minimum? The
prior observation (17) in the Recommendation provides further guidance
indicating what benefits adequacy could mean: “… [s]ocial protection is
considered to be adequate when it allows individuals to uphold a decent
standard of living, replace their income loss in a reasonable manner and
live with dignity, and prevents them from falling into poverty while con-
tributing, where appropriate, to activation and facilitating the return to
work”.
Although general in its wording, the Recommendation nevertheless
refers to some protection levels that must be respected by the systems. The
bottom line is that workers and the self-employed, when on benefits,
should be kept out of poverty. Benefits levels should not fall below mini-
mum subsistence levels as applied in the social assistance schemes. Like-
wise, the minimum social pension for a person having worked a full career
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The starting principle for standard work is a reasonable income protec-
tion so that the beneficiary can live in dignity. In this way, the Recommen-
dation strongly reflects the basic philosophy behind our European social
security systems, in which social insurance schemes and social assistance
schemes overlap when it comes to income protection. The latter schemes
are designed to provide residual protection against poverty if labour mar-
ket (policies) and social insurance fail to do so. Consequently, social pro-
tection schemes must do more than (only) protect against poverty: they
must guarantee reasonable protection against loss of income (from work).
Of course, with no concrete indications of the requested minimum in-
come replacement ratios (such as we e.g. could see in the minimum stan-
dard conventions), the condition to guarantee adequate benefits remains
difficult to monitor. And although the Recommendation calls for an ap-
proach to lower the financial burden on workers and the self-employed
with a low income, the fundamental question remains what kind of social
protection is to be guaranteed to persons with a structural low income.
Providing decent levels of social protection may work well when the vast
majority of the professionally active population work in standard work re-
lationships. It becomes more challenging though when a growing number
of workers or self-employed workers are on low incomes or do not have
regular work.
Transparent Access
The condition of transparency refers first and foremost to clear rules that
are openly communicated to the citizens. Yet, it refers as well to the design
of the schemes; these should not be made too complicated or too costly to
be applied by the workers and the self-employed. Especially in relation to
the latter group, there should be enough transparency in design, with not
too many complicated conditions to comply with. Especially for free-
lancers with limited income or platform workers who earn small incomes
on an irregular basis, applying complicated contribution assessments will
in the end be detrimental to system compliance; 23 by the same token, the
underlying logic of benefits accrual should be kept simple for persons who
bear the responsibility of contribution payment themselves, reflecting the
idea of benefits equivalence: entitlements of the self-employed should re-
d)
23 Schoukens, Paul, Adequacy and Financing (fn. 10).
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flect their actual earnings (adequacy of benefits).24 Moreover, the Recom-
mendation states that Member States should ensure that entitlements are
accumulated, preserved and transferable across all types of employment
and self-employment statuses and across economic sectors (transferability
of entitlements).25 In a society where persons are increasingly starting to
combine (professional) activities the design of the social protection system
should be kept transparent allowing a gradual and integrated benefits ac-
crual across the various income sources.
The EU Recommendation: Are the Needs of Platform Work Sufficiently
Addressed?
The Recommendation regarding access to social protection was not de-
signed specifically with platform work in mind. Platform work came only
recently to full exploitation after some major companies saw the “commer-
cial” potential of the sharing economy. The preparatory works for the Rec-
ommendation were already too advanced in their development to incorpo-
rate this emerging new atypical work form in its regulations. But as the
Recommendation had from the outset the ambition to address all different
work forms this was probably not necessary; its design should make it ver-
satile enough to incorporate new developments in work organisation, such
as all kinds of platform work. Platform work does challenge the Recom-
mendation in some aspects, three of which will be given further attention:
the difference between self-employment and wage-earnership when it
comes to formal access; adequacy and low-income workers; and finally, the
lack of definition of work.
Platform Work: Self-Employment or Wage-Earnership?
Compared to the proposal in which the option of voluntary access was re-
stricted to the risk of unemployment, the final adopted version levelled
down the condition on formal access for the group of self-employed work-
ers. Article 8 now calls upon Member States to improve the formal cover-
age and have it extended to all workers, regardless of the type of employ-
ment relationship, on a mandatory basis; for the self-employed though, the
V.
1.
24 Article 14 of Recommendation (fn. 17).
25 Article 10 of Recommendation (fn. 17).
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extension should be at least on a voluntary basis and, where appropriate,
on a mandatory basis. Even though one can interpret the Recommenda-
tion in an extensive way to mean that mandatory coverage is the standard
approach for having social protection organised for all professionally active
workers26, there remains a legal distinction in place between the groups of
wage-earners and the self-employed. This distinction goes against the fun-
damental philosophy of the Recommendation which aims at an equal ap-
proach towards social protection for all working groups; distinctions are
still accepted but should be restricted to the application of the principles,
which can be adapted to the specific working circumstances of the work-
ing groups at stake (see above). Choosing between mandatory and volun-
tary coverage is not in line with this; it goes against the very essence of so-
cial protection, which is to be organised on a mandatory basis in order to
generate enough redistribution between the groups (of workers).
When applied to platform work, we can see that the distinction be-
tween protection levels across the self-employed and wage-earners is one of
the major problems at stake. The legal discussion in social law on platform
work is still largely focused on the legal qualification of the work activi-
ties27: are they wage-earners or are they to be considered as self-employed?
The vast majority of platforms try to have them contracted as self-em-
ployed workers, essentially to keep the labour costs as low as possible. For
some platforms, contracting cheap labour is the cornerstone upon which
their business is based.
In relation to the Recommendation, a potential weakness could be the
differentiation between workers and the self-employed when it comes to
guaranteeing social protection. Apart from the idea of equal protection,
the Recommendation also aspires to an equal-level playing field across
work groups; ultimately, it should not matter for (the cost of) social pro-
tection whether one contracts a worker or a self-employed person. The re-
ality of platform work shows that, in reality, it does matter very much in-
deed. The fact that the self-employed have the choice to be protected (vol-
untary protection) will have the effect that in the end they will not be pro-
tected at all.28 The Recommendation is running short here: distinguishing
26 Schoukens, Paul, Extending Formal Coverage (fn. 22).
27 Rocca, Marco, Perspective internationale: les Juges face aux Plateformes, in:
Lamine, Auriane/Wattecamps, Céline (eds.), Quel Droit social pour les Tra-
vailleurs de Plateformes?, Brussels: Anthemis 2019.
28 European Commission, Behavioural Study on the Effects of an Extension of Ac-
cess to Social Protection for People in All Forms of Employment (fn. 22) and
Schoukens, Paul, Extending Formal Coverage (fn. 22).
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the self-employed from workers from the outset with regard to the formal
coverage risks undermining the very objectives for which the Recommen-
dations stands: equal levels of protection and the safeguarding of an equal-
level playing field for all workers. To limit the potential damage caused by
this voluntary protection clause, this clause must be interpreted strictly: it
is to be restricted to situations where the organisation of coverage against
particular social risks is too challenging for the group of self-employed per-
sons (such as might be the case for work accidents or unemployment).29
For the other eventualities, mandatory coverage is the key principle to be
followed, also by the self-employed.
Low-Income Groups Covered by the Guarantee of Adequate Benefits?
Another major challenge for platform work is low income and how to take
this into account for the organisation of social protection. The Recommen-
dation focuses mainly on the work-related social protection risks. From a
point of view of sustainability, it is challenging to guarantee adequate
(minimum) benefits that are structurally of a higher level than the income
on which contributions were paid in the past. This is rather problematic.
Platform work is known to have amid the groups a strong proportion of
persons earning a low to very low income. And even though some of these
workers engage in platform work in terms of a second job, the question
remains of how to take into account these low-income levels for the orga-
nisation of work-related social protection schemes. The national approach-
es diverge in their answers, although we notice a strong resurrection of all
kinds of minimum thresholds excluding platform workers from (effective
access to) social protection.30
The Recommendation calls now for guaranteeing an effective social
protection and thus for organising the system so that scattered insurance
records should not be disproportionally sanctioned in social protection sys-
tems. However, it remains silent as to what should be guaranteed in terms
of decent levels of social protection; similarly, it remains silent about what
kind of decent protection „should be guaranteed if the previous (underly-
ing) income basis (of the worker) was too low during his/her working life
to justify a (decent) minimum protection.
2.
29 Schoukens, Paul, Extending Formal Coverage (fn. 22).
30 Schoukens, Paul, Adequacy and Financing (fn. 10).
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Overall, Article 11 of the Recommendation calls for making sure that
(non-standard) workers and the self-employed should not end up in pover-
ty. Article 11 refers to the overall social protection system and the national
circumstances that have to be taken into account in that respect. By doing
so, it acknowledges that work-related social protection cannot address this
problematic issue on its own; when shaping redistribution these systems
are still bound by other principles, such as sustainability and equivalence,
principles that limit the levels of redistribution that can be put into the sys-
tem. It is thus an invitation to have a further look beyond the social protec-
tion schemes (in the narrow sense) and to see the interplay with other so-
cial schemes, such as social assistance, (health) care, family policies and so-
cial housing. In order to keep these references to other protection schemes
manageable, it would be helpful to make them somewhat more concrete
in the monitoring of the Recommendation. First, it would be recommend-
able to state what is understood by benefits adequacy (and thus indirectly
what is expected from the other schemes not targeted by the Recommen-
dation to achieve this). The fact that the EU, but also other international
organisations such as the ILO and the Council of Europe, have already de-
veloped a substantial arsenal of social indicators enabling the monitoring
of social outcomes is promising in this regard. The Recommendation
could use a coherent measurement framework with regard to adequacy
and in that way Article 11 can be seen as an invitation to coherently bring
together these indicators in order to provide some guidance on benefits ad-
equacy and on the positioning of social protection benefits, minimum
benefits and social assistance schemes when it comes to providing social
protection. Secondly, in order to reach the goal of adequacy, social insu-
rance protection schemes will have to be aligned well with schemes such as
social assistance and family benefits.
What is a Professional Activity and What is Not?
The Recommendation does not define what is considered to be work or
what a professional activity must consist of, nor does it provide its own
definitions of workers and the self-employed. There is indeed something to
be said about keeping these concepts open and having them gradually de-
fined over the years on the basis of national reporting. After all, the Rec-
ommendation is mainly targeting an approach whereby national systems
are monitored; using strict legal definitions from the outset does not work
very well with this approach.
3.
Chapter 12: European Standards for Platform Workers
327
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002, am 02.12.2021, 16:03:18
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
The case of platform work does, however, immediately show some lim-
its of this approach: what is to be considered as work and professional in-
come becomes increasingly blurred. If social protection systems do not
start to recalibrate their scope of application (and thus the underlying
concepts, such as work and income, that fall within this scope) they may
lose out on the new and evolving realities of work. Already with regard to
self-employment we notice that it is difficult to delimit precisely which in-
come sources are work-related and which are related to capital. This is also
the case with platform work. Platform work itself is possibly the exponent
of a societal evolution where people’s main concern is, in the first place, to
earn sufficient income to earn a living. This can be on the basis of a regular
standard job (as had for many decades been the main tool for earning suffi-
cient income), but it can also be through other means in place of or in
combination with a job. Taking into account the latest evolutions in non-
standard work (platform work), increasing emphasis is put on income pro-
tection rather than on the protection of labour income.31 More than ever
before, persons tend to combine a series of activities and/or live from vari-
ous income sources (from movable and immovable property). Social pro-
tection should develop alongside this evolution and incorporate these vari-
ous income sources both into the financing of social protection and the
payment of benefits. Some systems have already started to move in this di-
rection, hence it is a call for the Recommendation to incorporate this evo-
lution as well and to apply a broad definition of work and income in order
to do what it had originally intended to do: monitor the design of proper
social protection systems where all workers are treated equally in the pro-
tection of their social needs, regardless their source of professional income.
An Alternative to Benefits Harmonisation: Towards an EU Financing Fork?
The Recommendation can be considered as a positive evolution in the
standard-setting history of the EU, be it because from a legal point of view
VI.
31 Barrio, Alberto/Schoukens, Paul, The Changing Concept of Work (fn. 8), p. 221 ff;
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assess-
ment Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Council Recommendation on
Access to Social Protection for Workers and the Self-Employed, Strasbourg, 13
March 2018, p. 32 ff.
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nothing considerably happened since 1992.32 However, at the same time
some criticism arose, most often referring to the weak legal character of
the Recommendation. This is especially true knowing that originally the
Recommendation was conceived as an EU directive, which as an instru-
ment could have had a stronger legal impact than the Recommendation,
where ultimately any sanctioning is restricted to naming and blaming the
Member States which do not follow the Recommendation. Moreover, the
fact that the Recommendation weakened the formulation in relation to
the formal access conditions for the self-employed has also been strongly
criticised, as well as the too general wording in relation to benefits adequa-
cy; the trade unions expected a clearer stipulation of what is considered to
be the minimum income replacement for social protection benefits that
Member States have to respect (somewhat in the style in which the mini-
mum standard-setting instruments such as ILO Convention 102 and the
European Code of Social Security do so).33
As mentioned earlier, another point of criticism is the fact that no clear
definitions have been developed for the description of the professional
groups for which standards have been set: workers, self-employed, and
non-standard workers.34 Consequently, the Recommendation does not add
very much in the ongoing legal fight on whether platform workers are to
be considered to belong within the group of wage-earners or that of the
self-employed. Similarly, the Recommendation does not give much direc-
tion as to the protection to be guaranteed for the emerging group of in-
between workers that has been identified by quite some Member States, as
a mid-group of sorts between wage-earners and the self-employed (such as
the “parasubordinati” in Italy and the “trabajador autónomo economicamente
dependiente” (TRADE) in Spain); some see this third group to be represen-
tative of the growing group of platform workers. From a perspective of the
Recommendation, it is however not clear which standards are to be re-
spected for these “in-between” workers; at least voluntary protection such
32 The year during which were enacted: Council Recommendation (EEC) 92/441 of
24 June 1992 on common criteria concerning sufficient resources and social assis-
tance in social protection systems, OJ L 245, 26 August 1992 and Council Recom-
mendation (EEC) 92/442 of 27 July 1992 on the convergence of social protection
objectives and policies, OJ L 245, 26 August 1992.
33 Schoukens, Paul, Extending Formal Coverage (fn. 22).
34 Barrio, Alberto/Montebovi, Saskia/Schoukens, Paul, The EU Social Pillar: An Answer
to the Challenge of the Social Protection of Platform Workers? (fn. 1), pp.
219-241.
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as for the self-employed, or mandatory protection for all contingencies as is
applicable for wage-earners should be introduced (see also above).
However, one should not lose sight of the fact that the Recommenda-
tion and, more specifically, its application will be monitored, and as has
been mentioned before, the strength (or the weakness) of the application
of this instrument will also depend on how additional contents and fol-
low-up will be given on the occasion of this control process of monitoring.
In case some of the country recommendations made by the EU are picked
up for the annual semester monitoring, the legal impact may become even
stronger than originally foreseen by the designers of the Recommendation
on access to social protection.35
For possible future initiatives the EU might think of an instrument that
targets, in the first place, the financing of social security, indicating at once
the minimum investments but also the limits of the contributions to be
made for social protection schemes. Recently we have pleaded for this
(rather new) approach after we came to the conclusion that both in inter-
national and European law not much attention has been paid to the fi-
nancing side of social security.36 In short, we can summarise this idea as
the concept of the financing fork. We will explore this concept more pro-
foundly in the following paragraphs.
So far, lawyers have mainly focused on the benefits side, if only with lit-
tle impact. On the other hand, the financial side of social security has been
the focus of the monitoring of systems at European level from a fiscal-fi-
nancial view (addressing the national budgets and inevitably looking at so-
cial security mainly as a cost). Perhaps the time has come now for the fi-
nancial side to become the object of legal harmonising measures that deal
with the concerns which from the start called for the wide diversity of na-
tional social security schemes to be addressed. In other words, rather than
trying to overcome (only) the differences in the benefits side of social secu-
rity, we should try to develop some harmonising standards with regard to
the financing of national social security schemes. This would optimally re-
spect the national competence to define a state’s social security system (see
above), yet at the same time take into account the concern about the socio-
economic and financial impact of social security on the budgets. It also al-
lows for a direct address of the main arguments that the EU had raised
35 Beke, Joris/Schoukens, Paul, Fighting Social Exclusion under EU Horizon 2020. En-
hancing the Legal Enforceability of Social Inclusion Recommendations? (fn. 14),
pp. 51-72.
36 Pieters, Danny/Schoukens, Paul, Harmonising Social Security Financing, in: Van
Lancker, Wim, et al., Liber Amicorum Wim Van Oorschot 2020 (forthcoming).
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from the very start for the harmonisation of social security: the avoidance
of unfair competition through social security; and the combatting of the
social dumping phenomena. In relation to emerging platform work, “false
competition” between social security systems should be a major concern;
as highlighted before, the (reduction of the) employment cost of platform
workers definitely plays a major part in many a business model applied by
platform providers. Instead of undergoing yet another attempt to under-
mine the solidarity underlying all of the national social security systems,
the EU should urgently call for some fair playing rules in its internal mar-
ket – and respecting an equal level playing field when it comes to the cost
of protecting working persons may be one of them. To that purpose, the
financing (rules) of social security should be harmonised within a given
bandwidth or fork. Harmonising standards with regard to the financing of
social security could indeed best be developed by defining a “fork” or a
“bandwidth” within which social security contributions and government
subsidies to the social security systems would need to be allocated.
The basic idea is to set a minimum and maximum percentage for social
security contributions to be levied on the real professional incomes and a
minimum and maximum percentage for the costs of social security to be
financed out of the public budget. These minimums and maximums con-
stitute the “fork” or “bandwidth” within which national social security sys-
tems can determine the specifics of the social security benefits (e.g. amount
payable, eligibility criteria, etc.).
It is obvious that in doing so, the possibilities to (ab)use social security
arrangements to falsify competition between (enterprises of) Member
States would be considerably reduced; at the same time, the specified fork
would guarantee that each Member State allocates an adequate amount of
the workers’ incomes and of the state budget to social security, thus coun-
tering a rush to the bottom.
Such an approach would call for the use of some clearly defined
concepts related to work and income out of work. It is expedient that fu-
ture evolutions, such as we can already see emerge from platform work
and the like, be taken into account. First of all, we will have to define
clearly what we understand by social security and by social security
schemes affected by this financing fork. Which social security schemes are
to be taken into account? In an initial approach, we mainly consider the
contributory social insurance schemes of the country and, specifically, the
schemes that today fall under the EU coordination regulations, however
excluding the special non-contributory benefits schemes. As for social assis-
tance and special non-contributory benefits, Member States would contin-
ue to retain competence to finance these as they wish. As for other social
Chapter 12: European Standards for Platform Workers
331
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002, am 02.12.2021, 16:03:18
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
security benefits, they should be financed by the fork-related levy. Perhaps
the cost compensating schemes, health care and family allowances could
also be excluded, as these have little to do with the social charges on
labour, but this would require further examination.
When it comes to social contributions, we would not make any distinc-
tion between employer and employee contributions.37 What matters in the
end is the overall social security cost for the employer (nominal wage plus
employer’s contribution) and what net income the worker receives for
his/her work (wage minus employee contribution). We would set the
“fork” for the total of the contributions, not considering the specific social
risk schemes separately. All kinds of special tariffs (such as financing ex-
emptions) for specific groups or for specific situations would have to be in-
corporated in the final totals of the eventual set (maximum) level of the
fork. This could end up being a rather complex, but in our opinion possi-
ble procedure.
A “fork” for the social security contributions levied on the income from
work (wages, professional income of the self-employed) would also require
a clear definition of what is to be considered “income from work” and
thus, ultimately, what is “work”. This will inevitably lead to a broader defi-
nition of work and income from professional activities compared to the
one we are using today (see above). Otherwise, a new danger, namely that
of competition falsification, could indeed result from the emerging new
patterns of work such as gig work, platform work, etc.
Furthermore, the “fork” for the amount of state subsidies (to the rele-
vant social insurance schemes) could perhaps best be defined in relation to
the share of that financing in the total cost of the social insurance schemes
concerned; or perhaps, more practically, in relation to the total amount of
social contributions. In the latter case the “fork” could be expressed as a
fraction (or multiple fractions) of the total amount of social security con-
tributions.
In order to keep the necessary order and structure, the EU should make
a clear classification of what should be understood (for the purpose of EU
law) as a contribution and what as a state subsidy. National social security
levies should then, regardless of their national classification, belong to the
one or the other category. Social security levies that are not (clearly) la-
belled in the country as social security contributions should best be allocat-
ed to either the “social contribution” or the “state subsidy” rubric; in order
37 See on this fictitious distinction: Pieters, Danny, Social Security: An Introduction
to the Basic Principles, Alpen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2006.
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to make that distinction, it could, for example, be useful to fall back on (or
at least be inspired by) the labelling as it is applied right now in the exist-
ing EU coordination instruments (Regulation (EC) 883/2004). If the levy is
considered to be a tax, then the proceeds should be added to the rubric of
direct subventions of the state.
The question, of course, remains as to whether it will be feasible to de-
fine a minimum and a maximum of social security contributions for all
EU Member States. Here too, research on the current financing of national
social security schemes would be needed: What is the share of social contri-
butions? What is the share of state subsidies? Simple questions they may
seem, but they are, however, very complex to answer, requiring not only
legal and social policy knowledge but also macro-economic expertise. Any-
how, let us first explore what for most EU Member States could be a rea-
sonable “fork” of social contributions and of public subsidising of the
work-based social insurance schemes.
Conclusion
Platform work is challenging labour and social security law, probably
more than any other (new) work form ever. Moreover, due to the fact that
it gives many employers a new impetus to hire low cost work that due to
its virtual character is intrinsically mobile on the global market, the
question for more harmonisation in the field of social protection again
comes to the fore. This new emerging form of work thus challenges na-
tional and European policy makers, in particular with regard to low-in-
come workers (working poor) and to activities which are not of a profes-
sional nature, but from which persons (can) generate (sufficient) income
to live on. Low-income work is a challenge to the sustainability of every
(work-related) social insurance scheme and will in the future call for a
smart co-existence of social insurance, social assistance and other welfare
schemes. At the same time, the second form of work calls for the rethink-
ing of our professional social insurances. When generating income is no
longer (only) a matter of standard work, but is increasingly accompanied
by other types of activities and returns from (movable/immovable) goods,
it may be the right time to reconsider the organisation of social security.
This may call for a broadening of the income basis for social security fi-
nancing, but at the same time will demand a rethinking of our social secu-
rity risks (unemployment and work incapacity in particular) and of a dif-
ferent way of conditioning and calculating our social security benefits. At
the European level, it invites policy makers to think beyond the protection
VII.
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of social benefits (social outcomes) but in turn takes interest in developing
fair competition rules on the internal market: the financing of social secu-
rity definitely belongs to the scope of these competition rules – hence our
proposal to apply a fork or bandwidth within which Member States have
to set their social security contributions. In that way, platform work is not
to be considered as a threat to social security but mainly as a strong invita-
tion to finally bring social security into the 21st century (“towards a work-
related social security 2.0”).
Paul Schoukens
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Chapter 13
Social Law 4.0 and the Future of Social Security Coordination
Grega Strban
Introduction
The law of social security, or social law in a narrower sense,1 is among the
youngest branches of law. Although, it has evolved into a separate and ful-
ly-fledged legal field, some connections to labour law remain and certain
connections to other fields of law, like tax law, family law or even criminal
law were established.
Moreover, social law cannot remain static in the contemporary dynamic
or fluid society.2 One of the aspects of fluid society is challenging the tradi-
tional norms of work, its stability and predictable social security coverage.
Traditional patterns of (organising) work and mobility, which used to be
considered as a norm (standard), also when shaping social security systems
after the Second World War, are changing. According to ILO Convention
102 concerning minimum standards of social security of 1952, the stan-
I.
1 The definitions of social law may vary, e.g. in Belgium droit social or sociaal recht
encompasses labour and social security law (although both fundamental pillars
emancipated to a certain extent). Debaenst, Bruno, Belgian Social Law and its Jour-
nals: A Reflected History, in: C@hiers du CRHIDI. Histoire, Droit, Institutions,
Société [En ligne], 37 (2015), https://popups.uliege.be:443/1370-2262/index.php?id
=183. Accessed 15 May 2020. Similarly, the European Social Charter (in its initial
and revised versions) addresses both fields of law. Conversely, in Germany Sozial-
recht could more straightforwardly be translated as the law of Social Security, al-
though it may cover some fields of law that are considered to be outside of its
scope in some other countries, e.g. social compensation schemes. The latter are, for
instance, outside the scope of social security law in Slovenia and within the broad-
er field of social protection law. See Strban, Grega, Systematisierung des slowenis-
chen Rechts der sozialen Sicherheit im Vergleich zur Systematisierung des
deutschen Sozialrechts, in: Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Ar-
beits- und Sozialrecht, 24/25 (2010/2011) 4, p. 353.
2 Nowadays, some authors discuss fluid borders, fluid services, work without bound-
aries, and fluid communications. Hoencamp, Jeroen, The Fluid Society, Working
Without Boundaries, The Perspective Series, New Insights into the UK Workplace,
Circle Research, Vodafone 2014.
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dard beneficiary is a man with a wife and two children in a stable (full-
time and permanent) employment relationship. Standard social security
benefits should suffice for such a standard beneficiary. Nevertheless, work
(organisation), movement and social security have become more non-stan-
dard or unstable (fluid), especially within the EU.3
Societal fluidity may be reflected in new forms of work or, more specifi-
cally, organisation of work. Standard employment is being replaced by
non-standard forms of employment and new forms of self-employment.
Among them are fixed-term contracts, part-time work (either temporary or
on a more frequent basis, horizontal or vertical), temporary agency work,
telework, traineeships and student work, as well as casual work, including
on-demand work (including zero-hour contracts) and platform work (i.e.
people working for digital platforms, without having a fixed workplace).
Moreover, self-employment, especially involuntary, bogus, dependent,
new4 and part-time self-employment, or other country-specific non-stan-
dard contracts (mini-jobs, civil law contracts, etc.) may exist. The distinc-
tion between employment and self-employment is blurred to a certain ex-
tent also in EU law.5
Fluidity may also be associated with the problem of fraudulent forms of
undeclared work, especially its grey zone, in the form of under-reporting
of wages or hours worked. What is noticeable in the areas of platform
work and IT networks is undeclared own-account work, i.e. self-employed
work.6 On many occasions, labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive
platforms may not be required to declare the earnings of workers. Al-
3 Vukorepa, Ivana/Jorens, Yves/Strban, Grega, Pensions in the Fluid EU Society: Chal-
lenges for (Migrant) Workers, in: da Costa Cabral, Nazaré/Cunha Rodrigues,
Nuno (eds.), The Future of Pension Plans in the EU Internal Market, Financial and
Monetary Policy Studies, 48, Cham: Springer 2019, p. 326.
4 New self-employed persons may fall between the two traditional, standard cat-
egories of dependent and subordinated workers (or employees) and independent
self-employed persons (entrepreneurs) also in social security law.
5 Article 48, Treaty on the Functioning of the EU - TFEU, OJ C 202, 7 June 2016
(Title IV, Chapter 1 on the free movement of workers) referring to employed and
self-employed workers. Such provision is indeed a bit odd, since self-employed per-
sons are usually distinguished from workers and other provisions of EU law might
apply to them, such as freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services
in the internal market. However, this shows that workers and self-employed per-
sons might no longer be clearly separable categories, especially in social security
coordination law.
6 Reinhard, Hans-Joachim, Adjusting Old-Age Pensions to Match Employment Bi-
ographies – The German Case, in: Hohnerlein, Eva Maria/Hennion, Sylvie/Kauf-
mann, Otto (eds.), Erwerbsverlauf und sozialer Schutz in Europa, Berlin – Heidel-
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though such platforms try to avoid being considered as employers, nation-
al courts may classify them as such,7 which may lead to more comprehen-
sive social security coverage.
Many of the mentioned forms of non-standard work or new, more flexi-
ble forms of work organisation are associated with various elements of pre-
cariousness. They may range from job insecurity, to employment record
discontinuity, and lower earnings.8 Moreover, they may be involuntary for
persons performing such work.9
As much as it might be thought-provoking, the present paper does not
analyse labour law aspects of non-standard forms of employment and self-
employment. It rather focusses on the question how social law should fol-
low the changes in social relations in order to provide effective social secu-
rity to persons requiring it. Although persons performing various kinds of
non-standard work or engaged in new forms of self-employment do not
present a very homogenous group, they shall be defined as non-standard
berg: Springer 2018, p. 577; Becker, Ulrich, Die soziale Sicherung Selbständiger in
Europa, in: Zeitschrift für europäisches Sozial- und Arbeitsrecht, 17 (2018) 8, p.
307.
7 For instance, Italian Corte di Cassazione, judgment No. 1663 of 24 January 2020
qualifying riders delivering food to be considered as subordinated workers, https://
www.lavorodirittieuropa.it/images/Cassazione_Foodora-.pdf. Accessed 15 May
2020. Similarly, French Cour de Cassation qualifying an Uber driver as a worker:
Arrêt No. 374 du 4 mars 2020 (19-13.316) - Cour de Cassation - Chambre Sociale,
FR:CCAS:2020:SO00374, https://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/chambr
e_sociale_576/374_4_44522.html, or in English: https://www.courdecassation.fr/IM
G/20200304_arret_uber_english.pdf. Both accessed 15 May 2020.
8 Schoukens, Paul/Barrio, Alberto, The Changing Concept of Work: When does Typi-
cal Work Become Atypical?, in: European Labour Law Journal, 8 (2017) 4, p. 306;
Kresal Šoltes, Katarina/Strban, Grega/Domadenik, Polona (eds.), Prekarno delo:
Multidisciplinarna analiza (precarious work: multidisciplinary analysis), Ljubljana:
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Law and Faculty of Economics 2020; also: Man-
dl, Irene/Biletta, Isabella, Overview of New Forms of Employment – 2018 update,
Eurofound, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 2018, doi:
10.2806/09266.
9 In 2017, one in three among the economically dependent self-employed wished to
work as an employee. Hence, economically dependent self-employed persons most
particularly wish to work as employees (32.6 percent). The corresponding percent-
age for the independent self-employed without employees is 17.4 percent, and for
the self-employed with employees 10.5 percent. These results show that a strong re-
lation exists between self-employed status and the willingness to change. See Euro-
stat, Self-Employment Statistics, November 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/stati
stics-explained/index.php/Self-employment_statistics. Accessed 15 May 2020.
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workers (unless a specific group would require specific mentioning) for
the purpose of the present article.
It might be recalled that also during its establishment and over the
course of history, social security had to be modified in order to fulfil its
function, i.e. provide (income) security to people. Basically, it has always
followed the industrial revolutions.10 The response to the Industrial Revo-
lution 4.0 has to be modernised social law, hence designated as Social Law
4.0.
Even though Member States have transferred the execution of certain
sovereignty rights to a supranational organisation, such as the EU, they re-
main exclusively competent to determine the substance of their national
law of social security. They should find their own solution and shape So-
cial Law 4.0, whereby they might be supported by the EU.11 National solu-
tions are bound to be distinctive. They always reflect various historically
conditioned and rather distinctive structural (e.g. educational, living and
working conditions) and cultural elements (e.g. powers of trade unions or
civil movements)12 and policy preferences of each Member State. Today,
the courts of law might remind the legislature that the rule of law de-
10 The first one presenting manufacturing and focusing on a more optimised form
of labour performed through the use of water- and steam-powered engines and
other types of machine tools. Industrialisation and urbanisation led to the estab-
lishment of social security schemes. The second industrial revolution introduced
steel and the use of electricity in factories, enabling mass production on the as-
sembly lines. In the third one, electronic and eventually computer technology
was introduced in factories, moving from analogue to digital technology and au-
tomation software. The fourth industrial revolution is based on the interconnec-
tivity through the Internet of Things, access to real-time data, and the introduc-
tion of cyber-physical systems, i.e. connecting physical with digital, allowing for
better collaboration and access across departments, partners, vendors, products,
and people. See EPICOR, What is Industry 4.0 – the Industrial Internet of Things
(IIoT), https://www.epicor.com/en-ae/resource-center/articles/what-is-industry-4-
0/. Accessed 15 May 2020.
11 See e.g. The European Pillar of Social Rights, Principle 12 on Social Protection,
emphasising that regardless of the type and duration of their employment rela-
tionship, workers, and, under comparable conditions, the self-employed, have the
right to adequate social protection, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-pol
itical/files/social-summit-european-pillar-social-rights-booklet_en.pdf. Accessed on
25 May 2020; Also Schoukens, Paul/Barrio, Alberto/Montebovi, Saskia, The EU So-
cial Pillar: An Answer to the Challenge of the Social Protection of Platform
Workers?, in: European Journal of Social Security, 20 (2018) 3, p. 219.
12 Berghman, Jos, The Invisible Social Security, in: Van Oorschot, Wim/Peeters,
Hans/Boos, Kees (eds.), Invisible Social Security Revisited, Essays in Honour of
Jos Berghman, Tielt: Lannoo 2014, p. 37.
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mands of them to follow the changes in social relations with its normative
action.13 Hence, the law of social security is not only one of the youngest,
but is also bound to be one of the most rapidly changing areas of law.
In the present article, one additional element is added when considering
the most appropriate modifications of social law, or when discussing So-
cial Law 4.0, namely the element of cross-border movement. Fluidity with-
in EU society is reflected also in the changing trends of mobility. Patterns
of mobility of (non-standard) workers have become more diverse. The tra-
ditional long-term mobility of moving from home Member State to host
Member State and working there for a longer period of time has been par-
tially replaced or supplemented by mobility characterised by multiple
shorter-term movements to other Member States.14
Therefore, the research question is: How should the coordination of na-
tional social security systems be modified in order to follow the develop-
ment of non-standard forms of employment and self-employment? This in-
cludes higher digitalisation and ITC-supported work patterns, which
might be boosted even more by the recent pandemic15 with a higher ratio
of home office work and telework and remote (or blended) schooling,16
which is not occurring only within one Member State, but is bound to en-
tail a cross-border element in certain cases.
13 E.g. Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court U-I-69/03, 20 October 2005,
OdlUS XIV, 75; Strban, Grega, Country Report on Slovenia, in: Becker, Ulrich/
Pieters, Danny/Ross, Friso/Schoukens, Paul (eds.), Security: A General Principle
of Social Security Law in Europe, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2010, p.
412.
14 Fries-Tersch, Elena/Jones, Matthew/Böök, Birte/de Keyser, Linda/Tugran, Tugce, 2019
Annual Report on Intra-EU Labour Mobility, European Commission 2020, p. 13.
15 The WHO declared the outbreak of the new coronavirus Covid-19 (caused by
SARS-CoV-2 virus) a pandemic in Europe on 12 March 2020, http://www.euro.w
ho.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid-19/news/news/2020/
3/who-announces-covid-19-outbreak-a-pandemic. Accessed 15 May 2020.
16 See the outcome of the European Institute of Social Security, Blended Courses in
Social Security, https://www.eiss.be/training%20and%20education/blended%20co
urses.html. Accessed 25 May 2020.
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Coordination of Social Security Systems
The Objective
In highly mobile societies,17 where movements are more frequent, last
shorter and include various destinations, the reminiscence of the principle
of territoriality can hardly be justified.18 One of the major objectives of the
EU, which should enable the functioning of the internal market, is the
promotion of free movement of EU citizens, and all kinds of professionally
active persons and workers in particular. Without an effective, uniform so-
cial security coordination mechanism, such free movement could be seri-
ously hampered. Nevertheless, Member States are still free to shape the
substance of their social security systems, i.e. to determine the scope of en-
titled persons, kind and scope of benefits and conditions for their entitle-
ment. However, the shaping of national social security is not an island out-
side of EU law. The latter must still be taken into account, e.g. when treat-
ing national and Union citizens alike in national social security systems.
The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) tries to construe the secondary legis-
lation as a whole in order to achieve the desired result19 and uphold the
fundamental values of the EU.
As already noted above, the social security system is first and foremost
regulated by national law. The more similar national social security sys-
tems are, the easier their coordination might be. However, it seems that
national social security systems are growing apart, making their coordina-
tion more complex. In order to guarantee the free movement of workers
(Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
TFEU) and Union citizens in general (Article 21 TFEU) social security sys-
tems have to be legally and administratively connected, interlinked, coor-
dinated. Similar to national social law, EU social security coordination law
has to be adapted to the new and more fluid 4.0 social relations, based on
digitalised and non-standard forms of employment and self-employment.
II.
1.
17 Notwithstanding temporary restrictions to contain the pandemic in 2020.
18 For instance, ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention No. 102 of
1952 foresees that a benefit to which a person protected would otherwise be enti-
tled may be suspended for as long as the person concerned is absent from the ter-
ritory of the Member State (Article 69). Also, the European Court of Human
Rights ruled that such restrictions can no longer be justified, ECHR of 07 Febru-
ary 2014, Application No. 10441/06, Case of Pichkur v Ukraine.
19 E.g. one of the latest decisions: CJEU of 2 April 2020, Case C-802/18, Caisse pour
l'avenir des enfants v. FV and GW, ECLI:EU:C:2020:269.
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Two Paradoxes
It is correct that EU law does not unify national social security systems.
However, paradoxically, their coordination is achieved through a regu-
lation, which is by itself a unifying measure. It is generally and directly ap-
plicable and binding in its entirety in all Member States.20 The attribute of
direct applicability is linked to the doctrine of supremacy. In principle, it is
not open to Member States to interfere with the direct application of a
regulation in the national legal order. However, social security systems are
not unified, at least not in their substance. Rather, the part of formal social
security law, governing the application of the substantive social security
law in transnational situations is unified among all the Member States.21
Historically, the text on linking or coordinating social security systems
of the six EU founding Member States22 was agreed upon in the form of an
international convention. However, it was decided to make the coordina-
tion rules operational as soon as possible to avoid the time-consuming pro-
cedure of ratification. Hence, already agreed rules were passed in the form
of a regulation. In fact, this was done in the form of the third regulation
ever adopted by the (current) EU, i.e. Regulation (EEC) No. 3 concerning
social security for migrant workers.23 It was the first real legal instrument
in the EU.24 Regulation (EEC) 4/58 was the Implementing Regulation,
mainly containing rules of behaviour of the institution responsible for so-
cial security coordination.25
Choosing a regulation over the traditional international convention has
important implications. It gives the CJEU the possibility to interpret sec-
ondary legislation and establish its conformity with the Treaties,26 or in
fact apply the Treaties directly to the situations under the material scope of
EU law. Later on, the initial Social Security Coordination Regulations
2.
20 Article 288 TFEU.
21 Strban, Grega, Social Rights of Migrants in the European Union, in: Malfliet, K./
Abdullin, А. I./Shaikhutdinova, G. R./Davletgildeev, R. Sh. et al. (eds.), Regional
Aspects of Integration: European Union and Eurasian Space, Moscow: Statut
2019, p. 73.
22 The founding Member States were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg
and The Netherlands.
23 OJ L 30/561, 16 December 1958.
24 Regulations No. 1 and 2 dealt with the use of languages and the form of the laisser
passer to the Members of the European Parliament, respectively.
25 Both Regulations 3 and 4/58/EEC became applicable as of 1 January 1959.
26 Treaty on EU (TEU) and TFEU, both published as consolidated versions in OJ C
202, 7 June 2016.
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were replaced by Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 and its Implementing Regu-
lation (EEC) 574/72. Interestingly enough, the currently applicable Regu-
lation (EC) 883/2004 was passed only a couple of days before the largest
enlargement of the EU so far. The 15 Member States agreed on the word-
ing of the Regulation on 29 April 2004.27 The 10 States joined the EU on 1
May 2004 and the unanimity of 25 (and later 27) Member States would be
required.28 The Implementing Regulation was passed only in 2009, in the
form of Regulation (EC) 987/2009,29 which shows the resistance of the
Member States to give more competence in the field of social security to
the EU and difficulties on agreeing on a complex social security coordina-
tion mechanism within the EU.
Another paradox of a regulation might be detected when comparing it
to a directive. The latter has to be transposed into national law,30 whereas a
regulation applies directly. Hence, the reader of national law might be
readily aware of the directive rules, but not of the regulation rules, since
they have to be studied in addition to national law. This is very much evi-
dent also in the field of social security coordination, more specifically in
the law of cross-border healthcare. The rules of Directive 2011/24/EU on
the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare31 had to be
transposed into national law (in 2013), whereas the Regulation (EC)
27 OJ L 166, 30 April 2004.
28 After the Lisbon Treaty came into force in December 2009 (OJ C 306, 17 Decem-
ber 2007) the unanimity requirement was mitigated, but not completely abol-
ished. According to the ordinary legislative procedure votes of a qualified majori-
ty in the Council as a rule suffice for the legislative act to be passed (Articles 48
and 294 of the TFEU). However, a so-called “alarm procedure” or “brake proce-
dure” has been installed in the TFEU. In case the Commission proposal affects
important aspects of its social security system (including its scope, cost or finan-
cial structure) or affects the financial balance of that system, the Member State
may refer the matter to the European Council. In this case, the ordinary legis-
lative procedure is suspended and the European Council may accept or reject the
proposal. Nevertheless, the European Council as a rule adopts the decisions unan-
imously. The right of Member States to a veto has not been completely abolished,
it has merely been modified. Moreover, if no decision is taken in four months, it
is deemed that the act originally proposed has not been adopted.
29 Regulation (EC) 883/2004, OJ L 284, 30 October 2009. The latest proposal for the
revision of the Coordination Regulations was presented in December 2016: Euro-
pean Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council, COM (2016) 815 final.
30 A directive is binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State at
which it is addressed, but leaves to the national authorities the choice of form and
methods (Article 288 TFEU).
31 OJ L 88/45, 4 April 2011.
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833/2004 has been directly applicable since May 2010. Yet, the discussion
was much more vivid when the Directive was transposed into national law
and a very limited discussion (if any) was noticeable when the new social
security Coordination Regulation became applicable.32
Some principles of the EU social security coordination law can be de-
duced already from primary law (the Treaties),33 others from the secondary
law – most notably from the Coordination Regulations. These principles
are the principles of equal treatment, unity of applicable legislation, pro-
tection of the rights in course of acquisition (by aggregating all relevant pe-
riods), the protection of acquired rights (by the export of benefits) and
good and sincere administrative cooperation.34
Distinctive Definitions
One of the core problems related to social security of moving non-standard
workers might be their distinctive treatment in various Member States.
The concept of worker may be defined either by national or by EU law. It
constitutes an autonomous concept specific to EU law, unless the EU in-
strument in question makes express reference to definitions under national
law (at the same time attributing the EU meaning to such concept).35
There is a distinction in EU law between a free movement definition of
a worker, and a social security definition.36 According to settled CJEU case
III.
32 Strban, Grega, The Right to Health in the EU, in: Brameshuber, Elisabeth/
Friedrich, Michael/Karl, Beatrix (eds.), Festschrift Franz Marhold, Wien: Manz
2020, p. 843.
33 Articles 18, 21, 45 and 48 TFEU.
34 The present article is too limited in scope to analyse all the facets of administra-
tive cooperation among the Member States. Suffice it to note that a huge project
on the electronic exchange of social security information (EESSI) is under way
and the first electronic documents were exchanged between Slovenia and Austria
in 2019. See General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Electronic
Exchange of Social Security Information (EESSI): state of play – Information
from the Commission, 28 February 2019, 6986/19, p. 3, https://data.consilium.eur
opa.eu/doc/document/ST-6986-2019-INIT/en/pdf. Accessed on 19 June 2020.
35 See: CJEU of 19 March 1964, Case C-75/63, Unger v Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereini-
gung voor Detailhandel en Ambachten of Nijenoord 1 a, ECLI:EU:C:1964:19.
36 For instance, in the Coordination Regulations there is a reference to insurance
under national social security systems, disregarding nationality (Regulation (EU)
No. 1231/2010). However, according to the free movement perspective, the mi-
grant worker concept is only applied to EU nationals. See also CJEU of 14 Octo-
ber 2010, C-428/09, Union syndicale Solidaires Isère v Premier Ministre, Min-
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law, there is an autonomous EU concept of migrant worker linked to free
movement37 that follows a factual perspective, i.e. services must be per-
formed for and under the direction of another person in exchange for re-
muneration.38 Such definition explicitly excludes persons who do not per-
form activities considered genuine and effective, but perform them on
such a small scale as for them to be considered marginal and ancillary.39
Conversely, Regulation (EC) 883/2004 does not provide a definition of
worker or of a self-employed person.40 It refers to national law when activi-
ties of employed and self-employed persons have to be determined.41 Such
EU definition in the form of referral to national law is relevant, especially
with respect to non-standard workers, since national legislatures are free to
determine the conditions under which non-standard workers are covered
by their respective social security law.42
istère du Travail, ECLI:EU:C:2010:612. For more on the concept of worker in
labour law and social security law, see: Lhernould, Jean-Philippe/Strban, Grega/Van
der Mei, Anne Pieter/Vukorepa, Ivana, The Interrelation between Social Security
Coordination Law and Labour Law, FreSsco Analytical Report 2017, European
Commission 2017, p. 15.
37 See e.g. CJEU of 3 July 1986, Case C-66/85, Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Württem-
berg, ECLI:EU:C:1986:284; CJEU of 23 March 1982, Case C-53/81, Levin v
Staatssecretaris van Justitie, EU:C:1982:105.
38 See also CJEU of 17 July 2008, Case C-94/07, Raccanelli v Max-Planck-
Gesellschaft, ECLI:EU:C:2008:425.
39 On the scope of these undefined terms (marginal and ancillary) in the Member
States see O’Brien, Charlotte/Spaventa, Eleanor/De Coninck, Joyce, The Concept of
Worker under Article 45 TFEU and Certain Non-Standard Forms of Employ-
ment, FreSsco Comparative Report 2015, European Commission 2016.
40 Which avoids complex annexes with specifications of these definitions. See Annex
I of previous Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/17; Jorens, Yves/Van Overmeiren, Filip,
General Principles of Coordination Regulation 883/2004, in: European Journal of
Social Security, 11 (2009) 1-2, p. 55.
41 Article 1(a) defines “activity as an employed person” as any activity or equivalent
situation treated as such for the purposes of the social security legislation of the
Member State in which such activity or equivalent situation exists. See e.g. CJEU
of 3 May 1990, Case C-2/89, Kits van Heijningen v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzek-
eringsbank, ECLI:EU:C:1990:183; CJEU of 30 January 1997, Case C-221/95,
Hervein v Inasti, EU:C:1997:47; CJEU of 30 January 1997, Case C-340/94, De
Jaeck v Staatssecretaris van Financiën, ECLI:EU:C:1997:43.
42 Of course respecting the EU Law at the same time. See cases CJEU of 12 July
1979, Case C-266/78, Brunori v Landesversicherungsanstalt Rheinprovinz,
ECLI:EU:C:1979:200; CJEU of 24 April 1980, Case C-110/79, Coonan v The Insu-
rance Officer, ECLI:EU:C:1980:112; CJEU of 30 January 1997, Case C-340/94, De
Jaeck v Staatssecretaris van Financiën, E ECLI:U:C:1997:43.
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For historical reasons, the best social security coverage and hence all so-
cial security coordination rules apply to persons who are defined as or are
equivalent to full-time workers under national law. If persons are excluded
from such national definition, due to work being considered as marginal
or merely ancillary, they are also not subject to any social security coordi-
nation for workers. They might be covered as non-actives, if they are cov-
ered at all by the national social security law. If covered as non-actives, dis-
tinctive social security coordination rules would apply to them as com-
pared to those of workers. Alternatively, if a national social security system
covers all residents, the problems of classification of economic activity
might not be as pertinent.
Although the number of cases across Europe (re)qualifying platform
workers as employees for the application of their social insurance schemes
has risen,43 it is hard to tell under which status these workers eventually
fall. Depending on the concrete organisation of their work, they might be
considered either as employed or as (dependent) self-employed persons.
However, what is clear though is that a multitude of these workers are for-
mally hired as self-employed yet in reality work as wage-earners (bogus
self-employed).44 In some Member States platform work as such is not reg-
ulated yet and it does not offer social security coverage due to the ample
use of minimum (insurance) thresholds.45
Hence, problems that may cause difficulties for coordinating distinctive
social security systems for non-standard mobile workers might be related
to distinct classifications in various Member States. Moreover, classifica-
tion in one Member State may not be recognised in another Member
State. Especially thresholds related to certain income levels or working
hours, for being covered by the social security system and subject to (tradi-
tional) coordination rules may cause problems for non-standard workers.
43 Strban, Grega/Carrascosa Bermejo, Dolores/Schoukens, Paul/Vukorepa, Ivana, Social
Security Coordination and Non-Standard Forms of Employment and Self-Em-
ployment: Interrelation, Challenges and Prospects, MoveS Analytical Report
2018, European Commission 2020, p. 25, https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catI
d=1098&langId=en, Accessed 15 July 2020. And recent judgments of e.g. Italian
and French courts, as mentioned above.
44 See e.g. an example of massive requalification to wage-earner in Spain: https://elp
ais.com/economia/2019/07/28/actualidad/1564322291_541124.html. Accessed 15
May 2020.
45 Strban, Grega/Carrascosa Bermejo, Dolores/Schoukens Paul/Vukorepa, Ivana, Social
Security Coordination and Non-Standard Forms of Employment and Self-Em-
ployment: Interrelation, Challenges and Prospects (fn. 43), p. 25.
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Therefore, social security coordination law, adjusted to the Social Law
4.0, should disregard the thresholds concerning the level of income or
number of working hours for mobile non-standard workers, since the
adding of income or hours worked (e.g. simultaneously) in two or more
Member States may de facto present genuine and effective activities, and
not only marginal and ancillary ones. Moreover, the distinction between
activities as a worker and as a self-employed person might be abolished and
a person’s entire income or duration of work should be considered in its
entirety. In order to achieve this, information should be readily exchanged
among the Member States involved, e.g. for a person who is simultaneous-
ly self-employed in two or more Member States and works part-time for
one or more platforms.
Moreover, a classification of economic activities might be essential for
determining which Member State’s legislation should be applicable to a
non-standard worker.
Applicable Legislation
The rules on applicable legislation, designated also as collision or conflict
rules, differ between working and non-working groups and between em-
ployees, self-employed persons and civil servants. Consequently, Title II of
Regulation (EC) 883/2004 on the rules for determining the applicable leg-
islation is not neutral concerning the eventual qualification of activities.
Impact of Qualification to Collision Rules
As a rule, each of the Member States on whose territory professional activi-
ties are performed by a non-standard worker is competent to determine
the nature of these activities. The competent Member State will then be as-
signed by the social security coordination rules. For instance, a non-stan-
dard worker, performing the same activities in two Member States may be
qualified as a self-employed person in one and as an employed person in
the other. The outcome is that the Member State of employment, which
has priority over self-employment, will be competent due to the applica-
tion of Article 13 (3) of Regulation (EC) 883/2004.46 Only in the case of
IV.
1.
46 Similarly, civil servant activities prevail over employee and self-employed activi-
ties, according to Article 13 (4) of Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
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posting does the country from where the worker is posted retain its com-
petency to qualify the respective activities.47
The question might be whether each of the Member States concerned
should remain competent for determining the nature of activities per-
formed on its territory. If the purpose of social security coordination is to
avoid negative consequences of the principle of territoriality and improve
the legal position of a moving (also non-standard) worker, it could be ar-
gued that the Member State solely competent for the social security of
such worker should have the sole responsibility for qualifying all activities.
In the above case of employment and self-employment, the Member State
of employment should have the competence to qualify the person’s activi-
ties in both Member States as (dependent) employment for social security
purposes.
Moreover, due to a larger fluidity and flexibility of work patterns, more
people than before are combining different activities, which may also be
performed across national borders. It might not always be easy to deter-
mine at what point a certain activity becomes an economic or professional
activity. Some Member States might not consider very minor activities as
work, while others might. It is important in determining the legislation of
the respective Member State responsible for social security whether a per-
son is qualified as a worker or as a non-active person. In the first case, the
lex loci laboris rule becomes applicable, while in the second it is the lex loci
domicilii rule.48
These rules on determining the legislation applicable are based on the
geographical aspect of work. This is being emphasised also by the CJEU,
which mentions the location of the employed or self-employed activity as a
main criterion for social security coordination.49 However, Social Law 4.0
is based more on digital platforms and remote (i.e. tele-) working (boosted
by the Covid-19 pandemic), also from different Member States.50 Geo-
graphical stability between a worker, his/her employer and a Member State
is no longer guaranteed in all cases, which might complicate the coordina-
47 Article 12 of Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
48 Article 11 of Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
49 CJEU of 27 September 2012, Case C-137/11, Partena v Les Tartes de Chaumont-
Gistoux SA, ECLI:EU:C:2012:593.
50 See in this respect CJEU of 13 September 2017, Case C-570/15, X v Staatssecretaris
van Financiën, ECLI:EU:C:2017:674 (also the opinion of Advocate-General
Szpunar, ECLI:EU:C:2017:182).
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tion of national social security systems.51 Gainful activity from a distance
may no longer be of a merely marginal and ancillary nature.
Rules on Marginal Activity
Nevertheless, many non-standard workers struggle to earn enough income
to survive and the Coordination Regulation itself applies a concept of
marginal activities which refers to the limited amount of working time
and/or remuneration.52 However, there is no clear rule on what marginal
activity may be. As an indicator the Administrative Commission for the
Coordination of Social Security Systems proposes that activities account-
ing for less than five percent of the worker’s regular working time and/or
less than five percent of his/her overall remuneration should be regarded
as marginal.53 However, it seems that this rule applies only when activities
in two or more Member States are performed simultaneously, not general-
ly in all cases.
Nevertheless, even if applicable only to simultaneous activities,54 odd re-
sults may be produced for non-standard workers. As already discussed, em-
ployed activities prevail over self-employed activities, and this might even
be the case when a person is only marginally employed (e.g. slightly over
five percent)55 in one Member State and genuinely, effectively and pre-
dominately self-employed in another Member State. Does then the closest
link to the Member State of employment really exist?
Moreover, when simultaneous employments, which are rather popular
in some Member States,56 are performed in two or more Member States,
the one where the non-standard worker resides might be competent if sub-
2.
51 Strban, Grega/Carrascosa Bermejo, Dolores/Schoukens, Paul/Vukorepa, Ivana, Social
Security Coordination and Non-Standard Forms of Employment and Self-Em-
ployment: Interrelation, Challenges and Prospects (fn. 43), p. 31.
52 Article 14 (5) (b), (7) and (8) of Regulation (EC) 987/2009.
53 European Commission, Administrative Commission for the Coordination of So-
cial Security Systems, Practical Guide on the Applicable Legislation, December
2013, p. 27.
54 Article 13 of Regulation (EC) 883/2004 and Articles 14 to 16 of Regulation (EC)
987/2009.
55 In CJEU of 13 September 2017, Case C-570/15, X v Staatssecretaris van Financiën,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:674, marginal employment was 6.5 percent.
56 E.g. in 2018, there was a sharp decrease in postings, but at the same time a sharp
increase in simultaneous employments in Slovenia. The reason was that the law
of cross-border provision of services only regulates posting (among other things
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stantial activity is performed in this Member State of residence. However,
it might not always be easy to determine the quantitatively substantial part
(i.e. at least a quarter) of all activities. Account has to be taken of the work-
ing hours and/or remuneration (for employees) and of turnover, working
time, number of services and/or income (for the self-employed).57 Some in-
terpretation issues in determining the substantial part of activities might
arise, especially with regard to platform work.58
Minimum Coverage for a Legislation to be Applicable?
Social law coverage for non-standard workers differs among the Member
States. Many of them exempt non-standard workers from social security
schemes, or reduce coverage to certain basic insurances.59 As a rule, social
security coverage depends on the social law arrangements of the Member
State of work. In cross-border situations decisions of the CJEU have to be
taken into account. Following the Petroni principle (or principle of
3.
requiring for all taxes and other duties to be paid, before A1 form can be issued),
but not simultaneous activities.
57 Article 14 (8) of Regulation (EC) 987/2009.
58 Leaving aside the question of determining residence. For non-standard workers
another question might be raised due to salary thresholds, i.e. would they be con-
sidered as workers or would they have to satisfy the sufficient resources and com-
prehensive health coverage conditions of the Free Movement Directive, i.e. Direc-
tive 2004/38/EC on the Right of Citizens of the Union and their Family Members
to Move and Reside freely within the Territory of the Member States, OJ L 158,
30 April 2004.
59 For instance, so-called “Mini-Jobs” in Germany and in Austria are excluded from
the scope of the social security system. In the UK, if a person is employed, but
earns less than £116 a week, the latter will not be eligible for social security. In
some Member States non-standard workers are not covered against accidents at
work: in the Netherlands self-employed persons are not entitled to employee in-
surance, as there is no separate scheme for accidents at work and occupational dis-
eases; the same situation can be found in Norway (however, freelancers are cov-
ered), Portugal, Iceland, Malta, Sweden and Austria. In Spain, insurance against
accidents at work and occupational diseases is compulsory for TRADEs and vol-
untary for other self-employed persons. Strban, Grega/Carrascosa Bermejo, Dolores/
Schoukens, Paul/ Vukorepa, Ivana, Social Security Coordination and Non-Standard
Forms of Employment and Self-Employment: Interrelation, Challenges and
Prospects (fn. 43), p. 39.
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favourability),60 the CJEU reduced the exclusive and binding effect of the
applicable law rules.61 From the Bosmann case62 onwards,63 the Court has
been allowing an insured person to fall back on the social security system
of the Member State of residence, in case the applicable legislation of the
Member State of work does not provide certain social security benefits or
when these benefits are too limited.64
Contrary to its previous case law,65 the CJEU seems to be no longer up-
holding the rule on one single legislation applicable for a moving person
at the same time, in order to avoid positive and negative conflicts of na-
tional laws. Deviations are allowed, at least if it is in favorem laboratoris.
Moreover, it seems that social security systems are no longer perceived in
their entirety, but rather that specific social security schemes, such as fami-
ly benefits or pensions,66 are being compared.
Nevertheless, the CJEU seems to insist on the lex loci laboris rule, even
when it does not provide comprehensive social security coverage ratione
materiae. In the Franzen case67 the CJEU recalled that the general principle
of lex loci laboris means that a resident of a Member State who works for
several days per month on the basis of an on-call contract in the territory
of another Member State, is subject to the legislation of the Member State
of employment both on the days on which he performs the employed ac-
60 In CJEU of 21 October 1975, Case C-24/75, Petroni v Office national des Pen-
sions, ECLI:EU:C:1975:129, the CJEU argued that workers moving in the EU
should not be worse-off than those who are not moving.
61 Legislation of a single Member State only shall apply despite any territorial condi-
tions of national systems.
62 CJEU of 20 May 2008, Case C-352/06, Bosmann v Bundesagentur für Arbeit,
ECLI:EU:C:2008:290.
63 See also the following cases: CJEU of 12 June 2012, Case C-611/10, Hudzinski &
Wawrzyniak v Agentur für Arbeit, ECLI:EU:C:2012:339; CJEU of 23 April 2015,
Case of C-382/13, Franzen v Raad van bestuur, ECLI:EU:C:2015:261; CJEU of 19
September 2019, Case of C-95/18, van den Berg, Giesen and Franzen v Sociale
Verzekeringsbank, ECLI:EU:C:2019:767.
64 Strban, Grega, Family Benefits in the EU: Is it Still Possible to Coordinate Them?,
in: Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 23 (2016) 5, p. 787.
65 CJEU of 19 June 1980, Case C-41/79, Testa v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit,
ECLI:EU:C:1980:163; CJEU of 12 June 1986, Case C-302/84, Ten Holder v.
Nieuwe Algemene Bedrijfsvereniging, ECLI:EU:C:1986:242; CJEU of 10 July
1987, Case C-60/85, Luijten v Raad van Arbeid, ECLI:EU:C:1986:307.
66 Apart from the concrete case of Ms Franzen, C-382/13 integrated two other simi-
lar (national) cases, i.e. Giesen and van den Berg, where access to the Dutch uni-
versal pension scheme (AOW) was under consideration.
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tivities and on the days on which he does not. However, due to the irregu-
lar and low income earned from her activities, Ms Franzen was only cov-
ered by one scheme (i.e. accidents at work) in the competent Member
State. She was excluded from other parts of social security law, such as
child benefits, which she could also not claim in her Member State of resi-
dence, since it was not a competent Member State. The CJEU argued that
the amount of time devoted to employment, and also the existence of an
employment contract and the type of employment, whether partial or ca-
sual, were irrelevant for determining the competent Member State.
However, a migrant worker who is subject to the legislation of the
Member State of employment is not to be precluded from receiving, by
virtue of national legislation of the Member State of residence, social secu-
rity benefits from the latter State. This seems to be only the case if benefits
in the Member State of residence are provided on the mere fact of residing
in that country. For contributory social security systems the Court still up-
holds the competence of a single Member State.68 Nevertheless, such dou-
ble designation rule may cause problems in practice. The question is
whether it should be verified in each case which benefits are provided to
non-standard workers in the Member State of work and which are provid-
ed in the Member State of residence. Another question is whether the legal
nature of the benefits should be compared, i.e. whether they are residence-
or insurance-based.
It might be better to condition the application of the lex loci laboris rule
on certain minimum standards, meaning that it can only be applied if
comprehensive social protection is provided. If not, the Member State of
residence might be exclusively competent for non-standard workers, since
it also provides social assistance, recourse to which might be necessary for
many non-standard workers. Minimum standards are explicitly mentioned
in the Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the
self-employed,69 and non-standard workers (regardless of the form of em-
ployment or self-employment) should be covered at least against the social
risks of unemployment, sickness, parenthood (maternity and paternity),
invalidity, old age, decease, accidents at work and occupational diseases.
All non-standard workers shall be mandatorily covered. Alternatively, all
self-employed persons should have at least voluntary access to such mini-
68 CJEU of 19 September 2019, Case of C-95/18, van den Berg, Giesen and Franzen v
Sociale Verzekeringsbank, ECLI:EU:C:2019:767.
69 Point 1.2. of the Recommendation on Access to Social Protection for Workers
and the Self-Employed, OJ C 387, 15 November 2019.
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mum standard coverage,70 which brings us to another problem: voluntary
insurance.
Only Voluntary Insurance for Non-Standard Workers?
Some Member States may offer non-standard workers only voluntary ac-
cess to (certain) social insurance schemes, especially if they receive a rather
low remuneration.71 Voluntary schemes related to social risks covered by
the Coordination Regulations72 do fall under their material scope. Never-
theless, specific rules for such schemes exist.
The general rule stipulates that the applicable law rules73 are not appli-
cable to voluntary insurance (or optional continued insurance), unless on-
ly voluntary insurance for a certain branch exists in a Member State.74 The
question might be whether for non-standard workers to have voluntary ac-
cess to a certain social security scheme could be argued to be for them the
only voluntary insurance for a specific branch. In this case it would be sub-
ject to EU social security coordination law and linked to other mandatory
schemes. However, if the rule were to be construed as a mandatory scheme
for (standard) workers, and hence as not the only scheme for a specific
branch, it might not be subject to the social security coordination rules for
non-standard workers. The latter interpretation should be avoided in order
to provide social security also to cross-border non-standard workers access-
ing a certain scheme on a voluntary basis.
Moreover, if a non-standard worker is covered by a compulsory scheme
in one Member State s/he should not be covered voluntarily against the
same social risk in another Member State. However, an exception exists for
pensions (or more generally, benefits in respect of invalidity, old-age and
decease), where a non-standard worker may be compulsorily and voluntar-
ily insured in two Member States, respectively. Nevertheless, a connection
to the previous insurance has to exist in the Member State of voluntary in-
4.
70 Point 8 in relation with point 3.2. of the Recommendation.
71 Strban, Grega/Carrascosa Bermejo, Dolores/Schoukens Paul/ Vukorepa, Ivana, Social
Security Coordination and Non-Standard Forms of Employment and Self-Em-
ployment: Interrelation, Challenges and Prospects (fn. 43), p. 40.
72 CJEU of 9 July 1987, Joined Cases of C-82 and 103/86, Laborero and Sabato v OS-
SOM, ECLI:EU:C:1987:356.
73 Articles 11 to 13 of Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
74 Article 14 Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
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surance.75 However, if in both concerned Member States access to a given
scheme is voluntary, a non-standard worker may avoid the coercive (ius co-
gens) rules on applicable legislation and opt for a scheme of his or her
choice.76 Only the interpretation that both schemes, not entire social secu-
rity systems, should be voluntary would be coherent for the entire article
of the Regulation 883/2004 on voluntary insurance.
In cases where the competent Member State provides only for restricted
social protection, also the CJEU is tempted to accept additional access to
the social security system of the other Member State involved (usually
linked to residence) when under its national law this is made possible.77
Equality of Treatment
Rules on applicable legislation are, in principle, neutral and apply to all
non-standard workers in that Member State, just as for national workers.78
Hence, moving to another Member State might provide for more or less
advantageous social law for a mobile non-standard worker, but the princi-
ple of equal treatment has to apply.
Moreover, if no coverage is provided in the Member State of employ-
ment, the equal treatment principle might be applied in the Member State
of residence, e.g. in case of family benefits not provided in the Member
State of employment.79 Another situation might be related to the rules on
applicable legislation, i.e. to the question in which Member State a non-
standard worker, who is teleworking, should be covered and treated the
same as other workers. Should it be the Member State of the company s/he
is teleworking for or the Member State s/he is residing in? Additionally,
should it be verified where such a worker habitually resides and where the
V.
75 Article 14, Paragraph 3 Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
76 Article 14, Paragraph 2 Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
77 See cases already mentioned above, i.e. C-352/06, Bosmann, EU:C:2008:290 and
following.
78 Article 4 of Regulation (EC) 883/2004. More: Becker, Ulrich, Die Bedeutung des
gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Diskriminierungsverbots für die Gleichstellung von
Sachverhalten im koordinierenden Sozialrecht, in: Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial-
recht, 18 (2000) 3, p. 221.
79 See under the previous point mentioned cases C-352/06, Bosmann,
EU:C:2008:290; C-382/13, Franzen, EU:C:2015:261; and C-95/18, van den Berg
and Giesen, EU:C:2019:767.
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centre of his or her activities is located?80 In order to avoid focus on the
physical location of work, a special designation rule for applicable legisla-
tion might be applied and, in any case, minimum income thresholds for
social security coverage should be abolished.
Specific problems might relate to unemployment insurance if a non-
standard worker was covered by such a scheme in one Member State, but
after moving to another Member State s/he is not covered anymore (either
excluded with no possibility to voluntarily join the scheme, or because
such possibility was not exploited). Should such non-standard workers be
treated equally with national non-standard workers only in the Member
State of last employment, hence depriving them of unemployment bene-
fits? Even if this were the case, previous insurance periods from the Mem-
ber State of previous employment should not be lost. They should either
be taken into account as relevant periods in the Member State of last em-
ployment, or the competent Member State should be the one, where such
insurance periods were completed. In any case, different treatment of the
same activities across Member States raises more questions than the Coor-
dination Regulations provide answers for.
However, a solution might be found in the emanations of the equal
treatment principle, i.e. equal treatment of benefits, income, facts or
events.81 If certain circumstances occur on the territory of another Member
State, they should be taken into account by the competent Member State
as though they had taken place on its own territory. The competent Mem-
ber State should grant access to social security coverage or enable higher
social security benefits.82
Hence, national social security administrations should also consider in-
come (or benefits) acquired in a different Member State when assessing the
status of a non-standard worker. Certain income thresholds applicable to
grant worker status in the competent Member State should also include in-
come generated in other Member States. By doing so, non-standard work-
ers might reach the minimum level and be considered as genuine work-
80 Should corpus and animus manendi be verified? See Article 11 of Regulation (EC)
987/2009, also the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Se-
curity Systems, Practical Guide on the Applicable Legislation, Brussels, European
Commission, EU 2013, p. 41.
81 Article 5 of Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
82 See also Pöltl, Manfred/Eichenhofer, Eberhard/Garcia de Cortázar, Carlos, The Princi-
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ers.83 The CJEU already established that income earned in a different
Member State must be considered when calculating benefits.84 It would be
only reasonable to adopt this approach also in the granting of access to so-
cial insurance.
Another reason for assimilating conditions might be given if facts or
events are alike85 in both Member States concerned. Provisions do not
have to be identical and assimilation has to be applied on a case-by-case ba-
sis whenever similarity can be detected.86 Hence, coverage under unem-
ployment insurance in one Member State should be treated as a like fact
also in the competent Member State.87
Nevertheless, equal treatment of benefits, income, facts or events has its
limits. It must not interfere with the rules on applicable legislation88 and it
cannot lead to objectively unjustified results or to the overlapping of bene-
fits of the same kind for the same period.89 Moreover, it should be differ-
entiated from the aggregation principle.90
83 Member States might be obliged to report income on a Structured Electronic
Document – SED or Portable Document – PD, which would make assimilation
of income more transparent.
84 CJEU of 15 December 2011, Case C-257/10, Bergström v Försäkringskassan,
ECLI:EU:C:2011:839 (family benefits); CJEU of 15 December 2016, Case
C-256/15, Nemec v. Republika Slovenija, ECLI:EU:C:2016:954 (invalidity pen-
sion).
85 Article 5 of Regulation (EC) 883/2204 mentions “like facts or events”.
86 On broad interpretation see CJEU of 21 January 2016, Case C-453/14, Knauer v
Landeshauptmann von Vorarlberg, ECLI:EU:C:2016:37 and CJEU of 18 Decem-
ber 2014, Case C-523/13, Larcher v Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bayern Süd,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2458.
87 Assimilation of income, benefits, facts and events could also turn out to be nega-
tive for the non-standard worker, e.g. by landing him or her above the social assis-
tance threshold. See CJEU of 28 June 1978, Case C-1/78, Kenny v Insurance Offi-
cer, ECLI:EU:C:1978:140. Due to assimilation of facts, the Slovenian Supreme
Court denied the right to a pro-rata old-age pension to a person still insured in
Austria, see Case VIII IPS 169/2010, SI:VSRS:2011:VIII.IPS. 169.2010.
88 See Recital 11 of the Preamble to Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
89 See Recital 12 of the Preamble to Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
90 See Recital 10 of the Preamble to Regulation (EC) 883/2004, also Decision H6 by
the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Systems,
OJ C 45, 12 February 2011.
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Aggregation of Periods
The social security coordination rules on the aggregation (or totalisation)
of periods91 concern the “legal qualification of facts”92 and ensure that per-
sons who have used their freedom of movement may access social security
benefits under the legislation of the competent Member State. These rules
should be differentiated from the rules on the calculation of benefits (espe-
cially the pro rata temporis rule) which ensure a fair share of payment of
benefits between institutions of various Member States, corresponding the
time being insured under each of the legislations.93
Specific rules might apply to unemployment benefits94 and non-stan-
dard workers might benefit from them. They make a distinction between
periods of insurance, employment or self-employment required by a na-
tional scheme and provide for aggregation of such periods, to the extent
necessary, in order to satisfy the conditions of the legislation of the compe-
tent State (usually the Member State of last employment).95 Hence, if peri-
ods of employment or self-employment are considered under the unem-
ployment insurance of the competent Member State, they should be aggre-
gated with equal (employment or self-employment) periods from another
Member State, even if in that Member State they would not be leading to
unemployment insurance.96
Conversely, it should be prevented that periods of unemployment insu-
rance recognised as such in a Member State other than the competent
VI.
91 See Article 48 TFEU and Article 6 of Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
92 Pennings, Frans, European Social Security Law, Cambridge – Antwerp – Chicago:
Intersentia 2015, p. 135.
93 Strban, Grega/Carrascosa Bermejo, Dolores/Schoukens, Paul/Vukorepa, Ivana, Social
Security Coordination and Non-Standard Forms of Employment and Self-Em-
ployment: Interrelation, Challenges and Prospects (fn. 43), p. 54.
94 Article 61 of Regulation (EC) 883/2004, Article 54 of Regulation (EC) 987/2009.
95 For more details see Pennings, Frans, European Social Security Law (fn. 93), p.
270; Fuchs, Maximilian (ed.), Europäisches Sozialrecht, 7th edition, Baden-Baden:
Nomos 2018, p. 461.
96 Article 61 (1) Regulation (EC) 883/2004 specifies that “when the applicable legisla-
tion makes the right to benefits conditional on the completion of periods of insurance,
the periods of employment or self-employment completed under the legislation of another
Member State shall not be taken into account unless such periods would have been con-
sidered to be periods of insurance had they been completed in accordance with the appli-
cable legislation.” More: Strban, Grega/Carrascosa Bermejo, Dolores/Schoukens, Paul/
Vukorepa, Ivana, Social Security Coordination and Non-Standard Forms of Em-




https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002, am 02.12.2021, 16:03:18
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Member State are disregarded and hence lost. This could be the case when
a non-standard worker is covered as a self-employed person in one Mem-
ber State, but moves to a different, i.e. competent Member State, which
does not recognise periods of self-employment under its unemployment
insurance. Another case might be that the same activity is recognised as
employed activity in one Member State and as self-employed activity in the
competent Member State, the latter of which aggregates only periods of
equal legal nature (in this case self-employment).
The solution could be mandatory recognition of all periods of insu-
rance, whether in employment or self-employment, by the competent
Member State in cases where such periods were already recognised as un-
employment insurance periods by the legislation of another Member State.
To this end, the social security Coordination Regulations should be
amended. The current proposal for amending them in fact envisages the
insertion of a new article. It should provide that only the periods which are
taken into account under the legislation of the Member State in which
they were completed for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right
to unemployment benefits shall be aggregated by the competent Member
State.97 Another problem might lie in the requirement of an uninterrupted
period of insurance for a Member State (of the last or penultimate activity)
to be competent.98 It might be more difficult for non-standard workers to
satisfy the requirement of an uninterrupted insurance period.
Specific aggregation rules exist also for invalidity benefits and (old-age
and “survivors”) pensions.99 Regulation (EC) 883/2004 still contains the
special rule that a Member State is not required to provide benefits in re-
spect of periods of less than one year completed under its legislation, if no
benefit can be acquired under its legislation for such short period of
time.100 The rule is tuned to longer-term (or professional life-time) mobili-
ty from one Member State to another and may cause problems with short-
97 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council, COM (2016) 815 final.
98 Proposal of the new Article 61 of Regulation (EC) 883/2004; ibid.
99 Articles 45 and 51 of Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
100 Article 57 of Regulation (EC) 883/2004. See also CJEU of 20 November 1975,
Case C-49/75, Borella v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben,
ECLI:EU:C:1975:158.
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term mobility – especially for non-standard workers, who might be more
flexible also concerning movements to other Member States.101
Periods of less than one year are usually not completely lost, since they
are proportionally taken over by Member States, which have to aggregate
all periods of insurance or residence in order to calculate a theoretical pen-
sion amount and pay a pro-rata temporis pension.102 However, in practice
such short periods may be disregarded when a Member State concerned
pays only a national pension, a so-called independent benefit103 (and not a
pro-rata one). Still, they would have to be considered in such a case.104
The Coordination Regulations provide a solution for many periods
shorter than one year. In such cases, the Member State of last employment
is solely competent,105 which can be rather financially burdensome if no
reimbursement from other Member States is received. The one-year rule
might be abolished altogether even if this increases the administrative bur-
den of the Member States involved.
Export of Benefits
Providing social security benefits in a Member State other than the compe-
tent Member State is essential for the protection of already acquired (vest-
ed) social security rights. Such export of benefits applies predominately to
cash benefits.106
VII.
101 The initial goal seems to be to simplify the administrative procedure and reduce
costs related to the payment of very low pensions; Janda, Constanze, in: Fuchs,
Maximilian (ed.), Europäisches Sozialrecht (fn. 95), p. 452.
102 Article 57 (2) refers to Article 52 (1) (b) (i) of Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
103 See Article 52 (1) (a) of Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
104 In CJEU of 18 February 1982, Case C-55/81, Vermaut v Office national des Pen-
sions, ECLI:EU:C:1982:68, it was argued that the national pension institution
must take account of periods of insurance of less than a year completed by the
worker under the legislation of other Member States even if the right to a pen-
sion arises under national legislation alone.
105 Article 57 (3) of Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
106 They are not subject to any reduction, amendment, suspension, withdrawal or
confiscation, when the beneficiary or the members of his or her family reside in
another Member State. Article 7 Regulation (EC) 883/2004. On specific export
and overlapping rules for family benefits: Strban, Grega, Family Benefits in the
EU: Is it Still Possible to Coordinate Them? (fn. 64), p. 792.
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However, general social assistance, even when provided in cash, is ex-
cluded from the social security coordination rules.107 Also not exported is
the so-called categorical social assistance (special non-contributory cash
benefits) for which specific coordination rules apply.108 The latter might
be considered as social assistance also under the Free Movement Directive,
i.e. Directive 2004/38/EC and qualified as social advantage under Regu-
lation (EU) 492/2011.109
Non-export of special non-contributory cash benefits might prove to be
especially troublesome for non-standard workers, who might be paying
low social security contributions resulting in low benefits, or who might
even have to rely on (general or categorical) social assistance. Therefore,
they might not satisfy the residence condition of sufficient means and
comprehensive social insurance cover.110
Although it might be considered controversial, categorical (and possibly
general) social assistance should be provided also outside of the competent
Member State.111 It might be phased out in the former Member State and
gradually phased in in the new Member State of residence (according to
the “closest link” principle). Alternatively, the approach applied for family
benefits could be used, meaning that if the new Member State of residence
provides social assistance, the former Member State would have to cover
half of it (up to the actual amount of assistance) in the initial several (as a
rule five)112 years of residence. Social assistance and family benefits might
have similar characteristics. They are of a non-contributory legal nature,
and might be perceived as assistance to (or promotion of) the family (or
household) community.113
107 General social assistance (as well as medical assistance) is excluded from the ma-
terial scope by Article 3 (5) (a) of Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
108 Article 70 of Regulation (EC) 883/2004.
109 OJ L 141, 27 May 2011.
110 Article 7 Directive 2004/38/EC.




112 Article 16 Directive 2004/38/EC; see CJEU of 19 September 2013, Case C-140/12,
Brey v Pensionsversicherungsanstalt, ECLI:EU:C:2013:565 and the following cas-
es.
113 Some German authors call them Hilfs- und Förderungssysteme. More: Von Maydell,
Bernd Baron, Binnenstruktur des Sozialrechts, in: Von Maydell, Bernd Baron/
Ruland, Franz/Becker, Ulrich (eds.), Sozialrechtshandbuch (SRH), 5th edition,
Baden-Baden: Nomos 2012, p. 51.
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Moreover, benefits in kind may not be exported as such, but the right to
them, e.g. the right to healthcare, may be “exported” and healthcare pro-
vided in another Member State at the expense of the competent Member
State.114 The competent Member State should strive to issue to all non-
standard workers the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC), regardless
of the legal basis they are insured upon.115 This would enable not only ur-
gent, but necessary healthcare in other Member States.116
Conclusions and Proposals de lege ferenda
To paraphrase Heraclitus, the only constant in society is change. As soci-
etal relations evolve, so should social law and consequently its coordina-
tion law. For the latter, it might be more difficult to fulfil its function to-
day than it was in the past, since a number of very distinct national social
security systems have to be linked. It could be argued that coordination is
much easier if social security systems are similar and, in turn, that diversity
adds to its complexity. It should be recognised that the single breadwinner
is no longer the common model and cannot present the ideal of a standard
beneficiary.
Solutions to contemporary challenges could and should be found in or-
der to promote not only freedom of movement of standard, but also of
non-standard workers (who in some Member States might already present
a new standard). They might include coverage of all mobile (employed and
self-employed) workers regardless of the amount of activity, by abolishing
income and working time thresholds. Already existing social security coor-
dination rules could be subject to a more dynamic interpretation, e.g. in
terms of equal treatment of facts and event, income and benefits from oth-
er Member States.
Some other solutions might require a targeted modification of the Co-
ordination Regulations. For instance, rules on applicable legislation
VIII.
114 Strban, Grega, The Right to Health in the EU (fn. 32), p. 841.
115 More on EHIC at https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=559. Accessed 25
May 2020.
116 E.g. EHIC is issued to all self-employed persons in Slovenia, even if contribu-
tions are not paid. It has been conceived to provide urgent treatment (to which
anyone is always entitled), although all necessary treatment may be provided as
well; Strban, Grega/Carrascosa Bermejo, Dolores/Schoukens, Paul/Vukorepa, Ivana,
Social Security Coordination and Non-Standard Forms of Employment and Self-
Employment: Interrelation, Challenges and Prospects (fn. 43), p. 63.
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should consider an economically active person as one legal subject, not
giving priority to a classification of employed activities over self-employed
activities. Moreover, in order to apply the lex loci laboris rule, the compe-
tent Member State should provide at least a minimum standard of social
protection to non-standard workers. Previously recognised periods of insu-
rance or employment should be fixed and recognised in all other Member
States in order to avoid losing insured periods and to erase any obstacles to
free movement. Social security coordination rules should be rethought and
fine-tuned also to the social and legal reality of non-standard workers.
Hence, the one-year rule could be abolished and social assistance schemes
should be included in the material scope of EU social security coordina-
tion law. It would be said too lightly that if a person does not contribute
(enough), no benefits are due.
Social Law 4.0 should make use of the technology provided by the In-
dustrial Revolution 4.0, and so should social security coordination law.
There should be no obstacle (technical or other) to sharing all the informa-
tion of a moving non-standard worker. One contribution to this end could
be the introduction of a European Social Security Number (ESSN).117
More competencies on the part of the EU might be required in order to
establish a truly uniform internal single market. Some attempts are visible
within the European Unemployment Benefits Scheme (EUBS),118 and the
proposal for a separate EU social security system for mobile persons119 is
not new.
We should bear in mind that non-standard workers are gainfully active
workers, too, and they should be treated as such and not as inactive per-
sons with all the possible limitations that are linked to such status. They,
too, must be able to enjoy the fundamental human right to social security,
and this should not be limited solely because they make use of the freedom
of movement within the EU.
117 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/1222
-European-Social-Security-Number. Accessed 25 May 2020.
118 See https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/legal-and-operational-feasibility-europ
ean-unemployment-benefits-scheme-national-level/. Accessed 25 May 2020.
119 Today it could be called the 28th social security system, next to 27 national social
security systems. See Pieters, Danny/Vansteenkiste, Steven, The Thirteenth State -
Towards a European Community Social Insurance Scheme for Intra-Communi-
ty Migrants, Leuven: Acco 1993.
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Chapter 14




The digital economy encompasses various different business models medi-
ating technology in multi-sided markets (such as social networks, online
marketplaces, and sharing economy platforms) and highly specialised services
in single-sided markets (for example, cloud computing, diagnostics, etc.).1
The platform economy constitutes a sub-area of the digital economy. Various-
ly called the platform, sharing, collaborative, gig or “peer-to-peer” (P2P)
economy, and sometimes described as collaborative consumption or
crowd-based capitalism,2 all terms intend to describe an economic model
in which individuals are able to borrow or rent assets owned by someone
else.3 This contribution aims to shed some light on issues arising from the
taxation of the platform economy. While it is rather obvious that the pur-
poses of labour law, social security law and tax law differ, this chapter will
attempt to answer the question whether any lessons can be learned for so-
cial law from the treatment of platforms and platform workers in tax law.
As will be discussed, tax law, both at an international and EU level, has
focused mostly on how to ensure that the profits of the platforms are taxed
I.
1 Kofler, Georg/Mayer, Gunter/Schlager, Christoph, Taxation of the Digital Economy: A
Pragmatic Approach to Short-Term Measures, in: European Taxation, 58 (2018) 4,
p. 123.
2 This term was coined by Sundararajan, Arun, The Sharing Economy: The End of
Employment and the Rise of Crowd-Based Capitalism, Cambridge: MIT Press
2016, p. 27.
3 Schneider, Henrique, Creative Destruction and the Sharing Economy: Uber as Dis-
ruptive Innovation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2018, p. 6. Throughout
this chapter, these terms, and in particular the terms “sharing economy” and “plat-
form economy” are used interchangeably.
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where they should.4 Similarly, it is the taxation of the digital economy, and
not the sub-area of the platform economy, that is in the spotlight in the dis-
cussions of policy makers. These two facts taken together have contributed
to the absence of clear proposals as to the taxation of the platform econo-
my, and more specifically the taxation of “platform workers”. While some
discussion at policy level has been initiated recently,5 the approaches and
solutions rest with individual countries and are very far from being coordi-
nated.
The present chapter will provide an account of the main problem aris-
ing from a tax law perspective in the taxation of platform workers, it will
highlight the importance (or lack thereof) of the taxation of the platform,
and will examine some solutions put forward in different jurisdictions. It
will conclude by attempting to answer whether there is anything for social
law to learn from tax law and whether taxation, one of the main sources of
financing social protection, is adequately prepared to deal with the plat-
form economy challenges.
Platform-Related Issues and International Initiatives
Despite the challenges it poses, the taxation of the platform economy has
received little attention in the recent EU and international proposals that
focus primarily on the taxation of the digital economy. The recent proposals
aim to find ways to tax the big multinational corporations operating in the
digital economy, like Facebook and Google,6 which are usually taxed in
their place of residence (which is often the US) yet escape taxation in other
places where they create profits. It is obvious that the potential of taxing
Facebook in other states on the basis, for instance, of its number of users
there will bring much more revenue to those states, as opposed to the taxa-
tion of the “platform workers”.
II.
4 The place of the taxation of these profits is a debatable issue in taxation. Several
concepts have been put forward to substitute the required physical presence of the
platform as a nexus for taxing. One of those is “value creation”.
5 See for instance Milanez, Anna/Bratta, Barbara, Taxation and the Future of Work:
How Tax Systems Influence Choice of Employment Form, in: OECD Taxation
Working Papers, No. 41, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1787/20
f7164a-en. Accessed 10 July 2020.
6 Note, for instance, the GAFA tax (Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon) adopted
in France in July 2019, which imposes a 3 percent levy on the total annual rev-
enues of the largest technology firms providing services to French consumers.
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Placing this in the context of the platform economy, it comes as no sur-
prise that both the OECD and the EU focus on how they can tax the prof-
its of Airbnb and Uber instead of the Airbnb host and the Uber driver.7
Consequently, it is the taxation of the platform itself that has attracted the
focus of international proposals and recommendations, and notably the
question where to tax the profits of the platforms operating in the digital
economy, in absence of a physical presence in the countries where they op-
erate.8 But even in this case, a uniform definition of a platform does not
exist, as each one of them employs different business models. The question
is not merely rhetorical as one common definition encompassing a num-
ber of those models would allow for a common tax treatment of the differ-
ent platforms and platform workers.9
EU and international initiatives have focused on how to allow Member
States (or third countries) to tax the profits of companies that have no
physical presence in the respective country; yet, they certainly contribute
to value creation. By allowing for the fiction of the “digital presence” or
“significant economic presence evidenced via digital technology and other
automated means”10 and by ensuring that taxation will arise wherever a
Multinational Enterprise (MNE) has a “virtual permanent establish-
ment”,11 the recent proposals aimed to thwart the outdated idea that an en-
terprise needs to be physically present in a country to supply goods or ser-
vices in that market. However, the proposals as to how to best tackle this
7 The different proposals are discussed in the last sections. Among the different so-
lutions put forward is the suggestion to tax the platform’s profits where “value is
created”, that is where the profits arise and where the service is provided, instead
of the place of the tax residence of the corporation.
8 See for instance, OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Re-
port 2018: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2018, (hereinafter “2018 OECD Inter-
im Report”) p. 196, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264293083-en. Accessed 10 July
2020; European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules
relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence, COM (2018)
147 final (hereinafter “2018 SDP Directive Proposal”).
9 Pantazatou, Katerina, The Taxation of the Sharing Economy, in: Haslehner, Wern-
er/Kofler, Georg/Pantazatou, Katerina/Rust, Alexander (eds.), Tax and the Digital
Economy: Challenges and Proposals for Reform, Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters
Kluwer 2019, pp. 215-236, at 217.
10 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy. Pub-
lic Consultation Document. 13 February – 6 March 2019, https://www.oecd.org/t
ax/beps/public-consultation-document-addressing-the-tax-challenges-of-the-digitali
sation-of-the-economy.pdf. Accessed 10 July 2020.
11 OECD, 2018 OECD Interim Report (fn. 8), p. 160.
Chapter 14: Taxation of the Platform Economy
365
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002, am 02.12.2021, 16:03:19
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
issue were many, each one of them coming with its own set of problems,
such as the allocation of profits across countries.12 In 2018, the Commis-
sion followed the OECD’s initiatives and published proposals for two
Council Directives on the taxation of the digital economy13 and one (non-
binding) Commission Recommendation relating to the corporate taxation
of a significant digital presence (SDP).14 These proposals have now been
put “on hold” in favour of the OECD’s suggested “Unified Approach”.15 In
2019, the OECD attempted to find the commonalities among the different
proposals and agree on a “Unified Approach” towards the tax challenges
raised by the digitalisation of the economy.16
In January 2020, the OECD came up with a new proposal on a “Unified
Approach” hoping that consensus will be reached among the participating
countries regarding the best way to address the challenges arising from the
taxation of the digital economy.17 The proposal focused on the taxation of
the platforms and advocated, inter alia, the creation of a new nexus for the
taxation of the platforms’ profits, not dependent on physical presence but
largely based on sales, a profit allocation rule and mechanisms to ensure
greater legal certainty.18
While the aforementioned reports and proposals have been inadequate
in tackling the taxation of the platform workers, the 2018 OECD Interim
Report acknowledged that the focus, with regard to the sharing economy,
should be placed on the contractual relationship between the platforms and
12 These proposals included the “user participation”, “marketing intangibles”, and
“significant economic presence” proposals.
13 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common System
of a Digital Services Tax on Revenues resulting from the Provision of Certain Dig-
ital Services, COM (2018) 148 final as well as 2018 SDP Directive Proposal (fn. 8).
14 European Commission, European Commission Recommendation of 21 March
2018 relating to the Corporate Taxation of a Significant Digital Presence, COM
(2018) 1650 final.
15 OECD, Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-
Pillar Approach to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of
the Economy, January 2020, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-by-the-oecd
-g20-inclusive-framework-on-beps-january-2020.pdf. Accessed 10 June 2020.
16 OECD, Public Consultation Document: Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Ap-
proach” under Pillar One, November 2019, p. 4, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/p
ublic-consultation-document-secretariat-proposal-unified-approach-pillar-one.pdf.
Accessed 10 July 2020.
17 OECD, Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-
Pillar Approach to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of
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the service providers, as the grey zones that can be found therein could lead
to a minimisation of both tax liability and the tax base.19 In the context of
the platform economy, focusing on the platform worker would indeed
make sense, as on average, the “service provider” rather than the platform
receives over 85 percent of the transaction value.20
Nevertheless, as the sections below will show, the platform and its taxa-
tion does play a role in the taxation of the platform workers. One way this
may happen is through its classification and placement in the appropriate
legal and regulatory environment, which, in turn, may affect the employ-
ment relationship between the platform and the platform workers and,
thus, their taxation. Another way is by providing tax incentives to the plat-
form to create or opt for a particular work status of its workers (whether
this is an employment status or an independent contractor’s status). I now
turn to explore these two possibilities.
Relationship of Platform and Work Status
This section will attempt to explain how the classification of the platform
may influence the work status of “gig workers” and, in turn, their taxation.
As will be argued, the “worker classification” question relates (also) to the
classification of the platform. An Uber driver does not necessarily need to
be classified for tax purposes in the same way as an Airbnb host or a
“BlaBlaCar” driver. The classification, for example, of an Uber driver as an
independent contractor, a worker or an employee, cannot be considered
independently of the classification of the platform and the nature of the
services it requires.21 Consequently, one would have to start by under-
standing and classifying the services provided by the platforms in the shar-
ing economy, in an attempt to understand the legal relationship between
the platform workers and the platform. Two recent CJEU Grand Chamber
non-tax-related judgments aimed to shed some light on this problem, ex-
1.
19 OECD, 2018 OECD Interim Report (fn. 8).
20 Elliot, Carrie Brandon, Taxation of the Sharing Economy: Recurring Issues, in:
Bulletin for International Taxation 72 (2018) 1: Platform revenue models vary
significantly, even within the same commercial sector, but most adopt a fixed or
variable commission approach, with commissions ranging from 1 percent to 2
percent of transaction value for crowdlending, to as high as 20 percent for ride-
sharing.
21 CJEU of 20 December 2017, Case C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:981.
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amining, inter alia, the types of services provided by the two “flagship”
platforms in the sharing economy, Uber and Airbnb.
The CJEU dealt first with the Uber case,22 where it found Uber to be a
transportation service provider, instead of a digital platform, as the inter-
mediation service provided by the platform was inherently linked to a
transport service.23 In its recent case Grand Chamber Airbnb Ireland24 the
CJEU emphasised that Airbnb was different from Uber. In contrast to
Uber, the services provided by Airbnb could be classified as “information
society services” within the meaning of Directive 2000/31. In reaching this
conclusion, the CJEU considered that even though “the purpose of the in-
termediation service provided by Airbnb Ireland is to enable the renting of
accommodation […] the nature of the links between those services does
not justify departing from the classification of that intermediation service
as an “information society service” and therefore the application of Direc-
tive 2000/31 to it.”25 However, in the Court’s view and unlike its judgment
in Uber, in this case, the intermediation service is so strong and essential
that it “cannot be separated from the property transaction itself, in that it
is intended not only to provide an immediate accommodation service, but
also […] to provide a tool to facilitate the conclusion of contracts concern-
ing future interactions. It is the creation of such a list for the benefit both
of the hosts who have accommodation to rent and persons looking for that
type of accommodation which constitutes the essential feature of the elec-
tronic platform managed by Airbnb Ireland.” (emphasis added).26
In reaching this conclusion the Court considered the essential features
of each platform, the indispensability of the platform in the delivery of the
underlying service as well as the setting or the “capping” of the price to be
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., para. 48: The services Uber provides “[…] must be interpreted as meaning
that an intermediation service such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the
purpose of which is to connect, by means of a smartphone application and for re-
muneration, non-professional drivers using their own vehicle with persons who
wish to make urban journeys, must be regarded as being inherently linked to a trans-
port service and, accordingly, must be classified as “a service in the field of trans-
port” within the meaning of Article 58 (1) TFEU. Consequently, such a service
must be excluded from the scope of Article 56 TFEU, Directive 2006/123 and Di-
rective 2000/31.”
24 CJEU of 19 December 2019, Case C-390/18, Airbnb Ireland,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:1112.
25 Ibid., para. 52.
26 Ibid., para. 53.
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charged to the guests. Under all these criteria, the Court found that Uber
and Airbnb were different.27
The question of the services (and their ancillary or essential character)
provided by each platform is fundamental in the assessment of the taxation
of both the platform and the Uber driver or the Airbnb host. With regard
to the former point, the nature of the services provided by the platform is
relevant for the assessment of the VAT to be paid, notably the definition of
the place of supply of the service, which decides, inter alia, where the VAT
will be paid. This concerns both the B2B relationship between the plat-
form and the “supplier”/platform worker as well as the B2C relationship
between the platform and the consumer. In turn, the place of supply of the
service at issue “to a taxable person acting as such shall be the place where
that person has established his business.”28 For instance, if the service at is-
sue were to be classified as a transport service, then the place of supply
(and the place where VAT would be payable) would be where the trans-
portation takes place, pursuant to Article 48 of the VAT Directive.29
With regard to the second ramification, the legal framework to which
the platform is subject will be defined by its classification. In other words,
if Uber is classified as (mainly) a transportation service, then it will be sub-
ject to the transport policy-related directives. This categorisation may in-
form other important features in the systematisation of the work status of
the “service-providers” on the platform, such as control (i.e. ensuring that
the requisite standards of safety and quality are met) or the influence the
employer has to exercise over the service-provider and the quality of the
services (s)he provides.30
27 For more on the comparison of the two cases see Beretta, Giorgio, Airbnb is Not
Uber: VAT Reflections on the Airbnb Ireland Case (C-390/18), Blogpost on
LinkedIn, 22 December 2019, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/airbnb-uber-vat-re
flections-ireland-case-c-39018-giorgio-beretta/. Accessed 10 July 2020; and Loquet,
Erwan/Karoutis, Dimitrios, European Union – VAT Considerations on CJEU’s Rul-
ing that Airbnb is Not a Real Estate Agent, in: International VAT Monitor, 31
(2020) 4.
28 Article 44, Directive 2006/112/EC on the Common System of Value Added Tax
(6th Recast VAT Directive). On the definition of the taxable person, see infra, un-
der IV. 2. B.
29 See Beretta, Giorgio, Airbnb is Not Uber: VAT Reflections on the Airbnb Ireland
Case (C-390/18) (fn. 27).
30 Indeed, the degree of the influence and control of the platform to the “service
providers” was decisive in their classification as an “information society services”
platform for Airbnb and as a transportation services platform for Uber. In the
words of Advocate General Spzunar: “It should be noted, in that regard, that
Uber exercised control over the quality of the vehicles and their drivers and also
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Labour-Related Tax Incentives for Platforms
When looking into the platform economy, one should not overlook that,
in general, brick and mortar companies tend to opt for contracting self-
employed workers instead of hiring standard employees, because they face
lower tax burdens per worker hired. Indeed, tax incentives may play an im-
portant role in platforms’ preferences as to what kind of contracts they
would like to conclude with their workers. Besides not having to pay social
security contributions for independent contractors, tax incentives may con-
sist of deductions from Corporate Income Taxes (CIT) or the absence of
the obligation to pay certain taxes (such as payroll taxes), or reduced ad-
ministrative costs for the platforms. Consequently, taxation may be de-
cisive for the preferences of the platforms as to the “work status” they want
their workers to have.
For instance, it has been reported that in the Netherlands, the tax cost of
hiring an independent contractor is 37 percent lower compared to the cost
of hiring a standard employee, reflecting substantial labour cost savings for
firms.31 This is because the employer of an independent contractor is not
liable for social contributions for the worker. Similarly, the employer/plat-
form can deduct from its corporate income liability labour-related costs or
make use of “labour-related” tax allowances and credits against its total
CIT liability.32 These deductions and allowances obviously vary from
country to country and depend on the respective employment. For in-
stance, in Argentina, corporations (and platforms) are allowed to deduct
from their CIT base labour costs, including wages, employer social security
contributions and employee non-tax compulsory payments (NTCPs) for
2.
over the drivers’ conduct by reference to the standards that Uber itself had deter-
mined. On the other hand, as is apparent from points 27 and 29 of this Opinion,
the control exercised by Airbnb Ireland concerns users’ compliance with stan-
dards defined or, at the very least, chosen by those users. In any event, as regards
Uber’s activity, the exercise of the power of administrative control was only one
of the factors that led to the assertion that that provider exercised decisive influ-
ence over the conditions under which the transport services were provided.” See
CJEU of 19 December 2019, Case C-390/18, Airbnb Ireland,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:1112, para. 76.
31 Milanez, Anna, Gig Workers and the Tax Web, in: OECD Observer, 319 (2019)
Q3, https://oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/6278/Gig_workers_and_the_t
ax_web.html. Accessed 10 July 2020.
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standard employment contracts.33 In contrast, in Italy, according to the
OECD Working Paper, firms are able to deduct the overall employment
cost (gross wage plus profits) both when computing the CIT and the IRAP,
also when they “employ” independent contractors.34
In the same vein, the contractors are entitled to make certain deduc-
tions, which vary from country to country, from their income tax, lower-
ing both their own tax burden and their employer’s.35 When firms/plat-
forms can save a lot on tax-related labour costs by hiring contractors, and
when contractors are also in a tax-beneficial position if they are not classi-
fied as employees, it is obvious that the tax system at issue promotes de-
mand for independent work.
The recent OECD Working Paper highlights how tax systems may offer
tax incentives to both platforms and workers to distort the employment re-
lationship.36 Taking the Netherlands as one of the case studies, the OECD
Working Paper explains how the Dutch tax system entitles unincorporated
self-employed workers to two deductions from personal income tax allow-
ing them to pay less tax than employees.37 Consequently, unincorporated
self-employed workers have the lowest payment wedge, both at the average
wage but also across the wage spectrum.38 Indeed, the degree of variation
between payment wedges across different employment forms is consider-
able among the countries studied in the OECD Working Paper.39 As the
authors note, in countries like Hungary, Italy, Sweden and the United
States the payment wedges are rather “clustered” reflecting little incentive
to shift between employment forms for tax reasons (individual or firm-re-
33 Milanez, Anna/Bratta, Barbara, Annex – Taxation and the Future of Work: How
Tax Systems Influence Choice of Employment Form, in: OECD Taxation Work-
ing Paper Series, 42 (2019), p. 19, https://doi.org/10.1787/6b20cce5-en.
34 Ibid., p. 66. Similarly, for the Netherlands, p. 79: “[E]mployer’s labour costs are
deductible from the CIT base, irrespective of the type of worker.”
35 Milanez, Anna, Gig Workers and the Tax Web (fn. 31).
36 Milanez, Anna/ Bratta, Barbara, Taxation and the Future of Work: How Tax Sys-
tems influence Choice of Employment Form (fn. 5).
37 Ibid., p. 60: “In summary, in the Netherlands, this analysis shows that the tax sys-
tem provides an incentive for a firm to hire an unincorporated self-employed
worker, as by doing so it pays a total employment cost of EUR 40,911 instead of
EUR 64,960 for a standard employee or EUR 53,074 for an incorporated self-em-
ployed worker”.
38 Ibid. The paper defines the average compulsory payment wedge (“payment
wedge”) as the net amount that government receives as a result of taxing income
from work, inclusive of social contributions (SSCs and NTCPs), over the total
employment cost of the worker under consideration.
39 Ibid., pp. 55 f.
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lated), whereas in countries like the Netherlands and Argentina payment
wedges vary greatly, reflecting the opposite outcome.40 In this latter sce-
nario, “[t]his translates into a tax system incentive for firms to contract
labour rather than offer standard employment contracts, potentially mis-
classifying workers in the process. It also implies a tax system that incen-
tivises individuals to become self-employed.”41
Tax Issues and Employment Relationship: National Responses
The classification of platform workers is crucial not only for social security
contribution purposes, but also for tax purposes. When someone qualifies
as an employee, it is the employer that has to withhold (at least part) of the
taxes from the employee’s salary. In contrast, when someone qualifies as
self-employed or as an independent contractor, he/she is responsible for
declaring his/her income and for paying taxes (and social security contri-
butions) accordingly, saving the company significant administrative costs.
There are certainly variations with regard to the applicable tax rates, the
minimum taxable income, the deduction of business expenses etc. Usually,
in addition to paying income tax, a self-employed person who provides
some sort of services is liable to pay VAT.
Thus, the definition of the work status of the service providers/suppliers
becomes essential, equally for labour law, social law and tax law. Obvious-
ly, such a universal or pan-European allocation of work status in the shar-
ing economy or per platform does not exist, not least because such rules do
not even exist even for the traditional forms of work. A lawyer, a plumber
and an artist are taxed differently in different countries, depending on how
much they work, where they work, whether this is their main or ancillary
activity and considering many more factors. Equally, this difference in tax-
ation may be expressed via different applicable tax rates, different tax bases
(the income to be taxed) and as such, different allowances and deductions.
Things get even more complex when we consider a cross-border scenario,
even in the traditional (non-digital) understanding of work.
The context of the collaborative economy makes it even more difficult
to answer the crucial questions of who should pay/withhold taxes, where
taxes should be paid and what kind of taxes should be paid. There are sev-
eral reasons for that. 1) The uncertainty as to the qualification of the type
III.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 66.
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of work performed. For instance, the Uber driver may have a different sta-
tus in different countries ranging from an employee to an independent
contractor. This classification affects not only the direct taxes he will have
to pay but also the requirement of VAT registration and payment. Simi-
larly, his status may change if he works for “BlaBlaCar”. 2) The nature of
services provided in the sharing economy and the lack of reporting stan-
dards make it easier for the shadow economy and undeclared work to
flourish.42 3) The majority of platform workers work in at least one more
job, resulting in the fragmentation of their income.43 For instance, some-
one may be resident in France, rent out an apartment he has in Portugal
via Airbnb and, at the same time, provide online consultancy advice to a
company in Belgium. In such a multi-state scenario, it is possible that the
person at issue does not even know where to report the income he made
from the use of different platforms.
A question that arises frequently is who has the final say in this classifi-
cation. There is no obvious or clear answer to this question that would al-
low for a coherent legal framework. Reis and Chand provide for a good ac-
count of recent judgments in different countries that found Uber drivers
to be either employees or independent contractors, considering a number
of (similar) criteria.44
42 See for instance, OECD, Shining Light on the Shadow Economy: Opportunities
and Threats, 2017, p. 19, https://www.oecd.org/tax/crime/shining-light-on-the-sha
dow-economy-opportunities-and-threats.pdf. Accessed 10 July 2020. Where one of
the main issues tax-related to the sharing economy was identified as: “since there
is usually no traditional employer, payments received will not generally be visible
to the tax administrations in the way, for example, that they are for salaried em-
ployees in many countries.” I will come back to this point in Section IV. 3.
43 See for instance, OECD, Automation and Independent Work in a Digital Econo-
my, Policy Brief, May 2016, OECD Publishing, Paris, p. 4, https://www.oecd.org/e
ls/emp/Policy%20brief%20-%20Automation%20and%20Independent%20Work%
20in%20a%20Digital%20Economy.pdf. Accessed 10 July 2020: “As workers in the
“platform economy” are more likely to have multiple jobs and income sources,
the role and meaning of traditional labour market institutions are being chal-
lenged.”
44 Reis, Ariene/Chand, Vikram, Uber Drivers: Employees or Independent Contrac-
tors?, in: Kluwer International Tax Blog, 3 April 2020, http://kluwertaxblog.com/2
020/04/03/uber-drivers-employees-or-independent-contractors/?doing_wp_cron=1
591797547.0120589733123779296875. Accessed 10 June 2020.
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For example, the UK employment tribunal dealt with a case about the
employment status of Uber drivers.45 That tribunal was asked whether
Uber drivers qualified as self-employed/independent contractors or as em-
ployees/workers. In defining whether Uber drivers should be treated as
contractors, the tribunal looked into whether income tax and UK national
insurance were deducted from their pay. Conversely, to determine their
tax liability, the “tax test” would have had to look at their holiday pay, sick
pay and pension rights.46 The UK employment tribunal concluded that
Uber’s drivers were to be classed as workers with access to minimum wage,
sick pay and paid holidays, although they treated themselves as self-em-
ployed persons for tax purposes.47 The decision was also upheld by the Em-
ployment Appeal Tribunal48 and the Court of Appeal.49
The case highlights the distinction between labour law, social security
contributions and tax law in the sharing economy and raises the question
of whether there is a need to coordinate these interrelated policy areas. The
2018 OECD Interim Report identified this distinction as one of the thorni-
est issues in the sharing economy context.50 As different states provide for
different tax incentives or disincentives, depending on the type of labour
contract at issue, sharing economy features (and uncertainties) within the
tax system could lead to tax revenue losses if there are large shifts in work-
ing patterns and taxable status.51 Another pertinent question is who de-
cides on the qualification of the status of the “worker”. For instance, the
judgment of the UK employment tribunal seemed to cross-cut between the
tax treatment of Uber drivers, which is, in turn, informed by the drivers’
access to certain social security benefits. In some countries, it appears that
“priority” is given to the designation made by the tax authorities and
whether the Uber driver, for instance, falls within the given tax defini-
45 UK Employment Tribunal Judgement of 28 October 2016, Case No.
2202550/2015, Aslam and Farrar and Others v. Uber BV, Uber London Ltd and
Uber Britannia Ltd (hereinafter “UK Uber Case”).
46 Sayliss, Leigh, Be Careful What You Wish for, in: Taxation, 178 (2016) 4579.
47 UK Uber Case (fn. 45), para. 65.
48 UK Employment Appeal Tribunal Judgement of 10 November 2017, Appeal No.
UKEAT/0056/17/DA, Aslam and Farrar and Others v. Uber BV, Uber London Ltd
and Uber Britannia Ltd.
49 UK The Court of Appeal Judgement of 19 December 2018, Case No.
A2/2017/3467, Aslam and Farrar and Others v. Uber BV, Uber London Ltd and
Uber Britannia Ltd.
50 OECD, 2018 OECD Interim Report (fn. 8), p. 196.
51 Ibid., p. 196.
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tion.52 The problem is circular in that, if the definition is informed by, for
instance, the access to social security benefits, as happened in the Uber UK
case, then the different criteria and classifications may lead to contradicto-
ry results. What if, for example, one is classified for tax purposes as an em-
ployee but his employer does not pay for social security contributions?
Which classification will take precedence and how will the classification
for labour law purposes be made?
In Switzerland, there seems to be general consensus that Uber drivers
should be classified as employees.53 The French Cour de Cassation also
agreed that Uber drivers should be characterised as employees on the
premise that they do not have independence in fixing their price or build-
ing their clientele.54
In the US, the classification of “gig workers” has created a lot of tension
between platforms and workers, upon the delivery of the famous judg-
ment of the California Supreme Court.55 The judgment dealt with the ap-
plicable standards in determining whether workers should be classified as
employees or as independent contractors for purposes of California Wage
Orders.56 Pursuant to the judgment that suggested a new presumption that
all workers be employees instead of contractors, unless the employer
proves otherwise under the newly adopted “ABC test”,57 the State of Cali-
fornia approved, with effect from 1 January 2020, the California Assembly
Bill 5 (“AB-5”) incorporating the “ABC test”.58 Under this test, for a work-
er to be classified as a contractor, the employer will have to prove that: (A)
52 Such an example is Denmark.
53 With regard to that see Reis, Ariene/Chand, Vikram, Uber Drivers: Employees or
Independent Contractors? (fn. 44); the references made there to SUVA, SECO and
UNIA and judgments by domestic courts.
54 Arrêt No. 374 du 4 mars 2020 (19-13.316), Cour de Cassation – Chambre Sociale,
FR:CCAS:2020:SO00374, https://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/chamb
re_sociale_576/374_4_44522.html, or in English: https://www.courdecassation.fr/I
MG/20200304_arret_uber_english.pdf. Both accessed 15 May 2020.
55 Win, Suzin, The Bill That Disrupted the Gig Economy: AB-5 and Uber’s Trou-
bling Response, in: GGU Law Review Blog, 2 March 2020, https://ggulawreview.c
om/2020/03/02/the-bill-that-disrupted-the-gig-economy-ab-5-and-ubers-troubling-r
esponse/. Accessed 10 June 2020.
56 Supreme Court of California Judgement of 30 April 2018, Dynamex Operations
West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, https://law.justia.com/cases/california
/supreme-court/2018/s222732.html. Accessed 10 June 2020.
57 Ibid.
58 For the text of the Bill, see California State Legislature, Worker Status: Employees
and Independent Contractors, 19 September 2019, https://leginfo.legislature.ca.go
v/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB5. Accessed 13 July 2020.
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the worker is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in
connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for
the performance of the work and in fact; (B) the worker performs work
that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) the
worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occu-
pation, or business of the same nature as the work performed. The three
criteria are cumulative, therefore, if one of the three conditions is not met
then an employment relationship between the employee and the worker
will be established.
As it appears very likely that an Uber driver (though not an Airbnb
host) will not meet the ABC test, and, hence, will be qualified as an em-
ployee, the Bill has sparked reactions from Uber and like companies. In
the fear that approximately $500 million a year will be added to Uber’s
labour costs and payroll taxes Uber filed a lawsuit in federal court chal-
lenging the constitutionality of AB-5 and sent an email to more than
150,000 California drivers and millions of passengers, notifying a change
in the way they conduct the service.59 These changes consist in giving
more freedom to the drivers to select their passengers and destinations to
escape condition (A).
Despite these positive changes for gig workers at domestic or regional
level, several other institutions and organisations have classified Uber
drivers as independent contractors.60 Among the factors considered to-
wards such a finding, the control of the drivers over their workload (how
much, how often, when they can perform their work) was fundamental.
59 Win, Suzin, The Bill That Disrupted the Gig Economy: AB-5 and Uber’s Trou-
bling Response (fn. 55).
60 According to Reis, Ariene/Chand, Vikram, Uber Drivers: Employees or Indepen-
dent Contractors? (fn. 44) such examples include the District Court of Pennsylva-
nia in the US, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia, Ali Razak, Kenan Sabani and Khaldoun Cherdoud v. Uber Technologies Inc.,
Civil Action No. 16-573, 11 April 2018; the State of Florida in the US, Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal of State of Florida, Darrin E. McGillis v. Uber, No.
3D15-2758, Lower Tribunal No. 0026283468-02, 1 February 2017 and the Brazil-
ian Superior Labour Court that pronounced Uber drivers are contractors. In Aus-
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What can we Learn from Taxation?
A common definition, or at least a common understanding of what consti-
tutes an employment relationship, would facilitate the taxation of “plat-
form workers”. As highlighted, however, such a definition is lacking across
countries, or at a supranational level, and even across inter-related sub-dis-
ciplines (labour law, tax law, social security contributions). Given the im-
portance of the classification of gig workers either as employees or inde-
pendent contractors, the lack of common criteria and the complex legal re-
lationships in the platform economy have led to the paradoxical situation
that one and the same person, the Uber driver for instance, may for labour
law purposes be classified as an independent contractor, whereas for tax
law and/or social security law purposes as an employee. The situation is
even more complex when driving the Uber car is only an ancillary activity,
and the Uber driver’s main income is generated through different activi-
ties. Similarly, when the Airbnb host is resident in France and he rents out
his villa in Portugal for 2 months per year. This section will examine the
contribution of taxation in deciphering this complicated relationship in
the context of the platform economy.
In a cross-border scenario, a worker’s income may be taxed in multiple
countries, the country/ies where he works (source state(s)) and the country
where he resides (residence state). In order to limit or eliminate double
taxation, countries usually conclude Double Tax Treaties (DTTs). In a non-
cross-border scenario where an employee resides and works in the same
place, obviously there would not be much doubt as to where his income
from employment should be taxed, although in the context of the plat-
form economy his work may not be visible to the tax authorities. Things
get more complex, however, in the case of frontier workers, or posted
workers, or people with multiple jobs across the globe. In these cases, usu-
ally the DTTs aim, via their distributive rules, to “allocate taxing rights” be-
tween the involved states. This allocation does not imply that the DTT cre-
ates a taxing right in one state, but it rather suggests that if the income
from employment has already been taxed in state A (source state), then
state B (the residence state) should refrain from taxing the income again
and provide for relief from the double taxation that would otherwise
arise.61 In absence of a DTT, then in principle both the source state and the
residence state would have a right to tax.
IV.
61 The relief is usually provided either via the exemption method (Article 23A
OECD MC) or the credit method (Article 23B OECD MC).
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These DTTs usually follow the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development Model Convention on Income and Capital (hereinafter
OECD MC).62 Article 15 of the OECD MC provides that when employ-
ment is exercised in a country other than the residence country, then
salaries, wages and other similar remuneration shall be taxed in the source
state, in other words the state where employment is performed. The dou-
ble taxation that could arise may, thus, be resolved either via the applicable
DTTs or in an intra-EU scenario, by resorting to the non-discrimination
principle and the fundamental freedoms, provided some other conditions
are met.63
Double Tax Treaties and the OECD MC
In social law, it has already been discussed whether the place of work rule
(as a conflict of law rule of Regulation 883/2004) is still apt for social insu-
rance purposes. Other options (based on the location of a platform
provider or of a client) would, on the one hand, address the problem that
platform providers and clients might try to take advantage of “a planetary
labour market” in digital work,64 where platforms and clients can choose
the cheapest platform workers (service providers) and countries without
social and tax obligations imposed on platforms or clients. On the other
hand, such options are inconsistent with the collection of social contribu-
tions at the source.
The underlying problem in both social law and tax law is finding a
nexus to tax or to collect social security contributions in a digitalised world.
It has been widely accepted that the rules defining the legal bases upon
which a State may assert its tax jurisdiction over a particular taxpayer or an
item of income (nexus rules) will have to be rewritten.65 The purpose of
this section is to provide for an overview of the existing allocation rules
1.
62 Developing countries usually follow the UN Model, which is similar (but not
identical) to the OECD MC.
63 There is extensive CJEU case law that requires, inter alia, that resident and non-
resident taxpayers are found to be in a comparable situation.
64 Graham, Mark/Anwar, Mohammad Amir, The Global Gig Economy: Towards a
Planetary Labour Market? in: First Monday, 24 (2019) 4.
65 Gadzo, Stjepan, New Nexus for the Digital Economy: An Analysis of Digital, Rev-
enue-Based and User-Based Factors, in: Pistone, Pasquale/Weber, Dennis (eds.),
Taxing the Digital Economy: The EU Proposals and other Insights, Amsterdam:
IBFD 2019, p. 93.
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with regard to income from employment, in order to investigate whether
they can provide a) for any useful guidance as to the distinction between
independent contractors and employees and b) whether they are still apt
for use in the context of the platform economy.
According to the OECD MC, different taxing allocation rules exist de-
pending on the activity of the “worker”. Thus, different provisions exist for
entertainers and sportspersons whose income may be taxed in the state
where they perform (Article 17 OECD MC), pensions that are usually tax-
able in the state of residence of the recipient (Article 18 OECD MC), gov-
ernment services (Article 19 OECD MC) and students (Article 20 OECD
MC). Of relevance for the purposes of taxation of workers and/or self-em-
ployed persons are also Article 7 OECD MC on business profits, as well as
the definition of what constitutes a Permanent Establishment (hereinafter
PE) in Article 5 OECD MC, and when and how profits can be attributed
to it. If an enterprise carries out business through a PE, the profits that are
attributable to the PE may be taxed in the state of the PE. Such may be the
case, for instance, when a company carries out business in another state via
a dependent agent.66
While the aforementioned provisions will at first appear rather evident
as to their application in a cross-border scenario, there are too many vari-
ables to be considered in order to answer where the particular income will
be taxed, and how it will be taxed. These variables include factual assess-
ments, such as the frequency with which a frontier worker returns to his
“home country” during a fiscal year;67 as well as interpretative assessments
including qualification of the particular income,68 residence qualification
and qualification (or absence thereof) of the “employee” status. This ensu-
ing lack of coordination becomes all the more visible in the context of the
digital economy, whereby physical presence is not essential and the type of
work provided is uncertain in terms of frequency, ancillary character and
legal definition.
66 For more information on the distinction between dependent and independent
agent, see paragraph 32 of the OECD MC Commentary on Article 5.
67 See, for instance, Article 15 (2) of the OECD MC.
68 For instance, does the income at issue qualify as income from employment or as
business profit? The distinction is not always clear and depends also on the quali-
fication of the person at issue as employed or self-employed.
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However, the OECD MC could be of assistance in understanding the
concept of employment in international tax law. Article 15 (1) and (2) OECD
MC read: 69
“1. Subject to the provisions of Articles 16, 18 and 19, salaries, wages
and other similar remuneration derived by a resident of a Contracting
State in respect of an employment shall be taxable only in that State un-
less the employment is exercised in the other Contracting State. If the
employment is so exercised, such remuneration as is derived therefrom
may be taxed in that other State.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, remuneration de-
rived by a resident of a Contracting State in respect of an employment
exercised in the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in the
first-mentioned State if:
a) the recipient is present in the other State for a period or periods not
exceeding in the aggregate 183 days in any twelve month period com-
mencing or ending in the fiscal year concerned, and
b) the remuneration is paid by, or on behalf of, an employer who is
not a resident of the other State, and
c) the remuneration is not borne by a permanent establishment which
the employer has in the other State.”
Article 15 OECD MC includes several undefined terms, on which the
Commentary attempts to shed some light.70 However, the concept of em-
ployment itself is not analysed in the Commentary. Instead, the Commen-
tary only acknowledges that “[…] the issue of whether or not services are
provided in the exercise of an employment may sometimes give rise to dif-
ficulties which are discussed in paragraphs 8.1 ff”.71 Yet, one could argue
69 Note the change in the title of Article 15 OECD MC in 2000, from “Dependent
Personal Services” to “Employment”. The amendment followed the elimination
of Article 14 OECD MC which referred to “Independent Personal Services”.
70 For a discussion on the many undefined terms, see Peeters, Bernard, Article 15 of
the OECD Model Convention on “Income from Employment” and its Undefined
Terms, in: European Taxation, 44 (2004) 2, pp. 72-82.
71 Commentary on Article 15 (1) OECD MC (2017 version). See also para. 8.1. of
the Commentary on Article 15 (1) OECD MC that provides: “It may be difficult,
in certain cases, to determine whether the services rendered in a State by an indi-
vidual resident of another State, and provided to an enterprise of the first State (or
that has a permanent establishment in that State), constitute employment ser-
vices, to which Article 15 applies, or services rendered by a separate enterprise, to
which Article 7 applies or, more generally, whether the exception applies.”
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that from the remaining Commentary some valuable characteristics of
what constitutes employment in this particular context could be derived.
Subject to the limit described in paragraph 8.11 and unless the context
of a particular convention requires otherwise, it is a matter of domestic law
of the State of source (i.e. the place where the employment is exercised) to
determine whether services rendered by an individual in that State are pro-
vided in an employment relationship and that determination will govern
how that State applies the Convention.72 In such cases, the relevant domes-
tic law may ignore the way in which the services are characterised in the
formal contracts. It may prefer to focus primarily on the nature of the ser-
vices rendered by the individual and their integration into the business car-
ried out by the enterprise that acquires the services to conclude that there
is an employment relationship between the individual and that enter-
prise.73 The Commentary then goes on to give guidance on when a formal
contractual employment relationship should be disregarded, taking into
account the relevant facts and circumstances.74 As already mentioned, the
distinction between “employment services” and “services rendered under a
contract for the provision of services”75 is important for the application of
the relevant DTT article and the allocation of taxing rights between the
states.76 The Commentary encourages the involved states to solve any dis-
agreement as to the qualification of the work relationship having regard to
the nature of the services rendered by the individual. In this bid, according
to the Commentary, when the services rendered by the individual consti-
tute an integral part of the business of the enterprise to which these ser-
vices are provided, “it is logical to assume” that an employee will be provid-
ing such services.77 For that purpose, a key consideration will be which en-
terprise bears the responsibility or risk for the results produced by the individu-
al’s work.
72 Para. 8.4. of the Commentary on Article 15 (1) OECD MC (2017 version).
73 Para. 8.7. of the Commentary on Article 15 (1) OECD MC (2017 version).
74 See notably para. 8.11. of the Commentary on Article 15 (1) OECD MC (2017
version): “For instance, a State could not argue that services are deemed, under its
domestic law, to constitute employment services where, under the relevant facts
and circumstances, it clearly appears that these services are rendered under a con-
tract for the provision of services concluded between two separate enterprises.”
75 Similar to the concept of the independent contractor.
76 In the case of the independent contractor, Article 7 OECD MC would apply
whereas in the case of employment, Article 15 OECD MC would apply. The two
articles allocate in a different manner the taxing rights of the residence and the
source state.
77 Para. 8.13. of the Commentary on Article 15 (1) OECD MC (2017 version).
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Additional factors and questions to be taken into account when deter-
mining the working relationship, include:78
– who has the authority to instruct the individual regarding the manner
in which the work has to be performed;
– who controls and has responsibility for the place at which the work is
performed;
– whether the remuneration of the individual is directly charged by the
formal employer to the enterprise to which the services are provided;
– who puts the tools and materials necessary for the work at the individu-
al’s disposal;
– who determines the number and qualifications of the individuals per-
forming the work;
– who has the right to select the individual who will perform the work
and to terminate the contractual arrangements entered into with that
individual for that purpose;
– who has the right to impose disciplinary sanctions related to the work
of that individual;
– who determines the holidays and work schedule of that individual.
These indicative factors do not provide for any clear solutions as to the
qualification of gig workers. As Reis and Chand observe, both indications
of employment (some degree of subordination and control by the compa-
ny) and of independent services (flexibility of the drivers) can be met in
the case of Uber drivers.79 Consequently, while the OECD MC provides
for some indicia that could lead to the platform workers’ classification, the
“hybridity” of many platform models that encompass worker characteris-
tics of both an employee and a contactor cannot be resolved by solely rely-
ing on the Commentary. In case of no agreement between the states, the
Commentary advises to use, where appropriate, the mutual agreement pro-
cedure (MAP) to resolve the tax dispute.
78 The factors as appear in para. 8.14. of the Commentary on Article 15 (1) OECD
MC (2017 version). Note that the Commentary suggests that these are “additional
factors [that] may be relevant to determine whether this is really the case [i.e. a
formal employment relationship or a contract on the provision of services].”
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Can VAT Provisions be of any Help?
Carrying out Activities “Independently”
The payment of indirect taxes, specifically VAT, may also provide for guid-
ance with respect to the distinction between independent contractor and
employee in the context of the platform economy. In general, employees
are not required to register for and pay VAT, unlike independent contrac-
tors. One of the distinguishing criteria is, once again, the exercise of activi-
ties “independently”. Article 10 of the EU VAT Directive provides that the
requirement of “independent” activity, to qualify as a VAT “taxable per-
son”,80 excludes “employed and other persons from VAT in so far as they
are bound to an employer by a contract of employment or by any other
legal ties creating the relationship of employer and employee as regards
working conditions, remuneration and the employer's liability.” There-
fore, the concept of independence becomes once again essential in inform-
ing the distinction between independent contractor and employee.81
In the Court’s case law, the three criteria used to determine whether an
activity is carried out independently, include: a) whether it is exercised by
a person who is not organically integrated into the undertaking; b)
whether the person at issue has the appropriate organisational freedom
with regard to the human and material resources used in the exercise of
the relevant activity; and c) whether the person at issue bears any econo-
mic risk when performing the relevant activity.
It is obvious that an evaluation of the aforementioned criteria necessi-
tates an ad hoc factual assessment. The CJEU has provided guidance as to
the concept of independence in the context of the VAT Directive in several
cases.82 Applying these criteria in the platform economy, one may note
that usually “gig workers” are not organically integrated into the platform,
2.
a)
80 For the concept of the “taxable person” in EU VAT law see Article 9 (1) Council
Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the Common System of Value
Added Tax (hereinafter EU VAT Directive), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/
112/oj. Accessed 14 July 2020; analysed right below.
81 Note, however, that the concept of “employee” is not defined anywhere in the
VAT Directive.
82 See for instance, CJEU of 18 October 2007, Case C-355/06, van der Steen,
ECLI:EU:C:2007:615, where the CJEU ruled that since the sole director at issue
received regularly his salary regardless of the company’s financial situation, he
could not qualify as independent supplier and, hence, was not a taxable person
for VAT purposes. Also, CJEU of 12 October 2016, Case C-340/15, Nigl,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:764.
Chapter 14: Taxation of the Platform Economy
383
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002, am 02.12.2021, 16:03:19
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
they have sufficient organisational autonomy to decide whether to drive
their cars or rent their properties, and that their remuneration is not regu-
lar and secured in that it depends on the number of transactions conclud-
ed. The “independent activity” criteria, therefore, as enshrined in Article
10 of the EU VAT Directive are usually met. However, this does not suffice
to qualify a “gig worker” as a “taxable person” for VAT purposes. Article 9
provides for a number of further conditions, which I turn to examine now.
Taxable Person
According to the EU VAT Directive, the definition of a taxable person in-
cludes any person or entity “who, independently, carries out in any place
any economic activity, whatever the purpose or results of that activity”.83
Hence, employed and other persons bound to an employer by a contract of
employment or by any other legal ties creating the relationship of employ-
er and employee as regards working conditions, remuneration and the em-
ployer’s liability, escape taxability under the VAT Directive.
The test the CJEU usually applied to establish whether a particular activ-
ity, including the renting out of property, fulfils Article 9 (1) of the VAT
Directive examines whether the activity is carried out for the purpose of
obtaining income on a continuing basis.84 This criterion must be assessed
on a case-by-case basis “having regard to all the circumstances of the case,
which include, inter alia, the nature of the property concerned”.85
The term “economic activity” has been interpreted by the CJEU in very
broad terms, considering the activity per se rather than its purpose or re-
sults.86 Along these lines, the CJEU has repeatedly held that: “[T]he fact
b)
83 Article 9 (1) EU VAT Directive. With regard to the second condition (i.e., inde-
pendent performance), it may be concluded that in cases where the sharing plat-
form can be recognised as an employer of an individual provider (for the latter,
the criteria of the existence of a subordination link, the nature of work and the
presence of remuneration should be assessed pursuant to EU law), the individual
provider may not be regarded as a taxable person. In such cases, only the sharing
platform may be regarded as a taxable person instead – also with regard to under-
lying supplies of goods and services.
84 CJEU of 19 July 2012, Case C-263/11, Rēdlihs, ECLI:EU:C:2012:497, para. 33;
CJEU of 20 June 2013, Case C-219/12, Finanzamt Freistadt Rohrbach Urfahr,
ECLI:EU:C:2013:413, para. 19.
85 Ibid., Rēdlihs, para. 29.
86 CJEU of 12 January 2006 Joined Cases C-354/03, C-355/03 and C-484/03, Optigen
Ltd, Fulcrum Electronics Ltd, Bond House Systems Ltd v. Comm’n,
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that [the] property is suitable only for economic exploitation will normally
be sufficient for a finding that its owner is exploiting it for the purposes of
economic activities and, consequently, for the purpose of obtaining in-
come on a continuing basis. By contrast, if, by reason of its nature, proper-
ty is capable of being used for both economic and private purposes, all the
circumstances in which it is used will have to be examined in order to de-
termine whether it is actually being used for the purpose of obtaining in-
come on a continuing basis (emphasis added)”.87
Consequently, if the property is, due to its nature, clearly used for pur-
poses of obtaining income on a continuing basis, then it (the economic ac-
tivity) will be subject to VAT. If the use of the property, as matter of fact, is
not clear, then a more complex, factual analysis will be necessary to assess
whether the activity is carried out for the purpose of obtaining income on
a continuing basis.
Several issues arise with respect to whether “platform workers” are (and
should be) subject to VAT. At first sight, the CJEU-made “continuity” con-
dition seems to be rebuttable: for instance, in the case of Airbnb rentals, if
one shows that the purpose of renting out the property for a very short pe-
riod did not aim at “obtaining income on a continuing basis”, then the ac-
tivity will not be subject to VAT. Hence, in a strictly literal interpretation
of the phrase, it remains unclear whether someone who has rented out his
apartment every August for the past five years should be assessed. Recent
legislation in some countries has reduced, for non-tax-related reasons, the
number of days a service provider can provide short-term rentals of his im-
movable property.88
Article 12 of the VAT Directive attempts to ensure that even these ser-
vice providers can be made subject to VAT: it stipulates that “Member
States may regard as a taxable person anyone who carries out, on an occa-
sional basis, a transaction relating to the activities referred to in the second
subparagraph of Article 9 (1)” (emphasis added). While the CJEU has held
that the mere exercise of the right of ownership and the management of
ECLI:EU:C:2006:16, para. 43 and CJEU of 26 March 1987, Case C-235/85,
Comm’n v. Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:1987:161, para. 8.
87 CJEU of 19 July 2012, Case C-263/11, Rēdlihs, ECLI:EU:C:2012:497, para. 34;
CJEU of 20 June 2013, Case C-219/12, Finanzamt Freistadt Rohrbach Urfahr,
ECLI:EU:C:2013:413, para. 20.
88 In Paris, for instance, short-term rentals (Airbnb type) were reduced by law to a
maximum of 120 days per year. In Amsterdam, owners will be able to rent out
their property through Airbnb only for thirty days per year.
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the private property do not constitute economic activity,89 it has also ruled
that if the party has taken active steps to market property by mobilising re-
sources similar to those deployed by producers, traders or persons supply-
ing services within the meaning of Article 4 (2) of the [VAT] Directive,
such as, in particular, “the carrying out on that land of preparatory work to
make development possible, and the deployment of proven marketing
measures,” then such initiatives go beyond mere exercise of the manage-
ment of the private property.90 In other words, marketing or advertising
the property constitutes, in the CJEU’s view, the distinctive element that
separates the mere management of private property from its economic ex-
ploitation.
This very broad, CJEU understanding has led the Commission to sug-
gest that:
“Given the very wide understanding of the concept of economic activi-
ty […] it can be therefore concluded that the supplies of goods and ser-
vices made through sharing-economy platforms, such as driving cus-
tomers to requested destinations or renting out immovable property
may qualify as an economic activity in the sense of the VAT Directive
irrespective of whether such supplies are delivered with clear continuity or on
a more occasional basis” (emphasis added).91
Indeed, under these circumstances, and as the Commission notes, it seems
almost impossible for “platform workers” to escape the “taxable person”
definition. In the Airbnb and Uber scenarios, therefore, once someone up-
loads an apartment for rent or avails himself of the opportunity, through
the Uber platform, to drive someone to that person’s destination, he auto-
89 CJEU of 15 September 2011, Joined Cases C-180/10 & C-181/10, Słaby & Others,
ECLI:EU:C:2011:589, para. 36; CJEU of 9 July 2015, Case C-331/14, Trgovina
Prizma, ECLI:EU:C:2015:456, para. 23.
90 CJEU of 15 September 2011, Joined Cases C-180/10 & C-181/10, Słaby & Others,
ECLI:EU:C:2011:589, para. 39-41; CJEU of 9 July 2015, Case C-331/14, Trgovina
Prizma, ECLI:EU:C:2015:456, para. 24.
91 European Commission, Question Concerning the Application of EU VAT Provi-
sions: VAT Treatment of Sharing Economy 6, Value Added Tax Comm., Working
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matically becomes a taxable person for VAT purposes, even if he only does
so on an occasional basis.92
Beretta lists the following as the main conditions to check whether an
individual supplier carries out an economic activity pursuant to Article 9
of the VAT Directive: non-exclusionary membership, organisational auton-
omy, economic risk, regulatory autonomy, remuneration independence
and personal liability.93 He uses four different platforms to evaluate
whether these criteria are met: Airbnb, Uber, HomeExchange and
BlaBlaCar and he notes that the assessment varies significantly depending
on the platform at issue.94 Upon carrying out a functional analysis, he con-
cludes that only Uber drivers “might eventually be recharacterised as em-
ployees of the platform” as long as they tick more than half of the criteria
listed.95
Economic Activity/ Income Definition
Although one would expect that the definition of the type of work pre-
cedes the income definition, it is noteworthy to examine the questions that
pertain to what kind of income should be taxed. To exemplify the prob-
lem, income arising from renting property via Airbnb could be classified
as either income from immovable property or income from business.
The distinguishing criterion in answering this question is a thorny issue.
The remuneration or “income” the platform worker receives varies widely
depending on the platform itself and the worker himself. As the Commis-
sion pointed out, such income could range from “recovering costs (e.g.[,]
for the personal use of a good such as in ride-sharing/car sharing) to
amounts comparable to business/work activities.”96 While the Commission
suggests that “tax rules should follow national laws and jurisprudence,
c)
92 The only obvious escape from the application of VAT in such circumstances
would be the application of the de minimis exemption from VAT reporting. In
this vein, some Member States have established a minimum annual turnover for
VAT imposition (VAT registration threshold). See subsection below.
93 Beretta, Giorgio, European VAT and the Sharing Economy, Alphen aan den Rijn:
Wolters Kluwer 2019, p. 99.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Social and Economic Committee and the
Committee of the Regions on A European Agenda for Collaborative Economy,
COM (2016) 356, p. 41 (hereinafter EU Collaborative Economy Agenda), avail-
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which determine from which moment an activity becomes a business ac-
tivity,”97 income is not defined in a uniform manner across the Member
States. That fact adds to the uncertainty of the definition of what consti-
tutes an economic activity, according to the test the CJEU employs. Ac-
cordingly, the same activity may constitute an economic activity for VAT
purposes in one Member State and not in another because the remunera-
tion at issue does not qualify as income. If one adds to that situation the dif-
ferent thresholds Member States apply by reference to what constitutes a
“professional activity” vis-à-vis an “occasional” activity of private individu-
als, the fulfilment of the aforementioned definitions becomes even more
segregated.
Another interpretation difficulty across the different Member States re-
lates to the exemption of “small businesses” (i.e., businesses with low an-
nual turnover) from VAT registration.98 This special exemption scheme is
applied in most EU Member States, but it is not compulsory. Unfortunate-
ly, the VAT Directive does not specify whether “small taxable persons”
who participate in the sharing economy (e.g., somebody who occasionally
rents out his apartment) can benefit from such exemption schemes. One
(administratively burdensome!) option would be to treat them all as “full-
blown taxable persons” based on “tax points”.99 The other option would be
to extend the special rules for small businesses to the “small taxpayers” in
the context of the sharing economy.100
As a yardstick for measuring the level of business activity, a person’s an-
nual turnover, exclusive of VAT, is generally used.101 However, registration
thresholds vary consistently among Member States. Some Member States
set very high thresholds before a person incurs VAT payment obligations.
Italy for instance, sets a registration threshold at EUR 65,000, whereas Fin-
able at https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-356-EN-F
1-1.PDF. Accessed 10 June 2020.
97 Ibid.
98 Articles 284-287, EU VAT Directive. Member States are allowed to exempt small
businesses from VAT registration up to a given threshold.
99 Kogels, Han/van Hilten, Markien, Never a Dull Moment, in: International VAT
Monitor, 28 (2017) 2, p. 121. Tax points (or “time of supply”) for a transaction is
the date the transaction takes place for VAT purposes. Tax points can be, for in-
stance, the date of invoice or the day the supply took place.
100 Ibid., p. 122.
101 Beretta, Giorgio, VAT and the Sharing Economy, in: World Tax Journal, 10
(2018) 3, pp. 381, 414.
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land and Greece do so at only EUR 10,000.102 It is doubtful how many
Airbnb hosts would reach the Italian threshold, and how much the market
would be distorted due to these differences.103 Some other Member States,
such as Greece, grant service providers an exemption from VAT as long as
the host does not provide any services similar to the ones offered by hotels,
such as regular cleaning and linen changes.104
A remedy against potential tax evasion that could arise from the non-
payment of VAT by platform workers is the collection of such VAT by the
relevant platform (in addition to any other taxes they collect), provided,
however, that the hosts have exceeded the threshold for VAT registration.
This would presuppose an updated and informed reporting system be-
tween the platform and the platform worker. This way, all relevant details
that would define the amount to be paid by the taxpayer would already be
available to the platform and the risk of tax evasion would be minimised.
Enforcement and Collection
An additional problem that is created by blurring the boundaries between
employment and self-employment in the platform economy is the difficul-
ty for the authorities to “follow the money”.105 The lack of visibility of the
activity and the inability to identify potential taxpayers and their taxable
income has cost the tax authorities billions of tax revenue.106 This obvious-
ly poses obstacles to effective taxation and collection of taxes. The solutions
3.
102 For VAT registration thresholds, see https://www.avalara.com/vatlive/en/eu-vat-r
ules/eu-vat-number-registration/vat-registration-threshold.html. Accessed 14 July
2020.
103 Houlder, Vanessa, Airbnb’s Edge on Room Prices Depends on Tax Advantages,
Financial Times, 2 January 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/73102c20-c60e-11e
6-9043-7e34c07b46ef, reported that: “When you book an Airbnb room in Lon-
don, around a third of the USD 100 saving you make over the price of an aver-
age hotel room is due to tax advantages that favour Airbnb’s business model.”
Accessed 13 July 2020.
104 Article 111 (4) of Law 4446/2016 as amended by Law 4472/2017.
105 Mineva, Daniela/Stefanov, Ruslan, Evasion of Taxes and Social Security Contribu-
tions. September 2018, European Platform Undeclared Work.
106 While estimates of lost tax revenue per country do not exist, this is a recurring
theme. See for instance, OECD, Shining Light on the Shadow Economy: Oppor-
tunities and Threats (see fn. 42); Migai, Clement Okello/de Jong, Julia/Owens, Jef-
frey, The Sharing Economy: Turning Challenges into Compliance Opportunities
for Tax Administrations, in: eJournal of Tax Research, 16 (2018) 1, https://www.
business.unsw.edu.au/About-Site/Schools-Site/Taxation-Business-Law-Site/Docu
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for effectively taxing the sharing economy, in the OECD’s view, should fo-
cus on improving the effective taxation of activities facilitated by online
platforms through improving taxpayer education and facilitating self-re-
porting.107 Effective taxation becomes, hence, a matter of collaboration be-
tween the platform and the taxpayer. This recommendation has been im-
plemented by some Member States that have attempted to incentivise the
service providers to include their income from the sharing economy when
completing their tax returns through simplified procedures or automated,
pre-prepared tax declarations available to the service providers directly
through the platforms. In France, for example, as of July 2016, collabora-
tive platforms have been legally obliged to communicate to each individu-
al providing services in the sharing economy an annual summary of their
tax situation, mentioning how to do their tax declaration and how much
they have to declare to the tax authorities.108
Other countries, like Belgium, provide tax incentives to platform work-
ers if the latter enrol with a platform and register their activities.109 Re-
duced taxation applies to platform workers who provide services up to a
EUR 6,000 exemption threshold per year.110 The platform must share the
income of the platform worker with the tax administration. If the income
exceeds the EUR 6,000 cap, then the platform worker must register as self-
employed and be affiliated with the mandatory social security system for
the self-employed.
A commonly used example of a successful strategy for simplifying and
streamlining tax collection is Estonia. Upon working together with Uber,
the Estonian Tax and Customs Board developed a (voluntary) income data
reporting system that would simplify the tax declaration process for Uber
drivers. The main idea was to minimise bureaucracy and facilitate auto-
matic tax reporting for businesses and entrepreneurs. Consequently, trans-
actions between the driver and the customer are registered by the collabo-
rative platform, which then only sends the data that is relevant for taxation
purposes to the authorities, who in turn will then pre-prepare the taxpay-
ments/The-sharing-economy-turning-challenges-into-compliance-CM-JdJ-JO.pdf.
Accessed 14 July 2020.
107 OECD, 2018 OECD Interim Report (fn. 8), p. 198.
108 EU Collaborative Economy Agenda (fn. 96), p. 43.
109 In order for the platform worker to benefit from the tax exemption, the platform
needs to be formally recognised by the Belgian authorities.
110 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Belgium, February 2020, p. 115, https://www.
oecd.org/economy/surveys/Belgium-2020-OECD-economic-survey-overview.pdf.
Accessed 14 July 2020.
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er’s tax forms. The main idea is to help taxpayers fulfil their tax obligations
effectively and with minimal effort. The voluntary income reporting sys-
tem has been operational since the 2017 tax year and it is not limited to the
ride sharing sector; all platform operators can use the system if they wish.
However, it remains an “opt-in” system – if the platform decides not to
join, then reporting relies on the “good will” of the platform worker.111
Denmark has also developed an automated income reporting system
that could be used by all platforms. Currently, Denmark is testing the
“technical pilot” in several platforms in order to investigate the technical
feasibility of having an automated reporting scheme and a technology to
support platforms and taxation.112 This reporting system necessitated a
change in the Danish law in December 2018 stating that digital platforms
that facilitate the letting of property (homes, cars, etc.) should report all in-
come earned by users of the platforms to the Danish tax authorities.113
Mexico is another example of successful cooperation between the tax au-
thorities, the platform and the service providers. By using data recording
technologies that drivers of a particular ride-for-hire service are able to use,
the platform’s own systems file and send invoices to the customers and to
the Mexican Tax Administration (Servicio de Administración Tributaria
(SAT)), as well as download them for record-keeping purposes.114
In Australia, a consultation paper by the Treasury suggested that the re-
porting “burden” should be placed either at the platform level or at the fi-
nancial institutions’ level.115 Operators of sharing economy platforms
should be required to collect and report to the Australian Taxation Office
(ATO) key information such as identity details and income received by
their sellers based in Australia. Some platforms may already provide trans-
action information on a regular basis to their sellers, which assists them to
meet their tax or other obligations and can be used by the ATO to match
111 See also Ogembo, Daisy/Lehdonvirta, Vili, Taxing Earnings from the Platform
Economy: An EU Digital Single Window for Income Data?, in: British Tax Re-
view, 82 (2020) 1, pp. 92-93.
112 Ibid., p. 89.
113 Ibid. The authors also note that “[g]ig work platforms were also considered but
excluded from the scope of this initial legislation because of Denmark’s complex
social security legislation.”
114 OECD, 2018 OECD Interim Report (fn. 8), p. 201. Drivers are obliged to register
with the particular recording system of the platform.
115 The Australian Government Treasury, Tackling the Black Economy: A Sharing
Economy Reporting Regime – A Consultation Paper in Response to the Black
Economy Taskforce Final Report, January 2019, https://apo.org.au/node/216381.
Accessed 10 June 2020.
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and potentially to pre-fill in tax returns. This will contribute to reducing
the compliance burden on taxpayers.116 Alternatively, the financial institu-
tion or the payment processors, who would be required to report the trans-
action data to the tax authorities, could incur the reporting burden. Such
an “opt-in” model – with variations – already exists in Estonia.117
In July 2020, the OECD released a new global tax reporting framework,
the Model Rules for Reporting by Platform Operators with respect to Sell-
ers in the Sharing and Gig Economy (“MRDP”).118 Under the MRDP, digi-
tal platforms are required to collect information on the income realised by
those offering accommodation, transport and personal services through
platforms and to report the information to tax authorities. While the mod-
el reporting rules included in the MRDP are not compulsory for “interest-
ed jurisdictions”, they constitute a first consolidated effort by the OECD to
codify on a uniform basis information collection and information report-
ing by specific platforms. This way, automatic exchange agreements be-
tween such interested jurisdictions will be facilitated, and the proliferation
of different domestic reporting requirements will be contained.
Conclusion
Upon analysing the several problems and solutions provided from a tax
perspective, the question remains: how can taxation be of use for social
law? The first takeaway relates to the taxation of the platform. If platforms
are tax-incentivised to “hire” contractors, then obviously, they will resist
any change in the work relationship between them and the platform work-
ers, as the Uber example in California demonstrates. By contrast, if plat-
forms receive adequate tax deductions and credits that could set off the so-
cial security contributions they pay for employees, then a formal employ-
ment contract would be an option for both parties.
The second question relates to the issue as to who should identify the
work relationship and under which criteria. While it is widely acknowl-
V.
116 Ibid.
117 For details on the “small business account”, see Chapter 11, Section V, pp. 299 et
seq.
118 OECD, Model Rules for Reporting by Platform Operators with respect to Sellers
in the Sharing and Gig Economy, OECD, Paris, 2020, https://www.oecd.org/tax/
exchange-of-tax-information/model-rules-for-reporting-by-platform-operators-wit
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edged that labour law, social law and tax law serve different purposes, and
that the same person may be classified differently for social law or tax law
purposes respectively, it appears that the criteria of dependence, subordina-
tion and freedom in the way to provide services are pertinent across juris-
dictions and different legal areas, including within taxation (VAT and
OECD MC). Even though, indeed, an ad hoc assessment will have to be
performed each time, it is possible that the existing case law from these
three interrelated areas may result in convergence towards one, uniformly
applicable test. Such a coordinated approach would prevent resorting to
circular arguments including the platform worker’s tax treatment for
labour law classification purposes, which may lead to contradictory results.
Finally, the discussion at policy level appears to be slowly including the
taxation of platform workers and the revenue lost due to the platform
shadow economy. Platform workers, even when they fall under the “inde-
pendent contractor” status should be facilitated and encouraged to declare
their income. A series of reporting measures has been proposed by several
countries that often requires the cooperation of the platform, the worker
and the tax authorities. Laudably, the OECD published very recently its
Model Rules for Reporting by Platform Operators that aim to provide (in a
consistent and uniform manner) guidance to jurisdictions as to the report-
ing rules to be adopted and applied to platforms. A combination of the
right tax incentives at both platform and platform workers’ level, together
with a simplified reporting system would contribute to ensuring both ad-
equate revenue to finance social security schemes as well as a framework
that would assist in fighting bogus self-employment.
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